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Posted by admin in "Jihadi" Outfits of Terrorism, Makaar Dushman on February 21st, 2013
30122012
The policy of ‘fielding’ these non-state actors against the foreign policy initiative at lessening tensions in the region is riddled with bad faith.
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Amir Haider Hoti says Pakistan should undertake “do-or-die” action against terrorists who “want to destroy our state and society” from their sanctuaries inside the country. His words challenge the state of Pakistan:
“We are on the defensive in our streets and alleys, and they (terrorists) are at ease in their sanctuaries. We should evolve a national consensus on a comprehensive strategy for defeating terrorist outfits. We appeal to all political parties to take a clear stand on this issue (terrorism). If the experience of the recent past is anything to go by, terrorists will not forgive any political or religious party, even those who have literally acted as supporters of terrorists and apologists. It will be an exercise in futility to appease terrorists”.
Party chief Asfandyar Wali Khan has tried to rationalise the anti-drone policy his party was compelled to back, to be inside the national consensus against America, built inside parliament in Islamabad: he opposes the drones — because they violate the sovereignty of the state — at the same time as he opposes the continuation of Taliban sanctuaries in the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the country. The fact is that the US is retreating on the drones and may ultimately face internal American objection to them, while the Taliban flourish not only in their sanctuaries in the Tribal Areas but also in big cities inside the ‘governed spaces’.
Pakistan does not have a credible policy on the Taliban. Its approach is riddled with contradictions. The Pakistan Army, which ‘guides’ the foreign policy enclave in Islamabad, says it is not ready to challenge the sanctuaries. The world — including the 42 states that sent their troops to Afghanistan under Chapter Seven of the UN resolution — wants to help Pakistan in its confrontation with terror. But the strategy evolving in Pakistan is more focused on the situation inside Afghanistan where India is seen as a security challenge amid still-unproved allegations that the Baloch insurgency is orchestrated by New Delhi. Meanwhile, terror has moulded the attitude of the political parties who should have persuaded the army against its dangerously isolationist mindset: they want to make concessions to an entity that is actually planning a ‘revolutionary’ takeover of a nuclear-armed state.
The ANP is targeted because it contests Pakhtun nationalism with the predominantly Pakhtun Taliban on the basis of Pakhtunwali. The Swat trauma proved to the Pakhtun nation that terror can tame the tribal spirit and that the pain of seeing their sons killed can persuade the people to obey all kinds of commands. The terrorists use a policy of positive discrimination to command the direction of politics in Pakistan: they will not target those who favour ‘talks’ rather than ‘action’ vis-à-vis Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Their latest message clearly exempts parties that are friendly to the Taliban on the basis of the logic that terror is emanating from a reaction to the American presence in the region and that being anti-American will appease the terrorists.
The Taliban are not alone in their sanctuaries. Their support among the erstwhile ‘non-state actors’ trained by the state of Pakistan, in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, as instruments of foreign policy, riding on asymmetrical warfare is deep seated and growing. The so-called Punjabi Taliban are terror’s foot soldiers, produced by our madrassa network in support of privatisation of war on the basis of their doctrine of jihad. The policy of ‘fielding’ these non-state actors against the foreign policy initiative at lessening tensions in the region is riddled with bad faith.
The ANP’s cry from the heart will resound in 2013 when things get worse for Pakistan. But Pakistan’s isolationism — concealed behind rabid anti-Americanism — will not allow other political parties to rally around the ANP and confront the most palpable threat to the existence of the country. The Pakistan Army can take on the Taliban but it will need international help. The capacity of the state to cope with terror is at its lowest ebb.
Posted by admin in Bhutto-Zardari Feudal Family Corruption, CHINA -PAKISTAN FRIENDSHIP, Defense, Drone Attacks, INDIA'S HINDUISM, LIAR POLITICIANS, Makaar Dushman, Pakistan-US Relations, Zionist Enemy on February 21st, 2013
Pakistani paramilitary forces holds an alleged suspect during a crackdown operation against militants near Mingora in northern Pakistan, Friday, November 30, 2007. Photograph: Mohammad Zubair
Posted by admin in Afghanistan-Pakistan's Shield, Foreign Policy, THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN SERIES on February 21st, 2013
WHAT MILITARY LESSONS HAVE WE LEARNT FROM THE SOVIET AND US DEBACLES
IN AFGHANISTAN?
Afghanistan: the Smell of Defeat
by MIKE WHITNEY
“These two visions, one of tyranny and murder, the other of liberty
and life, clashed in Afghanistan. And thanks to brave US and coalition
forces and to Afghan patriots, the nightmare of the Taliban is over
and that nation is coming to life again.”
– George W. Bush, The War College Address, 2004
Not so fast, George.
The United States hasn’t liberated Afghanistan. It hasn’t rebuilt
Afghanistan. It hasn’t removed the warlords from power, curtailed
opium production, established strong democratic institutions, or
improved life for ordinary working people. The US hasn’t achieved any
of its strategic objectives. The Taliban are stronger than ever, the
central government is a corrupt farce, and, after 11 years of war, the
country is in a shambles.
