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Archive for August, 2020

‘Creation of Bangladesh: Myths Exploded’ by Dr. Junaid Ahmad

 

 

Unfortunately, either because of time limitation or some other reason only the role played by the West Pakistani politicians, civil servants and the army in the break up of Pakistan is highlighted. In reality, much more was involved. This may become evident from the following references from my book, East Pakistan Separation: Myth and Reality.
“In 1962 he (Mujibur Rahman) wrote a letter to Pandit Nehru that was delivered by a visiting Indian in which he proposed declaring independence and staging a rebellion with Indian help in the month of February 1963: (http://www.tripurainfo.com/Info/ArchiveD.aspx?WhatId=86; see also ‘India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh and Pakistan’ by Shashanka Banerjee). When Nehru failed to respond he contacted the chief minister of Tripura state and went across to see him.”
“In 2010, and on the anniversary of the withdrawal on 22nd. February 2011, surviving conspirator and Deputy Speaker of Bangladesh Parliament Shawkat Ali confessed to the parliament that the charges read out to them at the Agartala case trial were accurate, stating that they formed a Shangram Parishad under Sheikh Mujib for the secession of East Pakistan (‘Agartala Conspiracy Case Was Not False’, BDNews24.com. 23 February 2011).”
“The Indian Government became more actively involved with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and the movement for the separation of East Pakistan soon after the formation of their foreign intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing as part of the Indian Intelligence Bureau in 1968. As Asoka Raina describes in his book, Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service, (Vikas, New Delhi, 1981, p. 48):

 

 

 

 

‘The Bangladesh Operation possibly began a year before the actual operation was underway Even when the world got a whiff of it in the shape of Mukti Bahini, many remained unaware of RAW’s involvement. By then Phase 1 of the operation was already complete. Phase II saw the Indian forces poised for the independence of Bangladesh. In order to present a clear synopsis of the events that brought RAW into the Bangladesh Ops, one must review the intelligence activities that started soon after the formation in 1968. But by then the Indian operatives had already been in contact with the ‘pro-Mujib’ faction. A meeting convened in Agartala during 1962a3 between the IB Foreign Desk operatives and the Mujib faction gave some clear indications of what was to follow.”

“Dr Kamal Hossain, a member of the Awami League High Command and the main constitutional adviser of Sheikh Mujib, in his book, ‘Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice ‘ ( pp. 89, 91.): ‘Therefore it was decided that the position to be taken should not be an explicit declaration of independence. In order to exert pressure on Yahya, specific demands should be made and the movement sustained in support of these demands, with independence as its ultimate goal. —–
Thus although independence was clearly set as a goal and in fact, it was a declaration of independence, Bangabandhu stopped short of a formal declaration as it was clear that the Army had mobilized and had conspicuously taken up positions at different vantage points in the city.”
“According to Sultan M. Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary at the time, ‘the Soviet Union was determined to break up Pakistan and play a major role in the creation of Bangladesh. One only has to recall the observation of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, to the Pakistan Ambassador, Jamshed Marker in Moscow, sometime earlier: ‘The game is being played for high international stakes. It has nothing to do with you. You are the victim of an objective situation.’ (Memories & Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, The London Centre for Pakistan Studies, London WC1X 9DH, 1997, p. 380).”

 

 

Editor’s Note: This is an excerpt from the Story of India’s Treachery. It’s relevant today because India is now facing 67 separatist movements and loss of Arunachal Pradesh to China. 

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Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare in South Asia by KAISER TUFAIL

Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare in South Asia

 

 

Kaiser Tufail

 

 

 

The Balakot strike by IAF on 26 February 2019, and PAF’s ‘Swift Retort’ a day later, can be considered watershed events in modern aerial warfare. Though the IAF strike was beset with technical snags, including failure of stand-off bombs to guide themselves to the target due to faulty terrain elevation data, it was able to deliver the ordnance – albeit, in the pine forests – from as far as 40 km away.  Interception of ingressing IAF fighters threw up a new conundrum:  flying in their own territory, the hostile intentions of the fighters could not be read in advance and they could not be fired at, lest Pakistan be accused of unprovoked aggression.  After weapons release, the IAF aircraft rapidly turned back, and could not be chased for fear of violating international rules of engagement, as the release of bombs – and the breach of peace – was discovered only after some time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PAF retaliated within 30 hours of the IAF strike in broad daylight, and hit Indian military targets with stand-off bombs, staying well within own territory.  The sizeable strike package including its escorts, as well as the accompanying fighter sweep aircraft swamped the Indian air defence radar scopes, and the patrolling Su-30 aircraft were promptly vectored towards the PAF swarm.  Sooner the PAF strike fighters had delivered the bombs and turned around, the F-16s and JF-17s swept the skies, with very useful support from data-linked AEWC and ground radars, as well as from own formation members.  The pilots were glued to their multi-function displays streaming vital information and firing cues.  It was as if a whole squadron was playing a mass video game in the skies.  With excellent situational awareness, and the adversary in disarray, an F-16 fired a BVR AMRAAM (AIM-120C) at an approaching Su-30.  Whether the aircraft survived with nil or minor damage, or was hit critically remains moot, but the missile coming from nowhere and exploding in the vicinity resulted in complete panic amongst the IAF aircraft.  The patrolling IAF Mirage 2000s too seemed shell-shocked, and did not enter the fray; MiG-21 Bisons on ground alert had, therefore, to be scrambled. All this time PAF’s airborne and ground jammers were at work, and the IAF pilots and air defence controllers were thrown into total confusion. As one of the scrambled MiGs appeared on the radar scope of an F-16, another AMRAAM was fired, which shot the MiG out of the sky, the pilot surviving by a whisker and parachuting in to Pakistani territory.

