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Posts Tagged East Pakistan

From East Pakistan to Bangladesh by Brig(Retd) Asif Haroon Raja

From East Pakistan to Bangladesh

Asif Haroon Raja

 

 

The Pakistan that was achieved with so much of blood and tears, was split into two on the fateful day of December 16, 1971. Even after the passage of 47 years, the traumatic experience still haunts us and cannot be washed away from the memories of those who had witnessed the tragic break up. After the truncation of Pakistan, the new leadership desperately wanted a scapegoat to defuse the temper of the nation. Having lost the war on the eastern front, the Army was put in the woods. Apparently, the worthy Hamoodur Commission Report (HCR) with a mandate limited to the military’s role in East Pakistan only, influenced by the domestic environments as well as the poisonous propaganda launched by the western and Indian print and electronic media, put the whole blame on General Yahya Khan and Lt Gen AAK Niazi for the debacle. However, the Commission despite harshly bashing the Army also concluded that the debacle was a result of the cumulative follies of our leaders for the past 23 years and the ferment that was simmering in the minds of the Bengalis that led to such an impasse.

While the politicians failed to maintain unity among the diversified communities, the media failed to counter the Indo-Bangla-Soviet-Western-Jewish propaganda campaign. Diplomats failed to defend and present Pakistan’s case before the world – as a victim of a pre-planned international conspiracy. The military failed to protect our ideological and territorial frontiers against internal and external enemies. Unfortunately, the government officials posted in East Pakistan, mostly Urdu speaking and Punjabis, instead of performing their duties as public servants, behaved like demi-gods and made little effort to address the grievances of East Bengal.

Having suffered for nearly two hundred years at the hands of British-Hindu combo, the Bengalis were in the forefront of Pakistan movement and were the first to respond to Quaid-e-Azam’s call for Pakistan. A.K. Fazlul Haq, Nawab Sir Salimullah, Begum Shaista Ikramullah, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, Jogendra Nath Mandal, Nurul Amin were the frontrunners of Freedom Movement. However, this love and commitment to Pakistan underwent a radical change in two decades after the birth of Pakistan and their affections shifted to their erstwhile tormentors. This is where the tragedy gets compounded.

The Bengalis had great hopes from Pakistan and dreamt of a prosperous tomorrow; little realising that economics works on hard facts, not on emotional outbursts. They expected economic miracles, which never materialised due to extreme backwardness of East Pakistan, natural calamities, east-west misgivings, divergent perceptions, and above all the Hindu propaganda launched right at the roots of the new generation – the primary and secondary schools level.

The deep-rooted antagonism between the Muslims of East Bengal and the caste Hindus of Bengal has washed away and was replaced with misgivings and hatred between the Muslims of the two wings of Pakistan. This astonishing change in the perceptions of East Bengal Muslims came about as a result of well thought out subversion conducted by the Indian psychological operators duly reinforced by agencies of other regional countries.

Bengalis grew up in a culture of misgivings, mistrust, violence and hate and as a misled nation easily swayed by the Indian brainwashing. They tended to grieve over everything imaginable under the sun and made a lot of hue and cry over the oft-repeated theme of exploitation by the western wing. When power resided in the hands of Bengalis (Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra, Suhrawardy and Iskandar Mirza from 1951 to 1958), they grieved over language issue, economic deprivation and power-sharing based on population. The Bengali political leaders exploited their illiteracy and poverty.

However, it was the belittling attitude of the West Pakistan officials, treating the Bengalis as an inferior and uncouth race, which offended the Bengali Muslims and made them bitter. The affluent Hindu community in East Pakistan, particularly 90% of teachers and professors fueled resentment and converted Muslim Bengali bitterness into hatred. After the military operation in March 1971, about 8-10 million Bengalis, 80% of which were Hindus fled to India. They were housed in 330 refugee camps that had already been prepared and from within them, the Indian military trained the rebel forces to launch a nine-month-long insurgency.  

India sowed the seeds of subversion within East Pakistan and self-serving politicians of Pakistan nurtured the crop. Indian propaganda of exploitation by West Pakistan and treating East Pakistan as a colony misled the people of East Pakistan. Their emotional nature started viewing Indians as their saviours against their pre-supposed “West Pakistani masters”. This is where they blundered and showed political unawareness.

