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Posted by admin in CURRENT EVENTS on January 4th, 2022
“The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything”. Joseph Stalin
In the elections held on Dec 7, 1970, AL swept the polls in EP with a tally of 167 out of 169 national assembly seats and the PPP securing 87 of 126 seats in WP (simple majority in Punjab and Sindh).
As per Bengali writer Maswani, ‘Only about 7% of Muslim votes in EP had catapulted secessionist AL into majority. Its apparent success didn’t truly represent the will of the people of EP. The AL had won with only 43% of total votes, out of which about 12% were bogus votes cast mostly by infiltrators and 24.35% by the Hindus. (AMK Maswani, Subversion in EP, P 2).
There is no doubt of heavy rigging before and during the polls by the AL since the entire civil machinery was in its hands, the people terrorized and the military looked the other way.
After creating political ruckus to force Ayub to resign, Bhutto chose to side with the military junta rather than with the AL after the 1970 elections. Mujib-Bhutto confrontation sparked over the issue of framing of constitution, former wanting to formulate it entirely on his six points inside the Assembly and the latter wanting to do it jointly outside the Assembly. Both adopted a piggish stance which created a logjam. Had Gen Yahya retained the 1962 Constitution or reincarnated the 1956 Constitution, the constitutional crisis wouldn’t have arisen.
From Feb 1971 onwards, Bhutto became highly aggressive. Wanting to share power he threatened to break the legs of politicians going to Dacca. Mujib paid his bellicosity in the same coin which heated up the political temperature. Bhashani added fuel to the fire. Upset by Mujib’s intransigence over six-points, Yahya began to lean more heavily upon Bhutto.
Bengali nationalism was intensified by Mujib during the year-long election campaign based on his six-points, resulting in AL’s landslide victory. Militancy peaked when on 01 March President Gen Yahya postponed the session of the Constituent National Assembly at Dacca scheduled on 03 March 1971 indefinitely on the advice of Bhutto and hawks in his cabinet who dubbed Mujib as a security risk. It set ablaze the festering volcano.
From 02 March a systematic genocide of Biharis, non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis, rapes of women and destruction of their properties was unleashed by the AL activists and Mukti Bahini (MB). West Pakistani officers serving in East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and their families were killed, and banks were looted. Pakistan flags were burnt, BD flags hoisted and taxes were not paid. Military cantonments were besieged and water supply and fresh supplies blocked; soldiers confined to barracks since 4 March were abused and ridiculed. A parallel government had been put into force in EP and it was only Mujib’s directives that were obeyed. Bedlam could have been kept under control had reinforcements sent from WP not stopped, and troops not sent back to barracks on 4 March.
March 25 was given as the new date for the National Assembly meeting but it didn’t mitigate the anger of Mujib who became haughtier. In order to defuse the explosive situation, Gen Yahya and his team flew to Dacca on March 15 and till 24 March held negotiations with the Mujib led team. On 21-22 March, WP politicians joined to avert the crisis. Bhutto played on both sides of the wicket by poisoning the ears of Mujib and Yahya. Talks broke down when Mujib ruled out federation and insisted upon confederation provided EP was given 56% share of federal assets. According to Professor G.W Choudhury (p.168), ‘Some foreign economists financed by the Ford Foundation were the loudest in making extreme demands and were responsible for the failure of the Dacca dialogue’.
When the ten-day negotiations between the two teams at Dacca failed to yield results due to obduracy of Mujib, and there was no letup in the killing spree, and Gen Yahya was scorned for keeping the army in cotton wool, the President directed Lt Gen Tikka Khan, who had replaced Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan on 7 March, to launch Operation Searchlight on the night of March 25. Mujib and Dr. Kamal were arrested while all other AL leaders managed to flee to India where they set up BD govt in exile. Had they been rounded up, things could be different.
By dawn of 26 March, Dacca was in full control of the army after killing 66 extremists and injuring 31. Bhutto hailed the action saying “Thank God, Pakistan has at last been saved”. His exclamation was the manifestation of inner sentiments of the majority in WP. Yahya was eulogized for his action. (Hasan Zaheer, Separation of East Pakistan, Oxford, p 327). Only three EBR could be disarmed and the rest defected with arms. AL was outlawed and Mujib was declared a traitor and tried on charges of treason.
