For the common Baloch, it has all along been a tale of deception and treachery. He has always been treated as a commodity, bought and sold at the whims of exploiting tribal chiefs. While the Baloch sardars have had a history of enthusiastically selling the land, the Baloch populace approved and appreciated Pakistan’s creation. Unfortunately, the same parallel streams representing a clash of interests dominate the landscape of Balochistan, even today – the opportunist tribal chieftains and the hapless common Baloch. The former are always on the lookout for new buyers of the land and people in exchange for paltry personal gains, while the latter are overwhelmingly patriot Pakistanis.
In 1861, Jam of Bela allowed the British government to setup a telegraph line through his territory, substantially helping it to control large areas of Balochistan. In addition, he took the responsibility to safeguard the line. The compensation that Jam received for this was less than Rs 900 per month.
In 1883, the Khan of Kalat sold the Quetta district and adjoining territories to the British government. Beside the land, it was an outright sale of the people. The heirs of the Khan were also obliged to adhere to this hire purchase arrangement. He received an annual grant of Rs 25,000 for selling the most attractive part of Balochistan to the British.
Sardar Mehrulla Marri sold all mineral and petroleum rights of the Khatan region to the British government in 1885 for a paltry sum of Rs 200 per month. Again there was no time limit to this agreement; it was in perpetuity. In the same year, the British paid Rs 5,500 to the Bugti sardar for his cooperation, although it was not specified as to what kind of cooperation he extended to them.
Originally, Balochistan comprised of four states of Brahvis and Baloch known as Turan till 1700 AD. In 1754, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the King of Afghanistan, named Nasir Khan, who was a Brahvi, as ‘Khan of Kalat’ and allowed him to rule the Kalat state. Khan is not a Baloch; rather it is a Pashtun title. Later, other Brahvi/Baloch sardars were also brought under the Khan’s control. In 1854, all these four states went under British suzerainty in exchange for Rs 50,000 a year.
In 1896, the British, who had captured Afghanistan in 1876, carved out ‘British Balochistan’ by drawing the Durand Line and merging some of Afghanistan’s territory with Marri and Bugti tribal areas and a portion of Sindh. It was directly ruled, as a Commissionerate, through an agent to Governor General. The Baloch/Brahvi states were allowed to be run as a federation by the Khan of Kalat, with a British Major as ‘resident’ in the area.
In 1947, Balochistan was designated as Kalat division. The ‘British Balochistan’, alongside a part of Sindh, was designated as Quetta division. These two divisions were ruled as part of West Pakistan till 1970. The present-day Balochistan was established once the ‘one unit’ was abolished in 1970. The Quetta and Kalat divisions were merged and named Balochistan. However, the naming of this province was contrary to the realities of the landscape, it was, indeed, a merger of two distinct territories each housing a distinct ethnic group.
The Pashtun and Baloch are co-partners in the stakes of Balochistan with almost equal numbers. The total population of the province is between seven to eight million. This counts for five percent of Pakistan’s population. Its landscape is almost half of the country. This low man-to-land ratio, coupled with poor railroad infrastructure, supports the sustenance of exploitative socio-political structure usually centred around tribal chieftains. Hence, it is not surprising that the chiefs oppose infrastructure and services related development projects. The Marri and Mengal sardars first stood up against the federal government when the law was passed to abolish the sardari system in the province to free the ordinary Baloch from the clutches of tribal leaders.
During the cold war, the Soviet Union was surprised by the ability and resourcefulness of Pakistan to generate a spontaneous resistance movement in Afghanistan. To punish it, Kremlin decided to create some organisations that would specialise in sabotage activities in Pakistan. One such organisation was the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA); it was built around the core of Baloch Students Organisation (BSO). The BSO was a conglomerate of leftwing students in Quetta and some other cities of Balochistan. The BLA remained active during the Russo-Afghan war and then it disappeared from the surface, because its main source of funding – the Soviet Union – vanished from the global scene. In the wake of 9/11, when the US occupied Afghanistan with little preparation and less insight, it felt the need to create sources of information and action that was independent from the Pakistani government’s control. Most of the elements of such structures were in place, though dormant; and it was not difficult for anyone with sufficient resources to reactivate them. Hence, the present-day BLA was reborn.
In January 2002, reportedly, the first batch of ‘instructors’ crossed over from Afghanistan into Pakistan to set up the first training camp. The first shipment of arms and ammunition was received from Afghanistan, but as the number of camps grew new supply routes were opened from India. By 2005, according to reports, the pay structure of militants was elaborately defined. Ordinary recruits and basic insurgents received around $200 per month, the section leaders got upward of $300 and there were special bonuses for executing a task successfully. Presumably, now they are paid much higher sums. The BLA is not the only fish in the pond, there are others too out there who are actively doing their pay masters’ bidding.
Against this backdrop, the federal and provincial governments, as well as the people, need to align themselves with the common Baloch and capitalise on their goodwill to save lives, support livelihoods and prevent further deterioration of the province. The starting points could be through resolving the missing persons’ issue and provision of jobs to the youth.
The writer is a retired Air Commodore and former assistant chief of air staff of the Pakistan Air Force. At present, he is a member of the visiting faculty at the PAF Air War College, Naval War College and Quaid-i-Azam University.
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