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Posted by admin in CURRENT EVENTS on January 4th, 2022
“The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything”. Joseph Stalin
In the elections held on Dec 7, 1970, AL swept the polls in EP with a tally of 167 out of 169 national assembly seats and the PPP securing 87 of 126 seats in WP (simple majority in Punjab and Sindh).
As per Bengali writer Maswani, ‘Only about 7% of Muslim votes in EP had catapulted secessionist AL into majority. Its apparent success didn’t truly represent the will of the people of EP. The AL had won with only 43% of total votes, out of which about 12% were bogus votes cast mostly by infiltrators and 24.35% by the Hindus. (AMK Maswani, Subversion in EP, P 2).
There is no doubt of heavy rigging before and during the polls by the AL since the entire civil machinery was in its hands, the people terrorized and the military looked the other way.
After creating political ruckus to force Ayub to resign, Bhutto chose to side with the military junta rather than with the AL after the 1970 elections. Mujib-Bhutto confrontation sparked over the issue of framing of constitution, former wanting to formulate it entirely on his six points inside the Assembly and the latter wanting to do it jointly outside the Assembly. Both adopted a piggish stance which created a logjam. Had Gen Yahya retained the 1962 Constitution or reincarnated the 1956 Constitution, the constitutional crisis wouldn’t have arisen.
From Feb 1971 onwards, Bhutto became highly aggressive. Wanting to share power he threatened to break the legs of politicians going to Dacca. Mujib paid his bellicosity in the same coin which heated up the political temperature. Bhashani added fuel to the fire. Upset by Mujib’s intransigence over six-points, Yahya began to lean more heavily upon Bhutto.
Bengali nationalism was intensified by Mujib during the year-long election campaign based on his six-points, resulting in AL’s landslide victory. Militancy peaked when on 01 March President Gen Yahya postponed the session of the Constituent National Assembly at Dacca scheduled on 03 March 1971 indefinitely on the advice of Bhutto and hawks in his cabinet who dubbed Mujib as a security risk. It set ablaze the festering volcano.
From 02 March a systematic genocide of Biharis, non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis, rapes of women and destruction of their properties was unleashed by the AL activists and Mukti Bahini (MB). West Pakistani officers serving in East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and their families were killed, and banks were looted. Pakistan flags were burnt, BD flags hoisted and taxes were not paid. Military cantonments were besieged and water supply and fresh supplies blocked; soldiers confined to barracks since 4 March were abused and ridiculed. A parallel government had been put into force in EP and it was only Mujib’s directives that were obeyed. Bedlam could have been kept under control had reinforcements sent from WP not stopped, and troops not sent back to barracks on 4 March.
March 25 was given as the new date for the National Assembly meeting but it didn’t mitigate the anger of Mujib who became haughtier. In order to defuse the explosive situation, Gen Yahya and his team flew to Dacca on March 15 and till 24 March held negotiations with the Mujib led team. On 21-22 March, WP politicians joined to avert the crisis. Bhutto played on both sides of the wicket by poisoning the ears of Mujib and Yahya. Talks broke down when Mujib ruled out federation and insisted upon confederation provided EP was given 56% share of federal assets. According to Professor G.W Choudhury (p.168), ‘Some foreign economists financed by the Ford Foundation were the loudest in making extreme demands and were responsible for the failure of the Dacca dialogue’.
When the ten-day negotiations between the two teams at Dacca failed to yield results due to obduracy of Mujib, and there was no letup in the killing spree, and Gen Yahya was scorned for keeping the army in cotton wool, the President directed Lt Gen Tikka Khan, who had replaced Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan on 7 March, to launch Operation Searchlight on the night of March 25. Mujib and Dr. Kamal were arrested while all other AL leaders managed to flee to India where they set up BD govt in exile. Had they been rounded up, things could be different.
By dawn of 26 March, Dacca was in full control of the army after killing 66 extremists and injuring 31. Bhutto hailed the action saying “Thank God, Pakistan has at last been saved”. His exclamation was the manifestation of inner sentiments of the majority in WP. Yahya was eulogized for his action. (Hasan Zaheer, Separation of East Pakistan, Oxford, p 327). Only three EBR could be disarmed and the rest defected with arms. AL was outlawed and Mujib was declared a traitor and tried on charges of treason.
The military action which was falsely termed as a genocide by Indian media resulted in exodus of 7-10 million Bengalis to India 85% of whom were Hindus who should have migrated in 1947. (Kuldip Nayyar, Distant Neighbors, Delhi, p 155). It also sparked province wide rebellion which morphed into 9 months of civil war. The MB, six EB Regts, 16000 Bengalis in EPR and 45000 Policemen were aided by 50,000 Indian soldiers dressed in civvies. There were 116000 Bengalis in units, HQs, EBR, EPR, Police etc. and all had rebelled.
