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Archive for category PASHTUNS:THE IRON SHIELD OF PAKISTAN

THE REAL PAKISTAN

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BE PAKISTANI, BUY PAKISTANI

Nadia Rafiq Butt.
Pakistan like many other countries is striving to get a positive image for one reason or the other. One can spell out a number of reasons. On top is sectarianism and extremism which has become plague for our society. Then is the law and order situation, frequency of murders and thefts and all such crimes. However, this doesn’t suggest that things are not under control. There are good people and good things to report. It must be admitted that human societies have their limitations. Freedom, justice and equality are only ideals. Total justice and peace is not humanly possible. Instead of looking at it in a negative way, one should look at those negatives with a glass half-full approach, and one should realize that spreading positivity instead of deprivation and scarcity would serve the cause better as we all hold responsibility being nationals to our homeland. Man will only remain on the right track if a mental discipline is shaped by education and if there is a fear of law, justice and punishment, in short dispense of justice without fear or favor. If a society enjoys justice and fair play it will surely portray soft image.
If our social, economic and administrative systems work reasonably and efficiently no harm can come to Pakistan. If all get justice and feel secure no one will think of any criminal activities. Every citizen must have confidence in its justice system. There can be no peace without justice and no civilized society without education. In the absence of justice and literacy no one can vision of credibility of sound reputation of the country.
Apparently Pakistan’s softer image is being portrayed by book releases, rock concerts and exhibitions nationally either internationally. Somehow we misunderstood the reality that the solution lies to the problems of country. We can somehow fix this problem by altering our international image of being naïve along with gratified and full of pride of our own culture and traditions. We have to come out of copying and competing others thereafter. If we can value our own culture and traditions showcasing higher values and norms with self-dignity only then we can gently put others on the track of respecting our culture and traditions in reciprocation. 
Pakistan is making all sorts of efforts to tackle deadly hazard of terrorism not only for its own good but for the whole world. Terrorism could only be defeated through dialogue, as it was the only way to eliminate terrorism where the outcome of using power would produce no positive results but would aggravate the situation. Unfortunately the western world is not giving Pakistan its due credit. It keeps on highlighting only those things through which the image of the country can be damaged and their national interests get served. More fuel is been added by next-door enemy India whose psychological warfare has always put serious harm to our country both nationally and internationally. But would it serve sensible if we keep waiting for due credit. Putting aside unhygienic debate of our war or others war enforced on our country and steered by our forces, political leaders should get our unparalleled sacrifices and unshaken resolve acknowledged by international world regardless of opposition’s propaganda which has been going since years and will keep going. 
Pakistan’s soft image can be portrayed through three resources i.e. culture economy and media. Pakistan is not being able to attract the western world through its historical and cultural heritage. Pakistan has great heritage from North to South. Tourism can bring a big change and can play a pivotal role. Cultural events, exchange programs, broadcasting or teaching country’s language and promoting country’s culture and society can be used as soft tools. Basant and Valentine’s Day celebrations will not help. We are in dire need of culture of tolerance in Pakistan but anything against the true spirit of Islam needs to be discouraged. Pakistan must think to start exchange programs between students. Teachers must be welcome from abroad to teach their language to young students in Pakistan and vice versa. Science and technology must be given high preferences. Helping other countries in disasters and emergency situations can prove our soft side instead of highlighting and pretending miseries in the greed of getting aid from international world. Government should stay alive to the issues of backwardness, unemployment and economic deprivation in the country and keep striving to address these through judicious distribution of resources.
People buy brands not products, this is an age old fact acknowledged by the researchers of the world. We need to develop our brand reputed Pakistan. Almost every other country is associated with its national characteristics. Italy is associated with style, Japan with technology, India with history and culture, so our efforts with branding must be guided to find our economic role. Here comes the question how we can package our self. The media particularly electronic media can play a major role. We need to have more of English news channels to have more international audience. Media has hyped bad news and have made it look like a demon.This does not mean that nothing good has happened or is happening. The only prevailing fact that bad news is more newsworthy than good news. Media has played a huge part in this feeling of desperation by mainly reporting bad news and harping on it. Calling the same idiots for discussions on prime time every day is hardly a way of finding solutions tour myriad problems. Media seems to be shunning every positive news because it is not sexy and gets no TRPs or advertising.We all know that publicity is what a company or individual receives when something prominent happens and when the notable event is good, the publicity usually attracts new client and gives the company something to brag about in future.We as a nation have to say that yes we are going through bad times and all of us in some way or other are contributors to this. Let’s all now resolve to get out of this rut by doing sincerely and honestly what our individual jobs are before we point fingers at others. We need to be more focused and targeted as generic strategies “Be Pakistani, buy Pakistani” “East or West, Pakistan is the best” will not work anymore. 

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100 Years of Imperial Paranoia About the Pashtuns

100 Years of Imperial Paranoia About the Pashtuns

TIn fact, few intelligence predictions could have less chance of coming true. In the 2008 parliamentary election, the Pakistani public voted in centrist parties, some of them secular, virtually ignoring the Muslim fundamentalist parties. Today in Pakistan, there are about 24 million Pashtuns, a linguistic ethnic group that speaks Pashto. Another 13 million live across the British-drawn “Durand Line,” the border — mostly unacknowledged by Pashtuns — between Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. Most Taliban derive from this group, but the vast majority of Pashtuns are not Taliban and do not much care for the Muslim radicals.