The military action which was falsely termed as a genocide by Indian media resulted in exodus of 7-10 million Bengalis to India 85% of whom were Hindus who should have migrated in 1947. (Kuldip Nayyar, Distant Neighbors, Delhi, p 155). It also sparked province wide rebellion which morphed into 9 months of civil war. The MB, six EB Regts, 16000 Bengalis in EPR and 45000 Policemen were aided by 50,000 Indian soldiers dressed in civvies. There were 116000 Bengalis in units, HQs, EBR, EPR, Police etc. and all had rebelled.
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The western media had turned against the military regime after the ouster of journalists from Dacca by Lt Gen Tikka due to their biased reporting {by Jewish Reporter of Jewish Owned New York Times-Sydney Schanberg, New Delhi Correspondent of New York Times.} In the Whitehouse tapes released in the mid-nineties, President Nixon referred to the involvement of U.S diplomats in Pakistan who ignored his instructions and supported the separatists. CIA and the US Congress sided with Mujib in spite of Gen Yahya taking the risk of arranging a meeting of Henry Kissinger with Chinese PM at Beijing in Jul 1971 which led to US-China rapprochement. The USSR concluded a defence agreement with India in August 1971 to forestall any intervention by China.
The magnitude of the insurrection was beyond the capacity of lone 14 Division. 9 and 16 Divisions, two wings each of CAF and Rangers and 5000 policemen were airlifted to Dacca via Colombo in a record time of less than two weeks since the East-West air corridor had been blocked by India after the engineered hijacking of Indian airline on Jan 31 the blame of which was put on Pakistan.
In order to tackle the insurgency and to be prepared for a war with India, local Razakars numbering 60, 000 were raised to provide rear area security. The EPCAF numbering 13000 with a heavy intake of Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis were formed into units and wings. Out of the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams were created which mostly comprised Biharis and patriotic Bengalis. The two outfits became the eyes and ears of the army. The Razakars and the EPCAF supported the army fighting the insurgents and in the clearance of border towns and border posts captured by the MB.
Bhutto encouraged Yahya to withhold invoking UN action when India started to intervene militarily in April 1971(Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, p. 359). Foreign Secretary Sultan M. Khan wrote in his book (Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, London Centre for Pakistan Studies), ‘After the use of military power in East Pakistan on March 25th. 1971, the situation escalated out of Yahya Khan’s grasp and he could no longer control it. From then on he was merely reacting to the developing situation and had lost all initiative’.
By end April 1971, the whole area was cleared and the slaughter spree of the MB that was at its height till March 31 began to decline rapidly. By May/June complete normalcy was restored, the civil administration became functional. A general amnesty was announced, reception centres established for those who had fled to India including the politicians and a call for by-elections was given. However, India blocked their return, and in concert with Russia continued to train, equip and launch MBs to keep the pot of EP boiling. RAW and BSF had set up 59 training camps.
In the clearing operations from March to Nov 1971, 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 other ranks were killed and wounded in action. (Indian Army after Independence, Major K.C Praval, Delhi, 1990, p 321).
The MB supported by BSF and Indian Army launched border attacks in Sept/Oct with a view to draw Pak forces towards the border. Eastern Command hastened to push forward army units, broke them in sub-units and deployed them in penny-packets all along the border. Even the command reserves (53 Bde) were pushed forward denuding Dacca of regular troops. It resulted in loss of cohesion and made the units vulnerable to envelopment and piecemeal destruction.
Creation of ad hoc divisions/brigades two weeks before the start of the war was a big sham, since they were raised by milking the resources of infantry divisions/units and further weakening their combat strength deployed on extended frontages with no depth and no reserves. The formations were critically short of war munitions and manpower and didn’t have a single medium artillery regt. Limitation of range of guns and tanks was another drawback.
EPCAF and the Razakars plugged the yawning gaps between defensive localities and took part in the war with India. They fought valiantly till the end and large numbers embraced martyrdom or were injured in action.
When it was found that the MBs were unable to defeat the Pak forces or to capture a chunk of territory near the border where a BD flag could be hoisted, the Indian military barged into EP on 21 Nov which was Eid day, and attacked 23 salients across the border. Lodgment areas were secured in Jessore, Dinajpur and Sylhet sectors. The MB resorted to large-scale massacre of pro-Pakistan elements in the captured areas. That was the time to modify the defensive plan and bring a change in the exaggerated forward posture but it was not done. Lt Gen Niazi issued orders, ‘Fortress will be abandoned after incurring 75% casualties’.
