06 July 2012
OPINION
Tridivesh Maini on how the relationship has deteriorated into a series of transactions
THE WASHINGTON-ISLAMABAD relationship seemed to touch rock bottom over the last year as a result of numerous factors: CIA drone missile strikes, the Navy SEAL raid — dubbed Operation Geronimo — that killed Osama bin Laden last year and the release of a CIA contractor, Raymond Davis, accused of killing two Pakistanis. The final nail in the coffin seemed to be the closure of NATO supply lines in November by Pakistan, after 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed on 26 November in an attack by NATO forces. US combat helicopters and fighter jets had mistakenly attacked two border posts.
This deterioration in relations between the two, who were close allies at one time, was reiterated by some harsh statements by Secretary of State Leon Panetta, who recently stated that the US was losing patience with Pakistan. Even the discourse emanating from Washington DC’s academic community and think-tanks seems to be much harsher, with those who were earlier Pakistan sympathisers claiming that it has lost all face and Washington is left with limited options to deal with the former. This transformation in the Washington-Islamabad relationship has ironically coincided with an improvement in the New Delhi-Islamabad relationship.
Washington and Islamabad seem to have at least for the time being ensured that a functional or ‘transactional’ relationship between the two remains intact. On 3 July, a meeting of the DCC chaired by the Pakistan Prime Minister Raja Parvez Ashraf, also attended by army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, announced Pakistan’s decision to re-open supply lines. The reason given by the civilian government was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s phone call to her Pakistani counterpart where she expressed her regret over the killing of Pakistani soldiers. In a statement following the conversation, Clinton said, “We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military. We are committed to working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent this from ever happening again.”
Information minister Qamar Zaman Kaira stated that Clinton’s apology was a major victory for Islamabad, since a superpower like the US ‘apologised’ for impinging upon Pakistan’s sovereignty. Said the minister, “The main thing is that a superpower has acknowledged our principled stance, and they have shown flexibility,”
Pakistan has been firm that nothing less than an apology from the US would force Islamabad to change its decision. In a recent meeting between Kayani and isaf Commander General John Allen, the latter had apologised to Kayani, who rejected this saying that this was a matter not only between two armies, but two governments — hinting that nothing less than a statement coming from someone consequential in Washington could mend the damage.
It would be naïve to assume that Clinton’s call was the only factor for Islamabad’s decision. While this could have sealed the decision, there are many other possible causes for Islamabad’s decision.
Firstly, Pakistan has realised that none of its other long-time allies such as China, Saudi Arabia are ready to provide financial assistance as Washington. The US on the other hand, in spite of the strained relationship, has been providing aid to Pakistan and one of the immediate ramifications of the decision to open NATO supplies was Washington’s decision to release $1.1 billion to the Pakistani military from a US ‘coalition support fund’ designed to reimburse Pakistan for the cost of counter-insurgency operations. Islamabad has also realised that some of its trusted allies like Saudi Arabia are quite happy to distance themselves from the former, in case it is in their interest. The Abu Jundal extradition is a perfect example of it.
Second, in the ever-changing geo-political scenario in South Asia, the relationship between Washington and the Pakistan army has been tense, but the US has been supportive of the civilian government headed by Zardari. The PPP too has tried its hardest to ensure that the US and Pakistan ensure a working relationship. It might be mentioned here that in May itself, Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar had made an offer to the US which did not go through. However, since Islamabad’s terms were not acceptable to the US. Pakistan was supposedly demanding $5,000 as transit fee for allowing trucks to use the two routes into landlocked Afghanistan. The United States which paid $250 in the past, was not ready to go beyond $500.
IF ONE were to look at the US point of view, they had found alternative routes through Russia and Central Asia which were much more expensive, costing the US military about $100 million a month, according to an estimate by the Pentagon. Only last week, the Pentagon had asked Congress for approval to transfer $2.1 billion from other funds to cover costs largely resulting from the closure of the Pakistan supply routes. Opening up of the routes will thus reduce the burden on the US government and the tax payer.
While the development may have come as a relief to both the US and Pakistan in many ways — especially financial, it has some important political ramifications for both the PPP administration in Islamabad and the Democrats in Washington.
In the case of Pakistan, the civilian government will have to contend with criticism from hardliners within the political setup and outside. Interestingly, apart from opposition from the Taliban which has threatened to attack Afghanistan-bound NATO vehicles, Imran Khan, the head of the opposition (Tehreek-E-Insaaf), Movement for Justice, came down heavily on the government’s decision, saying that the government had meekly surrendered to the US while the latter continued to carry out drone strikes on Pakistani soil.
In the case of the US, in election year Republicans will use this opportunity to attack President Barrack Obama for having meekly surrendered to Pakistan. Mitt Romney has already accused Obama of being in the habit of apologising on behalf of the US, even when it is not necessary. At a transactional level, Islamabad’s decision benefits both. It remains to be seen who can draw more political mileage from it.
The writer is a New Delhi based-author and foreign policy analyst.
