Hussain Haqqani was Pakistan’s most reviled ambassador to the US–often derisively called “the US ambassador to Pakistan based in Washington“.
Mr. Haqqani’s latest rhetoric against Pakistan is nothing new–he has spent a lifetime deriding the Pakistani state. In the aftermath of the 911 attacks, Haqqani the opportunist jumped on the Neoconservative bandwagon and made a buck.
He even wrote a memo to the US which has been liked to a “traitor’s confession”. For that “Memo” he has been indicted in court. The Chief Justice of the Supreme court has demanded his appearance for his sins, and he is absconding. The noose is tightening around him, and soon he will be standing in Pakistani court which will send him to jail for being a foreign spy and a traitor.
“By coming to terms with this reality, Washington would be freer to explore new ways of pressuring Pakistan and achieving its own goals in the region. Islamabad, meanwhile, could finally pursue its regional ambitions, which would either succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country’s power,” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called theForeign Affairs journal.
“Once Pakistan’s national security elites recognize the limits of their power, the country might eventually seek a renewed partnership with the United States — but this time with greater humility and an awareness of what it can and cannot get.” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called the Foreign Affairs journal.
“it is also possible, although less likely…”Even if the breakup of the alliance did not lead to such a dramatic denouement, it would still leave both countries free to make the tough strategic decisions about dealing with the other that each has been avoiding,” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called the Foreign Affairs journal.
”Pakistan could find out whether its regional policy objectives of competing with and containing India are attainable without US support. The United States would be able to deal with issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation without the burden of Pakistani allegations of betrayal.” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called the Foreign Affairs journal.
“they could hardly be worse off than they are now, clinging to the idea of an alliance even though neither actually believes in it. Sometimes, the best way forward in a relationship lies in admitting that it’s over in its current incarnation.” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called the Foreign Affairs journal.
Haqqani lives in his own world where “Blame Pakistan First” is his mantra. His philosophy has been rejected by Pakistanis and Americans alike, yet his hatred for the Pakistani state finds venues which will pay him.
“The civilian leaders were unable to smooth over the distrust between the US and Pakistani militaries and intelligence agencies. And the lack of full civilian control over Pakistan’s military and intelligence services meant that, as ever, the two countries were working toward different outcomes.” Hussain Haqqani writing in a conservative magazine called the Foreign Affairs journal.
Mr. Haqqani has often been described as a scoundrel and a thief. He has no backing and no one listens to his advice. His current article is another attempt to get cheap publicity and find a limelight which he has lost and craves for.
Pakistan: Fifty Years Later-Leslie Noyes Mass’s Back to Pakistan
by CHARLES R. LARSON
Like yours truly, Leslie Noyes Mass was a Peace Corps Volunteer fifty years ago, recently returned to the country of her assignment: Pakistan. But unlike what I observed during my recent return to Africa, Mass discovered a significantly different country: more education for young children, an exploding population, and a country not nearly as friendly to the United States as it was when she was there years ago. I wouldn’t call any of these changes a great surprise, yet I found Back to Pakistan totally engaging for the contrasts I have already mentioned—plus the mirroring of some of the experiences I encountered as a volunteer in Nigeria.
Mass was dumped in Dhamke, twenty or so miles from Lahore, with few guidelines as to what she was expected to do. Ostensibly, community development, but it was expected that she would generate her own project(s) unlike some of the other volunteers who as teachers had clearly defined tasks. Her living facilities were basic, exacerbated by her gender as an unmarried woman is a Muslim community. Initially, she was frustrated and angry: “Now what? I had no idea. And I was mad at the Peace Corps for botching up my assignment. But I was determined to figure out a way to work in this village.”