Economic iniquities in East Pakistan were considerably reduced during Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s ten-year golden rule, however, issues of power deprivation saw them resorting to violent strikes and vandalism. Lawlessness created by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan and by Z.A. Bhutto in West Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to resign and hand over power to General Yahya Khan. Although the latter did his best to assuage the hurt feelings of the Bengalis by doling out political concessions and addressing economic inequities, by that time it was too late. The charms of Mujib swayed the Bengalis so intensely that they decided to break away from Pakistan after living together for more than twenty-four years and accept erstwhile tormentor (India) from whose shackles freedom was achieved, as a saviour and a mentor.

In the final act of the gory drama, the ill-fated leadership of General Yahya Khan from March 1969 to December 1971 could not save the ship from sinking. Politically naïve Yahya Khan dreamed of another five years of presidency, if not more. Truculent Mujib craved for wresting power on his terms, on the basis of victory in the polls. Bhutto hungered for half of the cake without qualifying for it. The duo remained fixated in their respective orbits and maintained an uncompromising stance till the end. Yahya performed poorly as a referee between the two rival contenders of power. Despite knowing Mujib’s past track record connected with Agartala conspiracy which had been unearthed in 1967, he acted too softly with him and ignored his wrong-doings and his willful defiance of the Legal Framework Order. He was allowed to base his election manifesto on his highly controversial six points, which bordered on secession.

Appeasement instead of firmness by Yahya Khan and the administrators in the eastern wing were at the cost of ensuring free and fair elections. While the masses in East Pakistan were terrorized during the yearlong election campaign, wide-scale unfair means were employed on the polling day by the ruffians of Awami League to turn the tide in its favour. The militancy of Awami League climaxed after it won a dubious landslide victory in the December 1970 polls.

The obduracy of Bhutto to share power at all costs, intransigence of Mujib to shun all moves for conciliation, cavalier attitude of Yahya Khan and his colleagues and Yahya’s fatal decision to postpone the National Assembly session at Dacca on 01 March 1971 without giving another date and without taking Mujib into confidence, resulted in the otherwise avoidable carnage of human beings. By the middle of March 1971, a civil disobedience movement was in full swing and a parallel government had come into existence.

The militant Bengalis egged on by Mujib and carried away by Bengali nationalism hacked to death 150,000 non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis and raped West Pakistani girls and women in hundreds. According to Qutbuddin Aziz in his book “Blood and Tears”, the figure of those killed ranges between 100,000 to 500,000. The Marauders, who indulged in pillage, plunder and slaughter, were no more than few hundred. The massacre of non-Bengalis caused the initial exodus to India. The second spree of the massacre of non-Bengalis took place in November-December 1971.

Those who physically saw the savagery of Bengali extremists shudder to recollect the horrifying scenes and feel mystified as to how a Muslim could indulge in such barbarities against another fellow Muslim. They also are still resentful and befuddled as to why the government and the Army remained indifferent for 25 days when East Pakistan was burning, and why our media didn’t counter India and Swadhin Bangla Betar clandestine radio propaganda, and why was media prevented from highlighting the atrocities of Bengalis against non-Bengalis. The plea taken was that there might be a backlash in West Pakistan against Bengalis. The world was kept ignorant of the mass killings of pro-Pakistan Bengalis, Biharis and West Pakistanis. Biharis had been disarmed on the advice of Mujib to the Martial Law Administrator. All the West Pakistan political parties except PPP and Qayyum Khan League supported Mujib.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After the failure of parleys from 15-24 March in Dacca due to Mujib’s intransigence and refusal to accept any formula within the framework of a united Pakistan, Operation Searchlight was launched on the night of 25 March to stop the bloodshed and re-establish the writ of the government. The 35 jilted foreign journalists (among them was a Jewish Correspondent of New York Times, Sydney Schanberg, who wrote vitriolic and fake news articles against Pakistan Army) who had been ousted from Dacca on 27 March by Lt Gen Tikka Khan; because of their biased reporting of the cyclone in October 1970 and hushing of 1-25 March mayhem of Bengalis, teamed up with Indian media at Calcutta and launched a full-throttled propaganda to demonize the Army and project them as human eating monsters and rapists.

