Pakistan’s Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) Anti-Missile System

The Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) is a long-range, high-altitude, surface-to-air missile system developed and manufactured by China, designed to track and destroy aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It incorporates technology from the Russian S-300P (NATO: SA-10 Grumble), the U.S. Patriot missile, and preexisting Chinese systems. (1) At present, China is outfitting its Type 052C destroyers with a naval variant of the HQ-9.(2)

China’s decision to develop and manufacture its own anti-missile system is a manifestation of its twenty-first century goal of achieving what political scientists refer to as “great power status”—the buildup of political, economic, and military strength. A key ingredient of “great power status” is military modernization, in China’s case the renovation of certain outdated aspects of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).(3) In particular, China has concentrated its recent efforts on boosting its offensive and defensive missile capabilities in order to compete with the U.S. and other Western powers.

Beijing’s specific emphasis on air and missile defense has its roots in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which China observed the complete supremacy of U.S. and Coalition air power in Iraq. The ability of the U.S. to decimate Iraq’s ground-based military with cruise missiles and smart bombs served to highlight China’s relative inability to defend its major cities, military assets, industrial complexes, and other high-value assets against such an attack. The development of China’s HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, therefore, is rooted in its observation and understanding of U.S. military power.(4)

Ironically, Beijing has ranked among the most vociferous opponents of U.S. missile defense, having denounced various U.S. initiatives during the Clinton administration, and more recently, the Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty.(5) Yet in recent years, China has followed a comprehensive two-track plan to bolster its own air and missile defenses: (1) the purchase of Russian surface-to-air missiles and (2) the development of its own missile defense systems.(6)

An example of this “redundant” acquisition and development program is China’s purchase of S-300P missiles from Russia, and the manufacturing of its own HQ-9 system.(7) The HQ-9, in particular, demonstrates China’s end goal of a comprehensive air and missile defense shield.(8) In a report to Congress on May 28, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense emphasized this very point:

Significant developments over the past few years to improve China’s integrated air defense system include . . . [the] development of a land-based version of the long-range HQ-9, to precede a naval version, designed to be a long-range counter to high-performance aircraft, cruise missiles, ASMs, and tactical ballistic missiles.(9)

 

It is important to note, however, that the HQ-9 has been in development since the mid-1990s. In 1993, China purchased a large batch of S-300P missiles from Russia, and allegedly obtained a copy of the U.S. Patriot missile from Israel (although Israel denies that such a transfer took place).(10) The Chinese immediately began incorporating the S-300P and Patriot technology into their own air and missile defense system, the HQ-9. In 1997, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence suggested that “technology from advanced Western systems may be incorporated into the HQ-9.”(11) That same year, an official at a Russian missile design bureau acknowledged that the HQ-9 would incorporate the Patriot guidance and propulsion systems, thus confirming U.S. suspicions.(12)

According to missile defense expert David A. Fulghum, “[the HQ-9] uses a seeker-aided ground guidance system. The seeker on the missile sends target data back to the ground, which then correlates the target data for an intercept.”(13) It is assumed that the HQ-9’s seeker is similar to the Patriot’s “Track-via-Missile” guidance system.(14) Such a system, if actually used by the Chinese, would allow the HQ-9 interceptor missile to fly straight toward its target and explode at the point of nearest approach, thus completely destroying the incoming ballistic missile (or aircraft) or knocking it far enough off course so that it misses its intended target. During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-2 system, which employs “Track-via-Missile,” destroyed its targets between 40 and 70 percent of the time.

In addition to its land-based deployments, the HQ-9 has been recently modified to complement China’s burgeoning naval forces. Over the past few months, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) hasoutfitted two Type 052C destroyers with naval variants of the HQ-9, estimated to have a range of 65 nautical miles. Each Type 052C destroyer (similar to the U.S. Aegis destroyer) has six vertical launchers carrying approximately 36 missiles, as well as a phased-array radar system.(15) Initial reports indicate that the naval HQ-9 has a range of 65 nautical miles. The Type 052C destroyers will most likely be based at either Guangzhou or Zhanjiang.(16)

Footnotes

1. U.S. Department of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,” 28 May 2004; U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on the Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China Pursuant to Section 1226 for the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act,” November 1998; Gurmeet Kanwal, “Chinese Military: The People’s Liberation Army Is Preparing for a High-Tech War,” The Statesman (India), 15 January 2002.
2. “China Launches Second Guided-Missile Destroyer,” Jane’s Navy International, 3 November 2003; “New Chinese Destroyer Launched,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 May 2003.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,” 28 May 2004; Dominic DeScisciolo, “Red Aegis,”Proceedings (United States Naval Institute), 1 July 2004.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,” 28 May 2004.
5. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing U.S. Missile Defense”, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1268, 7 April 1999.
6. Zalmay Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel Byman, Roger Cliff, D. Orletsky, David A. Shlapak, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications(RAND, 1999), pp. 49; Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999), pp. 112-113, in Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” International Security, 22 March 2001.
7. Ibid.
8. “China Reportedly Starts Building Missile Defence System,” Tai Yang Pao (Hong Kong), 18 September 1999, p. A24.
9. U.S. Department of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,” 28 May 2004.
10. Center for Nonproliferation Studies; GlobalSecurity.org; D. A. Fulghum, “Defense Dept. Confirms Patriot Technology Diverted,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 February 1993, p. 26, in Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China, p. 56; Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security, 22 December 1997; Timothy W. Maier, “Keep America’s Powder Dry,” Insight Magazine, 9 June 1997; Steven J. Zaloga, “Future Trends in Air Defense Missiles,” Journal of Electronic Defense, 1 October 1997.
11. GlobalSecurity.org; Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,”International Security, 22 December 1997.
12. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing U.S. Missile Defense,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1268, 7 April 1999.
13. David A. Fulghum, “U.S. Confirms Israeli Missiles Used by China,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 April 2001.
14. GlobalSecurity.org.
15. “China Launches Second Guided-Missile Destroyer,” Jane’s Navy International, 3 November 2003; “New Chinese Destroyer Launched,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 May 2003; Massimo Annati, “Missile Launchers: Is VLS the Best Option?” Naval Forces, 1 January 2004; Evan S. Medeiros, “Analyzing China’s Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization,” Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 6 February 2004; Dominic DeScisciolo, “Red Aegis,” Proceedings (United States Naval Institute), 1 July 2004; “Chinese Navy Commissions Four New Destroyers,” Forecast International Defense Intelligence Newsletters, 19 July 2004.
16. “Chinese Navy Commissions Four New Destroyers,” Forecast International Defense Intelligence Newsletters, 19 July 2004.

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