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MQM and Altaf Husain

Factsheet on MQM

There is a Gujarati saying that when one falls out of favor with luck, one may ride on a camel and be still bitten by a dog. The Mohajir Qaumi Movement faces a similar situation. It can change as many faces as it likes: from All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization to MQM, from Haq Parast (worshippers of truth) to Mohajir Rights Front, from Mohajir Tiger Force to MQM international wing, from Muthaidda Qaumi Movement to Rabita Committee; but it cannot help its luck. It is what it is _____ a destructive instrument in the hands of its highly whimsical supreme, the one and only Altaf Hussain.

So it is a duty of government to tell the people what MQM stands for, whether it is a Political Group or a Gang of Terrorists, what do they want, how do they treat places like Kashmir, Pakistan and Karachi, why do they kill, why do they promise to send dead bodies, who do they serve by heightening linguistic feelings, why do they hit transformers and leave people to roast in heat, why do they burn transport, why do they target personnel of law enforcing agencies why do they torture common people, why do they pump bullets into public servants, why have their bullets torn away life from SHOs Bahadur Ali and Imdad Khatian, DSP Bashir Ahmed Noorani (from Sukkur), five relatives of DSP Nisar Khwaja, DSP Tanoli, SDM Mohammad Nawaz Khushk, Journalist Mohammad Salahuddin, Azim Ahmad Tariq, Zohair Akram Nadeem Pir Pagaro’s son-in-law, Salim Malik, KESC Chairman Malik Shahid Hamid??? And how finally a renowned scholar, Chairman Hamdard Foundation and Ex-governor Sindh Hakim Mohammad Saeed?

The government of the federation is under obligation to explain also to the people who robbed their laughter, who turned the cosmopolitan of Karachi city, its citizens, its hospitals, parks, roads and avenues, its storage houses, police stations and assembly houses into exclusive property; who tempted the citizens to sell off all means of recreation and buy guards with the money; who were the people who never started a single development project in Karachi but did every thing to destroy the KMC by controlling it during 1987-92 and the provincial government by controlling it during 1990-92?

Government is also called upon to explain the lack of round of MQM, and the role different personalities played in its origin, what factors were responsible for the creation of a client class of industrialists and business men which paid protection money, and was physically forced to pay it in the event of a refusal.

Then there is a need to explain why this party (MQM) tends to dishonour the modesty of the womenfolk on popular level, what conspiracy led to the slaughter of Pathans although the bus that crushed Bushra Zaidi to death was not driven by a Phatan and how one after the other – from Nahid Butt to Shazia to Farzana Sultan to Rais Fatima to Semi Zarrin etc etc. – the women have in succession been disgraced in what look like nothing but petty political gimmicks? Why the MQM works against everything that pertains to Pakistan, the two-nation theory, its geographical and constitutional unity, the democracy and the peoples will? Why they collaborate with people like the late G.M. Sayed to up apart the multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan fabric of Karachi first and the whole nation of late.

The people would also like the government to explore the historical fact as to why an anti-democracy force and its adherents abhor the men of letters? The men who have undertaken to defend their country with their blood, the Pakistani Army.

But all this will require a review of the thoughts propagated by Hitler 65 years ago and of resemblance’s Altaf Hussain has with that Nazi leader.

 

1. Terrorism in Karachi on Hitler’s Footsteps

    

2. Anti-State Activites of MQM

    

3. Anti Media Activites of MQM

    

4. Indian Connection of MQM

    

5. Economical Damage in Form of MQM’s Forced Strikes

    

6.  

   Unwrapping the Rape Dramas

1. Terrorism in Karachi on Hitler’s Footsteps

Just as the world knows all about the nuclear holocaust which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so does it know about Hitler’s cruelty which left an entire nation paralyzed and divided. So when government says that the Karachi problem is the problem of the whole country, and that we are fighting the battle for Pakistan in Karachi, they seek to explain the simple logic that the wiles of Fascist Hitler brought destruction not only on the German nation, but resulted in the killing of 55 million people all over the world. Just as MQM has wrought havoc on not only the people of Karachi but the nation at large.

Now we would take the opportunity to see it is really in bad taste to compare Altaf Hussain with Hitler, as some self-preferred terrorists feel. This would depend on the extent to which Altaf Hussain has followed the fascist declarations canonized by Hitler while founding his party.

Hitler’s autobiography, “Mein Kampf” was translated in Urdu by Maulvi Ibrahim Ali Chishti and printed by Lahore’s Lion Press in two volumes (1950 and 1955). In his foreword, the Maulvi stated three distinguishing features of the system which Hitler evolved: use of terrorism to achieve ones’ aims, preference of racism over nationalism as the basic political creed, and use of people’s power to gain political ascendancy and then discard them. Hitler-power was achieved when they announced the Nazi party’s manifesto at a public meeting in 1920. The main features of this manifesto which are given in the following, reflect on his personality and bent of mind more vividly than any other historical document. These are:

 

• Nation’s destinies are charted by the minority, not the majority.

   

• Intellectuals are misguided individuals, suffering from scientific indigestion.

   

• Democracy brings anarchy and chaos.

   

• Our creed is true, and only this creed is true.

   

• Destruction fuelled by violent demagoguery is necessary.

   

• The leader requires disciples who oppress others while pretending to protect them from oppression.

   

• Illiterates and naïve youngsters are more suitable for the movement.

   

• The disciple should be trained to act, not ask questions.

   

• We are not the slaves of public opinion, but its leaders.

   

• Newspapers should not be allowed to ride popular will.

   

• Reject everything that the opponents utter.

   

• Minimum writing, maximum speaking.

   

• Street trouble is the life blood of the movement.

   

• Public demonstrations should not be peaceful.

   

• Deserters should face death.

   

• Kill big traitors before small ones.

   

• Divide and rule.

   

• A constitution cannot correct political weaknesses.

   

• Use force in preaching.

   

• 80 million Germans ought to grow to 250 million in 100 years.

   

• 12,000 traitors should be put to sword.

We invite everyone here to go over these points and take out those, which haven’t been used by Altaf Hussain and his party in their operations at one time or another. Go briefly over the points once again. The negatives for a terrorist include democracy knowledge and learning, newspapers, children, public debate and peaceful activity. The positives are illiteracy, blind following, the infallible saint, lawlessness, street trouble, minority decisions, rejection of the opposition, and increase in population.

The conspiracy to spread terrorism in Karachi is a pure Hitlerian strategy which consists in occupying whatever belongs to the people, and then repeatedly dispel the impression that such an occupation has taken place; keep repeating that we are on the side of justice, and that the rest of the world consists of liars; and that so-and-so is opposed to our ideas because he is the enemy of our people. MQM ostensibly seeks to be a civil rights movement, but it conveniently ignores that a civil rights movement needs to be civil first.

Review the performance of Karachi Municipal Corporation when MQM was in power, especially in the light of this strategy to have an inkling of what is this all about. For five years during 1987-92, MQM wielded total control over the billions of rupees of corporations’ funds. But what was the result? Nothing but more destruction. And it couldn’t be otherwise, because if people’s problems have been solved, who will come to listen to fire-spitting orator dilating on then put theme of deprivation and helplessness.

The largest agency of urban development put at their disposal for five long years, and all we got in return was the same chain of accusations, complaints of repression, of powerlessness, of being cheated; appeals to the people to use in revolt, listen to no one but the MQM as these Chaudhries, Waderas and Sardars were out to fleece every penny of what Appealing to the Army for Justice while attacking the same institution belonged to Karachi’s people.

While the civic problems went from bad to worse the “nation” was being fed on slogans like “death to Quaid’s traitors “homeland or coffin”, “freedom or death”. And just as the civic authority dissolved into a party fief meant for fund raising and ceremonial purposes, the specter of the leader rose as a symbol of Pirdom, sacrosanct and therefore in fallible, at the same time attacking every national institution, every sense of hope creaking at the hinges from internal tension, the party split into two in June 1992, one group identified as MQM Haqiqi and the other called MQM/Haqprast and now Muthaidda. Later a third group emerged under the leadership of the former party chairman, Azim Ahmed Tariq, and a former member of the party’s central cabinet, S.M. Tariq. Both Muthaidda activists subsequently assassinated these leaders and their murder blamed on official agencies.

The first to fall was Azim Ahmed Tariq who was eliminated by the terrorists of Altaf who were directly received order from their master through phone calls. But Muthaidda ostensibly mourned his death and held various official agencies as responsible for it. But confusion subsided when the former chief minister of Sindh, Muzaffar Hussain Shah, declared on the floor of Sindh Assembly, Azim Tariq was killed by Hashamuz Zafar and Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui both activists of Muthaidda

S.M. Tariq’s murder came in the immediate aftermath of the arrest of Hashamuz Zafar by the law enforcing agencies. He was a close aide of Azim Tariq, and a potential witness in his murder case. Muthaidda again held the agencies responsible for the murder, and mourned his death amidst touching statements. During 1992-98 almost 450 central leaders and supporter of MQM (H) were killed and eliminated by the terrorists of Altaf Hussain including Mansoor Ahmed Khan (Deputy General Secretary of MQM (H), Sardar Ahmed (Finance Secretary of MQM (H) Rehan Umar Farooqi (Ex Member National Assembly) and many others.

The target killing; process of elimination of political rivals is still going on by the terrorists of MQM. This again reminds one of a Penguin books publication titled ” Hitler’s Englishman” written by Francis Selwyn .He writes in his book that “just as the Mongols and the Asiatic pirates considered raping women as morality, robbing as the part of civilization and manslaughter as a favorite pastime, so did Hitler” and now we say so did Altaf Hussain as he is a true disciple of Hitler the cruelest manifestation of evil in this century.

But no one can hide facts and that what is the real nature of these barefooted gun-totting terrorists? What ingredients are they made up of? What soil went into the making of such a beastly spate of fascism, which has eclipsed Karachi’s sun in the wink of an eye?

Everyone knows that Altaf Hussain has shown himself to be an extremely impulsive man who can alter a “principled” stand sooner than one can say Jack Robinson, and often for no obvious reason, unless one takes into account his well known tendency for terrorism as a tool of political black mail. A look at the composition of his dialogue team over the last many years demonstrates this fact. Just because many of the members of this team could not contrive excuses for terrorism on the dialogue table, they were frequently discarded in favour of others. And saw the replacement of M.A. Jalil with Dr Farooq Sattar, followed by Senator Ashtiaq Azhar and more recently Ajmal Dehlavi and company. The same goes for MQM’s assembly members, who are changed every time the elections are held so that they wouldn’t take roots among the masses and carve out an exclusive niche for their own leadership.

2. Anti-State Activities of MQM

MQM killed thousands of innocent persons including government functionaries. Its first major situational action against political rivals comes in Pakistan Steel Mills in 1990 when a number of men kidnapped from there. These men were taken to torture cells in Landhi and Korangi. Since then, torture and murder of army officers, navy functionaries and a whole range of other professional and non-professional men and women has become a routine. Hundreds and thousands of innocent citizens were eliminated by the terrorists of MQM affair in Karachi. Among them are eminent citizens, politicians and law-enforcing personal, high government officials, writers like Salahuddin and finally the former Governor of Sindh, internationally renowned scholar and social worker Hakim Saeed.