This is what defeat looks like. The US military has been defeated by a
poorly-armed militia which has demonstrated a superior grasp of modern
warfare and asymmetric engagement. The Taliban has shown that they are
more adaptable, more motivated, and smarter. That’s why they
prevailed. That’s why they beat the world’s most celebrated army.
Americans don’t like to hear that kind of talk. They’re very proud of
their military and are willing to pay upwards of $1 trillion per year
to keep it outfitted in the most advanced weaponry on earth. But
weapons don’t win wars, neither does propaganda. If they did, the US
would have won long ago, but they don’t. What wins wars is tactics,
operations, and strategy, and that’s where the emphasis must be if one
expects to succeed.. Here’s an excerpt from an article by William S.
Lind explaining why the US mission in Afghanistan failed:
“A general rule of warfare is that a higher level trumps a lower, and
technique is the lowest level of all. Our SEALs, Rangers, Delta, SF,
and all the rest are vastly superior to the Taliban or al-Qaeda at
techniques. But those opponents have sometimes shown themselves able
at tactics, operations, and strategy. We can only defeat them by
making ourselves superior at those higher levels of war. There,
regrettably, Special Operations Forces have nothing to offer. They are
just another lead bullet in an obsolete Second Generation arsenal.”
(“What’s so special about Special Ops?”, William S. Lind, The American
Conservative)
The US military’s high-tech gadgetry and pilotless drones merely
disguise the fact that America is still fighting the last war and
hasn’t adapted to the new reality. Here’s more from Lind expanding on
the same theory:
“The greatest intellectual challenge in Fourth Generation war—war
against opponents that are not states—is how to fight it at the
operational level. NATO in Afghanistan, like the Soviets three decades
ago, has been unable to solve that riddle. But the Taliban appears to
have done so….
The Soviet army focused its best talent on operational art. But in
Afghanistan, it failed, just as we have failed. Like the Soviets, we
can take and hold any piece of Afghan ground. And doing so brings us,
like the Soviets, not one step closer to strategic victory. The
Taliban, by contrast, have found an elegant way to connect strategy
and tactics in decentralized modern warfare.
What passes for NATO’s strategy is to train sufficient Afghan forces
to hold off the Taliban once we pull out. The Taliban’s response has
been to have men in Afghan uniform— many of whom actually are Afghan
government soldiers or police—turn their guns on their NATO advisers.
That is a fatal blow against our strategy because it makes the
training mission impossible. Behold operational art in Fourth
Generation war……
The Taliban know this technique is operational, not just tactical.
They can be expected to put all their effort into it. What counter do
we have? Just order our troops to pretend it is not happening—to keep
trusting their Afghan counterparts. That order, if enforced, will put
our soldiers in such an untenable position that morale will collapse.”
(“Unfriendly Fire”, William S. Lind, The American Conservative)
Lind does not underestimate the Taliban or dismiss them as “ignorant
goat herders”. In fact, he appears to admire the way they have
mastered 4-G warfare and routed an enemy that has vastly superior
technology, communications and firepower. It helps to prove his basic
thesis that tactics, operations, and strategy are what matter most.
For more than a decade, the Taliban have been carrying out an
impressive guerrilla war frustrating attempts by the US to establish
security, hold ground or expand the power of the central (Karzai)
government. In the last year, however, the militia’s efforts have paid
off as so-called “green on blue” shootings–where coalition troops have
been killed by Afghan soldiers or policemen–have dashed US plans to
maintain a client regime in Kabul when US combat operations end and
American troops withdraw. The Taliban found the weak-link in the
Pentagon’s strategy and has used it to full advantage. “As American
Security Project Central and South Asia specialist Joshua Foust puts
it, ‘The training mission is the foundation of the current strategy.
Without that mission, the strategy collapses. The war is adrift, and
it’s hard to see how anyone can avoid a complete disaster at this
point.’” (“The Day we lost Afghanistan”, The National Interest)
TIME TO CUT AND RUN?
The persistent green on blue attacks have convinced US and NATO
leaders that the war cannot be won which is why President Barack Obama
has decided to throw in the towel. Here’s a clip from a speech Obama
gave in May at a NATO confab in Chicago:
“I don’t think that there is ever going to be an optimal point where
we say, this is all done, this is perfect, this is just the way we
wanted it and now we can wrap up all our equipment and go home…Our
coalition is committed to this plan to bring our war in Afghanistan to
a responsible end.”
The political class is calling it quits. They’ve decided to cut their
losses and leave. Here’s how the New York Times summed it up:
“After more than a decade of having American blood spilled in
Afghanistan…it is time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan
….. It should not take more than a year. The United States will not
achieve even President Obama’s narrowing goals, and prolonging the war
will only do more harm….
