U.S.-Iran-Israel vortex of conflict: Rushing to an unwanted war?


The drumbeats of war against Iran by Israel defy all conventional geopolitical rationales in the region at a time when the U.S. military interventions in two countries of Afghanistan and Iraq have led to enormous costs and disappointing results in both blood and treasure.

Thus far, more than 6,300 American troops killed and nearly 50,000 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, with an unbelievable cost estimated at $3 trillion—not to mention the horrendous human and material costs in victimized countries. And now enter the talk of military strikes against Iran. Attacking Iran is likely to descend the Persian Gulf region into chaos, sending oil prices through the roof. A military strike will also inflame Iranians’ nationalistic sentiments and cause them to rally around the government. Furthermore, an Osiraq-style attack, carried out in 1981 against Iraq, stands little chance of success in a huge country like Iran that has dispersed its nuclear power installations across the country. How many sorties are needed to accomplish a successful military mission, if there ever was one in such a context: 200 sorties? And 7-10 days of constant bombing? I am not a military analyst, but I am dumbfounded at the duplicity and naiveté with which such talk of war intoxicates the political ambiance in which Republican contenders who are running for the 2012 presidential elections utter their preference for marching toward war with Iran.

For its part, the Netanyahu administration in Israel intends to drag the United States into the war with Iran—a war that many politicians on left and right consider incompatible with the U.S. long-term interests in the region—in large part because Israelis know that an attack on Iran is not an easy task, nor much can be achieved by doing so; thus they intend to use the U.S. presidential elections as an opportunity to ratchet up the pressure on the Obama administration to cave in. Yet, U.S. military generals, who see no desirable outcome stemming from attacking Iran, have frequently warned against being sucked into an unwanted war.

To escape the pressure of Israeli Lobby (AIPAC), the Obama administration is constantly hammering at the point that economic sanctions will effect change in Iran’s behavior, while insisting on imposing the most devastating economic sanctions on Iran’s central bank. Many experts argue that this level of intensity of multilateral sanctions could choke off Iran’s economy, weakening the possibility of compelling Iranians to negotiate. Meanwhile, the United States has yet to provide any realistic and tangible opportunity for Iran to come to the negotiating table. On December 5, 2001, at the Bonn Conference, Iranians and their American counterparts negotiated over the future of Afghanistan—a diplomatic exchange that lasted for only 45 minutes. Since then, U.S. foreign policymakers have emphasized either sanctions or military options, as if there is no realistic chance for diplomacy and negotiations to work.

As a result, the trust between Iran and the United States has reached a nadir in the modern history of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Today, the United States has nearly 45 military bases around Iran, bent on containing Chinese influence in the region, and using the occasion of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, as some observers note, to effect regime change in Iran. The Netanyahu administration is threatening Iran with air strikes, while sabotaging military installations, deploying the Stuxnet computer worm and virus, and assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists inside Iran. While the United States has approximately 8,500 nuclear warheads and Israel nearly 75-200, it is mindboggling that all of the sudden Iran has become the greatest threat of all time in the region, even as there is no evidence that Iranian leaders have decided to weaponize their nuclear energy program. The basic question that remains unanswered is this: given that nuclear weapons haven’t rendered Russia, China, Pakistan, and India hostile in the past, why should then they make Iran hostile, if Iranian leaders ever decide to move in that direction? Nuclear weapons aren’t enough for Iran, and for that matter, any other country to yield power, and, therefore, the threat has been exaggerated. Quite the contrary, China’s influence and its ability to leverage its economic power across the globe has to do with its competitive economic clout. Similarly, it is India’s software industry—not its nuclear might—that has resulted in its great stride on the global scene. It is also fair to ask: how has Pakistan’s nuclear power contributed to its influence and power in the region? All this saber-rattling against Iran—a country that since 1798 has not invaded any of its neighbors—is beyond any conventional wisdom.

There are reasons to hold a serious negotiation with Iran. The mutual security interests of the United States and Iran in restoring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan have unexpectedly merged. Both Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president, and Nouri Al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, see Iran’s role as positive and vitally significant to their country’s stability. Moreover, there is a growing consensus in Iran—in spite of its polarized politics—that dialogue with its neighbors, such as Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan, is the only way to enhance peace in the region. Increasingly, experts and diplomats, inside and outside the region, argue that a military attack against Iran will prove to be a geopolitical disaster and that no single factor would more aid the U.S. capacity to redress the power balance in the Middle East than U.S.-Iran cooperation. It is time to pursue serious, direct negotiations that address Iran’s security concerns and its legitimate desire as well as right to enrich uranium for medical purposes and build an infrastructure for power generation, bearing in mind that bargaining is not appeasement.

Mahmood Monshipouri is associate professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. He is working on a book on the Arab Spring and its regional implications.

Thursday 01 March 2012

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