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The western media had turned against the military regime after the ouster of journalists from Dacca by Lt Gen Tikka due to their biased reporting {by Jewish Reporter of Jewish Owned New York Times-Sydney Schanberg, New Delhi Correspondent of New York Times.} In the Whitehouse tapes released in the mid-nineties, President Nixon referred to the involvement of U.S diplomats in Pakistan who ignored his instructions and supported the separatists. CIA and the US Congress sided with Mujib in spite of Gen Yahya taking the risk of arranging a meeting of Henry Kissinger with Chinese PM at Beijing in Jul 1971 which led to US-China rapprochement. The USSR concluded a defence agreement with India in August 1971 to forestall any intervention by China.
The magnitude of the insurrection was beyond the capacity of lone 14 Division. 9 and 16 Divisions, two wings each of CAF and Rangers and 5000 policemen were airlifted to Dacca via Colombo in a record time of less than two weeks since the East-West air corridor had been blocked by India after the engineered hijacking of Indian airline on Jan 31 the blame of which was put on Pakistan.
In order to tackle the insurgency and to be prepared for a war with India, local Razakars numbering 60, 000 were raised to provide rear area security. The EPCAF numbering 13000 with a heavy intake of Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis were formed into units and wings. Out of the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams were created which mostly comprised Biharis and patriotic Bengalis. The two outfits became the eyes and ears of the army. The Razakars and the EPCAF supported the army fighting the insurgents and in the clearance of border towns and border posts captured by the MB.
Bhutto encouraged Yahya to withhold invoking UN action when India started to intervene militarily in April 1971(Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, p. 359). Foreign Secretary Sultan M. Khan wrote in his book (Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, London Centre for Pakistan Studies), ‘After the use of military power in East Pakistan on March 25th. 1971, the situation escalated out of Yahya Khan’s grasp and he could no longer control it. From then on he was merely reacting to the developing situation and had lost all initiative’.
By end April 1971, the whole area was cleared and the slaughter spree of the MB that was at its height till March 31 began to decline rapidly. By May/June complete normalcy was restored, the civil administration became functional. A general amnesty was announced, reception centres established for those who had fled to India including the politicians and a call for by-elections was given. However, India blocked their return, and in concert with Russia continued to train, equip and launch MBs to keep the pot of EP boiling. RAW and BSF had set up 59 training camps.
In the clearing operations from March to Nov 1971, 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 other ranks were killed and wounded in action. (Indian Army after Independence, Major K.C Praval, Delhi, 1990, p 321).
The MB supported by BSF and Indian Army launched border attacks in Sept/Oct with a view to draw Pak forces towards the border. Eastern Command hastened to push forward army units, broke them in sub-units and deployed them in penny-packets all along the border. Even the command reserves (53 Bde) were pushed forward denuding Dacca of regular troops. It resulted in loss of cohesion and made the units vulnerable to envelopment and piecemeal destruction.
Creation of ad hoc divisions/brigades two weeks before the start of the war was a big sham, since they were raised by milking the resources of infantry divisions/units and further weakening their combat strength deployed on extended frontages with no depth and no reserves. The formations were critically short of war munitions and manpower and didn’t have a single medium artillery regt. Limitation of range of guns and tanks was another drawback.
EPCAF and the Razakars plugged the yawning gaps between defensive localities and took part in the war with India. They fought valiantly till the end and large numbers embraced martyrdom or were injured in action.
When it was found that the MBs were unable to defeat the Pak forces or to capture a chunk of territory near the border where a BD flag could be hoisted, the Indian military barged into EP on 21 Nov which was Eid day, and attacked 23 salients across the border. Lodgment areas were secured in Jessore, Dinajpur and Sylhet sectors. The MB resorted to large-scale massacre of pro-Pakistan elements in the captured areas. That was the time to modify the defensive plan and bring a change in the exaggerated forward posture but it was not done. Lt Gen Niazi issued orders, ‘Fortress will be abandoned after incurring 75% casualties’.
On the diplomatic front, it was the right time to move the case to the UN against unprovoked aggression of India as was suggested by Agha Shahi, but no move was made.
On Dec 2, India threw in 3 more divisions supported by armor to expand its penetrations at 7 different fronts. At that stage it dawned upon GHQ that India’s plans were much bigger than assumed, but it was too late to affect a change in defensive posture. Most crossing points on the rivers were destroyed or seized by the MB.