The method is simple. Terrorists chose a government servant and mark his residence. They watch his movements and his routines. Then, when orders are issued to “resurrect the movement and do his case”, the main is whisked away from a convenient spot. The kidnapped is invariably tortured, then killed and his body stuffed in a gunny bag to be dumped on a street in the quite of the night. The movement of Haqparasti (truth worship) is thus kept alive. In 1995 alone, 120 public functionaries were killed in this manner by MQM terrorists.

The question is, if MQM has not been engaged in killing government officials, policemen and members of other ethno-linguistic groups, what has it been doing all these years? A group which is armed to it tee hand given to a foreign induced philosophy of separatism cannot do much else. The whole country knows that it started the gory tradition of killing innocent, unarmed civilians in a bid to cause a wedge in the nation.

The people of Pakistan want MQM to renounce its anti-state operations, but it is understandably a hard thing for the group to do. Its personality and holding power depend on men like Farooq Dada, Asif Zaidi, Ali Mota and the like. Regrettably these men can in one lifetime kill 60 to 65 government officials for the sake of Muthhida glory, but they cannot turn it into a formation fit for human politics.

The whole world knows that Altaf during a telephonic address instigated his audience to chant the slogan “aadha tumhara aadha hamara” (half Sindh for you, half for us) and this slogan obviously reminds us about another slogan which was raised some quarter century ago” Udhr Tum Ider Hum” and the horrible consequences it bought in a form of Dahka Fall. At the end of the meeting a prayer was held which said, “makes us the sons of our soil, O Lord,” then there is Rana Safder Ali Khan’s threat in the Sindh Assembly, “we will demand the deployment of UN troops in Sindh”, or Ajmal Dehlavi’s threat, “give us our rights otherwise India, or some other country may intervene.” One also has not forgotten the “break Pakistan” slogan raised by mourners during a funeral procession in February 1994.

MQM’s strategy to effect a division of Sindh is reflected in its efforts to point all the parties active in Sindh politics as Sindh parties with support base in rural Sindh only, and itself as the sole spokesman of urban Sindh is aimed at boosting its claim for a greater share of power on the one hand, and playing up the non-representation of this population on the other coming to Sindh’s Mohajir; population, it used to be estimated by MQM at around a few million in 1986. In 1990, Azim Tariq put it at 10 million. In a petition filed by MQM in the Supreme Court in Jan 1995 – it was mentioned as 15 million. Seven months later in September 95 they said it had become 22 million, growing at a preposterous rate of one million heads every month.

MQM understands one thing. There is no urban – rural dichotomy when it comes to rights, and there are no set formulae – Rights are where the need is. Had it been for geographical area, Tharparker and Dadu would be getting the most funds in Sindh and Baluchistan would be claiming a lions share in the federal pool. Had the criterion been the population Punjab would today be far more developed than Karachi. In Sindh, Karachi with its 10 million population would be receiving much less compared to rural Sindh where a greater majority of people live. But this is not the case.

In Karachi 10% of the people of Pakistan have 70% of its wealth. Total population of Pakistan is 130 million and the; population of Karachi which is even less than 10% of total population have 70% of country’s wealth, and yet Altaf Hussain claims that they are being discriminated against. The truth is that Altaf wants all this wealth for himself. He publicly ordered Mohajirs not to pay taxes as these taxes are used to develop poorer areas of Pakistan. And then he; professes to be the protector of the federation. Altaf knows this and wants to separate so that he has it all to himself.

In spite of the fact that Karachi remains the most prosperous city of Pakistan, offering unequaled facilities of urban livelihood, the best industrial infrastructure and the highest rate of employment, a major share of Sindh’s development funds continues to go into the city because its growing size makes the upgradation of its infrastructure imperative. RS 121 billion have been earmarked as the Karachi package for various schemes in this regard. This is much more than what is getting in to rural areas. .

The urban – rural dichotomy is just a force put up to fuel hatred and MQM falls for it as any fascist organisation would fall for it is a dependable tool of scaring people into subjection.

3. Anti Media Activities of MQM

Altaf and his MQM were asked by the government to renounce its policy of press censorship, and publicly declare that it will not use threats and direct or indirect pressure to influence the print media.

Altaf’s MQM is perhaps the first “political ” party in the world which clamped an across the board censorship on newspapers and kept breathing down the editor neck for more than four years. Hitler had said, “newspapers should not be allowed to ride popular will”. Altaf and MQM followed this dictum to a tee. The code of censorship, which MQM designed under the able guidance of Altaf Hussain for the newspapers of Karachi, was impeccably complete. “Important” news items and photographs, their size, length and their exact placement on specified pages (mostly front page) was dictated to the city’s newsrooms from Nine Zero. Anything, which Altaf did not want published, could not see the light of the day.

MQM’s terrorism against the press took its early shape in 1985. By 1987 it had gradually made its presence felt in the newsrooms. Any departure from Nine – Zero’s guidelines brought down the Pir’s wrath on the reporter, the sub-editor, the editor, the publisher the owner – anyone in any way connected with the production of that particular section of the newspaper. Inadvertent violations sent shivers through the entire newspaper establishment.

Daily Jang, being the largest circulated newspaper of the country, tried to break the shackles in earlier days of the Pir (Altaf Hussain) and he threatened that paper “one paper is becoming a party against “Mohajirs”, it should take warning (daily Amn April 6, 1987). The Pir’s disciples ultimately in Hyderabad lit up 30,000 copies of the paper on June 21, 1987. Thousands of copies more were burnt in Karachi. On June 24, Jang columnist, Nizam Siddiqui, wrote, “Altaf Hussain demands that Jang should; publish his statements and photographs in places proposed by him, and that his opponents views should not be brought into print. No political party or leader has made such a demand in 47 years.”

Altaf’s reactions have always been aggressive and devoid of any regard for ethics. Ask about who persecuted Maulana Salahuddin, editor weekly Takbir, burnt his house, burnt Takbir copies, tried to prevent Takbirs’; publication from Karachi, and when the Maulana refused to budge, killed him? And every one will say MQM.

An evening newspaper brought out a supplement on the assassination of some opponent of MQM, in which it called him a “Shaheed”. The paper had to suspend its publication for several days, and the editor attended hearings at Nine-zero day in and day out. He was finally given the license to live, but on a price. Until today, this evening newspaper is acting as an official spokesman of MQM.

On November 14, 1988, Altaf served another warning to daily Jang. “If Jang does not change its attitude by 16 November, we will put an end to lit forever” (daily Savera, Karachi).

On March 8, 1989, Jang failed to cover May or Dr Farooq Sattar’s wedding to the satisfaction of Altaf Hussain. He said, “this has been a source of grief, to us. We will observe a taken boycott of Jang on March 10”. Azim Tariq said, “we appeal to hawkers not to lift Jang on March 10th. And we are telling them in advance” (daily Amn, March 8, 1989).

On the orders of Altaf Hussain and Azim Tariq (the same Azim Tariq which was lately killed on the directives of Altaf Hussain), MQM workers in Hyderabad burnt hundreds of thousands of copies of dailies Jang, Dawn, The News, Jasarat, Star, monthly Herald and weekly Takbir between March 10 and March 20, 1991. Journalists in Islamabad boycotted the parliament in protest over these incidents.

Weekly Takbir’s offices were ransacked and set on fire on March 22, 1991. The FIR lodged with the Arambagh police station said, “this incident is part of Altaf Hussain and Azim Tariq’s campaign to terrorize Takbir and its editor”. In the Liaquatabad public meeting, Azim Tariq reiterated Altaf Hussain’s directives that “Takbir” would not be allowed to circulate anywhere in Karachi (weekly Takbir, April 4, 1991).

Talking to the journalists in hospital (Abbasi Shaheed) on March 10 Altaf Hussain said, “Dawn is hatching conspiracies against MQM. Herald spits; poison against us. Takbir is an agent publication of the Jews. People reserve the right to make newspapers accountable. If the accountability begins, you shouldn’t start your press freedom lamentations.”

Sarwat editor of Takbir, was harassed and threatened by hooligans at her residence on March 13. The following day, newspaper hawkers and agents were deprived of their copies and beaten up in several parts of the city. On March15, Azim Tariq said, “Herald and Takbir will not sell in this city now. This is the people’s decision” (daily Amn). Altaf Hussain seconded this on March 16: “from today onwards, people will not read Takbir and Herald, which comes out of the Dawn building. This is our right”. He further said, “any newspaper that does not give us proper coverage, will not run.” (Daily Qaumi Akhbar). BBC’s reporter in Karachi Zafar Abbas, was attacked on March 19.

Journalists held a protest meeting at Karachi Press Club and decided to boycott MQM’s programs. On March 20, Altaf Hussain announced his boycott of Dawn, Herald, Star and Takbir.

Altaf Hussain and his MQM cannot bear criticism and difference of opinion and that’s why each and every paper if writes even a single word against Altaf or MQM gets punishment. Amount of punishment depends upon the nature of crime. And these punishments can vary from the burning of newspaper copies to the murder of editors. But the irony of situation is that besides doing these heinous, crimes against media and media MQM cries hoarse for its own freedom of expression.

4. Indian Connection of MQM

The government has repeatedly called upon Muthaidda to close its training camps in India and call back Javed Langhra and others to the country. Altaf and his party responded that leveling such an allegation against a party was not only a crime, it was violate of the security of the country.

According to Altaf and his Muthaidda there are no training camps in India but Javed Langrha lives there because it is a democratic country. It also says that thousands of other workers went abroad to escape persecution. It does not say how many, but if we take it at 20,000 who paid for their fare? They must have spent well over a billion rupees.

But here money is not the issue (Altaf’s Muthaidda was a multi billion-rupee organisation, having robbed with total impunity the richest city of Pakistan for more than a decade. The issue is, did thousands really leave the country in 1992? All we have heard so far is a few names: Altaf Hussain, his 12 body guards, Salim Shahzad, Anwar Khan, Javed Langrha Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui, Ishratul Ebad and about hundred others. There may be hundred more phony asylum seekers in the west, using MQM’s cover. To say that they are in thousands is to say that there are 22 million Mohajirs in Sindh. It is Master Goebbles at his dirty work again.

The government has repeatedly referred to training camps in India on the basis of two known factors. Firstly, the types of weapons – Klashnikovs, rocket launchers and hand grenades that are used by MQM terrorists are in use in three zones of this region; Tamil Nadu, Karachi and Afghanistan. All the three zones are divided between different gangsters and warlords, who are spilling blood to strengthen the irrespective bargaining positions. Secondly, enough circumstantial evidence exists to suggest that MQM is doing India an overt favour by harming the cause of Pakistan on every possible platform.

Since 1990, every year Karachi has religiously plunged into an orgy of death and violence at or about February 5, the day that the government of Pakistan observes as the annual black day for Kashmir. MQM’s; peak violent action has also coincided with other Kashmir related issues, such as the official Pakistani protest over the burning of Charar Sharif or during the earlier hold out at Dargah Hazrat Bal. Towing this; policy, MQM has brought the issue of Karachi at par with that of Kashmir in the international media. Although the issue of Kashmir involves a deeper sense of loss, strongly rooted in the valley’s historical consciousness, tying it up with a predominantly criminalised Karachi has nevertheless been a victory of sorts for India.