Drawing on her letters to friends back home, Mass is able to provide vivid details and feelings about her initial impressions of Pakistan (and her assignment) all those years ago. Here’s a paragraph from a letter to her boyfriend (later to be her husband), dated October 19, 1962: “The Volunteers here seem to be living pretty well and though some are equally disgusted with the lack of job definition, I am the orphan of the group. No other woman is alone in a village; everyone else has, at least, a place to live and a real job. The teachers have already started teaching and the men assigned to agricultural extension and engineering projects all have co-workers. But we Community Development workers are on our own. No one really knows what we are supposed to do.” She’s upset that her attempts to reach out to women in the community are largely unsuccessful. This is no huge surprise, given the restrictions on women’s lives (and their mobility) at the time and the country’s literacy rate of 12%. But when she is transferred to Sheikhupura months later, Mass realizes that she had made significant inroads into the lives of the Dhamke women.
Shift to 2009. Mass returns to Pakistan with several others, including people who were in the Peace Corps all those years ago. She’s been teaching for decades, earned a doctorate in early and middle school education, and retired from her job as director of an educational program at Ohio Wesleyan University. She’s a pro, accustomed to training teachers, which she and her friends will do in Pakistan for several months. They have been successful with making arrangements with The Citizens Foundation (TCF), a private organization that has set up several hundred schools across the country since the government-sponsored schools are sadly lacking. TCF has had major successes in the country, largely because of its curriculum and the dedication of its teachers who are women only.
Mass, thus, in 2009 is part volunteer, part educational expert, part tourist, keenly attuned to all the differences in the country from the first time she worked there. The activities with TCF are totally professional, and instantly rewarding. But it is an incident related to her by Ateed Riaz, one of the organization’s founding directors, that is most revealing to Mass (and to this reader), providing the context for the country’s education and development: “A friend of mine went to the city of Medina and went to a woman squatting on the floor selling something. He negotiated with her, but she would not sell to him. She said, ‘If you like it, buy it from that other tradeswoman. I will not sell it to you.’ So he got a local to come and talk to her in her own language. She talked to the local and explained that she had already sold enough that day and that other woman had not yet sold any, so I should buy from her. The message is clear: We need to help each other.”
The beauty of Back to Pakistan: A Fifty-Year Journey is Leslie Noyes Mass’s hindsight, combined with her insight. The book intermixes the two times instead of following a linear narrative and abounds in Mass’s first-hand reports from all those years earlier, sent as missives to her friends. Yes, I was predisposed to enjoy this book because of my own educational journey, and I confess that some of the passages describing her activities with TCF (administrators, teachers and pupils) may seem too pedantic to the average reader. But there are wonderful moments throughout the entire book, such as this one, just as Mass and her friends are going to depart from Lahore: “The schoolmaster said, in a mish-mash of English, Urdu, and Punjabi that he and all the village were happy that I had come back because it shows that not all Americans view Pakistan as a dangerous place where everyone is a terrorist.”
Leslie Noyes Mass Rowan & Littlefield, 212 pp., $32.95
Charles R. Larson is Emeritus Professor of Literature at American University, in Washington, D.C. Email: [email protected].
Tuesday, April 16, 2013 – Islamabad—Lieutenant General Viktor Nikolayevich Bondarev Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Air Force visited Air Headquarters Islamabad Monday.
It is the first ever visit of Russian Air Chief to Pakistan, Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt, Chief of the Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force had his maiden visit to Russia in August 2012, for participation in the International Military Conference.
Lieutenant General Viktor Nikolayevich Bondarev is visiting Pakistan on the invitation of Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt, Chief of the Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force.
The visiting guest paid homage to the martyrs of PAF by laying floral wreath on Martyrs’ Monument at Air Headquarters, Islamabad.
Later he called on Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt in his office. Both remained together for some time and discussed matters of professional interest.
The delegation also attended a briefing at Air Headquarters on the organization, role and functioning of Pakistan Air Force.
Later in the day, the Russian Delegation visited Air Defence Command, Pakistan Air Force.
The Delegation attended a briefing on the working of Air Defence Command and also visited Air Defence Operation Centre.
On their arrival, the Delegation was received by Air Vice Marshal Ejaz Mahmood Malik, Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command, Pakistan Air Force.