Administration officials say they will not consider a secure
“logistical withdrawal,” but they offer no hope of achieving broad
governance and security goals. And the only final mission we know of,
to provide security for a 2014 Afghan election, seems dubious at best
…
…the idea of fully realizing broader democratic and security aims
simply grows more elusive….More fighting will not consolidate the
modest gains made by this war, and there seems little chance of
guaranteeing that the Taliban do not “come back in..
Post-American Afghanistan is likely to be more presentable than North
Korea, less presentable than Iraq and perhaps about the same as
Vietnam. But it fits the same pattern of damaging stalemate. We need
to exit as soon as we safely can.
America’s global interests suffer when it is mired in unwinnable wars
in distant regions.” (“Time to Pack Up”, New York Times)
Notice how the Times fails to mention the War on Terror, al Qaida, or
Bin Laden, all of which were used to garner support for the war. What
matters now is “America’s global interests”. That’s quite a reversal,
isn’t it?
What happened to the steely resolve to fight the good fight for as
long as it takes; to liberate Afghan women, to spread democracy to
far-flung Central Asia, and to crush the fanatical Taliban once and
for all? Was it all just empty posturing aimed at ginning up the war
machine and swaying public opinion?
And look how easy it is for the Times to do a 180 when just months ago
they were trying to persuade readers that we should hang-in-there to
protect Afghan women. Take a look at this August 2012 editorial titled
“The Women of Afghanistan”:
“Afghanistan can be a hard and cruel land, especially for women and
girls. Many fear they will be even more vulnerable to harsh tribal
customs and the men who impose them after American troops withdraw by
the end of 2014.
Womens’ rights have made modest but encouraging gains over the past
decade. But these could disappear without a strong commitment to
preserve and advance them from Afghan leaders, Washington and other
international partners….
…all Afghans should be invested in empowering women. As Mrs. Clinton
has argued, there is plenty of evidence to show that no country can
grow and prosper in today’s world if women are marginalized and
oppressed.” (“The Women of Afghanistan”, New York Times)
Ahh, but lending a hand to “marginalized and oppressed” women doesn’t
really hold a candle to “America’s global interests”, now does it? As
one might expect, the Times most heartfelt feelings are shaped by
political expediency. In any event, the Times tacit admission proves
that the war was never really about liberating women or spreading
democracy or even killing bin Laden. It was about “America’s global
interests”, particularly, pipeline corridors, mineral extraction and
the Great Game, controlling real estate in thriving Eurasia, the
economic center of the next century. That’s why the US invaded
Afghanistan, the rest is propaganda.
There’s one other glaring omission in the Times article that’s worth
noting. The editors tiptoe around the one word that most accurately
summarises the situation: Defeat. The United States is not leaving
Afghanistan voluntarily. It was defeated. The US military was defeated
in the same way that the IDF was defeated by Hezbollah in the summer
of 2006, by underestimating the tenacity, the skill, the ferocity, the
adaptability, and the intelligence of their adversary. That’s why
Israel lost the war in Lebanon. And that’s why the US lost the war in
Afghanistan.
There’s a reason why the media won’t use the term defeat however
applicable it may be. It’s because your average “Joe” understands
defeat, the shame of defeat, the sting of defeat, the anger of defeat.
Defeat is a repudiation of leadership, proof that we are ruled by
fools and scoundrels. Defeat is also a powerful deterrent, the idea
festers in people’s minds and turns them against foreign
interventions, police actions and war. That’s why the Times won’t
utter the word, because defeat is the antidote for aggression, and the
Times doesn’t want that. None of the media do.
But the truth is, the United States was defeated in Afghanistan. If we
can grasp that fact, then maybe can stop the next war before it gets
started.
Posted by admin in " RIAZ THE SHAITAN OF PAKISTAN, "BAHRIA TOWN, Asif Zardari Crook Par Excellance, Pakistan's Ruling Elite Feudals Industrialists on February 21st, 2013
ASIF ZARDARI : President for Life & Minister of Finance & Governor State Bank of Pakistan
NAWAZ SHARIF : Minister of Religious Affairs & Right Wing Fanaticism with Special Portfolio of Minister for Bhagoras & Duffers
RAJA RENTAL PERVEZ: Minister for Car Rentals, Power Rentals, Truck Rentals, Call Girl Rentals, Dishonesty Rentals, and Selling Your Soul to the Devil Rentals
MALIK RIAZ : Minister for National Accountability Bureau & Chief Justice Designate
“DR” REHMAN MALIK : PRIME MINISTER & Minister for Education & Promotion of Languages with Special Emphasis on English & Urdu
ALTAF HUSSAIN: Minister for Food, Fire Arms & Population Control
MULLA FAZLUR RAHMAN: Minister for Diesel, Petroleum, & Women
SHARMILA FAROOQI: Minister for Jails
AMIN FAHIM: Minister for Anti-Corruption, Excise & Taxation & State Loans
ASHFAQ PERVEZ KAYANI ; Minister For Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
BILAWAL BHUTTO: Minister for Sports & Entertainment & Juvenile Affairs
FIRDOUS ASHIQ AWAN: Chief of Staff Pakistan