On the diplomatic front, it was the right time to move the case to the UN against unprovoked aggression of India as was suggested by Agha Shahi, but no move was made.
On Dec 2, India threw in 3 more divisions supported by armor to expand its penetrations at 7 different fronts. At that stage it dawned upon GHQ that India’s plans were much bigger than assumed, but it was too late to affect a change in defensive posture. Most crossing points on the rivers were destroyed or seized by the MB.
The Indian forces aided by the MB launched their offensive through gaps under complete air superiority on multiple axes with speed, grounding defending forces in respective compartments, while the MB stepped up their disruptive activities in the rear to block rearward moves of Pak troops. It made the task of forward troops to converge into the Dacca Bowl almost impossible. The ground situation changed with such rapidity that it left the Eastern Command dislocated and paralyzed. Its strategic balance lay in tatters and the defensive operational cycle got jammed.
After the PAF launched an air offensive on the western front on Dec 3, India declared war on both fronts with main effort in EP and secondary effort in the WP. India also forwarded a complaint to the UN Secretary General alleging that Pakistan had attacked India.
In EP, the Indian military enjoying 15:1 superiority, launched their offensive with main effort against Sylhet-Comilla by 4 Corps, secondary effort against Jessore sector by 2 Corps, another secondary effort against Bogra by 33 Corps and an auxiliary effort against Mymensingh-Tangail sector by 101 Communication Zone.
It had 7 armor regts with T-55 and T-72 tanks, a Para Bde, 46 artillery regts including Mediums, 24 Mortar Btys, 4 AA regts, 32 BSF units, 4 BD Bdes, 287000 MBs, helicopter support, 11 sqns of MiG-21, SU-23, Gnat, Canberra generating 120 sorties a day. Its naval assets consisted of one aircraft carrier, 3 landing ships and 8 destroyers. The IAF flew 80 air sorties in support of ground forces from 3-15 Dec and generated a total of 1978 sorties. The Indian Navy affected a sea blockade on 4 Dec.
Pakistan’s Eastern Command had one Corps HQ, 3 infantry divisions, 2 adhoc divisions, one armor regiment with M-24 tanks, 6 Field regts, 5 Mortar Batteries, 13000 EPCAF men, 60,000 Razaqars. The PAF had only one squadron and the Navy had 4 converted gunboats and 8 Chinese Coasters/landing crafts.
Major towns were converted into fortresses. While the static fronts outmaneuvered by Indian tanks and supported by armor collapsed at most places, at Hilli, 4 FF under Lt Col Akhlaq Abbasi, SJ put up a gallant fight and didn’t allow 20 Mountain Div with an additional Inf Bde supported by Armored Bde to breakout towards Bogra for 19 days. The unit was ordered to withdraw on 11 Dec when the opposing enemy outflanked the whole brigade. Another gallant fight was put up at Kamalpur and Jamalpur by 31 Baluch under Lt Col Sultan, SJ & Bar. 107 Bde under Brig Hayat Khan, SJ, put up a stubborn resistance at Khulna till 16 Dec. There were several other valiant actions at sub-unit levels. Most of the fortresses were intact on 16 Dec.
The lone PAF squadron put up an extremely brave show by flying 292 air sorties in support of the ground forces from 29 March till 6 Dec. Pak Navy’s Ghazi sent from Karachi to carry out strategic mining of Visakhapatnam and to interdict Indian Navy ships sank close to its target with 93 all ranks on board on the night of 3 Dec as a result of underwater explosion.
On 12 Dec, Lt Gen Gul Hassan informed Lt Gen Niazi that US and Chinese help was on the way. On 14 Dec, the GHQ gave an assurance to Niazi that the UNSC was in session and was most likely to order a ceasefire and he should hold on. Niazi cracked up when the heat came upon Dacca on 15 Dec. His oft repeated motto “last man last round” was probably meant for the forward troops only. Dacca, which was viewed by the opposing side as the toughest nut to crack and identified by Niazi as the centre of gravity, was left defenseless and had no regular troops. It fell like a ripe apple without being penetrated and without a fight.
Heavily outnumbered, outgunned, cut off from the world, subjected to psychological war and demonized by Indo-Russian-Western propaganda, the beleaguered Pak forces fought and defended the motherland gallantly. Overwhelmed by the sheer weight and size of the enemy and adverse obtaining conditions, Gen Niazi gave orders on the morning of Dec 16 to stop fighting and ceasefire. The ceasefire transformed into surrender.