WHAT MILITARY LESSONS HAVE WE LEARNT FROM THE SOVIET AND US DEBACLES IN AFGHANISTAN?
Afghanistan: the Smell of Defeat by MIKE WHITNEY
“These two visions, one of tyranny and murder, the other of liberty and life, clashed in Afghanistan. And thanks to brave US and coalition forces and to Afghan patriots, the nightmare of the Taliban is over and that nation is coming to life again.”
– George W. Bush, The War College Address, 2004
Not so fast, George.
The United States hasn’t liberated Afghanistan. It hasn’t rebuilt Afghanistan. It hasn’t removed the warlords from power, curtailed opium production, established strong democratic institutions, or improved life for ordinary working people. The US hasn’t achieved any of its strategic objectives. The Taliban are stronger than ever, the central government is a corrupt farce, and, after 11 years of war, the country is in a shambles.
This is what defeat looks like. The US military has been defeated by a poorly-armed militia which has demonstrated a superior grasp of modern warfare and asymmetric engagement. The Taliban has shown that they are more adaptable, more motivated, and smarter. That’s why they prevailed. That’s why they beat the world’s most celebrated army.
Americans don’t like to hear that kind of talk. They’re very proud of their military and are willing to pay upwards of $1 trillion per year to keep it outfitted in the most advanced weaponry on earth. But weapons don’t win wars, neither does propaganda. If they did, the US would have won long ago, but they don’t. What wins wars is tactics, operations, and strategy, and that’s where the emphasis must be if one expects to succeed.. Here’s an excerpt from an article by William S. Lind explaining why the US mission in Afghanistan failed:
“A general rule of warfare is that a higher level trumps a lower, and technique is the lowest level of all. Our SEALs, Rangers, Delta, SF, and all the rest are vastly superior to the Taliban or al-Qaeda at techniques. But those opponents have sometimes shown themselves able at tactics, operations, and strategy. We can only defeat them by making ourselves superior at those higher levels of war. There, regrettably, Special Operations Forces have nothing to offer. They are just another lead bullet in an obsolete Second Generation arsenal.” (“What’s so special about Special Ops?”, William S. Lind, The American Conservative)
The US military’s high-tech gadgetry and pilotless drones merely disguise the fact that America is still fighting the last war and hasn’t adapted to the new reality. Here’s more from Lind expanding on the same theory:
“The greatest intellectual challenge in Fourth Generation war—war against opponents that are not states—is how to fight it at the operational level. NATO in Afghanistan, like the Soviets three decades ago, has been unable to solve that riddle. But the Taliban appears to have done so….
The Soviet army focused its best talent on operational art. But in Afghanistan, it failed, just as we have failed. Like the Soviets, we can take and hold any piece of Afghan ground. And doing so brings us, like the Soviets, not one step closer to strategic victory. The Taliban, by contrast, have found an elegant way to connect strategy and tactics in decentralized modern warfare.
What passes for NATO’s strategy is to train sufficient Afghan forces to hold off the Taliban once we pull out. The Taliban’s response has been to have men in Afghan uniform— many of whom actually are Afghan government soldiers or police—turn their guns on their NATO advisers. That is a fatal blow against our strategy because it makes the training mission impossible. Behold operational art in Fourth Generation war……
The Taliban know this technique is operational, not just tactical. They can be expected to put all their effort into it. What counter do we have? Just order our troops to pretend it is not happening—to keep trusting their Afghan counterparts. That order, if enforced, will put our soldiers in such an untenable position that morale will collapse.” (“Unfriendly Fire”, William S. Lind, The American Conservative)
Lind does not underestimate the Taliban or dismiss them as “ignorant goat herders”. In fact, he appears to admire the way they have mastered 4-G warfare and routed an enemy that has vastly superior technology, communications and firepower. It helps to prove his basic thesis that tactics, operations, and strategy are what matter most.