The crackdown ignited the powder keg and demand for provincial autonomy suddenly transformed into a secessionist movement leading to separation. Failure of Pakistan’s publicity wing to counter the vile propaganda undermined the faith of Pakistani soldiers in the cause they were fighting for and also contributed towards intensification of Bengali nationalism and hatred against the Army.

Once India applied the military instrument with a preponderance of ground, air and naval power against a highly fatigued and marooned Pakistani force numbering only 45000 armed forces soldiers and paramilitary forces (23500 as regular soldiers); the end was a foregone conclusion. The sinking could have been delayed by Lt Gen AAK Niazi but not prevented. It was too late.

It must not be forgotten that Pakistani troops in East Pakistan fought under extremely adverse conditions, which have few parallels in the history of warfare. To start with they were put under an extreme test of patience when they were ridiculed and made the butt of criticism by the Awami League. They were confined to barracks from 03-25 March 1971 during which they helplessly saw the horrifying atrocities committed against non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan elements by the Awami League militants and rogue elements. Isolated army pickets were attacked and men in uniform were ruthlessly killed. As the Bengali nationalism peaked, many West Pakistani officers, men and their families serving in East Bengal Regiments and East Pakistan Rifles were brutally hacked to death.

Under such volatile conditions, the lone 14 Division initially got busy in the onerous task of disarming the Bengali regular troops, para military forces and civil police and also trying to re-establish the writ of the government. All this was done with a meagre force of 12000 troops. Once reinforcements arrived in April, they recaptured all the towns taken over by the rebels and Indian soldiers (disguised as Mukti Bahini).  

They also got embroiled in quelling the insurgency waged by the 100,000 Mukti Bahini duly trained in all types of warfare, equipped and aided by India in 59 camps. Reinforcements rushed in from West Pakistan in the last week of March/first week of April 1971 (depleted two divisions) were neither in possession of tanks; medium artillery, heavy weapons, nor acclimatized or trained to fight guerrilla warfare in riverine terrain.

After quelling the insurgency in a record time of a little over one month, they had to suffer the rigours of monsoon under insecure battle conditions with no rest or respite. They also remained involved in restoring the rail, road and river communication means and putting the administrative machinery back on the rail while maintaining law and order. During this perilous process, many lives were lost and many got maimed for life owing to clashes with the rebels, and mines and booby traps planted for them.

After September 1971, they got distributed in penny packets to guard the frontiers and defend every inch of the territory. By November 1971, casualties in counter insurgency operations steadily mounted. 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 other ranks embraced martyrdom and few thousands got wounded. 

Indian military took nine months to get prepared for the offensive. By the time the Indian forces intervened on 21 November, the deployed troops were thoroughly fatigued and suffered from innumerable operational, administrative and technical handicaps. The troops knew that they were surrounded on all sides and no help could reach them from West Pakistan or from elsewhere. With 10:1 ratio, and devoid of air cover, they were fighting outnumbered and outgunned. Fighting the enemy in front, and the Mukti Bahini hiding behind every bush made the entire rear area insecure and facilitated forward movement of Indian forces. At the time of surrender, the defenders of Khulna, Rajshahi, Nator, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Joyedpur, Bogra, Sylhet, Myanmati and Chittagong were still putting up stiff resistance. No single army unit surrendered before 16 December.

Stiffest resistance was put up by my unit 4 FF of which I was a part in the battle of Hilli, where the repeated attacks of the Indian 20 Mountain Division supported by an armoured brigade, corps artillery and air support were blunted for 19 days and not an inch was lost. The enemy had to change its axis of advance and undertook a wide detour to race for Bogra. In the epic battle, Maj Muhammad Akram Shaheed was awarded Nishan-e-Haider posthumously, and I had the proud privilege of taking over the command of his Company and also recovering his body lying well ahead of forward defences. Maj Akram was buried in Bogra on 6 December.    

The troops in erstwhile East Pakistan fought with valour and determination to protect the motherland until ordered to the ceasefire. They may have continued to fight had the senior leadership not caved in and decided to give up. Thousands of our brave officers and men were killed while fighting for a united Pakistan. They were never to return home and are buried somewhere in a foreign land. Their graves are unknown and their deeds have been overshadowed under the dark shadow of capitulation.

It will be unfair not to make a mention of the sacrifices rendered by the Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis who stood beside the Pak security forces and fought the rebels tenaciously till the very end. 