The Indian forces aided by the MB launched their offensive through gaps under complete air superiority on multiple axes with speed, grounding defending forces in respective compartments, while the MB stepped up their disruptive activities in the rear to block rearward moves of Pak troops. It made the task of forward troops to converge into the Dacca Bowl almost impossible. The ground situation changed with such rapidity that it left the Eastern Command dislocated and paralyzed. Its strategic balance lay in tatters and the defensive operational cycle got jammed.
After the PAF launched an air offensive on the western front on Dec 3, India declared war on both fronts with main effort in EP and secondary effort in the WP. India also forwarded a complaint to the UN Secretary General alleging that Pakistan had attacked India.
In EP, the Indian military enjoying 15:1 superiority, launched their offensive with main effort against Sylhet-Comilla by 4 Corps, secondary effort against Jessore sector by 2 Corps, another secondary effort against Bogra by 33 Corps and an auxiliary effort against Mymensingh-Tangail sector by 101 Communication Zone.
It had 7 armor regts with T-55 and T-72 tanks, a Para Bde, 46 artillery regts including Mediums, 24 Mortar Btys, 4 AA regts, 32 BSF units, 4 BD Bdes, 287000 MBs, helicopter support, 11 sqns of MiG-21, SU-23, Gnat, Canberra generating 120 sorties a day. Its naval assets consisted of one aircraft carrier, 3 landing ships and 8 destroyers. The IAF flew 80 air sorties in support of ground forces from 3-15 Dec and generated a total of 1978 sorties. The Indian Navy affected a sea blockade on 4 Dec.
Pakistan’s Eastern Command had one Corps HQ, 3 infantry divisions, 2 adhoc divisions, one armor regiment with M-24 tanks, 6 Field regts, 5 Mortar Batteries, 13000 EPCAF men, 60,000 Razaqars. The PAF had only one squadron and the Navy had 4 converted gunboats and 8 Chinese Coasters/landing crafts.
Major towns were converted into fortresses. While the static fronts outmaneuvered by Indian tanks and supported by armor collapsed at most places, at Hilli, 4 FF under Lt Col Akhlaq Abbasi, SJ put up a gallant fight and didn’t allow 20 Mountain Div with an additional Inf Bde supported by Armored Bde to breakout towards Bogra for 19 days. The unit was ordered to withdraw on 11 Dec when the opposing enemy outflanked the whole brigade. Another gallant fight was put up at Kamalpur and Jamalpur by 31 Baluch under Lt Col Sultan, SJ & Bar. 107 Bde under Brig Hayat Khan, SJ, put up a stubborn resistance at Khulna till 16 Dec. There were several other valiant actions at sub-unit levels. Most of the fortresses were intact on 16 Dec.
The lone PAF squadron put up an extremely brave show by flying 292 air sorties in support of the ground forces from 29 March till 6 Dec. Pak Navy’s Ghazi sent from Karachi to carry out strategic mining of Visakhapatnam and to interdict Indian Navy ships sank close to its target with 93 all ranks on board on the night of 3 Dec as a result of underwater explosion.
On 12 Dec, Lt Gen Gul Hassan informed Lt Gen Niazi that US and Chinese help was on the way. On 14 Dec, the GHQ gave an assurance to Niazi that the UNSC was in session and was most likely to order a ceasefire and he should hold on. Niazi cracked up when the heat came upon Dacca on 15 Dec. His oft repeated motto “last man last round” was probably meant for the forward troops only. Dacca, which was viewed by the opposing side as the toughest nut to crack and identified by Niazi as the centre of gravity, was left defenseless and had no regular troops. It fell like a ripe apple without being penetrated and without a fight.
Heavily outnumbered, outgunned, cut off from the world, subjected to psychological war and demonized by Indo-Russian-Western propaganda, the beleaguered Pak forces fought and defended the motherland gallantly. Overwhelmed by the sheer weight and size of the enemy and adverse obtaining conditions, Gen Niazi gave orders on the morning of Dec 16 to stop fighting and ceasefire. The ceasefire transformed into surrender.