To be concluded
The writer is Brig, war veteran, defence analyst, international columnist, author of five books, sixth book under publication, Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre. asifharoonraja@gmail.com
Posted by admin in East Pakistan, History, HISTORY OF PAKISTAN on September 9th, 2020
Posted by admin in East Pakistan on December 16th, 2018
The Pakistan that was achieved with so much of blood and tears, was split into two on the fateful day of December 16, 1971. Even after the passage of 47 years, the traumatic experience still haunts us and cannot be washed away from the memories of those who had witnessed the tragic break up. After the truncation of Pakistan, the new leadership desperately wanted a scapegoat to defuse the temper of the nation. Having lost the war on the eastern front, the Army was put in the woods. Apparently, the worthy Hamoodur Commission Report (HCR) with a mandate limited to the military’s role in East Pakistan only, influenced by the domestic environments as well as the poisonous propaganda launched by the western and Indian print and electronic media, put the whole blame on General Yahya Khan and Lt Gen AAK Niazi for the debacle. However, the Commission despite harshly bashing the Army also concluded that the debacle was a result of the cumulative follies of our leaders for the past 23 years and the ferment that was simmering in the minds of the Bengalis that led to such an impasse.
While the politicians failed to maintain unity among the diversified communities, the media failed to counter the Indo-Bangla-Soviet-Western-Jewish propaganda campaign. Diplomats failed to defend and present Pakistan’s case before the world – as a victim of a pre-planned international conspiracy. The military failed to protect our ideological and territorial frontiers against internal and external enemies. Unfortunately, the government officials posted in East Pakistan, mostly Urdu speaking and Punjabis, instead of performing their duties as public servants, behaved like demi-gods and made little effort to address the grievances of East Bengal.
Having suffered for nearly two hundred years at the hands of British-Hindu combo, the Bengalis were in the forefront of Pakistan movement and were the first to respond to Quaid-e-Azam’s call for Pakistan. A.K. Fazlul Haq, Nawab Sir Salimullah, Begum Shaista Ikramullah, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, Jogendra Nath Mandal, Nurul Amin were the frontrunners of Freedom Movement. However, this love and commitment to Pakistan underwent a radical change in two decades after the birth of Pakistan and their affections shifted to their erstwhile tormentors. This is where the tragedy gets compounded.
The Bengalis had great hopes from Pakistan and dreamt of a prosperous tomorrow; little realising that economics works on hard facts, not on emotional outbursts. They expected economic miracles, which never materialised due to extreme backwardness of East Pakistan, natural calamities, east-west misgivings, divergent perceptions, and above all the Hindu propaganda launched right at the roots of the new generation – the primary and secondary schools level.
The deep-rooted antagonism between the Muslims of East Bengal and the caste Hindus of Bengal has washed away and was replaced with misgivings and hatred between the Muslims of the two wings of Pakistan. This astonishing change in the perceptions of East Bengal Muslims came about as a result of well thought out subversion conducted by the Indian psychological operators duly reinforced by agencies of other regional countries.
Bengalis grew up in a culture of misgivings, mistrust, violence and hate and as a misled nation easily swayed by the Indian brainwashing. They tended to grieve over everything imaginable under the sun and made a lot of hue and cry over the oft-repeated theme of exploitation by the western wing. When power resided in the hands of Bengalis (Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra, Suhrawardy and Iskandar Mirza from 1951 to 1958), they grieved over language issue, economic deprivation and power-sharing based on population. The Bengali political leaders exploited their illiteracy and poverty.
However, it was the belittling attitude of the West Pakistan officials, treating the Bengalis as an inferior and uncouth race, which offended the Bengali Muslims and made them bitter. The affluent Hindu community in East Pakistan, particularly 90% of teachers and professors fueled resentment and converted Muslim Bengali bitterness into hatred. After the military operation in March 1971, about 8-10 million Bengalis, 80% of which were Hindus fled to India. They were housed in 330 refugee camps that had already been prepared and from within them, the Indian military trained the rebel forces to launch a nine-month-long insurgency.
India sowed the seeds of subversion within East Pakistan and self-serving politicians of Pakistan nurtured the crop. Indian propaganda of exploitation by West Pakistan and treating East Pakistan as a colony misled the people of East Pakistan. Their emotional nature started viewing Indians as their saviours against their pre-supposed “West Pakistani masters”. This is where they blundered and showed political unawareness.