But for the betrayal of Bengalis, the Indian military despite its preponderance in men and material could never have achieved victory.

Had the Polish resolution or the Anglo-French resolution been accepted by Bhutto, a face-saving UN resolution of ceasefire and honourable return of armed forces and civilians to West Pakistan, and possibly some kind of political settlement like confederation with East Pakistan could have been obtained.

The writer is a retired Brig, a war veteran, defence and security analyst, author of five books which include ‘Maarka Hilli’, ‘Muhammad bin Qasim to Gen Musharraf’ and ‘Roots of 1971 Tragedy’. His next book ‘East Pakistan Crisis: Battle of Hilli’ is under publication. He is Vice Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre and member Central Working Committee of Pakistan-Ex-Servicemen-Society. asifharoonraja@gmail.com         

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Bhutto and the Polish Resolution By Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)

Bhutto and the Polish Resolution

By

 

 Col. S. Riaz Jafri (Retd)

 

Many may have seen Pakistani TV channels occasionally showing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was representing Pakistan as its nominated Foreign Minister, tearing and throwing away some papers in rage and walking out of the UN Security Council.

 

 

 

 

                                                                               

 

              

ZAB tearing the Polish Resolution  and Walking out of the UNSC Session

 

 

Well … well … the papers were the Polish Resolution and it was 15th of  December 1971 when the 71 war between India and Pakistan was in its most crucial stage and for Pakistan, every day – nay – every moment mattered incalculably.  

Events leading to the Polish Resolution were that after months of shelling at East Pakistan borders, sending infiltrators and assisting the Bengali Mukti Bahini, Indian armed forces crossed the international borders in the Eastern Sector on Eid ul Fitr day –  the 22 November 1971.  On 3rd December armed hostilities broke out on the Western Front also. As full-fledged India and Pakistan War started the matter came before the UN Security Council. 

On 4 December 1971 Pakistan’s representative Agha Shahi argued that Pakistan’s internal crisis was outside the ambit of the Security Council who could deal only with international peace and not the internal peace of a member state.

The Soviet delegate held Pakistan Military responsible for the situation and proposed that the so-called Bangladesh government, formed in exile on Indian territory, be also given a hearing in the Council, which was vetoed by China.

A deadlock resulted in the Security Council when the Soviets too vetoed resolutions moved by the United States and China calling for “immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops from each other’s territory”

 In the meantime, the situation in East Pakistan had become very critical. But most surprisingly while the matter of life and death for Pakistan was being discussed and negotiated by the world powers at the UN, Bhutto who had arrived there on 11th Dec 1971 stayed away for full three days from the UNSC debates resting in his Waldorf-Astoria hotel suite ‘indisposed’ due to common cold!

On 15 December 1971, Poland sponsored a draft resolution that had the Soviet support.  It provided for the release of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and transfer of power to the elected representatives under his leadership in East Pakistan, cessation of military actions in all the areas, initial and then permanent ceasefire, withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces to the preset locations in the eastern theatre, evacuation of Pakistani nationals and armed forces from there and the withdrawal of the Indian armed forces from the eastern theatre in consultation with the newly established authority.

Since for all practical purposes, Pakistan’s acceptance of the Polish Resolution would have meant that it had agreed to the secession of East Pakistan, Bhutto declined to take upon himself the responsibility of conceding defeat there and walked out of the Security Council.

A little closer look at the Polish Resolution would, however, show that it favored Pakistan to quite some extent.  Though the acceptance of the Polish Resolution would not have prevented the dismemberment of Pakistan, which in any case was a matter of forgone conclusion yet,  its implementation would have averted the sad and stigmatic episode of Pakistan armed forces’ surrender in East Pakistan and becoming Prisoners of War. It provided for:

1.        A Cease-Fire and immediate mutual withdrawal before the capture of Dacca.

2.        This would have deprived India of the clear victory it sought.

3.        A quick return of the Pakistan Army under UN arrangements would have greatly complicated India’s capacity to assist the Awami league in establishing a stable and moderate regime in East Pakistan.

4.        As once both Indian & Pakistani forces returned by virtue of the resolution the conglomeration of Mukti-Bahini forces would have commenced their ‘own civil war for power’, in the race to control the new country.