To be concluded
The writer is Brig, war veteran, defence analyst, international columnist, author of five books, sixth book under publication, Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre. [email protected]
Posted by admin in Brig (Retd).Asif Haroon Raja's Column, OPINION, OPINION LEADER on November 1st, 2021
Post US withdrawal from AfghanistanPart – 1
Asif Haroon Raja
“The aim of human happiness and solidarity is not violence, wars and aggression. All wars perpetuate violence, fear, and vindictiveness and are aimed at the destruction of civilizations and dehumanization of succeeding generations”. Bruce Gambrill Foster, “The Scourge of War: The Shameless Marketing of Violence”
Optimism dampened
The US had made Pakistan its coalition partner and a frontline state to fight the war on terror but throughout the two-decade war, its attitude towards Pakistan was highly discriminatory. It never hid its dislike against Pakistan and fondness for India and its two puppet regimes in Kabul. Pakistan was optimistic that after the withdrawal of foreign troops and removal of the anti-Pakistan Kabul regime and elimination of perverse influence of India, Afghanistan and its western border would become peaceful and would open up vistas for a better future.
Pakistan was also hopeful that after doing so much for the double-dealing USA in the 20-year war on terror, the US would bring a change in its acrimonious behavior and become more empathetic and affable but there is no change. The US frostiness towards both Afghanistan and Pakistan coupled with fluid and uncertain conditions in Afghanistan have dampened Pakistan’s optimism.
Apart from unfriendly outlook of the US, and lukewarm response of the regional countries towards the plight of war-torn Afghanistan, Islamic State-Khurasan (IS-K) is making Afghanistan insecure by its acts of terror. In addition to the attack in Kabul, two deadly suicide attacks occurred in the Imam-bargahs of Kunduz and Kandahar during the prayers on two successive Fridays resulting in heavy human losses. The victims were mostly Shias who form 10% of the population.
Foreign supported TTP and BLA as well as IS-K have carried out a series of attacks in Waziristan and Baluchistan in the last 2-3 months. The Taliban recently busted one of the dens of BLA in Nimroz, captured several of its militants and recovered a heavy cache of arms. The BLA has also been operating from Sistan in Iran.
After the Taliban recaptured power, anti-Pakistan Hamid Karzai started giving friendly signals to Pakistan in the hope of getting a seat in the Taliban cabinet. But on prompting of his masters, he again changed colors like a chameleon and is threatening Pakistan not to meddle in Afghan affairs.
With over 11 million Afghans living below poverty lines, the resource constraint Taliban regime is finding it extremely difficult to feed the hungry, provide salaries to the workers and daily wages to the laborers. Humanitarian crisis similar to Yemen is being deliberately created by the spoilers of peace eager to deter Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran from filling the power vacuum in Afghanistan and to discredit the new regime. The IMF has predicted that if $ 9.50 billion of the Afghan Central Bank confiscated by the US is not released and no foreign aid is provided, the Afghan economy may shrink by 30%.
The sense of elation felt by the Taliban after achieving great victory is dampening as a result of bleak economic and security conditions and non-cooperative attitude of the international community.
Reasons behind the US estrangement with Pakistan
The US after achieving all its objectives from the Afghan Jihad, dropped its most allied ally of South Asia Pakistan from its plate like a hot potato in 1990 and hugged India which had consistently pursued anti-American policies. Since then Pakistan has been taken out of the American security calculus and put in the hit list of Washington. India was made a strategic partner due to converging security interests. Under the changed perceptions, the US has striven to make Pakistan a compliant State and India the policeman of the Indo-Pacific region.
Driven by its wish to make India fight their war with China, the US signed high profile security pacts like civil nuclear deal, LEMOA, COMCASA, and ISA. The US hasn’t given up this wish even after China’s PLA soundly thrashed Indian soldiers with fists and spiked clubs in unarmed combat in Eastern Ladakh.
Major reasons of the USA’s estrangement with Pakistan were that it is a Muslim country with high pitched Islamic ideological fervor and strong armed forces, it has weapon grade nuclear program and variety of sophisticated guided missiles, enjoys strong friendship with China and refuses to accept Indian hegemony. Later on CPEC, and Pakistan’s intimacy with the new Taliban regime have been added to the list which give it bellyaches.
Slight change which came in the US attitude after 9/11 was because of geo-political compulsions. Pakistan was taken on board because of its usefulness in Afghanistan. It was first used for the occupation of Afghanistan in 2001. Next it was used to defeat Al-Qaeda. It was then needed to extend the war to fight and defeat the Taliban, which was not possible without the two supply routes provided by Pakistan.
Warmth in relations cooled down when Pakistan refused to fight the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network (HN). Pakistan’s bold act of flushing out HN from North Waziristan in 2015 didn’t satisfy the US and the Kabul regime since the duo wanted Pak security forces to deal with the Afghan Taliban the same way. Pakistan’s refusal to fight someone else’s war annoyed the US. Pakistan’s services were again required to make the Doha peace talks with the Taliban successful, and lastly to carry out safe exit of troops from Afghanistan.