For more than a decade, the Taliban have been carrying out an impressive guerrilla war frustrating attempts by the US to establish security, hold ground or expand the power of the central (Karzai) government. In the last year, however, the militia’s efforts have paid off as so-called “green on blue” shootings–where coalition troops have been killed by Afghan soldiers or policemen–have dashed US plans to maintain a client regime in Kabul when US combat operations end and American troops withdraw. The Taliban found the weak-link in the Pentagon’s strategy and has used it to full advantage. “As American Security Project Central and South Asia specialist Joshua Foust puts it, ‘The training mission is the foundation of the current strategy. Without that mission, the strategy collapses. The war is adrift, and it’s hard to see how anyone can avoid a complete disaster at this point.’” (“The Day we lost Afghanistan”, The National Interest)
TIME TO CUT AND RUN?
The persistent green on blue attacks have convinced US and NATO leaders that the war cannot be won which is why President Barack Obama has decided to throw in the towel. Here’s a clip from a speech Obama gave in May at a NATO confab in Chicago:
“I don’t think that there is ever going to be an optimal point where we say, this is all done, this is perfect, this is just the way we wanted it and now we can wrap up all our equipment and go home…Our coalition is committed to this plan to bring our war in Afghanistan to a responsible end.”
The political class is calling it quits. They’ve decided to cut their losses and leave. Here’s how the New York Times summed it up:
“After more than a decade of having American blood spilled in Afghanistan…it is time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan ….. It should not take more than a year. The United States will not achieve even President Obama’s narrowing goals, and prolonging the war will only do more harm….
Administration officials say they will not consider a secure “logistical withdrawal,” but they offer no hope of achieving broad governance and security goals. And the only final mission we know of, to provide security for a 2014 Afghan election, seems dubious at best …
…the idea of fully realizing broader democratic and security aims simply grows more elusive….More fighting will not consolidate the modest gains made by this war, and there seems little chance of guaranteeing that the Taliban do not “come back in..
Post-American Afghanistan is likely to be more presentable than North Korea, less presentable than Iraq and perhaps about the same as Vietnam. But it fits the same pattern of damaging stalemate. We need to exit as soon as we safely can.
America’s global interests suffer when it is mired in unwinnable wars in distant regions.” (“Time to Pack Up”, New York Times)
Notice how the Times fails to mention the War on Terror, al Qaida, or Bin Laden, all of which were used to garner support for the war. What matters now is “America’s global interests”. That’s quite a reversal, isn’t it?
What happened to the steely resolve to fight the good fight for as long as it takes; to liberate Afghan women, to spread democracy to far-flung Central Asia, and to crush the fanatical Taliban once and for all? Was it all just empty posturing aimed at ginning up the war machine and swaying public opinion?
And look how easy it is for the Times to do a 180 when just months ago they were trying to persuade readers that we should hang-in-there to protect Afghan women. Take a look at this August 2012 editorial titled “The Women of Afghanistan”:
“Afghanistan can be a hard and cruel land, especially for women and girls. Many fear they will be even more vulnerable to harsh tribal customs and the men who impose them after American troops withdraw by the end of 2014.
Womens’ rights have made modest but encouraging gains over the past decade. But these could disappear without a strong commitment to preserve and advance them from Afghan leaders, Washington and other international partners….
…all Afghans should be invested in empowering women. As Mrs. Clinton has argued, there is plenty of evidence to show that no country can grow and prosper in today’s world if women are marginalized and oppressed.” (“The Women of Afghanistan”, New York Times)
Ahh, but lending a hand to “marginalized and oppressed” women doesn’t really hold a candle to “America’s global interests”, now does it? As one might expect, the Times most heartfelt feelings are shaped by political expediency. In any event, the Times tacit admission proves that the war was never really about liberating women or spreading democracy or even killing bin Laden. It was about “America’s global interests”, particularly, pipeline corridors, mineral extraction and the Great Game, controlling real estate in thriving Eurasia, the economic center of the next century. That’s why the US invaded Afghanistan, the rest is propaganda.