5.        This was a no-win situation for India as that would have forced India to restore the strategic points on the Pakistani side of cease-fire line in Kashmir, that the Indians had seized at some cost in the 1971 war.

6.        To add further to above, Indra Gandhi knew that behind the Polish Resolution, really stood the Soviets, and in principle, New Dehli had reluctantly conceded that it had no options but to accept the resolution that had been approved unanimously.

However, ZAB in  his quite lengthy and forceful speech and probably driven by his some hidden inner desire stalked out of Assembly saying, Finally, I am not a rat. I have never ratted in my life. I have faced assassination attempts, I have faced imprisonments. I have always confronted crises. Today I am not ratting, but I am leaving your Security Council. I find it disgraceful to my person and to my country to remain here a moment longer than is necessary. I am not boycotting. Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than the Treaty of Versailles, legalize aggression, legalize occupation, legalize everything that has been illegal up to 15 December 1971. I will not be a party to it. We will fight; we will go back and fight. My country beckons me. Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are. (Ripping papers) I am going.”

 

Next day the 16 December 1971 East Pakistan was lost forever.

 

 Reflecting on the wisdom of the hindsight of 45 years one is at times compelled to ponder over some of the insolvable quizzes, like :

·        Why did Bhutto evade the UNSC debates from 11 Dec till 14 Dec 1971 on the pretext of suffering from the common cold?   

·        Was he filibustering and gaining time to make the position of the Pak armed forces untenable and wanted them to surrender?  In this context  a page from  Mr.  Sultan Muhammad Khan’s book ‘Memories & Reflections’. pages-385-386, who was the foreign secretary in January 1970 and handled Pakistan’s foreign relations during the civil war in East Pakistan is quite revealing, He says, “The no less important apprehension that two or three army divisions with their formations and arms intact, returning to West Pakistan with a stigma of failure, would be a serious threat to the military and emerging political leadership. Questions would be raised by them to determine and assign responsibility for the political and military failure in East Pakistan. Things could take an unpredictable course and emergence of a new military leadership which would put an end to the prospect of the civil rule was a distinct possibility”. To conclude: Had the Army come back, as stated in the remarks above, Yahya & his team, as well ZAB would have been jointly tried by an Army commission, and their fates sealed, a coup was definitely expected”.

·        And then look at the Justice Hamood ur Rehman Commission appointed by him and the mandate given to it, “To inquire into and find out the circumstances in which the Commander Eastern command surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a cease-fire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”   What could a commission entrusted with such a task (purely military in nature) do except find faults and blame the army for the debacle ?!

·        Why was the Commission not given the task, “To enquire into the circumstances which led to the cessation of East Pakistan from Pakistan”.  The outcome report would have been quite different.

·        And the million dollar question; “Would Mujib ur Rehman have proved to be a loyal and patriotic PM had Bhutto agreed to his becoming the PM of united Pakistan as was announced by President  Yahya Khan?

 

I leave these afterthoughts for the readers to decide for themselves.

 

Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)
30 Westridge 1
Rawalpindi 46000
Pakistan
E.mail: jafri@rifiela.com

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Revisiting the fall of Dhaka

 
 
Revisiting the fall of Dhaka 
 
by Sabena Siddiqi
 
imgres-2Media reported the hanging of Abdul Quader Molla in Bangladesh, a leading Jamaat-i-Islami leader; the first person to go to gallows for the alleged massacre of 1971. A leading newspaper reported, “Molla’s lawyers had protested the original order, saying the death penalty was awarded based on evidence given by only one prosecution witness, who had also earlier given two different versions of the same event… UN Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay wrote to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seeking a stay of the execution, saying the trial did not meet stringent international standards for the death penalty.” (12-12-2013)
 
A brief revisit to the 1971 genocide is in order. The facts are well detailed in a book Blood and Tears (Published 1974) by historian Qutubuddin Aziz. It details 170 eye witness accounts of atrocities on non-Bengalis and pro Pakistan Bengalis by Awami League militants and other rebels in 55 towns of then East Pakistan between March-April 1971 with photographs. Another interesting book by B Raman; “The Kaoboys of RAW: Down Memory Lane” talks about the role of Israel and Indian intelligence agencies in creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Raman has headed the counter-terrorism branch of India’s intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
 