After the departure of all the foreign troops from Afghanistan which obviated the danger of body bags, the US doesn’t need Pakistan and will view its future relations through the Afghanistan lens only. This can be gauged from the unfriendly statement made by the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in India, “We don’t see ourselves building a broad relationship with Pakistan”.
The US-India nexus desire unstable Afghanistan
The US as well as India were never interested in the stability and development of Afghanistan. Prolongation of war suited their geo-economic and geo-strategic interests.
Peace talks were a ruse to divide the Taliban and to keep the Afghanistan-Pakistan region unstable.
The US is eager to fail the new regime in Kabul and pave the way for the return of the Northern Alliance led by ex-Vice President Amrullah Saleh.
The US desire for an airbase
Currently, the US sole interest in Pakistan is to acquire an air base, or air passage to conduct counterterrorism operations against IS-K and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s services are needed to maximize pressure on the Taliban to make them submissive.
Washington had wanted an airbase in Uzbekistan or in Tajikistan on a temporary basis which was not accepted by Russia. Its request for deploying an Intel apparatus in Central Asia to monitor Afghanistan was also flatly declined by Moscow.
The US wants to renew air war to be able to gun down the Taliban and HN senior leaders, particularly those who are blacklisted and are in hiding.
The US media splashed news on Oct 23 that Islamabad has agreed to provide air base facility to Pakistan which was refuted by the latter.
Taliban and Pakistan in firing line
The US spent $ 8 trillion for the achievement of its geo-economic objectives through the deceitful and bloody war on terror. In spite of spending colossal amounts of dollars, using massive military force, waging the longest war, and suffering heavy fatalities, injuries, trauma and bearing the taunts of the world, the end result for the US was catastrophic. It soiled its reputation as the invincible sole super power and has become a descending power. The time and money it spent to hand back Kabul to the Taliban could have been used to help the struggling Americans. Instead of carrying out self-examination and post mortem as to why it lost the war, why it couldn’t denuclearize Pakistan, failed to contain China and Russia, and couldn’t tame Iran, the US civil and military leadership started to look for sacrificial lambs to pin the blame of their humiliation upon them. There is no regret or feelings of remorse among the ones in power in Washington that the response to 9/11 attacks lacked sagaciousness, and was a reckless misadventure. US War Crimes in AfghanistanThere is no talk of war crimes and war trials of those who legitimized brutality, indulged in massive human rights violations, used excessive force, and earned profits from the war. None is talking of rebuilding the destroyed country and providing compensations to the next of kin of the victims of war. Data published in May by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), a London-based charity, showed that 3,977 casualties were caused by US-led airstrikes between 2016 and 2020. Among them, 1,598 were children. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1235240.shtml U.S. personnel to be investigated for alleged war crimes in AfghanistanThe International Criminal Court will also look into possible crimes by Taliban militants and Afghan government forces.
 The International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands.Peter Dejong / AP file
The Taliban are blamed for defeating and disgracefully pushing out the US-NATO forces, and allegedly failing to abide by the terms of Doha agreement. Pakistan is held responsible for allegedly assisting the Taliban in achieving victory. They are burning in the inferno of rage, humiliation and revenge, and are hatching plans on how to settle scores with the Taliban and Pakistan.
Both the narratives are as cockeyed as the ones conceived after 9/11 and amounts to passing the buck on to someone else and ignoring own glaring blunders.
Biden is being blamed by the US Generals and the Republicans for the chaotic withdrawal and Trump is exploiting it to gain political mileage.
The writer is retired Brig Gen, war veteran, defence & security analyst, international columnist, author of five books, Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre, & Member CWC PESS & Veterans Think Tank. [email protected] |
Posted by admin in Counter-Terrorism, Peshawar Massacre, President Joseph Biden, TARGET PAKISTAN:4TH GENERATION WARFARE, TERRORISM FROM KARZAI SUPPORTED TALIBAN, TERRORIST TALIBAN, THE MAD DUDE, Trump, TRUMP - INDIA BUSINESS, Trump-The Global Nightmare, US FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL LAW, USA, WEST AND ZIONIST CONTROL OF GLOBAL MEDIA, World Affairs & US on March 3rd, 2021
“While we all hope for peace it shouldn’t be peace at any cost but peace based on principle, on justice” Corazon C. Aquino
Pakistan and Afghanistan never enjoyed friendly relations since the latter didn’t accept the Durand Line as an international border and laid claims over Pashtun inhabited areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Afghanistan has traditionally remained close to India and hostile towards Pakistan. Relations dipped during the rule of President Daud after he seized power in 1973 from King Zahir Shah. Insurgents in Baluchistan were provided safe havens and Pakhtunistan movement was fueled.