Moreover, Javed Langhra’s access to the personal company of Indian minister of interior and other high-ranking officials is a matter of concern for the government of Pakistan. Not very long ago, the former Indian: Prime Minster, V.P. Singh, had stated that India could not keep quiet over the situation in Karachi any longer. Altaf Hussain’s appeals to Indian Muslims to hold protest rallies against Pakistan, are also fresh in our memory. Then there is the incident of(UNHRC) Geneva Conference in which MQM’s New York based leader Anwar Khan, delivered a speech and took sides, with the Indian delegation against Pakistan. Altaf Hussain himself ridiculed the two- nation theory and spoke derisively about Pakistan Army in an interview with the Indian fortnightly magazine, India Today.

He has frequently been clamoring to the world opinion leaders to forget about Bosnia and Kashmir, and to watch Karachi instead. In the back ground of all these facts, the extra coverage which MQM gets at the Indian radio and TV media is a further source of concern to the Pakistani government. Apart from enlisting India’s support, Altaf has repeatedly sold Karachi to the west as another Hong Kong – all that needs be done is repeat of history when the Hong Kong was taken away by the British.

Muhttida’s coordination committee is ever willing to shoot arrows in the dark, but it cannot be expected to offer comments on ground realities. Nor does it have the courage to convince Altaf Hussain that there is only one way out of this situation: end of terrorism and an inclination towards Islamabad rather the new Delhi.

Altaf Hussain was also asked by the government to condemn Indian excesses against Kashmiris, desist from portraying Karachi (which is a part of Pakistan) at par with Kashmir in international circles and stop its activities in Karachi and abroad which are aimed at diverting the world’s attention from Kashmir.

Altaf Hussain established its Indian connection probably a little before 1990. According to some observers, previously this connection worked through the mediation of G.M. Syed’s workers. But direct contacts were established once Altaf (because of criminal charges, which he refuses, to face) departed from Pakistan and took permanent abode in London.

A little before the army operation of June 92 Javed Largrha and his comrades slipped into India and, in connivance with the Indian authorities, started training camps for subversive activities inside Pakistan. Some Muthaidda activists who were later arrested – among them Naahid Butt’s phony brother, Khalid Taqqi – have narrated before the Islamabad press their tour to India in the company of Langrha.

The government of Pakistan has a real cause of concern here. Langrah is a fugitive from the law. His stay in India makes him susceptible to Indian pressure to work against Pakistan. India competes with Pakistan in the international market for textile, leather goods, rice cotton and other commodities. Obviously the Indians will not get on Pakistani ships to destroy their consignment.

They will rather avail the services of Pakistan’s gun totting “political” activists to cripple its economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that Altaf Hussain continues to dish out strike calls in protest over the arrest or killing of criminals who have each killed anything from 20 to 50 persons in a brief career of between two to four years. The economic fallout of these strikes inevitably goes to favour India.

The first time Altaf’s Muthidda stayed away from the government’s annual, February 5 Kashmir Day protest was in 1990. The Kashmiri intifada was a year old then, and the Indian government was already feeling the heat. Relief came from Muthidda on February 6 and 7, when unprecedented violence started in Karachi and continued for several days. Since then the 5th of February has occurred many times, but not a single occasion has seen Altaf’s Muthidda joining the anti-India protest over human rights violations in Kashmir. If anything, it has punished the protesters on each occasion by resorting to terrorist attacks in Karachi and Hhyderabad. For example in such an attack in Liaquatabad killed 10 camp followers of Harkat-ul-Ansaar, a Kashmiri organisation. A pro- Altaf morning newspaper and another sympathetic eveninger put headlines that read, “5 die in Kashmir, 10 in Karachi”.

Such comparisons are the core of Altaf Hussain’s present propaganda technique, and the newspapers that are promoting this propaganda have been eliciting Altaf’s Muthidda armed support against two rival newspapers of Karachi.

During the 47th UN Conference which was held at Geneva MQM circulated to the delegates two specially prepared booklets; a 91-page book titled “Pakistan: where the State Kills”, and the 64-page “Pakistan” A Terrorist State”. The concluding lines of the first booklet read,”there is no doubt whatsoever that Mohajirs in Pakistan are subject to the same atrocities as the people in Bosnia, Kashmir and Rwanda”. The second booklet uses excerpts from domestic and foreign material to prove that Pakistan is involved in lawlessness in Kashmir on the one hand, and serves as a base for Islamic terrorists on the other.

During this conference, MQM Anwar Khan interrupted the speech of Pakistani delegate with disgust, which not even enemies’ display at such civilized forum.

During 1996 and 1997 the terrorist of MQM somehow again managed to enter in the Palle, the UN headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland and distributed various booklets and pamphlets, against Pakistan. Although during this period, the political wing was part of the Sindh Government. During March 1998 the same people of Muthidda namely Anwar, Arif Ajakiya with the support help and connivance of anti Pakistan NGOs and Indian organizations not only distributed books, but confronted with Pakistani official delegation, Mr. Nehal Hashmi and other peace loving NGOs, who were supporting a peaceful and just cause.

Since early 90, the International headquarter of MQM based in London is attending various international conferences to cover-up their unlawful terrorist activities and acts nationally and internationally.

During early 90s, many foreign national including US embassy officials were killed in Karachi by the terrorists of Altaf Hussain. This leads to create uncertainty and to pass message internationally that Karachi is not a safe and secure city for any foreign, national investors.

5. Economical Damage in Form of MQM’s Forced Strikes

It is not easy to quantify the damage done by terrorism, blood looting, firing, arson, and riots, strikers and torture spread over these ten, twelve years. The cost paid by Karachiites in terms of deaths, damage to property, anxiety, extortion and hunger is far greater then the cozy Pirji of London can imagine.

In these years more than 5000 persons fell to terrorist bullets in Karachi and Hyderabad, while more than 1000 others were wounded. Property set on fire or otherwise destroyed included 475 vehicles, 20 banks, 102 houses, 95 shops, two telephone exchanges, 20 offices of different political parties, 12 petrol pumps, 2 factories, one office each of Wapda and social security, two post offices and 4 police stations.

The successive years saw the terrorists upgrade their weaponry from simple revolvers to Klashnikov assault rifles and rocket launchers. Terrorists used their war machine to strike at the national interests of Pakistan on the one hand, and use cellular telephone and pager facilities to organize raids against government officials and political rivals on the other. 360 policemen were killed during these years.

MQM insists that its strikes are peaceful. But the facts speak other wise, In a total 38 strike calls spread over these years, MQM prevented Rs 30 billion worth of business transactions from taking place. Hundreds of thousands of people had to do without postal and other communication facilities. Given these facts, it is a wonder how “educated men” like Ishtiaq Azhar and Dr Farooq Sattar can insist that strikes do no harm to Karachiites.

a) Bhatta (A forced tax)

Since 1988 the terrorist of Altaf Hussain introduced a new method to collect tax from the common, ordinary citizen which called Tanzimee Chanda, later on the method of collection was divided in various forms one is monthly tax from each and every shop and house. Another forced tax called “Saman Kiya Tayyar Hai” which used for the purchasing of arms and ammunition to protect themselves, later on almost every shopkeeper, industrialists, businessmen and investors was compelled by the terrorist of Altaf and his Muthidda either to pay the weekly tax or shut down and closed their business and commercial activities. If someone refuse to pay either he eliminated physically or his business forced to close by the terrorists.

Resultantly hundred’s of businessmen shifted their business from Karachi to other part of Pakistan. According to a report published in a news daily “MQM’s monthly income, which it earned through Bhattaism before the imposition of the Governor Rule in Sindh, was Rs. 600 million. Never a single penny was spent on the economic and social betterment of Karachi people. In fact this money was use to arm the youths of Karachi with weapons rather than education, the business and trade in Karachi almost rewound due to this forced tax and robbery.

b) Skin Collection (Another way of collecting money for criminal activities)

Since last 10 years, the skin of sacrificed animals during Eid-ul-Azha the terrorists of Altaf use to snatch from each and every house of Karachi, Hyderabad, Mirpur Khas, Sukkur on gunpoint. If any body hesitated to hand over the skin, the terrorist open fire on them.

Even internationally renowned Abdus Sattar Edhi, social worker was victim of the same. In year 1993 the terrorist of Altaf Hussain attacked on the loaded trucks of Abdus Sattar Edhi, carrying skins of the scarified animals were forcibly snatched by the Altaf Hussain’s terrorists. The same has been reported by the BBC, national and international media. And the money they get from selling these skins is getting use in buying destruction for the innocent people of Karachi.

6. Unwrapping the Rape Dramas

MQM was asked to give up the policy of using women to incite violence. MQM denies this, of course, but evidence exists to show that cases of gang rape were cooked up either to helped it steer through a tight sot, or put the government on the defensive.

MQM origins are tied with the famous name of Bushra Zaidi, a Sir Syed College girl who made Altaf Hussain’s career by dying in a road accident in 1985. Since then, a woman has always figured in the evolving strategy of Altaf Hussain to build an empire on terrorism. Nahid Butt, Shazia, Seema Zarrin and others. All these women were portrayed as victims of sexual assault. Not one of them ever comes to fit the merits of the case.

Take Shazia for example, the sister of India based Javed Langrha. She had a tiff with the family, and went to her grandmother’s house without telling anyone. She stayed there for two days. MQM was quick to react. Shooting in the dark, they cooked up a story that the personnel of Rangers had carried her away. Hearing the scandal, Shazia returned home and told the truth. Milk was separated from water.

a) Case of Nahid Butt

Nahid Butt’s name figured at a time when hostilities in Kashmir had temporarily heightened. She was used to put across the message that Butt (a Kashmiri tribe) women were as exposed to rape in Karachi as in Kashmir. Khalid, MQM activist who was claimed to be Nahid’s brother, turned out to be her lover. Khalid alias Taqqi alias Mamoo was a resident of Lines Area.

Presently he is charged with 10 cases of murder and is in official custody. MQM attempted to portray him as a Kashmiri sympathizer of the party who resided in New Karachi. An army officer was accused of raping Nahid. The army plunged into action and investigated the case. As it turned out, Nahid was not a Butt, but was painted as such for political reasons. Moreover, Khalid was not her brother, but one of her lovers. She was found carrying contraceptives on her, and admitted that she entertained MQM boys off and on.

b) Farzana Sultan “Rape” Case

A case in point is that of Farzana Sultan, the young sister of MQM activist, Shahid Feroz. Although the poor girl was subjected to this unwarranted ignominy for the sake of a lie, 30 people died as Altaf Hussain called a strike in reaction.

On its part MQM sensationalized the drama by inviting suitors for the `raped` girl. For several days, the local press carried Nine-Zero’s press releases counting the names of the suitors who had volunteered to take in the daughter of the nation. It also gave a call for protest strike, in which 30 persons died in the name of Farzana Sultan. Altaf Hussain’s ego further inflated by an inch.

MQM has time and again used women folk to incite violence and disturbances in the city. A case in point is that of Farzana Sultan, the younger sister of MQM’s activist Shahid Feroze. It was alleged by MQM that on June 20, 1995, a fifty (50) years old PPP Councilor Naeem Qureshi along with seven (07) others, including his alleged son Bhoora had subjected Farzana Sultan to gang rape.

On the evening of June 22, 1995, some MQM’s leader arrived at Karachi Press Club at 09.00 p.m. along with Mr. Shoaib Bukhari, MPA and Deputy Leader of the Opposition in Sindh Assembly, to address Press Conference. The Press Conference was video taped and also transmitted through mobile phone to London for the consumption of Mr. Altaf Hussain. In the Press Conference the above allegation of gang rape were repeated.