The Indian Express in a piece by Sabyasachi Bandopadhyay, “Didn’t fight on front, yet proud to have helped Mukti Bahini” writes, “Kartik Kumar Ganguly, then a Major, was assigned to help a motley group of people from then East Pakistan — some deserters from the Pakistan Army but largely students, other young civilians, factory laborers and farmers — who formed the Mukti Bahini. His task, he says, was to take care of their various needs and give them courage… Ganguly, one of a number of Indian Army officers who interacted with the mukti joddhas, found them lacking in training but not in enthusiasm…” (Published December 16, 2011) 
 
Borrowing research from a treatise by Lt. Gen [R] Kamal Matinuddin, “Tragedy of Errors; East Pakistan Crisis 1968-1971” states that the hard core team leaders of Mukhti-Bahini were the deserters, from the Bengali element [officers, junior-commissioned, non-commissioned, and other ranks] composed in the following Army and para-military formations:. Six battalions of East Bengal Regiment 5,000, East Pakistan Rifles [like our Rangers in West Pakistan] 16,000, Razakars 50,000, Bengali in East Pakistan police and allied services 45,000. This is a total of 116,000 forces. 
 
East-PakistanBy 3rd March 1971 a de facto Bangladesh Government was in place. It was after the March 1971 crackdown by the Pakistan Army in Dacca and later all over East Pakistan that the 6 battalions of East Bengal Regiment as well as the forces above cited deserted and went over to the Indian Army. Colonel [retired] Osmani; the first commanding Officer 1st East Bengal Regiment in 1952 and later been made the Commandant of East Bengal Regimental Centre at Chittagong having retired from Pakistan Army in 1966 organized, with the help of the Indian Army; a militant wing of Awami League in July 1970. It was he who led the march past of the militant Awami League on 23rd March 1971,in front of Shiekh Mujib’s house. On 17April 1971 the Acting President of the defacto Bangladesh Government made him the Commander in Chief of the ‘Bengal Liberation Army’ with a rank of a ‘General.’
 
Although Pakistan Army had by end of April 1971 regained all border posts in East Pakistan and Bengal Liberation Army had suffered defeat, it was then that the Indian Army moved in. It set up 6 training centers and unlimited cash flow to induce younger student element from East Pakistan to join and be trained. All of these 6 training centers which encircled East Pakistan on the Indian side of the borders were under Brigadiers of Indian Army. Soon after another 70,000 young Bengali students inspired by Bengali patriotism joined these camps for a three week crash course including use of mortars, mines, machine-gun handling as well as use of PRC 25 wireless sets for communication. Selected 600 became the naval wing of Mukhti-Bahini; trained by Indian special forces as ‘Frogmen’ to plant explosives under the ships and take over boats, barrages and launches plying in the rivers of East Pakistan. 
 
Other radical elements arose as well from the men trained in the 6 Indian training centers. They were a force of 20,000 under the two sons of Sheikh Mujib namely Moin & Kamal and three other i.e. Rafiq, Siraj- ul- Islam & Tofail Ahmed. Yet another set of special forces were led by Major Zia-ur-Rehman [later President of BD] called ‘ZED FORCE’ another was ‘Kay force under Major Khalid Musharaff. Yet another was the ‘S’ force under Major Saifullah, another large force; the ‘Kader Bahini’ was under Abdul Kader Siddiqui who styled himself as the ‘Tiger of Tangail’ and had 20,000 men under him. (Reference ‘Dismemberment of Pakistan’ by Brig. Jagder Singh 1988) General Osmani divided his Mukhti-Bahini force of 1,0000 in ten sectors, each under a former officer of East Bengal Regiment. (Reference ‘ Bangladesh at War’ by Major General Saifullah 1989-page 149). Besides the various Bengali Liberation Army outfits the Indian Army had encircled East Pakistan with a total effective strength of 400,000 men. (Seepages -408,411-418, ‘Roots of Tragedy’ by Brig. Asif Haroon 2005).
 