When Afghanistan was occupied by Soviet forces in December 1979, and 4 million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan, Pakistan under Gen Ziaul Haq condemned the invasion and decided to support the Afghan resistance forces. The US and Saudi Arabia came in support of Pakistan led covert war in June 1981. The two provided funds and weapons only. The Soviet forces accepted defeat and pulled out by February 1989 but in the ten-year gruesome war, the country was devastated and two million Afghan civilians lost their lives. Pakistan had to face KGB-KHAD-RAW-Al-Zulfiqar sabotage and subversion.
No sooner the US achieved all its objectives, the US not only ditched Pakistan in 1990 and put it under harsh sanctions, but to rub salt on wounds of Pakistan, it made India its strategic partner which was the camp follower of USSR. The Mujahideen eulogized as holy warriors were abandoned as a result of which civil war broke out between the warring groups.
The Taliban under Mulla Omar started their Islamic movement from Kandahar in 1994 and after capturing Kabul in 1996, they established Islamic Emirate. Taliban were in control of 93% territory till 07 Oct 2001, and only 7% in the north was controlled by the Northern Alliance (NA) comprising Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras. The military wing of NA was trained by the Indian and Iranian military trainers in Iran.
From 1997 onwards, the Taliban regime came in bad books of Washington because of cancellation of oil & gas pipelines project of UNICOL and was put under sanctions. Al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden that had been created by CIA to fight the Soviets turned hostile and started hitting American targets in Gulf of Aden and African countries.
During the 5-year rule of Taliban, Afghanistan was made free of warlords, crimes and social vices including rapes and drug business. People could leave their houses and shops unlocked since none dared to commit theft. Justice was cheap and quick. For the first time since 1947, Pakistan enjoyed very cordial relations with Afghanistan and its western border became safe and Indian presence in Afghanistan faded. The closeness promoted the concept of strategic depth. After the forcible removal of Taliban regime by the US-NATO forces in November 2001, Pak-Afghanistan relations have strained and Indian influence has bounced back in a big way. It was owing to their social and judicial achievements that Talibanization crept into FATA and Malakand Division in Pakistan and later give birth to TTP and TNSM.
Pakistan-USA relations have all along been transactional in nature and never developed into deep-rooted strategic relationship based on mutual trust and friendship. The 74 years history has seen many ups and downs; the US behaving like an overbearing mother-in-law and Pakistan put on a roller coaster ride behaving like a submissive daughter-in-law, taking her barbs without a whimper. Such an unfair treatment was meted out in spite of Pakistan having put its national security at stake three times and each time suffering a great deal.
The US embraced Pakistan for the accomplishment of its objectives in this region and no sooner the objectives were achieved, it was unceremoniously dumped. Each time the US ventured into this part of the world, it found Pakistan to be most suitable and most pliable to serve its ends. Pak-US relations were at their best during Eisenhower-Dulles era after which the US started wooing India and forced Pakistan to lean on China.
During the Cold War, Pakistan was reluctantly taken on board by the US in 1953/4 to help in containing communism in South Asia after India which was the camp follower of the Soviet Union refused to become part of the US defensive arc. Pakistan joined the western pacts due to its extreme security concerns from India and Afghanistan, both backed by former Soviet Union.
Although Pakistan earned the title of ‘most allied ally of the US’ and became totally dependent upon the US arms and technology, but the US disappointed Pakistan when its support was needed the most in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. Pakistan was denied the crucially needed war munitions from the US as well as diplomatic support during the two wars, while India continued to receive arms from the USSR and kept the resolution of Kashmir dispute at bay due to Soviet vetoes.
The US ignored India’s nuclear explosion in 1974 but promptly imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1979 on mere suspicion that it was working on a nuclear program. However, soon after, when Pakistan’s services were needed to fight the occupying Soviet forces in Afghanistan, it once again hugged it in 1981 and doled out monetary and military assistance.
Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan was kept under the leash under the charges of developing an Islamic bomb, nuclear proliferation and cross border terrorism in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Holy warriors were dubbed as terrorists and hounded. Indo-US relations blossomed into strategic relationship during Bill Clinton rule and thereon it kept flourishing leaps and bounds.
Pakistan was once again taken on board by the US after 9/11 for the achievement of its short-term regional objectives in Afghanistan. From the very outset, the US intoxicated with power ignored the geography, history, culture, sociology and ideology of Afghanistan. It didn’t bother that it had been a graveyard of empires where it was easy to enter but near impossible to exit safely. Not only Alexander the great fell, but the British also failed and the USSR disintegrated.