Economic iniquities in East Pakistan were considerably reduced during Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s ten-year golden rule, however, issues of power deprivation saw them resorting to violent strikes and vandalism. Lawlessness created by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan and by Z.A. Bhutto in West Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to resign and hand over power to General Yahya Khan. Although the latter did his best to assuage the hurt feelings of the Bengalis by doling out political concessions and addressing economic inequities, by that time it was too late. The charms of Mujib swayed the Bengalis so intensely that they decided to break away from Pakistan after living together for more than twenty-four years and accept erstwhile tormentor (India) from whose shackles freedom was achieved, as a saviour and a mentor.
In the final act of the gory drama, the ill-fated leadership of General Yahya Khan from March 1969 to December 1971 could not save the ship from sinking. Politically naïve Yahya Khan dreamed of another five years of presidency, if not more. Truculent Mujib craved for wresting power on his terms, on the basis of victory in the polls. Bhutto hungered for half of the cake without qualifying for it. The duo remained fixated in their respective orbits and maintained an uncompromising stance till the end. Yahya performed poorly as a referee between the two rival contenders of power. Despite knowing Mujib’s past track record connected with Agartala conspiracy which had been unearthed in 1967, he acted too softly with him and ignored his wrong-doings and his willful defiance of the Legal Framework Order. He was allowed to base his election manifesto on his highly controversial six points, which bordered on secession.
Appeasement instead of firmness by Yahya Khan and the administrators in the eastern wing were at the cost of ensuring free and fair elections. While the masses in East Pakistan were terrorized during the yearlong election campaign, wide-scale unfair means were employed on the polling day by the ruffians of Awami League to turn the tide in its favour. The militancy of Awami League climaxed after it won a dubious landslide victory in the December 1970 polls.
The obduracy of Bhutto to share power at all costs, intransigence of Mujib to shun all moves for conciliation, cavalier attitude of Yahya Khan and his colleagues and Yahya’s fatal decision to postpone the National Assembly session at Dacca on 01 March 1971 without giving another date and without taking Mujib into confidence, resulted in the otherwise avoidable carnage of human beings. By the middle of March 1971, a civil disobedience movement was in full swing and a parallel government had come into existence.
The militant Bengalis egged on by Mujib and carried away by Bengali nationalism hacked to death 150,000 non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis and raped West Pakistani girls and women in hundreds. According to Qutbuddin Aziz in his book “Blood and Tears”, the figure of those killed ranges between 100,000 to 500,000. The Marauders, who indulged in pillage, plunder and slaughter, were no more than few hundred. The massacre of non-Bengalis caused the initial exodus to India. The second spree of the massacre of non-Bengalis took place in November-December 1971.
Those who physically saw the savagery of Bengali extremists shudder to recollect the horrifying scenes and feel mystified as to how a Muslim could indulge in such barbarities against another fellow Muslim. They also are still resentful and befuddled as to why the government and the Army remained indifferent for 25 days when East Pakistan was burning, and why our media didn’t counter India and Swadhin Bangla Betar clandestine radio propaganda, and why was media prevented from highlighting the atrocities of Bengalis against non-Bengalis. The plea taken was that there might be a backlash in West Pakistan against Bengalis. The world was kept ignorant of the mass killings of pro-Pakistan Bengalis, Biharis and West Pakistanis. Biharis had been disarmed on the advice of Mujib to the Martial Law Administrator. All the West Pakistan political parties except PPP and Qayyum Khan League supported Mujib.
After the failure of parleys from 15-24 March in Dacca due to Mujib’s intransigence and refusal to accept any formula within the framework of a united Pakistan, Operation Searchlight was launched on the night of 25 March to stop the bloodshed and re-establish the writ of the government. The 35 jilted foreign journalists (among them was a Jewish Correspondent of New York Times, Sydney Schanberg, who wrote vitriolic and fake news articles against Pakistan Army) who had been ousted from Dacca on 27 March by Lt Gen Tikka Khan; because of their biased reporting of the cyclone in October 1970 and hushing of 1-25 March mayhem of Bengalis, teamed up with Indian media at Calcutta and launched a full-throttled propaganda to demonize the Army and project them as human eating monsters and rapists.
The crackdown ignited the powder keg and demand for provincial autonomy suddenly transformed into a secessionist movement leading to separation. Failure of Pakistan’s publicity wing to counter the vile propaganda undermined the faith of Pakistani soldiers in the cause they were fighting for and also contributed towards intensification of Bengali nationalism and hatred against the Army.