There’s one other glaring omission in the Times article that’s worth noting. The editors tiptoe around the one word that most accurately summarises the situation: Defeat. The United States is not leaving Afghanistan voluntarily. It was defeated. The US military was defeated in the same way that the IDF was defeated by Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, by underestimating the tenacity, the skill, the ferocity, the adaptability, and the intelligence of their adversary. That’s why Israel lost the war in Lebanon. And that’s why the US lost the war in Afghanistan.
There’s a reason why the media won’t use the term defeat however applicable it may be. It’s because your average “Joe” understands defeat, the shame of defeat, the sting of defeat, the anger of defeat. Defeat is a repudiation of leadership, proof that we are ruled by fools and scoundrels. Defeat is also a powerful deterrent, the idea festers in people’s minds and turns them against foreign interventions, police actions and war. That’s why the Times won’t utter the word, because defeat is the antidote for aggression, and the Times doesn’t want that. None of the media do.
But the truth is, the United States was defeated in Afghanistan. If we can grasp that fact, then maybe can stop the next war before it gets started.
According to a report, Pakistan’s two-third lawmakers don’t pay tax.
Islamabad, Dec 12/ Nationalturk – The first-ever report on the taxes of Pakistan parliament members was released on Wednesday, which shows that more than two thirds of country’s lawmakers paid no tax last year.
According to the report, of the 104 Senators, only 49 paid income tax in 2011. They included 11 newly elected senators, who did not file tax returns, though they mentioned otherwise in their nomination papers.
Aitzaz Ahsan is top taxpayer among the senators. He paid Rs.12.97 million. Next four Senators in this list are Abbas Khan Afridi (Rs. 11.52 million), Talha Mehmood (Rs. 7.60 million), Dr. Farogh Naseem (Rs. 4.56 million) and Osman Saifullah (Rs. 1.79 million).
The former minister and Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed is conspicuous by leading the list of the five lowest taxpaying Senators. “The data shows that he paid Rs. 82 as income tax. The four Senators next to him from the bottom are Karim Ahmad Khawaja (Rs. 3,636), Haji Saifullah Bangash (Rs.4,063), Naseema Ehsan (Rs. 4,280) and Malik Salahuddin Dogar (Rs. 8, 659)”.
The party-wise break-up indicates that only 17 ruling PPP Senators out of 44, six PML-N senators out of 14, four MQM senators out of seven, two each of ANP and PML out of 12 and five respectively, and one each of BNP-A, JUI-F, and PML-F filed tax returns in 2011.
Pakistan’s National Assembly has 341 sitting members; one seat is vacant. Of them, only 90 members have filed their tax returns. There were 16 lawmakers, whose requisite details for checking the income tax filing status were not available. Among the rest, Jehangir Khan Tareen (who was lawmaker in September 2011 when returns were filed) is top taxpayer (Rs. 17.05 million). Those next to him in descending order are Hamid Yar Hiraj (Rs. 2.44 million), Hamza Shehbaz Sharif (Rs. 2.31 million), Attiya Inayatullah (Rs.1.59 million) and Humayun Saifullah (Rs. 1.44 million). From the other side, Sheikh Rohail Asghar (Rs.16, 893) is at the bottom, surpassed by Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi (Rs. 21, 993), Asim Nazir (Rs. 28, 923) Engineer Amir Muqam (Rs. 29, 324) and Rana Afzal Hussain (Rs. 39, 713).
Pakistan’s President and Interior Minister also did not file tax returns in 2011
The report, which marks the launch of the Centre for Investigative Reporting in Pakistan (CIRP), based its findings on information from the FBR and lawmakers themselves. It urges politicians to disclose their tax returns voluntarily in future.
According to Cheema’s findings, President Asif Ali Zardari did not file a tax return in 2011 and neither did 34 of the 55 cabinet members including Interior Minister Rehman Malik.
The Pakistan cabinet comprises Prime Minister and his 55 cabinet members. However, only 20 ministers filed their tax returns. Of 28 parliamentary secretaries, only seven filed tax returns. Of are 55 MNAs holding key positions in the National Assembly and its Standing Committees; only 15 filed tax returns.
