FADING IN STRENGTH, INDIA SPONSORED BLA & BNP RESORTS TO TERRORISM ON JOURNALISTS

Abdul Haq Baloch, a correspondent for
Islamabad: A reporter of a TV news channel was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the restive Balochistan province of southwest Pakistan on Saturday, officials said. 

Abdul Haq Baloch, a correspondent for ARY News in Khuzdar city, was attacked by two gunmen riding a motorcycle near the local press club at Chakar Khan Road at 7:30 pm (local time). 

Officials said the motive for the killing had not been ascertained. But, BLA and BNP sponsored terrorists have been involved in previous killings of journalists.

ARY News confirmed the incident and said Baloch was heading home when he was attacked. 

The channel said the reporter had not received threats from anyone. 

The gunmen fled after the attack. 

No group claimed responsibility for the incident. 

Another employee of ARY News was killed in Peshawar city in the northwest during violent protests against an anti-Islam film on September 21. 

The employee died after being hit by a bullet in police firing. 

Baloch’s murder again raised concern about the security of journalists in Pakistan. 

International media organizations have listed Pakistan as one of the most dangerous countries for journalists. 

Dozens of reporters have died while performing their duties over the past decade. 

After the 1973 Baloch insurgency, current national movements and terrorist groups gradually began to form and reorganize. The Baloch National Party (BNP) was an alliance of moderate political forces aimed at winning support for nationalism in the province. The BNP aimed to establish political autonomy with limited control from Islamabad. The Balochistan Students Organization (BSO) aims to establish a multinational Pakistan and a recognized Balochi nationalism within it, such as through using the Baloch language as a medium of instruction.

Most terrorist attacks against the Pakistani military and targets within Balochistan are attributed to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which was formed in the early 1980s and aims for a Greater Balochistan that includes territories in south-eastern Iran and southern Afghanistan. Operations have also been seen in the Bugti tribe, which controls a force of about 10,000 fighters that takes a similarly hardline approach to nationalism in the province. Even throughout the 1990s, Balochis were more or less divided between the two movements, until the 2000s when groups such as BLA and Bugti began to gain more strength.

Musharraf and the United States
Following the ascension of General Pervez Musharraf to power in 2001, the Pakistani military began taking a much more stern policy towards Balochistan. Musharraf expanded upon a two-step approach to the province, which was still in place:

The first was to divide and rule. Islamabad created rifts and division among non-dominant groups by actively promoting distrust among opposition factions. This strategy only happens to work if local Balochi leaders are opportunistic and vengeful against one another, explaining why the BLA killed Shafiq Mengal even though the Mengal tribe was also at war with the Pakistani government. Islamabad also empowers allied elite in Balochistan such as tribal chiefs, lords, intellectuals, and politicians through benefits and political favors.

The second is economic dependency. Islamabad, through the previously stated policy of divide-and-rule, empowers dominant groups to act as liaisons for the Pakistani central government. This leaves many Balochi citizens unable to function independently, a situation that is worsened by 98% of revenue from natural resources leaving the province. Additionally, many industries functioning in Balochistan, which includes the Frontier Corps and other military establishments, employ non-locals rather than unemployed Balochis.

Musharraf also began a ruthless military campaign against the Baloch nationalists, following a rise in attacks from the BLA and other tribes, known as kill-and-drops. Justifying the policy on spreading stability in the province, Musharraf began assassinating non-violent organizers in the BSO and BNP as well. The Pakistani military launched an assault on Balochistan in December 2005, attacking groups such as Bugti, but also expanded the kill-and-drop policy. The BNP itself remains damaged by the kidnap and murder of three major leaders by Pakistani intelligence agencies. The event, which occurred on April 8, 2009, has come to be known as the Turbat killings and caused protests, riots, and strikes in Balochi communities all over Pakistan.

Turbat especially has catalyzed the strength of violent separatist groups that call for complete secession from Pakistan. Due to kill-and-drop policies and the marginalization of Balochi nationalists who advocate for greater liberty within Pakistan, Islamabad has strengthened the fringe terrorist movement considerably. The opinion among many fighters is that democratic Islamabad, as has theoretically been the case since Musharraf stepped down in 2008, is indistinguishable from dictatorial Islamabad. Certainly, cases such as the Turbat killings add strength to this logic.

The war in Afghanistan and tensions between the United States and Pakistan have placed focus on a peaceful solution to the Balochi question. The US Congress recently held a session on the future of an independent Balochistan, clearly meant to send an antagonistic message towards Islamabad. Some members of the Balochi middle-class seek to capitalize on this opportunity, pressuring Congress to recognize Balochi liberty as part of a larger strategy to attack Taliban groups operating in Pakistan.

However, much of the American cultural consciousness regarding Pakistan starts with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, which is precisely why the nature of Balochi resistance must be properly understood. The current Taliban resistance, which bases its major leadership in Quetta, is able to operate in the province mainly because it lacks central authority and tribes function independently from the state. Pressure for the Pakistani military to attack the Taliban in Balochistan does not bear in mind the military’s memory of such events as the 1973 insurgency. Baloch nationalism is therefore tied into American aspirations in Central and South Asia, and will continue to be important as Islamabad attempts to navigate its growing problem of violent instability.


Last Updated: Sunday, September 30, 2012, 00:19

 

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