Once India applied the military instrument with a preponderance of ground, air and naval power against a highly fatigued and marooned Pakistani force numbering only 45000 armed forces soldiers and paramilitary forces (23500 as regular soldiers); the end was a foregone conclusion. The sinking could have been delayed by Lt Gen AAK Niazi but not prevented. It was too late.
It must not be forgotten that Pakistani troops in East Pakistan fought under extremely adverse conditions, which have few parallels in the history of warfare. To start with they were put under an extreme test of patience when they were ridiculed and made the butt of criticism by the Awami League. They were confined to barracks from 03-25 March 1971 during which they helplessly saw the horrifying atrocities committed against non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan elements by the Awami League militants and rogue elements. Isolated army pickets were attacked and men in uniform were ruthlessly killed. As the Bengali nationalism peaked, many West Pakistani officers, men and their families serving in East Bengal Regiments and East Pakistan Rifles were brutally hacked to death.
Under such volatile conditions, the lone 14 Division initially got busy in the onerous task of disarming the Bengali regular troops, para military forces and civil police and also trying to re-establish the writ of the government. All this was done with a meagre force of 12000 troops. Once reinforcements arrived in April, they recaptured all the towns taken over by the rebels and Indian soldiers (disguised as Mukti Bahini).
They also got embroiled in quelling the insurgency waged by the 100,000 Mukti Bahini duly trained in all types of warfare, equipped and aided by India in 59 camps. Reinforcements rushed in from West Pakistan in the last week of March/first week of April 1971 (depleted two divisions) were neither in possession of tanks; medium artillery, heavy weapons, nor acclimatized or trained to fight guerrilla warfare in riverine terrain.
After quelling the insurgency in a record time of a little over one month, they had to suffer the rigours of monsoon under insecure battle conditions with no rest or respite. They also remained involved in restoring the rail, road and river communication means and putting the administrative machinery back on the rail while maintaining law and order. During this perilous process, many lives were lost and many got maimed for life owing to clashes with the rebels, and mines and booby traps planted for them.
After September 1971, they got distributed in penny packets to guard the frontiers and defend every inch of the territory. By November 1971, casualties in counter insurgency operations steadily mounted. 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 other ranks embraced martyrdom and few thousands got wounded.
Indian military took nine months to get prepared for the offensive. By the time the Indian forces intervened on 21 November, the deployed troops were thoroughly fatigued and suffered from innumerable operational, administrative and technical handicaps. The troops knew that they were surrounded on all sides and no help could reach them from West Pakistan or from elsewhere. With 10:1 ratio, and devoid of air cover, they were fighting outnumbered and outgunned. Fighting the enemy in front, and the Mukti Bahini hiding behind every bush made the entire rear area insecure and facilitated forward movement of Indian forces. At the time of surrender, the defenders of Khulna, Rajshahi, Nator, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Joyedpur, Bogra, Sylhet, Myanmati and Chittagong were still putting up stiff resistance. No single army unit surrendered before 16 December.
Stiffest resistance was put up by my unit 4 FF of which I was a part in the battle of Hilli, where the repeated attacks of the Indian 20 Mountain Division supported by an armoured brigade, corps artillery and air support were blunted for 19 days and not an inch was lost. The enemy had to change its axis of advance and undertook a wide detour to race for Bogra. In the epic battle, Maj Muhammad Akram Shaheed was awarded Nishan-e-Haider posthumously, and I had the proud privilege of taking over the command of his Company and also recovering his body lying well ahead of forward defences. Maj Akram was buried in Bogra on 6 December.
The troops in erstwhile East Pakistan fought with valour and determination to protect the motherland until ordered to the ceasefire. They may have continued to fight had the senior leadership not caved in and decided to give up. Thousands of our brave officers and men were killed while fighting for a united Pakistan. They were never to return home and are buried somewhere in a foreign land. Their graves are unknown and their deeds have been overshadowed under the dark shadow of capitulation.
It will be unfair not to make a mention of the sacrifices rendered by the Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis who stood beside the Pak security forces and fought the rebels tenaciously till the very end.
But for the betrayal of Bengalis, the Indian military despite its preponderance in men and material could never have achieved victory.