On the same day, Mr. Shoaib Bukhari lodged an FIR with area Police Station, wherein the allegations of gang rape were repeated. However, the name of PPP Councilor was conspicuously not included by Mr. Shoaib Bukhari. It is worth mentioning that Mr. Naeem Qureshi the PPP Councilor did not have any son by the name of Bhoora.

Mr. Altaf Hussain and other leaders of MQM sensationalized the alleged incident and called for strike in protest in the city. Colossal damage was caused to public and private properties and about 30 innocent people were killed by MQM wherein 94 police and private vehicles were set on fire. The hooligans of Altaf Hussain for couple of days disturbed the city. In the process the poor girl Farzana Sultan was subjected to all kind of adverse publicity.

The Government, immediately taking cognizance, of the allegation leveled by MQM, ordered the medical examination of the girl, which was carried out and the report was immediately made public. Mr. Altaf Hussain and other leaders of MQM disputed the findings contained in the medical report ” that no marks of violence were found on the person of the alleged victim nor there was any medical evidence of the alleged gang rape or rape. ” The Government immediately offered that the doctors of the choice of the parents of Farzana Sultan and MQM from Pakistan or abroad might examine the alleged victim.

Report of Agha Khan University Hospital

On June 26, 1995, Agha Khan University Hospital Department of Obstetrics/Gynecology Faculty, including Professor and Assistant Professor examined the alleged victim of gang rape Miss Farzana Sultan. The report of Agha Khan University Hospital concluded, “the clinical findings in this case suggest minor injury to the posterior area of the fourchetta, which is almost healed, although still sore to the patient. The findings are consistent with the conclusion that the patient has had sexual intercourse in the recent past”.

Subsequently, the follow-up medical report in the case of the alleged victim was issued by the Agha Khan University Hospital on July 02, 19956. In the follow-up report it was further concluded, “besides shows inflammatory exudate with metaplastic cells and gram negative intracellular diplococci, confirmed by culture to be Neisseria Gonococci. The infection is confirmed to be sensitive to Penicillin, Erythromycin, Cefotaxim and tetracycline”.

Based upon the above findings it was advised by the Consultant Physician that Miss Farzana Sultan should pursue appropriate follow-up and treatment without delay.

From the above medical findings it was quit clear that the alleged victim Farzana Sultan was not subjected to the alleged gang rape or rape as was insinuated by Mr. Altaf Hussain and other leaders of MQM. Be that as it may, owing to the said allegation of gang rape and subsequent call of strike and agitation given Mr. Altaf Hussain from London and other leaders of MQM from Karachi resulted in 30 innocent people being killed and damage to private and public properties besides disrupting the city life and causing trouble in the city.

Findings of The State Department of USA in Farzana Sultan Case

The State Department of USA, recently, issued its Human Rights Report regarding Pakistan, wherein inter-alia about this incident of alleged gang rape of Farzana Sultan, the report contains a finding “although the MQM/A consistently claims that its activists are innocent, unarmed victims of ethnic violence, disinterested observers believe that cells of armed MQM/A activists are responsible for a considerable amount of Karachi’s violence and crime. This includes extortion of large sums of money from Mohajir businessmen as well as others.

In an apparent attempt to inflame public opinion and destabilize the situation in Karachi, MQM/A leader Altaf Hussain the alleged gang rape of an MQM/A supporter (while in custody) to call for three ” days of mourning” in Karachi June 24-26. At least 67 people died in strike-related violence during the protest. Medical reports on the alleged victim, however, did not substantiate the charges of gang rape. The MQM/A enforced numerous other strike calls with violence, resulting in the deaths of law enforcement personnel and civilian bystanders.”

It is the standard practice of Mr. Altaf Hussain and MQM to concoct and fabricate false allegation and create a issue out of non-issue and exploit it to the hilt through the medium of aggressive propaganda and rhetoric and then malign the Government and give calls for so called protest strike. Invariably in all such cases strikes have been enforced through intimidation, resorting to indiscriminate firing and burning of public and private transport. In the case of Farzana Sultan, it has been established by independent findings of Agha Khan University Hospital, which also substantiates the findings of the Government doctor that no rape or gang rape was committed and the allegation was concocted.

It is well known and talks of town that terrorists of MQM used to enter enforceable in the houses of helpless people and commit rape with the women to terrorize the family and to blackmail. Being an Islamic and eastern traditions most of the families hesitate to lodge complaints against them. Because of the fear, disgrace, and defamation in the society, the helpless women can only pray to the Almighty for help and justice, besides looking forward towards the International community and to come forward and to obtain support from the lawful authorities to eliminates and arrest such type of heinous acts of the MQM.

The so-called Naheed Butt and Farzana Sultana rape case is just a tool for negative propaganda. At present no one knows the whereabouts of Naheed Butt and Farzana Sultan and many others. Such cases were only used for negative propaganda.

It is apprehend that there is likelihood that ” evil mind of Altaf Hussain will create new rape dramas to save their dirty face from local, national and international community and to cover-up their terrorist and un-human activities from the eyes of law and peace loving people.”

UPDATE ON THE MOHAJIR QAUMI MOVEMENT (MQM) IN KARACHI

GLOSSARY

CIA         Criminal Investigation Agency

DIG         Deputy Inspector General of Police

FIR          First Information Report

KMC      Karachi Municipal Corporation

MLO       Medico-Legal Officer

MQM(A)               Mohajir Qaumi Movement-Altaf (led by Altaf Hussain)

MQM-Haqiqi        Haqiqi faction of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement

PML(N)  Pakistan Muslim League (led by Nawaz Sharif)

PPP         Pakistan People’s Party (led by Benazir Bhutto)

PPP (Shaheed)      Shaheed faction of Pakistan People’s Party (led by Murtaza Bhutto/Ghinwa Bhutto)

MAP 1: PAKISTAN

See original

Source: Pakistan: A Country Study 1984, p. xxviii.

MAP 2: KARACHI

See original

Source: King Apr. 1993, p. 108.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is intended to serve as an update on human rights issues surrounding the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)[1]1 in Karachi, Pakistan, since April 1996. It follows and is meant to be read in conjunction with the November 1996 DIRB Question and Answer series paper Pakistan: The Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi January 1995-April 1996.

Political violence in Karachi dates back several years and is, as Jane’s Intelligence Review sums up, “a complex phenomenon” involving not just political and ethnic tensions, but also rapid population growth, corrupt and neglectful government, and a massive influx of drugs and small arms from the Afghan war (July 1996; see also Current History Apr. 1996, 162). Karachi, Pakistan’s main seaport with an estimated population of 12-15 million, is 60-65 per cent Mohajir, and contributes disproportionately to the economy and government revenues of both Sindh Province and the country as a whole (Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1038; Le Monde diplomatique Jan. 1996). However, political power in Sindh Province has traditionally rested with rural-based parties rather than with the urban-based Mohajirs, who make up about 40 per cent of the province’s population (Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1038-39). In recent years, politics in Karachi has been dominated by bitter conflict between former prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the MQM, a conflict that contributed to the dismissal of both Bhutto national governments, in 1990 and 1996 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1465; Asian Survey July 1996c, 671; Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996). But tensions and incidents of violence have also been high between rival factions of the MQM: the MQM(A), which is headed by Altaf Hussain in London, UK, and the breakaway Haqiqi faction headed by Afaq Ahmed in Karachi (ibid.; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1037; AFP 3 May 1996).

This paper proceeds chronologically, beginning with issues related to the stepped-up police action against the MQM in early 1996, and following through Benazir Bhutto’s dismissal by President Farooq Ahmed Leghari in November 1996 on charges of corruption and of orchestrating extrajudicial killings in Karachi. The paper also discusses the national and provincial elections in February 1997, which saw re-emerging MQM involvement and a new influence for the party in both the Sindh and national governments.

2. SITUATION IN KARACHI

2.1 Police Action

In the spring of 1996 Karachi police, in coordination with the paramilitary Rangers[2]2, were completing a massive crackdown on suspected MQM supporters that had been building since July 1995, when key military and police officials were replaced and security forces were reportedly given a free hand to destroy the MQM leadership using whatever means necessary (The Herald Mar. 1996a, 46a-46b, 47-48; ibid. Mar. 1996b, 25-26; Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996). In March 1996 the Karachi monthly The Herald reported a wave of fake encounter killings, often accompanied by torture, of suspected MQM activists, staged by police and Rangers and supported by Medico-Legal Officers (MLOs) and police surgeons untrained in forensic medicine and unlikely to challenge security forces’ stories (Mar. 1996a, 46a-46b; ibid. Mar. 1996b, 25-27; ibid. Mar. 1996c, 32-33). According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, “there can be little doubt that the government sanctioned the use of extra-judicial methods to eliminate key terrorist suspects” (July 1996). As well, The Herald reported that “many of those killed in fake encounters are people whose only crime was to be politically active and who had never been known for any kind of violent act” (Mar. 1996b, 26, 30). Others, according to The Herald, were victimized simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and then later were labelled as MQM activists (ibid., 31).

Tactics used by security forces included stepped-up patrols in MQM-dominated areas, cordon-and-search operations and round-ups of able-bodied males, the use of reward money and torture to obtain information, selective tapping of phone lines and intense surveillance of suspects, and the banning of mobile phones and pagers, which had been used heavily by the MQM[3]3 (HRW Dec. 1996, 176; Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; The Herald Mar. 1996a, 46b; ibid. Mar. 1996b, 26; UN 15 Oct. 1996, 5).

The most controversial tactic, however, was the use of targeted extrajudicial killings—a policy officially denied by security forces and government officials, but widely alleged by other sources, including President Leghari, who cited government-sponsored extrajudicial killings in Karachi as a major reason for dismissing the Bhutto government in November 1996 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; India Abroad 15 Nov. 1996; AI Nov. 1996, 1; HRW Dec. 1996, 176; The Herald Feb. 1996). Torture was often involved: according to The Herald, most of the suspected MQM activists killed by security forces in early 1996 “were picked up, tortured to extract information and murdered in cold blood” (ibid. Mar. 1996b, 26; see also Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; HRW Dec. 1996, 176). The Herald also stated that “extreme forms of torture, with detainees being burnt with cigarettes and iron rods, beaten, cut with razors, having their flesh gouged out and their bones broken seemed to be the norm rather than the exception” (ibid., 30; see also UN 15 Oct. 1996, 5, 21).

By various accounts the security forces’ campaign hit hard against the MQM leadership, forcing many of those not killed or arrested to flee the country or go underground (AFP 9 Jan. 1997; The Herald Mar. 1996a, 46b; ibid. Feb. 1997; Asian Survey July 1996c, 671; India Abroad 12 Apr. 1996; The Economist 1-7 June 1996). In June 1996 The Economist reported

The MQM is wounded. Of its 26 members of Sindh’s provincial assembly, all but three are in jail or live abroad. The party leader, Altaf Hussein, is in exile in London. Thousands of party supporters are in hiding (ibid.; see also India Abroad 12 Apr. 1996).

Similarly, in April 1996 India Abroad reported that according to a submission to the UN Commission on Human Rights by the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Group,

700 MQM workers are in jail in Islamabad, 50 in Rawalpindi, more than 100 in Karachi, 28 in Landhi, 287 in Khairpur, 300 in Sukkur, 200 in Jacobabad, 400 in Hyderabad and hundreds more under what is called house arrest in Islamabad (12 Apr. 1996).