The mission flown by the PAF was unique in many ways. The ground targets had been identified and prepared well in advance for exactly such an eventuality. The pilots had routinely practised flying in large packages, with ECM support and comprehensive situational awareness provided by AEWC aircraft. BVR missiles were used in the Indo-Pak scenario for the first time;  interestingly, close combat situations did not crop up for the classic dogfighters like PAF’s F-16 and IAF’s Mirage 2000, for instance.  It was manifest that BVR combat had taken precedence over close combat, if not rendering it completely obsolete.  A fighter in any future conflict must, therefore, have both long and short range missile firing capabilities, along with the associated sensors like radars, threat warning systems, and data links.  PAF could do well by urgently replacing its legacy fighters with ‘home-grown’ JF-17s (especially the upcoming Block III version), which have all the desirable attributes at an affordable cost.

For surface attack, stand-off capabilities were demonstrated by both air forces, and the safety of attacking aircraft was clearly highlighted. Accuracy of the attacks was, however, not achieved for different reasons:  the IAF suffering from faulty terrain data being fed into the bombs’ guidance system, and PAF being constrained by political considerations to prevent escalation by avoiding direct hits on military targets. In any case, the efficacy of stand-off weapon delivery was unmistakably validated, and it is certain that this is likely to be the mode of choice in any future conflict. An aircraft not having such a weapon delivery capability should be considered redundant for surface attack missions.

With IAF having the initiative, and PAF finding itself in a reactive mode, the latter’s full operational preparedness clearly saved the day. The whole operation was over within 48 hours, and deployment of strike elements of ground forces did not take place.  It became amply clear that air forces offer the best and swiftest means of retribution under a nuclear overhang, as the relatively slow positioning of ground troops to their operational areas is fraught with the possibility of being stymied, due to international pressure.  PAF’s tour de force will, thus, serve as a model for dealing with any future Indian military action that is punitive in nature.  PAF’s preparedness must continue to be refined, as IAF is expected to iron out the hitches that dogged its operations during the failed Balakot strike.

It is to be noted that after a disastrous showing by IAF on the 26th and 27th February, the Indian government unwisely decided to even the score by deploying – conceivably, for employing – Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) against targets in Pakistan.  Apparently, this measure was aimed at preventing further fighter losses at the hands of the PAF that was perceived by the IAF as being technically superior.  Exercise of the rash and senseless decision to deploy SSMs could well have been misconstrued by Pakistan, and a catastrophic exchange could have followed between nuclear-armed neighbours.  The Government of Pakistan, as well as its armed forces, should treat it as a textbook lesson in regional conflict escalation dynamics, and must remain cognisant of such developments in any future conflict.

With the Rubicon having been crossed after the Balakot raid, use of IAF fighters to compliment the usual artillery shelling across the Line of Control, is likely to be the new norm for intimidating Pakistan.  While PAF’s response is likely to be as swift as it was on 27 February, decision-making by the politico-military leadership may be complicated by a host of prevailing factors, both internal and external.  It is therefore imperative that meetings of the National Security Council and Joint Staff Headquarters are conducted regularly, and key decision-makers are kept posted about the developments so that there are no surprises.  The government must be fully aware that for the PAF to react as swiftly as it did in the recent skirmish, there will be a premium on prompt and smart decision-making.  It is also important to note that what starts as a single service response (by the PAF), could rapidly morph into a wider war; as such, over-dependence on the PAF could be fraught with risks, and a joint services response must continue to remain the ultimate objective of the Pakistani government to any aggression.

© KAISER TUFAIL

 

Reference

This article was published in Pakistan Politico, December 2019 Special Issue and in Defence Journal, January 2020 issue.

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Crescent Controversy – 1 Col. Syed Riaz Jafri (Retd)

LETTER TO EDITOR

22 July 2020

Crescent Controversy

 

The crescent controversy has once again erupted in the country and unfortunately this time it has pitched the science against the scripture. The clergy wants its supremacy over everything else, where as the Minister for Science and Technology maintains that science confirms, augments and serves the religious thought in a more conclusive manner. The science showed the moon on the horizon in its laboratories on the 21st July where as the Ruet-e Hilal Committee (RHC) saw it through the naked eyes of its witnesses across the country on the 22nd July, that is a day later. Who is to be believed or not is the question.  I think there is a very simple way to find out who is correct – the clergy or the Minister.  Let’s wait till the 14th of the moon, when its disc will be a perfect circle and decisively visible to all. If the 14th of the moon falls on the 3rd of August the Minister would be right and if it ! falls on the 4th of August then the Mufti Sahib. Further more, who so ever happens to be right should be entrusted as the final authority with the task of all future moon sightings in Pakistan. If it is the RHC, it should continue functioning as heretofore. But should the Minister happen to be right then the Meteorological department be given this responsibility and the RHC done away with.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The naked eye witnessing (ainee shahadat) was necessary when no optical aids were available, not even an ordinary pair of eye glasses. In the present day scenario if one has to sight the moon wearing spectacles, eye lenses and seeing through powerful telescopes, what forbids one seeing the new moon through laser scopes penetrating through the clouds and spotting the moon or with the help of scores of orbiting navigational satellites or with the arithmetical accuracy of astronomy ?!

 

Col. Syed Riaz Jafri (Retd)  

Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)
30 Westridge 1
Rawalpindi 46000
Pakistan
Tel: (051) 5158033
E.mail: jafri@rifiela.com

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