Had the Polish resolution or the Anglo-French resolution been accepted by Bhutto, a face-saving UN resolution of ceasefire and honourable return of armed forces and civilians to West Pakistan, and possibly some kind of political settlement like confederation with East Pakistan could have been obtained.
The writer is a retired Brig, a war veteran, defence and security analyst, author of five books which include ‘Maarka Hilli’, ‘Muhammad bin Qasim to Gen Musharraf’ and ‘Roots of 1971 Tragedy’. His next book ‘East Pakistan Crisis: Battle of Hilli’ is under publication. He is Vice Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre and member Central Working Committee of Pakistan-Ex-Servicemen-Society. asifharoonraja@gmail.com
Posted by admin in CURRENT EVENTS on December 11th, 2016
Many may have seen Pakistani TV channels occasionally showing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was representing Pakistan as its nominated Foreign Minister, tearing and throwing away some papers in rage and walking out of the UN Security Council.
ZAB tearing the Polish Resolution and Walking out of the UNSC Session
Well … well … the papers were the Polish Resolution and it was 15th of December 1971 when the 71 war between India and Pakistan was in its most crucial stage and for Pakistan, every day – nay – every moment mattered incalculably.
Events leading to the Polish Resolution were that after months of shelling at East Pakistan borders, sending infiltrators and assisting the Bengali Mukti Bahini, Indian armed forces crossed the international borders in the Eastern Sector on Eid ul Fitr day – the 22 November 1971. On 3rd December armed hostilities broke out on the Western Front also. As full-fledged India and Pakistan War started the matter came before the UN Security Council.
On 4 December 1971 Pakistan’s representative Agha Shahi argued that Pakistan’s internal crisis was outside the ambit of the Security Council who could deal only with international peace and not the internal peace of a member state.
The Soviet delegate held Pakistan Military responsible for the situation and proposed that the so-called Bangladesh government, formed in exile on Indian territory, be also given a hearing in the Council, which was vetoed by China.
A deadlock resulted in the Security Council when the Soviets too vetoed resolutions moved by the United States and China calling for “immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops from each other’s territory”
In the meantime, the situation in East Pakistan had become very critical. But most surprisingly while the matter of life and death for Pakistan was being discussed and negotiated by the world powers at the UN, Bhutto who had arrived there on 11th Dec 1971 stayed away for full three days from the UNSC debates resting in his Waldorf-Astoria hotel suite ‘indisposed’ due to common cold!
On 15 December 1971, Poland sponsored a draft resolution that had the Soviet support. It provided for the release of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and transfer of power to the elected representatives under his leadership in East Pakistan, cessation of military actions in all the areas, initial and then permanent ceasefire, withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces to the preset locations in the eastern theatre, evacuation of Pakistani nationals and armed forces from there and the withdrawal of the Indian armed forces from the eastern theatre in consultation with the newly established authority.
Since for all practical purposes, Pakistan’s acceptance of the Polish Resolution would have meant that it had agreed to the secession of East Pakistan, Bhutto declined to take upon himself the responsibility of conceding defeat there and walked out of the Security Council.
A little closer look at the Polish Resolution would, however, show that it favored Pakistan to quite some extent. Though the acceptance of the Polish Resolution would not have prevented the dismemberment of Pakistan, which in any case was a matter of forgone conclusion yet, its implementation would have averted the sad and stigmatic episode of Pakistan armed forces’ surrender in East Pakistan and becoming Prisoners of War. It provided for:
1. A Cease-Fire and immediate mutual withdrawal before the capture of Dacca.
2. This would have deprived India of the clear victory it sought.
3. A quick return of the Pakistan Army under UN arrangements would have greatly complicated India’s capacity to assist the Awami league in establishing a stable and moderate regime in East Pakistan.
4. As once both Indian & Pakistani forces returned by virtue of the resolution the conglomeration of Mukti-Bahini forces would have commenced their ‘own civil war for power’, in the race to control the new country.
5. This was a no-win situation for India as that would have forced India to restore the strategic points on the Pakistani side of cease-fire line in Kashmir, that the Indians had seized at some cost in the 1971 war.
6. To add further to above, Indra Gandhi knew that behind the Polish Resolution, really stood the Soviets, and in principle, New Dehli had reluctantly conceded that it had no options but to accept the resolution that had been approved unanimously.