In 1996 the MQM estimated that up to 5,000 of its members were in prison in Pakistan, although according to Country Reports 1996 “this number is impossible to confirm” (1997, 1469).

Allegations of corruption and misuse of power accompanied the security forces’ campaign against the MQM (UN 15 Oct. 1996, 21-22; Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; AFP 18 Feb. 1996). The use of extortion against MQM suspects and their families was widely reported, and security forces were criticised for allegedly falsifying accounts of the deaths of MQM suspects in their custody (UN 15 Oct. 1996, 21-22; Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; HRW Dec. 1996, 176; The Herald Mar. 1996d, 38).

Corruption is alleged to be widespread throughout Pakistan’s police forces (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1468; UN 15 Oct. 1996, 6, 26). According to Country Reports 1996, in the spring of 1996 President Leghari

alleged that police stations are sold—meaning that police officials pay bribes to the politicians and senior officials in the department in order to get posted to police stations of their choice. They then recoup their investments by extorting money from the citizenry (1997, 1468).

UN Special Rapporteur Nigel S. Rodley, who visited Pakistan from 23 February to 3 March 1996 to investigate allegations of torture in custody, reported that according to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in Karachi, between January 1995 and March 1996, 179 cases were registered against police (UN 15 Oct. 1996, 22).

In 51 cases the policemen were dismissed from the police force, 50 received `major punishments’ and 40 received `minor’ punishments. However, none were prosecuted for their violations. This is consistent with information the Special Rapporteur received from other sources. There appears to be a conviction on the part of police and government officials that administrative disciplinary measures such as dismissal, demotion and transfer are sufficient punishment for police and security officials who have abused their authority. Although the Government has stated its commitment to prosecute any officer found responsible for crimes such as torture, to the Special Rapporteur’s knowledge none have been convicted (ibid.).

Country Reports 1996 reported that in November 1996 the caretaker government in Sindh initiated “a wholesale housecleaning” of the Karachi police department (1997, 1467). Similarly, in March 1997 the Karachi daily Dawn reported a new initiative from the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Karachi to establish a cell at the Central Police Office where citizens could lodge complaints against corrupt officers (19 Mar. 1997a). According to police sources, “the complaint cell is manned by clean and honest officials so that the accountability of the corrupt would not be affected” (ibid.).

2.2 Reports of Calm

Numerous sources reported that a relative calm descended on Karachi in 1996 in the wake of the crackdown on the MQM (HRW Dec. 1996, 176; The Herald Mar. 1996a, 46a; The Economist 25 Jan. 1997; ibid. 1-7 June 1996; AFP 19 July 1996; UN 15 Oct. 1996, 22). Deaths due to political violence fell sharply from the previous year—approximately 400 in 1996 as compared to over 2,000 for 1995 (HRCP 1996, 50; see also Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; Reuters 26 Sept. 1996; UPI 12 Oct. 1996). In June 1996 The Economist likened Karachi to Belfast:

It is a scarred city, relieved that at last it is almost peaceful, but fearful that violence could return. People are still being shot in the street, but the Battle of Karachi … has reached [the] exhaustion point, if not a conclusion (1-7 June 1996).

In July 1996 Agence France Presse also reported that violence was “at a low ebb” and that Karachi was experiencing the “gradual resumption of normal life and business” (19 July 1996). According to AFP,

Rusted shells of torched cars no longer dot the streets, gunfire has stopped echoing through the night and road-side vendors are again doing brisk business in the once-ravaged central and western districts of the city (ibid.).

The UN Special Rapporteur also commented that along with the reduced violence, the city’s successful hosting of World Cup cricket matches in early 1996 indicated that “some semblance of law and order” had returned to Karachi (UN 15 Oct. 1996, 22).

However, MQM-led strikes, usually to protest killings of MQM members by security forces but also to protest other issues,[4]4 frequently disrupted life in the city (Asian Survey July 1996c, 672; Reuters 26 Sept. 1996; ibid. 14 Sept. 1996; ibid. 18 Apr. 1996; DPA 8 Sept. 1996; AFP 12 May 1996; ibid. 3 Apr. 1996; ibid. 14 Mar. 1996). In a July 1996 Asian Survey article, Saeed Shafqat reported that

whenever Altaf Hussain, the MQM leader, issues a strike call the response is overwhelming and the city of Karachi and other urban centers of Sindh come to a grinding halt. These strikes have a crippling effect on the social, cultural, and commercial life in Karachi and on the economy of the country (July 1996c, 671-72).

As well, the MQM(A) and MQM-Haqiqi rivalry continued to spark violence (AFP 3 May 1996; The Herald [Glasgow] 4 Feb. 1997; Reuters 4 Feb. 1997; ibid. 26 Jan. 1997; AFP 3 Feb. 1997; ibid. 2 Feb. 1997). The Haqiqi, or “real” MQM, split off from the main group in 1991 in opposition to the leadership of Altaf Hussain (Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1037).[5]5 According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the MQM-Haqiqi were originally covertly backed by the military in an attempt to undermine the MQM (ibid.). Thus the MQM(A) still frequently refers to the MQM-Haqiqi group as “state-sponsored terrorists” (MQM News 29 Sept. 1996; The News 7 Apr. 1997). However, the Haqiqi group itself reported a crackdown on its supporters by security forces in 1996 (Dawn 15 July 1996; Reuters 20 Sept. 1996). In July, for example, police clashed with MQM-Haqiqi supporters in the Central district of Karachi and shut down preparations for a public meeting for which they claimed the MQM-Haqiqi had not received proper authority (Dawn 15 July 1996). As well, in September 1996 police killed Haqiqi activist Mohammad Habib in a raid on his home in Orangi Town in what the Haqiqi leadership claimed was a false encounter (Reuters 20 Sept. 1996).

For its part, the MQM(A) reported that several of its members were killed by Haqiqi activists in 1996, and there were numerous reports of election violence between MQM(A) and Haqiqi groups in early 1997[6]6 (MQM News 29 Sept. 1996; The Herald [Glasgow] 4 Feb. 1997; Reuters 4 Feb. 1997; ibid. 26 Jan. 1997; AFP 3 Feb. 1997; ibid. 2 Feb. 1997; The Herald Feb. 1997, 50).

A number of sources commented that despite the relative calm in 1996, peace could not be counted on in Karachi until fundamental problems had been addressed on a political level (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1041; DWS 20 Mar. 1997b; AFP 19 July 1996; The Economist 25 Jan. 1997; The News 18 Aug. 1996). Long-standing Mohajir grievances include not only the violence associated with the past few years, but also discrimination in filling quota-driven public employment and educational positions, and being left out of political power in a system dominated by rural-based Sindhis in Karachi and Sindh, and Punjabis on the federal level (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1036; Asia Times 22 Jan. 1997; India Abroad 12 Apr. 1996). President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the father of Benazir Bhutto, introduced the quota system for government jobs (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1039-40). Asia Times reports that traditionally Mohajirs have been limited to only 7 per cent of federal government employment, and that Karachi, despite providing more than 70 per cent of the country’s revenues, receives only 5 per cent of funding for development (22 Jan. 1997).

Compounding the sense of injustice has been the ongoing reluctance of subsequent governments to hold a national census—since the last one was held in 1981, for example, the population of Karachi has ballooned to an estimated 12-15 million, but for official purposes remains set at 6.4 million (India Abroad 12 Apr. 1996; Current History Apr. 1996, 161; Asiaweek 22 Nov. 1996). As Ahmed Rashid reported in Current History in April 1996,

a census would lead to a new demarcation of constituencies for seats in the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies, drastically reducing the rural seats now held by feudal politicians and allowing the nascent urban middle class a better chance to enter politics. Both major political parties [the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League] have therefore stalled on carrying out a count (Apr. 1996, 162).

In March 1997, however, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s new federal government announced plans to hold a new census (DWS 20 Mar. 1997a).

2.3 Prison Conditions/Corruption

Beginning in July 1996 a number of reports from the Pakistani media focused on alarming conditions in prisons in Sindh Province and in the country as a whole, exposing widespread use of bar fetters, torture, extortion of prisoners and family members, and deep-rooted corruption among officials (AI Oct. 1996, 1-4; The Herald Sept. 1996a; ibid. Sept. 1996b; ibid. Sept. 1996c; ibid. Sept. 1996d; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1467; UN 15 Oct. 1996 13-17, 23-26; HRCP 1996, 57-64). The initial reaction of authorities was to press charges against journalist M.H. Khan for his part in an exposé on the workings of the Hyderabad Central Jail (AI Oct. 1996, 1-4; UN 15 Oct. 1996, 17; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1467). Khan was granted bail, and by the end of 1996 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan had taken up his case, with hearings still pending (ibid.). As well, the superintendent of Hyderabad Central Jail, Major Ghulam Hussain Khoso, was suspended and charged with corruption, and the Sindh provincial ombudsman Justice (retired) Salahuddin Mirza conducted an investigation into conditions at the jail (AI Oct. 1996, 1-4; The Herald Sept. 1996b; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1467). According to The Herald, Justice Mirza’s 10-hour visit in August 1996 “confirmed the extensive use of fetters, torture and extortion” (Sept. 1996b). For example,

among the inmates who had clearly been tortured was former MQM member of the National Assembly, Anees Qaimkhani from Mirpurkhas. His buttocks were blackened from constant whipping. Another prisoner, Mohammed Ali’s lips had been sewn shut with an ordinary needle and thread by jail officials in sheer anger over his refusal to break his hunger strike. The floor of the ward was stained with blood (ibid.).

In the Karachi Central Jail, the UN Special Rapporteur collected testimony from several prisoners:

The ill-treatment described included beatings, burning with cigarettes, whippings with rubber or leather straps, sexual assault, being hung upside down for prolonged periods, electric shocks, deprivation of sleep, mock executions, the use of fetters, blindfolding for periods of up to 16 days and public humiliation. Although many of these prisoners claimed that the police, Rangers and prison officials had used force to elicit confessions and to compel detainees to incriminate others, some indicated that the force was used to extort money or merely to humiliate individuals (UN 15 Oct. 1996, 13).

The Herald reported that in Pakistan prisoners are routinely forced to pay bribes to avoid fetters, solitary confinement and beatings, or to buy “privileges” such as a comfortable room, drugs, the right to receive mail and visitors, or even to attend court hearings (Sept. 1996d; ibid. Sept. 1996a; ibid. Sept. 1996b). As well, reports indicated that prisoners who have been tortured have little chance of receiving medical treatment (ibid. Sept. 1996d; UN 15 Oct. 1996, 13). A mid-1996 report by the Democratic Commission for Human Development indicated that it is a common perception throughout Pakistan that torture under police custody is endemic, as is the act of detaining a relative of a suspect in order to get the suspect to surrender (1996, 13-14).

The UN Special Rapporteur reported that corruption within Pakistani prisons is “facilitated by the failure of the judiciary to … monitor them regularly” (15 Oct. 1996, 25). However, the Special Rapporteur found it even “more disturbing” that “in the few cases where judicial magistrates or High Court judges take action to improve the treatment of prisoners, their orders are routinely ignored by the authorities” (ibid., 23).