Now comes the icing on the cake; the total strength of Pakistan Army was just 45,000 out which the actual fighting arm the infantry had 23,000 men, and 11,000 were men from armour, artillery, engineers, signals and ancillary units. A total of 34,000 men. .The other 11,000 were from civil armed forces like the police and other armed, yet non-combatants outfits who were West Pakistani personnel serving in East Pakistan. [page 52 The Betrayal of East Pakistan by Lt. Gen. A.K Niazi, Oxford Press.1998]
 
Martin Woollacott in a brilliant book review of Dead Reckoning by Sarmila Bose says, “Bose’s case-by-case arithmetic leads her in the end to estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in 1971.” He goes on to state, “The wider revision of the conflict’s history she implies exonerates the Pakistani government of any plot to rule the east by force, suggests that the Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman let the genie of nationalism out of the bottle but could not control it, and insists that the conflict was a civil war within East Pakistan…Yet when she underlines how stretched the Pakistani forces were, how unready they were for the role of suppression that was thrust on them, and how perplexed they were in the face of a Bengali hostility that seemed to them so disproportionate, what she writes rings very true. The killings by Bengalis of non-Bengali minorities, of Bengalis who stuck with the idea of a united Pakistan, and even of some Hindu Bengalis – all of whose deaths were attributed at the time to the Pakistani army – needs to be reckoned in any fair balance.” (The Guardian July 1, 2011)
 
Who was outnumbered, who committed atrocities upon who is now clear. Lack of research leads to formation of uneducated opinion. It was under these odds that men of Jamiat-e-Islami in counter outfits like Al Badar and Al Shams fought those who wanted to break Pakistan.
 
Reports announce death of three protesters and two activists from Awami League. These riots were to be expected in light of a very public execution of Molla. The headline of Wall Street Journal tellingly announced, “Bangladesh Executes Opposition Leader”. The hanging of Molla is likely to lead to polarization within the Bengali society. A friend wrote, “The hanging of the JI leader by Bangladesh was nothing but a witch hunt and a state sponsored atrocity!”
 

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BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN: Beware Pakistan; TTP terrorists and Baloch insurgents are India’s KAO-Boys….

balochistan-unrest-foreign-powers-operatives-creating-mess

The research reveals that soon after the formation of RAW, Rameshwar Nath Kao’s first priority was to form a team of professionals at the top level of agency; well trusted guys of Kao as majority of them was known as gays and thus were very commonly called the Kao-boys of RAW, not within the agency but also in the media across India and those officials who were not inducted in RAW by Kao, despite being falling on merit were the main sources of such leaks to the media and also to the young RAW officers. The research reveals that RAW launched the Bangla plan soon after its inception.

The basic features of Kao plan were to:

  • launch a Psychological Warfare operation in East Pakistan;
  • to communicate with East Pakistani politicians, mainly those belonging to Awami League;
  • to get on board all the East Pakistani civil servants working in East and West Pakistan and also in Pakistani embassies across the world;
  • to launch extensive media campaign against Pakistan army’s actions in East Pakistan and to project a highly exaggerated plight of the people of East Pakistan in the world media and to organize moots and conferences across the world to highlight the sham miseries of the people of Pakistan;
  • to establish a sense of deprivation amongst the general public in East Pakistan;
  • to create a feeling of hatred amongst the people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan through social circles etc.

While the training of militants of Mukti Bahni goons at training camps inside Indian territory, at West Bengal, Assam and Tripura and to arm them for an ultimate civil war was decided to be organized with the help and assistance of Indian army, headed by General Manekshaw and IndianBorder Security Force (BSF), headed by K.F. Rustomji while the IB was also kept engaged for other covert operations. According to a veteran journalist Qutubuddine Aziz , who was stationed in former East Pakistan during the execution of India Kao plan for creating Bangladesh and the gentlemen who wrote the famous book Blood and Tears, India trained Mukti Bahini militants massacred at least one million non-Bengalis in former East Pakistan.

After the RAW got immense success in East Pakistan and due to the lack of abilities on part of Pakistani leadership to handle the crises in Eastern part of the country, a new country was created with name of Bangladesh in 1971, just within some 30 months of the inception of RAW, Rameshwar Nath Kao sought Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s permission to launch KBP-II for the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan.