Blinded by rage to avenge the 9/11 attacks and immersed in the pool of arrogance and egotism, the US and its western allies jumped into the inferno of Afghanistan with full zeal and enthusiasm, and vaulted from one plan to another in pursuit of a hollow strategy, which was never changed to correct its course.
Gen Musharraf accepted all 7 demands of the US since he was denied the option of staying neutral. To save Pakistan from destruction, he ditched the Taliban and provided airbases, seaport, land routes and intelligence cooperation to the invaders. The US could not have so easily toppled the Taliban regime and occupied Afghanistan in a month if Pakistan had not provided full support.
Completely isolated and encircled from all directions, and the traditional fallback position of FATA denied, the Taliban could fight the ground forces of NA, but couldn’t have resisted the massive air bombing for long. Hence they wisely undertook a tactical withdrawal to regain strength and start bleeding the occupiers through prolonged insurrectional war. The euphoric George W. Bush sounded the victory bugles too prematurely and took it for granted that the Taliban were down and out.
Much against Pakistan’s advice, the US installed NA heavy regime in Kabul which was pro-India and anti-Pakistan. The puppet regime ignored the Afghan Pashtuns and started giving more space to India to make it the preeminent player in Afghanistan as was desired by the US.
Ignoring the heavy majority Pashtuns and relying solely on the minority NA regime was the first mistake made by Bush administration. This blunder was followed by another when it imposed the US tailored constitution upon the tribal based society.
Opening of the second front by USA in Iraq in 2003 without consolidating the gains in Afghanistan was another slip-up, since engagement on two fronts diluted the war effort of the US-NATO and allowed breathing space to the Taliban to regroup in FATA.
Yet another error was raising non-Pashtun heavy Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) which turned into a liability.
CIA and NATO as well as Afghan warlords indulged in drug business which had almost been eliminated by the Taliban. These distractions loosened the grip of ISAF led by weak military commanders over Afghanistan and enabled the Taliban to recover lost space in southern and eastern Afghanistan and also earn money from drug business for their war effort.
Since the two land routes from Pakistan used by NATO containers passed through the Taliban dominated rural belt, the US security contractors and Afghan officials had to pay toll tax to the Taliban for passage of every container which also became a source of income for them.
Misled by misconceived victory, over confident Bush instead of fulfilling the promises made to the Afghans by promoting democracy, education and development works, he gave preference to covert operations against Pakistan and forced Pakistan to fight the Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan (SW). That way, Pakistan earned the hostility of Al-Qaeda and own tribesmen.
Ironically, while Washington waged war in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring democracy, it stoutly upheld Pakistan’s military dictatorship.
While Pak security forces fought the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch rebel groups in FATA and in Baluchistan that were funded, trained, equipped and guided by RAW-NDS combine to destabilize Pakistan, they didn’t confront the Afghan Taliban whose struggle was entirely confined to Afghanistan and they never fired a bullet against Pak forces.
Pakistan started taking measures to protect its national security in 2008 once it learnt that CIA-FBI had gained complete sway over FATA with the help of TTP formed in Dec 2006. Blackwater was inducted in 2008 to bolster CIA-FBI in urban areas of Pakistan. Nexus of CIA-RAW-NDS-MI-6-Mossad-BND in Kabul supported anti-Pakistan proxies in FATA and Baluchistan.
In order to keep the supply routes to the TTP open so that it could indulge in terrorism in FATA and KP, the US rejected Pakistan’s proposal to fence the western border, or to increase number of border posts on Afghan side to prevent infiltration.
A coordinated Indo-Afghan propaganda campaign backed by the west was launched to defame Pakistan and its premier institutions.
Based on Obama’s Af-Pak strategy of anvil and hammer, managed by Richard Holbrook, ISAF failed to provide the anvil when Pak forces delivered the hammer in SW in 2009, thus letting the TTP militants under Hakimullah Mehsud to flee to Afghanistan. Pak forces managed to retrieve 17 out of 19 administrative units under the influence of TTP and confined its presence to the last bastions of North Waziristan (NW) and Khyber Agency.
But for Pakistan which nabbed over 600 Al-Qaeda senior leaders and operators and handed them over to CIA, the ISAF couldn’t have dismantled and defeated them in Afghanistan as claimed by Obama. Bulk of Al-Qaeda fighters had otherwise shifted to Iraq in 2004 and formed Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula after the US-NATO forces occupied Iraq in May 2003.