As well, the UN Special Rapporteur reports that the corruption found within Pakistani prisons is reflected in other areas of the legal and law enforcement system:

Provincial powers of appointment, promotion and deployment of police and prison personnel are not subject to institutional systems designed to promote competence, integrity, efficiency and adherence to the rule of law. It is generally understood that corruption is rife. Many of the notoriously underpaid and ill-trained personnel are generally thought to make ends meet by extorting money from those over whom they have power. It is commonly asserted that the jobs of such personnel, ranging from police recruits to station house officers, from prison guards to jail superintendents, can be bought, with the return on investment coming from the opportunities provided by unlawful enrichment (15 Oct. 1996, 22).

In September 1996 the MQM shut down Karachi with a strike protesting an apparent case of the Sindh government using corruption within the prison system for its own political gain (Reuters 14 Sept. 1996). Feroza Begum, an MQM deputy in the provincial assembly, testified that she had been forced to cross the floor to the ruling PPP government in order to keep her son, Osama Qadri, also formerly a deputy of the provincial assembly, from being tortured and killed in prison (ibid.; AFP 24 Oct. 1996). According to a 13 September 1996 editorial in The Muslim reprinted by the MQM, the “barbaric practice” of extrajudicial killings in police custody

has worked as the most effective threat to a degree where even a non-political family is willing to pay whatever price is asked by the local policemen for releasing their youth who are picked up in a general sweep or a search operation.

2.4 Police Killing of Murtaza Bhutto/Dismissal of Benazir Bhutto

On 20 September 1996, in a case that would eventually bring down the government, Karachi police shot and killed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s estranged brother and political rival, Mir Murtaza Bhutto, and seven of his bodyguards outside his Karachi residence (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; The Herald Oct. 1996b, 24; The News 24 Feb. 1997; HRCP 1996, 50-51). Police claimed the men were killed in an encounter that began when officers attempted to arrest the bodyguards for terrorist acts and possession of unregistered weapons (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; The Herald Oct. 1996b, 24; AFP 19 Dec. 1996). Murtaza Bhutto had headed a PPP faction called Shaheed (“martyr”) Bhutto that was opposed to his sister’s governing PPP and at times allied with the MQM in Karachi (The Herald Oct. 1996c, 26; Reuters 26 Sept. 1996; Dawn 28 Jan. 1997). On 17 September police and Rangers had arrested Murtaza’s second-in-command, Ali Mohammed Soonara, who was suspected of being behind numerous terrorist attacks in Karachi (The Herald Oct. 1996c, 26; ibid. Oct. 1996b, 24; HRCP 1996, 50-51). According to The Herald, just hours after the arrest Murtaza Bhutto, anticipating that police would torture Soonara to obtain information and then kill him, led his bodyguards in a raid on two Criminal Investigation Agency (CIA) centres in a failed attempt to free Soonara (ibid. Oct. 1996c, 26; ibid. Oct. 1996b, 24). Police then registered cases against Murtaza and his bodyguards, which led to the 20 September confrontation (HRCP 1996, 51; The Herald Oct. 1996c, 26; ibid. Oct. 1996b, 24).

According to The Herald, Murtaza Bhutto had been travelling in an armed motorcade that police intercepted outside his residence (Oct. 1996b, 25-28). The Herald report indicates that a single shot appears to have set off a volley of shots from police; police claim there was a prolonged shoot-out, but according to witnesses there was little return fire from Murtaza’s guards (ibid.).

Writing in The Herald in October 1996, Hasan Zaidi argued that the case highlighted a profound loss of faith among Pakistanis: “the lack of trust among the public in the organs of the state and the eroding credibility of institutions is emblematic of a much bigger problem” (Oct. 1996a, 40). Zaidi argued that if the state had been functioning properly, Murtaza’s death would have launched widespread reforms:

The entire structure and operating procedures of the law enforcement agencies would have come in for review and transformation, making both more accountable to the public, as would have the laxity of laws which allowed Murtaza to move with impunity within the city in a convoy of guards armed to the hilt with deadly weapons. Such a reform movement would have also questioned why certain pockets within the administration were outside the normal chain of command and answerable only to their direct political and military patrons, as is the case with an elite group of police officers in Karachi (ibid., 40-41).

In fact the case has had wide-reaching ramifications: in early November 1996 President Leghari dismissed the PPP government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, citing among other issues thousands of extrajudicial killings in Karachi, widespread corruption and a “sustained assault” on the judiciary (AI Nov. 1996, 1; Dialogue Dec. 1996, 4; Country Reports 1996 1997, 1472; India Abroad 15 Nov. 1996; AFP 12 Feb. 1997). In early January 1997 Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, stood charged with Murtaza Bhutto’s murder, along with former interior minister Nasirullah Babar, former Sindh chief minister Syed Abdullah Shah and several police officials, on the evidence of 52 witnesses, including Murtaza’s widow Ghinwa Bhutto (ibid. 19 Dec. 1996; The News 3 Jan. 1997). According to The News from Islamabad,

The charge-sheet accused Asif Ali Zardari of hatching a conspiracy in connivance with Abdullah Shah, DIG [Deputy Inspector General] Karachi, Dr. Shoaib Suddle and Intelligence Bureau chief Masood Sharif to eliminate Murtaza Bhutto from the political scene. The charge-sheet said that they considered Murtaza Bhutto as a threat to the PPP (ibid.)

For her part Benazir Bhutto has charged that “there is a nexus between my brother’s death and the president,” testifying before the three-person tribunal investigating the killing that President Leghari was involved in a conspiracy to bring down her government through Murtaza’s death (AFP 12 Nov. 1996; ibid. 19 Dec. 1996; The News 24 Feb. 1997). Mysteries and conspiracy theories surround the case: for example, a key witness, police officer Haq Nawaz, was murdered, there were delays in registering First Information Reports (FIRs), and a mysterious fax allegedly from Military Intelligence reportedly links Benazir Bhutto and her brother to planned terrorist attacks just before Murtaza’s death (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1466; The Herald Oct. 1996a, 40-41; Dawn 17 Feb. 1997).

In April 1997 the trial of Asif Ali Zardari continued, but the political map of the country had changed: the dismissal of the Bhutto government and the calling of national and provincial elections allowed the MQM(A) to re-emerge from hiding and campaign openly for the first time in several years (The News 9 Apr. 1997; The Economist 25 Jan. 1997; AFP 9 Jan. 1997; DPA 29 Jan. 1997; The News 5 Mar. 1997).

2.5 National and Provincial Elections

In the 3 February 1997 national and provincial elections[7]7, the MQM(A) emerged as a powerful ally of the victorious Pakistan Muslim League (PML(N)) of Nawaz Sharif (AFP 13 Feb. 1997; AP 5 Feb. 1997; PTV Television Network 24 Feb. 1997; The News 20 Feb. 1997). Nationally, the MQM(A) won 12 seats, as compared to 134 for the PML(N) and 18 for the PPP, while in Sindh Province the MQM(A) won 28, with 35 for the PPP and 12 for PML(N) (The Herald Mar. 1997a, 48b; AP 5 Feb. 1997; AFP 13 Feb. 1997).

Immediately after the election both the PPP and MQM(A) claimed that the results had been marred by fraud, but international observers declared them largely free and fair[8]8 (The Washington Post 5 Feb. 1997; AP 5 Feb. 1997; The Herald [Glasgow] 4 Feb. 1997; AFP 12 Feb. 1997). The report of the European Union (EU) observer mission mentioned some problems, especially with the registration of women in tribal areas, and with sporadic violence in Karachi (AP 5 Feb. 1997). Reports indicate that in Karachi MQM(A) and Haqiqi members clashed throughout the election campaign, and that members of each side faced violence when trying to campaign in areas dominated by the other (The Herald [Glasgow] 4 Feb. 1997; AFP 3 Feb. 1997; ibid. 2 Feb. 1997; Reuters 26 Jan. 1997; The Herald Feb. 1997, 50). On election day, for example, the MQM(A) claimed that two of its members were killed and several others abducted by Haqiqi rivals, while a few days earlier two MQM-Haqiqi members were shot and wounded, reportedly by MQM(A) workers (AP 5 Feb. 1997; The Herald [Glasgow] 4 Feb. 1997; AFP 3 Feb. 1997; ibid. 2 Feb. 1997). As well, early in the campaign the MQM(A) charged that police had destroyed an MQM election office and brutally broken up a prayer meeting of MQM women (India Abroad 17 Jan. 1997).

Several reports indicate, however, that in general the MQM(A) was able to campaign openly, with large telephone rallies featuring Altaf Hussain speaking from London, and the re-emergence of many party workers who had previously been in hiding (DPA 29 Jan. 1997; Asia Times 22 Jan. 1997; The Herald Feb. 1997, 50). For example, Asia Times reported a peaceful midnight telephone rally in Karachi that featured 20,000 MQM supporters chanting for Altaf Hussain (22 Jan. 1997). As well, a number of key MQM leaders were released from prison on parole to contest the elections, including Farooq Sattar, the former mayor of Karachi, and MQM senators Nasreen Jalil and Aftab Sheikh (AFP 20 Jan. 1997).

In February 1997, as a result of the MQM(A)’s strong showing in the elections, the PML(N) and MQM(A) reached a power-sharing deal on both the federal and provincial levels. According to press accounts, the MQM was promised the positions of Sindh governor and speaker of the Sindh assembly, equal sharing of Sindh cabinet portfolios, and either one or three federal cabinet positions. The accord also reportedly contains commitments to appoint a judicial commission to probe into extrajudicial killings in Karachi, to provide compensation for victims of extrajudicial killings and political violence[9]9, to possibly withdraw the Rangers from the city, to release MQM detainees and withdraw cases against them, to increase the federal service employment quota for urban Sindh from 7.5 to 11.5 per cent, and to review and reinstate all those dismissed from service for political reasons by the previous government (The Herald Mar. 1997b, 42; The News 20 Feb. 1997; ibid. 11 Mar. 1997; Radio Pakistan Network 20 Feb. 1997; Pakistan Observer 13 Mar. 1997).

As a result of the power-sharing agreement, Liaqat Ali Khan Jatoi of the PML(N) became the new Sindh chief minister, while Nawaz Mirza Ahmad of the MQM became the speaker of the Sindh Assembly (The News 20 Feb. 1997; PTV Television Network 24 Feb. 1997; Radio Pakistan Network 20 Feb. 1997). However, the post of Sindh governor did not go to an MQM candidate as agreed but to LGen (retd) Moinuddin Haider, as Prime Minister Sharif reportedly was unable to convince President Leghari to accept an MQM governor (The Muslim 18 Mar. 1997; Dawn 3 Apr. 1997). The Nation describes Haider as “originally a PPP appointee [who] tried to cling to office by switching loyalties after the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government” (13 Mar. 1997). A Dawn report stated that the MQM was unhappy with the turn of events and that the issue would arise again (3 Apr. 1997). However, in an early speech the governor-elect called exiled MQM leader Altaf Hussain “patriotic” and invited him to return to Pakistan to fulfil a political role as leader of the party (The Nation 17 Mar. 1997).

In March 1997 charges of inciting to riot in a 1994 case against Altaf Hussain and several other prominent MQM members were dismissed by a judge in South Karachi for lack of evidence (The News 5 Mar. 1997). However, several murder charges against Hussain are still outstanding (The News 22 May 1997; The Nation 16 Apr. 1997), and in April 1997 Hussain reiterated that he felt it would be dangerous for him to return to Pakistan[10]10 (DWS 18 Apr. 1997). The News reported on 22 May 1997 that the MQM was insisting on withdrawal of 40 outstanding cases against Hussain, ranging from murder to rioting and kidnapping, on grounds that the police as main witnesses could not be trusted; however, The News also reported that the government seemed “indecisive” on how or whether to proceed.