However, ZAB in his quite lengthy and forceful speech and probably driven by his some hidden inner desire stalked out of Assembly saying, “Finally, I am not a rat. I have never ratted in my life. I have faced assassination attempts, I have faced imprisonments. I have always confronted crises. Today I am not ratting, but I am leaving your Security Council. I find it disgraceful to my person and to my country to remain here a moment longer than is necessary. I am not boycotting. Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than the Treaty of Versailles, legalize aggression, legalize occupation, legalize everything that has been illegal up to 15 December 1971. I will not be a party to it. We will fight; we will go back and fight. My country beckons me. Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be a party to the ignominious surrender of a part of my country. You can take your Security Council. Here you are. (Ripping papers) I am going.”
Next day the 16 December 1971 East Pakistan was lost forever.
Reflecting on the wisdom of the hindsight of 45 years one is at times compelled to ponder over some of the insolvable quizzes, like :
· Why did Bhutto evade the UNSC debates from 11 Dec till 14 Dec 1971 on the pretext of suffering from the common cold?
· Was he filibustering and gaining time to make the position of the Pak armed forces untenable and wanted them to surrender? In this context a page from Mr. Sultan Muhammad Khan’s book ‘Memories & Reflections’. pages-385-386, who was the foreign secretary in January 1970 and handled Pakistan’s foreign relations during the civil war in East Pakistan is quite revealing, He says, “The no less important apprehension that two or three army divisions with their formations and arms intact, returning to West Pakistan with a stigma of failure, would be a serious threat to the military and emerging political leadership. Questions would be raised by them to determine and assign responsibility for the political and military failure in East Pakistan. Things could take an unpredictable course and emergence of a new military leadership which would put an end to the prospect of the civil rule was a distinct possibility”. To conclude: Had the Army come back, as stated in the remarks above, Yahya & his team, as well ZAB would have been jointly tried by an Army commission, and their fates sealed, a coup was definitely expected”.
· And then look at the Justice Hamood ur Rehman Commission appointed by him and the mandate given to it, “To inquire into and find out the circumstances in which the Commander Eastern command surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a cease-fire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” What could a commission entrusted with such a task (purely military in nature) do except find faults and blame the army for the debacle ?!
· Why was the Commission not given the task, “To enquire into the circumstances which led to the cessation of East Pakistan from Pakistan”. The outcome report would have been quite different.
· And the million dollar question; “Would Mujib ur Rehman have proved to be a loyal and patriotic PM had Bhutto agreed to his becoming the PM of united Pakistan as was announced by President Yahya Khan?
I leave these afterthoughts for the readers to decide for themselves.
Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd)
30 Westridge 1
Rawalpindi 46000
Pakistan
E.mail: jafri@rifiela.com
Posted by admin in EAST PAKISTAN LIVES IN PAKISTANI'S HEARTS, India Destroys US Economy, INDIA EXPOSED, INDIA FRAUD, INDIA IMAGE SPIN MASTERS, INDIA MACHINATIONS TO DESTROY CHINA, INDIA: THE EVIL HINDU EMPIRE, INDIAN GOVTS LIES EXPOSED, INDIAN SABRE RATTLING BITS THE DUST, INDIAN SCAMMERS AROUND THE GLOBE on January 4th, 2014
Media reported the hanging of Abdul Quader Molla in Bangladesh, a leading Jamaat-i-Islami leader; the first person to go to gallows for the alleged massacre of 1971. A leading newspaper reported, “Molla’s lawyers had protested the original order, saying the death penalty was awarded based on evidence given by only one prosecution witness, who had also earlier given two different versions of the same event… UN Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay wrote to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seeking a stay of the execution, saying the trial did not meet stringent international standards for the death penalty.” (12-12-2013)By 3rd March 1971 a de facto Bangladesh Government was in place. It was after the March 1971 crackdown by the Pakistan Army in Dacca and later all over East Pakistan that the 6 battalions of East Bengal Regiment as well as the forces above cited deserted and went over to the Indian Army. Colonel [retired] Osmani; the first commanding Officer 1st East Bengal Regiment in 1952 and later been made the Commandant of East Bengal Regimental Centre at Chittagong having retired from Pakistan Army in 1966 organized, with the help of the Indian Army; a militant wing of Awami League in July 1970. It was he who led the march past of the militant Awami League on 23rd March 1971,in front of Shiekh Mujib’s house. On 17April 1971 the Acting President of the defacto Bangladesh Government made him the Commander in Chief of the ‘Bengal Liberation Army’ with a rank of a ‘General.’© 2022, All Rights Reserved by Pakistan Think Tank.