Two troop surges in 2009 raised the strength of ISAF (an amalgam of 48 military contingents) to near 1,50,000, but it proved futile since it resulted in heavy casualties of the occupiers. Adoption of rearward posture and abandonment of boots on ground strategy by ISAF after suffering setbacks in battles of Helmand and Nuristan and putting ANSF in the forefront, and thereafter putting heavy reliance on airpower, was a wrong decision made by Gen McChrystal. It enabled the Taliban to snatch the initiative and build momentum of offensive, which couldn’t be reversed by the occupying force.
Tensions between the US and Pakistan kept increasing when the US adopted a highly discriminatory policy of blaming Pakistan for the failures of ISAF-ANSF, and instability in Afghanistan; subjecting it to drone war; insulting and penalizing it and constantly pressing it to do more against Haqqani Network (HN) and Quetta Shura, and at the same time covering up the sins of India and Kabul regime and going out of the way to reward them. Extreme pressure was mounted to flush out HN from NW. Discriminatory policy brought in element of distrust.
2011 was the worst year for Pakistan in which Raymond Davis, Abbottabad attack, Memogate and Salala attack took place which forced Pakistan to cut off military cooperation with the US and stop the two NATO supply routes for six months.
The reason behind the discriminatory behavior was that while Indo-US-Afghan-West-Israel are strategic partners and work in collusion to achieve their common objectives, Pakistan doesn’t fit into the US security paradigm or the Indo-Pacific strategy, and as such was accepted as a tactical partner to fight terrorism both inside Pakistan and in Afghanistan.
The points of friction which kept the Pak-US relations dysfunctional are Pakistan’s nuclear program, the CPEC, its closeness with China, hostility against India mainly due to unresolved Kashmir dispute, its refusal to recognize Israel, and its refusal to fight Afghan Taliban.
Initiation of peace talks by Obama in 2011 which led to opening of Taliban’s political office at Doha in mid-June 2013 lacked sincerity since whichever Taliban leader came forward for a peace deal, whether from TTP or the Taliban, was droned. Wali, Baituallah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, Akhtar Mansour, were all killed by drones. Fight and talk strategy was aimed at dividing Taliban movement.
After withdrawal of bulk of ISAF forces by Dec 2014, the Taliban rapidly captured more territory and gained a military ascendency over occupying forces and the ANSF. Demoralization set in among the occupiers and collaborators; green-over-blue attacks as well as suicide cases increased; rate of desertions in ANSF accelerated.
Installation of a unity regime in Kabul in 2016 by Obama regime was a bad decision. Due to poor governance, corruption and power tussle between Ghani and Abdullah, writ of the government got confined to Kabul.
The Taliban gained dominance over 56% rural territory through which major supply routes pass; its influence stretched to well over 80% area where they installed shadow governments; could strike any part of the country; developed war economy; had sound command, control & communication infrastructure; fair judicial system and dedicated fighters.
The Taliban succeeded in breaking their isolation and were wooed by China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Qatar, UAE, KSA, and Germany. China signed a $ 3 billion development project with the Taliban. It reduced the clout of Pakistan over them.
Writ of the ANSF backed by the US led Resolute Support Group got restricted to capital cities which are often attacked by the Taliban.
Landmark peace agreement
After maximizing force against the Taliban and pressure against Pakistan, Donald Trump reopened the stalled peace talks in July 2018 and finally inked the historic peace agreement with the Taliban on February 29, 2020, in which the Kabul regime was excluded. The UN, Russia, China and Pakistan endorsed the agreement.
The Taliban agreed not to allow Afghan soil for terrorism against the US/allies, reduce violence, desist from attacking western targets in Afghanistan, sever ties with al-Qaeda, and to open inter-Afghan dialogue for a comprehensive political settlement. The US agreed to pull out all troops by May 1, 2021 and to refrain from attacking the Taliban. 5000 Taliban prisoners and 1000 ANSF prisoners were to be released within 3 months after start of intra-Afghan talks on March 10, 2020, and Taliban leaders removed from the UN blacklist.
Intra-Afghan dialogue got delayed due to Ashraf Ghani’s reservations and foot dragging over prisoner exchange. Firefight between the Taliban and ANSF supported by the US continued in which former had an upper hand.
Trump was keen to end the longest war and make a clean break from Afghanistan and he reduced the US troop level to 2500 only.
The writer is a retired Brig Gen, war veteran, defence & security analyst, international columnist, author of five books, 6th book under publication, Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre, takes part in TV talk shows. Email: [email protected]
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