An editorial in The Nation commented that the alliance in Sindh would only last as long as “the MQM(A), despite having more seats than the PML(N), accepts a secondary role,” and explained that neither the PML(N) nor the PPP could have afforded to give the chief ministership to the MQM for fear of “[widening] the Sindh-Muhajir divide” (17 Feb. 1997). Another editorial commented that rural Sindh is still most deeply represented by the PPP, and that true peace in the province would require an unlikely reconciliation between the PPP and MQM: “An improvised legislative majority is not a solution. It is a key that can unlock the door to the repetition of an unhappy past on which the country must turn its back” (DWS 15 Feb. 1997a). However, an editorial in The Muslim argues that the MQM, by compromising on its demand for the position of governor, has re-entered the “mainstream of the country’s political life,” and points out that the Sindh chief minister and the MQM have similar priorities: “maintenance of law and order, creating harmony between the residents of Sindh rural and urban, improving health and education facilities and according high place to merit” (18 Mar. 1997; see also Dawn 15 Mar. 1997).

In a 13 March 1997 editorial that focused on two main points of agreement between the PML(N) and MQM(A) in Sindh, the Pakistan Observer welcomed the planned judicial probe into extrajudicial killings in Karachi but cautioned against a hasty withdrawal of the Rangers. It warned that “rival political factions in Karachi and other urban areas of Sindh province, are still dangerously poised against each other and justice demands none of the factions should be allowed to crush the other with the help of the state authority” (Pakistan Observer 13 Mar. 1997). On 25 May 1997 Dawn reported that the federal government had decided to keep the Rangers in Karachi to maintain law and order. According to the report, the MQM has strongly protested the presence of Rangers in Karachi schools, where, according to the MQM, they have been harassing students (ibid.).

For its part, the PPP (Shaheed Bhutto) has called the PML(N)-MQM(A) agreement “anti-Sindh,” has criticized the anticipated committee to review compensation claims for victims of extrajudicial killings, which it feels will be dominated by the MQM, and protested any changes in the federal job quota without a proper national census (The News 11 Mar. 1997). In mid-April 1997 the Supreme Court ruled the quota system for government jobs invalid because the 20-year period specified for the program had lapsed in September 1993 (DWS 17 Apr. 1997).

On 7 April 1997 MQM leader Altaf Hussain voiced strong frustrations with the political situation. In a telephone speech from London to party leaders in Karachi, he complained that the PML(N)-MQM(A) accord was not being followed, that no progress had been made on assembling the committee to review extrajudicial killings and no compensation money had been paid to families of victims, that MQM ministers were being ignored in cabinet, and that the state was providing protection to Haqiqi “terrorists” who he claimed were still killing MQM(A) members (The News 7 Apr. 1997). Hussain also reportedly warned members to be prepared for another “operation” against the MQM(A), and said that despite MQM(A) cooperation on all major issues, the PML(N) government was ignoring Mohajir grievances by not implementing the provisions of the PML(N)-MQM(A) accord quickly enough (ibid.). Sindh chief minister Liaquat Ali Jatoi subsequently flew to London with two prominent MQM leaders, Dr. Farooq Sattar and Shoaib Bokhari, to meet with Altaf Hussain (ibid. 13 Apr. 1997). On 14 April 1997 Jatoi announced that the accord would be fully implemented, that compensation would be paid to families of victims, that all “fabricated cases” against MQM workers would be withdrawn, and that those who were dismissed by the previous government would be reinstated (Radio Pakistan Network 14 Apr. 1997). Altaf Hussain reportedly “extended wholehearted cooperation to the Sindh government in promoting the well-being of the people of the province,” and stated that many MQM(A) demands had already been accepted by the PML(N) government (ibid.). On 21 May 1997 The Frontier Post reported that over 250 MQM(A) leaders and activists, who had been in jail since the early 1990s, were released on bail as part of the accord. Also, a 30 April 1997 report from The News indicated that a judicial commission to “decide payment of compensation and rehabilitation of the Karachi operation victims” was being struck, and that a four-member committee would be regularly reviewing the progress of implementation of the accord.

All has not, however, been peaceful. The MQM(A) has reported murders and other crimes against MQM(A) supporters, which, according to MQM(A) leaders, were committed in an attempt to destabilize the government in Sindh (Dawn 24 May 1997; ibid. 16 May 1997). Other sources accuse the MQM(A) of participating in violence; in mid-April 1997, for example, two MQM-Haqiqi members were killed in Karachi, allegedly by members of the MQM(A) (Dawn 14 Apr. 1997; ibid. 13 Apr. 1997). According to MQM-Haqiqi sources, Mehmood Khan was killed on 12 April 1997 by several MQM(A) gunmen, and then on 13 April 1997 a bomb exploded outside Khan’s residence, killing another Haqiqi member, Syed Iqbal, and wounding two others (ibid. 14 Apr. 1997). In late April and early May 1997 The Nation reported that under MQM(A) pressure the Sindh government had launched a police operation against the Haqiqi faction, picking up over 500 Haqiqi activists from seven Haqiqi-dominated areas in Karachi: Landhi, Korangi, Malir, Shah Faisal Colony, Lines Area, Liaquatabad and Orangi Town (3 May 1997; ibid. 22 Apr. 1997). On 23 April 1997 MQM(A) member Qazi Khlaid Ali publicly complained that he was unable to visit certain parts of his constituency in Landhi without being shot at by Haqiqi members (Dawn 23 Apr. 1997; see also DWS 23 May 1997). However, Rashed Rahman of The Nation had a different interpretation:

…the law and order situation in Sindh generally, and in Karachi particularly, has been characterised as `beyond the control of the Sindh administration’. What this means in plain language is that the MQM and elements either directly under its control or claiming its umbrella are back to their old tricks of collecting bhatta (i.e. extortion), and/or criminal elements are taking advantage of the climate in Karachi to indulge in a free for all (22 Apr. 1997).

3. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Many sources have commented that Pakistan in 1996 was a country at the crossroads, facing the possibility of spiralling into chaos if the government was unable to deal with a host of problems, including endemic corruption, an overwhelming national debt, a paralysing sense of public cynicism and paranoia, regional, ethnic and religious tensions, and lingering political violence in Karachi, the country’s economic powerhouse (The Economist 8 Feb. 1997; Dialogue Dec. 1996, 4; Asian Survey July 1996a, 690; ibid. July 1996b, 648-49; ibid. July 1996c, 672; Current History Apr. 1996, 159; The Herald Oct. 1996a, 40-41). According to The Economist, the collapse of the Bhutto government, the third consecutive government dismissed for corruption and mismanagement in the 1990s, left a sense of “popular despair … [stemming] from a widespread belief that the country’s politicians are irredeemably corrupt,” a despair that could only be lifted with “a spell of clean government … to restore public faith in democracy” (8 Feb. 1997).

Only about a third of eligible Pakistanis voted in the February 1997 federal and provincial elections, yet the resounding victory of Nawaz Sharif and the fledgling government’s efforts to restore the public faith appear to have opened a door to constructive debate about approaches to solving the country’s many problems (The Economist 8 Feb. 1997; The Muslim 18 Mar. 1997; Pakistan Observer 13 Mar. 1997; DWS 20 Mar. 1997b). In April 1997 the government, with unanimous all-party support in both the National Assembly and Senate, passed a constitutional amendment taking away the power of the appointed president and governors to dissolve elected federal and provincial governments, and restoring “the prime minister’s mandatory advice in the appointment of armed services chiefs and governors” (ibid. 2 Apr. 1997). The statement of objects and reasons in the new Thirteenth Amendment explains that the changes are meant to “strengthen parliamentary democracy” (ibid.). The scrapped Eighth Amendment had been instituted by military dictator General Ziaul Haq in 1985, and had been used by three presidents to “pack up four assemblies in eight years” (ibid. 5 Apr. 1997).

In another effort to restore public confidence, in March 1997 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif launched an anti-corruption campaign, instructing federal and provincial governments to compile lists of officials against whom charges of corruption have been brought, or who seem to be “living beyond their means or have a general reputation of being dishonest and corrupt” (Dawn 19 Mar. 1997b). However, efforts to root out corruption have met institutional resistance, and by all accounts the extent of corruption is enormous[11]11 (DWS 25 Mar. 1997; ibid. 24 Mar. 1997; ibid. 3 Apr. 1997; The Economist 8 Feb. 1997; The Banker Dec. 1996). Yet as Omar Kureishi writes in a Dawn editorial on corruption and the many other problems facing the nation,

We are observing our Golden Anniversary this year. It should be an occasion of pride in ourselves. Despite all the forebodings and confident predictions that we would collapse, Pakistan is still there and on the map. We have had our share of difficulties and gone from one crisis to another but we have bungled through. As I have written before, the leadership may have failed but the people have not. The people, on the contrary have faced every manner of adversity bravely. The Golden Anniversary can be seen as a triumph of the people over the leadership (DWS 24 Mar. 1997).

NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

Various Pakistani press sources, including Dawn Wire Service (DWS), Dawn, The Herald, The Nation, The News, Pakistan Observer, Radio Pakistan Network and PTV Television Network.

This paper extensively cites various Pakistani press sources, many of them available through the Internet either directly or through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) operated by World News Connection (WNC). Some human rights groups have reported restrictions on freedom of the press in Pakistan, including increased government restrictions on reporting on ethnic and sectarian violence in urban areas such as Karachi during 1996 (AI Oct. 1996, 6; DWS 16 Mar. 1997). In general, however, the Pakistani English-language press is considered free and lively, and a valuable source of commentary and information on political and social issues in Pakistan (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1472; The World’s News Media 1991, 382). However, most broadcasting is controlled by the government in Pakistan, and sources warn that radio and television news broadcasts are strictly controlled (Country Reports 1996 1997, 1472; The World’s News Media 1991, 382). The Herald, an independent monthly, often produces series of articles that centre on issues of interest, and a number of these series have featured prominently in this paper, including The Herald’s work on the security forces’ crackdown on the MQM, the state of Sindh’s prisons, the murder of Murtaza Bhutto, and the national and provincial elections.

Jane’s Intelligence Review [Surrey, UK]. July 1996. Anthony Davis. “Karachi: Pakistan’s Political Time-Bomb.”

This lengthy report gives a detailed yet clear account of the many forces colliding in Karachi up to July 1996, with background on the security forces’ operations against the MQM and on MQM tactics and organization. Davis’ contention that despite the crackdown the MQM was not a spent force and remained politically strong turned out to be remarkably prescient.

United Nations. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. 15 October 1996. (E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.2). Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37. Addendum: Visit by the Special Rapporteur to Pakistan.

The Special Rapporteur visited Pakistan from 23 February to 3 March 1996, and met with a wide variety of government, police and legal authorities, as well as representatives from human rights and opposition groups, including the MQM in Karachi. As well, the Special Rapporteur visited a number of jails and detention centres, and supplemented his report with press accounts received before publication in October 1996. The report gives many details specific to the time and subject of the visit, but also contains wider commentary on the nature of the various problems facing Pakistan.

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Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). 8 September 1996. BC Cycle. “One Reported Dead in Karachi Opposition Strike.” (NEXIS)

Dialogue[London]. December 1996. Imran Raza Kazmi. “Pakistan: Standing at the Crossroads.”