However, due to a possible resistance from the then Shah of Iran, China and also from CIA, the plan to separate Balochistan was put on hold by Indira Gandhi. But the Kao-boys had already started contacting Baloch leaders through social activities in foreign countries and a PSYWAR was launched amongst the Balochistan people with a crystal clear reference to what happened in East Pakistan and how India helped East Pakistanis to have a spate, independent country. In the meantime RAW also sought agency-to-agency help from its counterpart in former Soviet Union and KGB replied in a positive manner to help RAW implement its Kao plan for Balochistan. However, it was realized at some time that India had no advantage of having a road link in Balochistan that they had in East Pakistan and secondly the disadvantage was that Pakistani army had total control and very strong road link to any part of Balochistan, something that it lacked in case of East Pakistan. The only encouraging point for RAW while starting the Balochistan game was that here they did not had to launch and fund the movement at the grassroots level like in case of the East Pakistan but in fact in Balochistan, they just needed to lure a handful of Baloch tribal leaders, especially young ones who were very much attracted towards fun life of West, and rest was to be done by these tribal leaders. After making this assessment, RAW decided to go-ahead with the KPB-II. Just when Indira Gandhi was about to order full-fledged launching of the Kao plan for Balochistan to divert the national and international criticism from operation Blue Star, she was assassinated by some religiously motivate Sikh Guards of her own security detail.

Indira Gandhi’s assassination brought in her elder son Rajiv Gandhi to the scene and he took over as Indian Prime Minister. Rajiv always had serious doubts that her mother lost her life due to completely misleading reports and advices of RAW and thus had special anger and hatred for RAW and its top policy makers. He had to lose his life at the hands of Raw-assisted Tamil terrorists. Finally, Sonia approved the Kao plan in 2004-2005 as it was found out to be the best time to launch the Kao plan as Pakistan was already surrounded with multiple dangers and conspiracies and for the first time it did not have a friendly government in adjoining Afghanistan. The Kao plan was initiated in Balochistan formally in 2004-2005 and within one year of its formal launching things got drastically changed across the province. The Kao plan made veteran Baloch leader Akbar Bugti and his like-minded tribal leaders of the province defiant towards the federal government and they bent upon initiating an insurgency movement in the province and even brought a name for the new Independent country as Islamic Emirates of Balochistan.

Kao plan for Balochistan had just a few amendments if compared with the Kao plan for East Pakistan. The basics remained the same. What was that? Launch a psychological war amongst the general public of the area; generate a feeling of deprivation and hatred amongst the local against the rest of the people of the country; fund and arm the tribal leaders; launch motivated media campaigns and seminars across the world to highlight a sham plight of the locals; generate feeling of hatred against the country’s army and Armed Forces; motivate locals to assault the Armed forces and portray security forces as some occupying troops amongst the locals as well to the global audience; create fake as well real clashes between country’s security Forces and the paid militants; train and arm the militants; organize seminars and conferences at major Capitals of the world and motivate a global opinion in favor of the militants by portraying them as freedom fighters and oppressed nation; do the media buying in the local country as well in the international market; create caucuses at different parliamentary forums across the world to plead and support the view point of the fighting militants etc; equate Baluchistan issue with the freedom movement in Indian Occupied Kashmir etc.

This plan is very clearly unleashed in Balochistan at the moment and this plan is titled “RAW’s Kao Plan for Balochistan” in the clandestine community of India and the West. The study indicates that the game is just the same that it was in 1971 in East Pakistan, just the players and the rules of the game have changed a bit.

The Daily Mail’s also findings indicate that the latest move in the US Congress to support the cause of Balochistan’s militants and to call for right of self-determination for the people of Balochistan is nothing new. RAW has been organizing similar move at many occasions in the past as well by getting the paid services of certain politicians and so called intellectuals as well as NGOs across the world. They have done it in England, in India and at many other places across the world while the Capitol Hill is the latest venue for the purpose.

In this backdrop, let us have a fresh look at the role of politicians of the mainstream parties, the media and even the judiciary. They all seem to be working in unison for success of at least one objective of the plan; tarnishing the image of the armed forces. They may not be aware of the fact that they are all strengthening the hands of RAW and its associates to carve out an independent state of Balochistan and disintegrate Pakistan’s unity. Similarly, the holy warriors of TTP and other criminal outfits are foot soldiers employed for Kao plan execution. Politicians, as ever, are not siding with Pakistan. They are siding with Kao-boys. They are disturbed at the drone attacks but they do not feel disturbed at killing of innocent civilians at the hands of Kao-boys.

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