The Economist[New York]. 8 February 1997. “Last Chance in Pakistan.” (NEXIS)

The Economist[New York]. 25 January 1997. “Pakistan, Blood and Balloting in Karachi.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 4 Feb. 1997, Vol. 13, No. 4)

The Economist[New York]. 1-7 June 1996. “Pakistan: The Belfast of Asia.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 3 July 1996, Vol. 11, No. 25)

[Peshawar, in English]. 21 May 1997. “Pakistan: Hundreds of MQM Leaders, Activists Released from Jail.” (FBIS-NES-97-142 22 May 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

The Herald[Glasgow]. 4 February 1997. Raja Asghar. “Bhutto Urged to Accept Defeat.” (NEXIS)

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1997a. Aamer Ahmed Khan. “The Anatomy of a Landslide.”

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1997b. “Wheels Within Deals.”

The Herald[Karachi]. February 1997. Idrees Bakhtiar. “Mohajir Qaumi Movement.”

The Herald[Karachi]. October 1996a. Hasan Zaidi. “State of Paralysis.”

The Herald[Karachi]. October 1996b. Hasan Iqbal Jafri. “Who Killed Murtaza Bhutto?”

The Herald[Karachi]. October 1996c. Hasan Iqbal Jafri. “The Last Stand.”

The Herald[Karachi]. September 1996a. Firuza Pastakia. “The Gates of Hell.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 15 Oct. 1996, Vol. 12, No. 14)

The Herald[Karachi]. September 1996b. Ali Hassan. “Judgement Day.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 15 Oct. 1996, Vol. 12, No. 14)

The Herald[Karachi]. September 1996c. Hasan Jafri. “Inhuman Bondage.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 15 Oct. 1996, Vol. 12, No. 14)

The Herald[Karachi]. September 1996d. Hasan Iqbal Jafri. “In the Belly of the Beast.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 15 Oct. 1996, Vol. 12, No. 14)

The Herald[Karachi]. May 1996. Idrees Bakhtiar. “Hijacking Karachi.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 11 June 1996, Vol. 11, No. 22)

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1996a. Azhar Abbas. “Future Shock?”

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1996b. Ghulam Hasnain and Hasan Zaidi. “The Politics of Murder.”

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1996c. Ghulam Hasnain and Hasan Zaidi. “Anatomy of a Post-mortem.”

The Herald[Karachi]. March 1996d. Ghulam Hasnain and Hasan Zaidi. “Fact and Fiction.”

The Herald[Karachi]. February 1996. Idrees Bakhtiar. “Law of the Gun.”

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP). 1996. State of Human Rights in 1996. Lahore: HRCP.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). December 1996. Human Rights Watch World Report 1997. New York: Human Rights Watch.

India Abroad[Toronto]. 17 January 1997. Sanjay Suri. “MQM Announces Candidates but May Boycott Elections.”

India Abroad[Toronto]. 15 November 1996. Sanjay Suri. “MQM Chief Holds Phone Rally After Benazir Bhutto’s Ouster.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 3 Dec. 1996, Vol. 12, No. 21)

India Abroad[Toronto]. 12 April 1996. Sanjay Suri. “U.N. Inquiry Urged on Abuse of Mohajirs.” (DIRB Indexed Media Review[Ottawa], 30 Apr. 1996, Vol. 11, No. 16)

Jane’s Intelligence Review[Surrey, UK]. July 1996. Anthony Davis. “Karachi: Pakistan’s Political Time-Bomb.”

King, John S. April 1993. Pakistan: A Travel Survival Kit. 4th ed. Hawthorn, Vic.: Lonely Planet Publications.

[Paris]. January 1996. Alexandre Dastarac and M. Levent. “Karachi, une île à la dérive.” [Internet] (URL: http://www.ina.fr/CP/MondeDiplo/1996/01/ DASTARAC/2211.html).

[London]. 29 September 1996. “Human Rights Violation Report: List of MQM Workers and Supporters Extrajudicially Killed by Government Agencies During 1996.” [Internet] (URL: http://pw2.netcom.com/~newsntwk/KillingList1.html).

[Islamabad, in English]. 18 March 1997. “Pakistan: Article Views MQM, PML Relations.” (FBIS-NES-97-053 18 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld. gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 13 September 1996. “An Old Lady Takes Up the Challenge.” [Internet] (URL: http://pw2.netcom.com/~newsntwk/Articles.html).

[Islamabad, in English]. 3 May 1997. “Pakistan: Over 500 Haqiqi Activists Rounded Up.” (FBIS-NES-97-123 3 May 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld. gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 22 April 1997. Rashed Rahman. “Pakistan: Article Evaluates Government Performance.” (FBIS-NES-97-078 22 Apr. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld. gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 16 April 1997. “Pakistan: Prime Minister Forestalls Action Against Bhutto.” (FBIS-NES-97-107 17 Apr. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 17 March 1997. “Pakistan: Sindh Governor Designate: MQM Chief Patriotic Citizen.” (FBIS-NES-97-076 17 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 13 March 1997. “Editorial Views Appointment of Governors, Problems.” (FBIS-NES-97-072 13 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 17 February 1997. “Pakistan: Uncertainty of Situation in Sindh Viewed.” (FBIS-NES-97-033 17 Feb. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 22 May 1997. Amir Mir. “Pakistan: Government `Indecisive’ on Cases Against MQM, Altaf.” (FBIS-NES-97-143 23 May 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 30 April 1997. Jawed Jaidi. “Pakistan: `Crucial Dialogue’ Between PML-MQM Ends on Positive Note.” (FBIS-NES-97-121 1 May 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc. fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 13 April 1997. “Pakistan: Sindh Chief Minister, MQM Leaders on Surprise London Visit.” (FBIS-NES-97-103 13 Apr. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 9 April 1997. “Pakistan: Court Allows Senator-Elect Zardari to Attend Senate Session.” (FBIS-NES-97-100 10 Apr. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 7 April 1997. “Pakistan: MQM Tells Sharif to Quit if Agreement Not Implemented.” (FBIS-NES-97-098 8 Apr. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 11 March 1997. “PPP (SB) Official: MQM-PML Agreement ‘Anti-Sindh’.” (FBIS-NES-97-070 11 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 10 March 1997. “MQM To Go to Court To Claim Rigging.” (FBIS-NES-97-069 10 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 5 March 1997. “Altaf, Others Exonerated in Several Cases.” (FBIS-NES-97-064 5 Mar. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 24 February 1997. “Pakistan: Bhutto Gives Evidence at Murtaza Tribunal.” (FBIS-NES-97-037 24 Feb. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

[Islamabad, in English]. 20 February 1997. Javed Jaidi. “Pakistan: PML, MQM Reach Agreement on Power Sharing.” (FBIS-NES-97-034 20 Feb. 1997 [Internet] (URL: http://wnc.fedworld.gov))

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[1]1.           The MQM claims to represent the interests of Mohajirs, Urdu-speaking Muslims who left India after partition in 1947 to settle in Pakistan (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1036-37). For more background on Mohajirs and the MQM, please see the November 1996 DIRB Question and Answer series paper Pakistan: The Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi January 1995-April 1996, pp. 1-3.

[2]2.           The Rangers, numbering 6,000 to 7,000, are commanded by regular army officers and complement the approximately 25,000 police officers in Karachi (Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996).

[3]3.           The caretaker government restored the use of mobile telephones in Karachi after Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in November 1996 (DWS 15 Feb. 1997b).

[4]4.           In September 1996, for example, the MQM staged a strike to protest the alleged blackmailing of MQM member Feroza Begum (see subsection 2.3) (Reuters 14 Sept. 1996; AFP 24 Oct. 1996). Also in September 1996 the MQM led a strike to protest the police killing of Murtaza Bhutto (Reuters 26 Sept. 1996), and in April 1996 called another strike to protest changes to the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) that had the potential to reduce the KMC’s autonomy (ibid. 18 Apr. 1996; The Herald May 1996).

[5]5.           According to Moonis Ahmar, “criticism against the MQM leadership, particularly against Altaf Hussain, was considered unpardonable and the whole organization was run on the style of Nazi and Fascist parties of Germany and Italy. The MQM leadership dealt harshly with dissidents and compelled them to leave the city” (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1037; see also Jane’s Intelligence Review July 1996; Asia Times 22 Jan. 1997).

[6]6.           For more information on election violence, please see subsection 2.5 National and Provincial Elections.

[7]7.           For full lists of the 3 February 1997 national and provincial elections, please see DIRB Responses to Information Requests PAK26432.E of 28 February 1997, PAK26467.E of 28 February 1997, and PAK26468.E of 28 February 1997, which are available at IRB Regional Documentation Centres.

[8]8.           Benazir Bhutto publicly acknowledged Sharif’s victory and wished the new government well for the sake of democracy in the country (AFP 12 Feb. 1997). Altaf Hussain of the MQM(A), while working in coalition with PML(N), has threatened to bring the issue of election rigging to court (The News 10 Mar. 1997).

[9]9.           According to The Herald, the secret agreement states that the Government of Sindh will pay Rs 300,000 (Cdn $11,160) to families of victims of extrajudicial killings and/or terrorist activities (to a maximum of 1,000 persons/families), Rs 150,000 (Cdn $5,580) to individuals who were disabled partially or totally handicapped as a result of activities of terrorists or “other agencies” (to a maximum of 150 persons/families), and Rs 75,000 (Cdn $2790) to those who lost property to terrorists (to a maximum of 1,200 persons/families) (Mar. 1997b, 42; The Ottawa Citizen 18 Apr. 1997, C14). “The total amount of compensation is not to exceed 40 crore rupees [Rs 400 million or approximately Cdn $15 million]. In addition, the above categories shall be compensated on the basis of a list prepared and authenticated by the MQM leadership” and verified by a review commission (ibid.).

[10]10.        There has been much speculation about Hussain’s possible return. In April 1997, on a complaint by MQM(A) member Shoib Bukhari, a minister in the Sindh government, police filed a First Information Report (FIR) against former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and former Sindh Chief Minister Abdullah Shah for the 1995 murders of Altaf Hussain’s brother and nephew (Radio Pakistan Network 10 Apr. 1997; The Nation 16 Apr. 1997). According to The Nation, the FIRs were carefully tabled when both Bhutto and Shah were outside the country, and the case was designed to be a test: if Bhutto could safely return to Pakistan with a murder charge over her head, the argument ran, then Hussain would also have to be allowed a safe return (ibid.). According to The Nation, on 16 April 1997 Prime Minister Sharif directed the Sindh authorities to not arrest Bhutto until the case had been completely investigated (ibid.). Bhutto did return to Pakistan, while Shah applied for asylum in London (ibid.). By the end of research for this paper (25 May 1997), Hussain had not announced any plans to return to Pakistan.

[11]11.        Pakistan was named the second most corrupt country next to Nigeria in a widely cited 1996 poll of international business people taken by Transparency International (The Economist 8 Feb. 1997; The Banker Dec. 1996; DWS 24 Mar. 1997). Perhaps illustrative of the extent of the corruption, as part of his anti-corruption drive the prime minister has reportedly announced that income tax returns will not be checked this year in order to deprive reviewing officers of a substantial source of bribery (ibid. 3 Apr. 1997).

Copyright notice: This document is published with the permission of the copyright holder and producer Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB). The original version of this document may be found on the offical website of the IRB at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/. Documents earlier than 2003 may be found only on Refworld.

17th April 2007

Reference