The Taliban force that was handily defeated this spring by the Pakistani army in a swift campaign in the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province, amounted to a mere 4,000 men. The Pakistani military is 550,000 strong and has a similar number of reservists. It has tanks, artillery, and fighter jets. The Taliban’s appeal is limited to that country’s Pashtun ethnic group, about 14% of the population and, from everything we can tell, it is a minority taste even among them. The Taliban can commit terrorism and destabilize, but they cannot take over the Pakistani government.

Some Western analysts worry that the Taliban could unite with disgruntled junior officers of the Pakistani Army, who could come to power in a putsch and so offer their Taliban allies access to sophisticated weaponry. Successful Pakistani coups, however, have been made by the chief of staff at the top, not by junior officers, since the military is quite disciplined. Far from coup-making to protect the Taliban, the military has actually spent the past year in hard slogging against them in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Bajaur and more recently in Swat.

Today’s fantasy of a nuclear-armed Taliban is the modern equivalent of Churchill’s anxiety about those all-conquering, ultramodern Pashtun riflemen with the instincts of savages.

Frontier Ward and Watch

On a recent research trip to the India Office archives in London to plunge into British military memoirs of the Waziristan campaigns in the first half of the twentieth century, I was overcome by a vivid sense of déjà vu. The British in India fought three wars with Afghanistan, losing the first two decisively, and barely achieving a draw in the third in 1919. Among the Afghan king Amanullah’s demands during the third war were that the Pashtun tribes of the frontier be allowed to give him their fealty and that Britain permit Afghanistan to conduct a sovereign foreign policy. He lost on the first demand, but won on the second and soon signed a treaty of friendship with the newly established Soviet Union.

Disgruntled Pashtun tribes in Waziristan, a no-man’s land sandwiched between the Afghan border and the formal boundary of the British-ruled North-West Frontier Province, preferred Kabul’s rule to that of London, and launched their own attacks on the British, beginning in 1919. Putting down the rebellious Wazir and Mahsud tribes of this region would, in the end, cost imperial Britain’s treasury three times as much as had the Third Anglo-Afghan War itself.

On May 2, 1921, long after the Pashtun tribesmen should have been pacified, the Manchester Guardian carried a panicky news release by the British Viceroy of India on a Mahsud attack. “Enemy activity continues throughout,” the alarmed message from Viceroy Rufus Isaacs, the Marquess of Reading, said, implying that a massive uprising on the subcontinent was underway. In fact, the action at that point was in only a small set of villages in one part of Waziristan, itself but one of several otherwise relatively quiet tribal areas.

On the 23rd of that month, a large band of Mahsud struck “convoys” near the village of Piazha. British losses included a British officer killed, four British and two Indian officers wounded, and seven Indian troops killed, with 26 wounded. On the 24th, “a picket [sentry outpost] near Suidgi was ambushed, and lost nine killed and seven wounded.” In nearby Zhob, the British received support from friendly Pashtun tribes engaged in a feud with what they called the “hostiles,” and — a modern touch — “aeroplanes” weighed in as well. They were, it was said, “cooperating,” though this too was an exaggeration. At the time, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was eager to prove its colonial worth on the imperial frontiers in ways that extended beyond simple reconnaissance, even though in 1921 it maintained but a single airplane at Peshawar, the nearest city, which had “a hole in its wing.” By 1925, the RAF had gotten its wish and would drop 150 tons of bombs on the Mahsud tribe.

On July 5, 1921, a newspaper report in the Allahabad Pioneer gives a sense of the tactics the British deployed against the “hostiles.” One center of rebellion was the village of Makin, inhabited by that same Mahsud tribe, which apparently wanted its own irrigation system and freedom from British interference. The British Indian army held the nearby village of Ladka. “Makin was shelled from Ladka on the 20th June,” the report ran.

The tribal fighters responded by beginning to move their flocks, though their families remained. British archival sources report that a Muslim holy man, or faqir, attempted to give the people of Makin hope by laying a spell on the 6-inch howitzer shells and pledging that they would no longer explode in the valley. (Overblown imperial anxiety about such faqirs or akhonds, Pashtun religious leaders, inspired Victorian satirists such as Edward Lear, who began one poem, “Who, or why, or which, or what, Is the Akond of Swat?”)

The faqir’s spells were to no avail. The shelling, the Pioneer reported, continued over the next two days, “with good results.” Then on the 23rd, “another bombardment of Makin was carried out by our 6-inch howitzers at Ladka.” This shelling “had a great moral effect,” the newspaper intoned, and revealed with satisfaction that “the inhabitants are now evacuating their families.” The particular nature of the moral effect of bombarding a civilian village where women and children were known to be present was not explained. Two days later, however, thanks to air observation, the howitzers at Ladka and the guns at “Piazha camp” made a “direct hit” on another similarly obscure village.

Such accounts of small, vicious engagements in mountainous villages with (to British ears) outlandish names fit oddly with the strange conviction of the elite and the press that the fate of the Empire was somehow at stake — just as strangely as similar reports out of exactly the same area, often involving the very same tribes, do in our own time. On July 7, 2009, for instance, the Pakistani newspaper The Nation published a typical daily report on the Swat valley campaign which might have come right out of the early twentieth century. Keep in mind that this was a campaign into which the Obama administration forced the Pakistani government to save itself and the American position in the Greater Middle East, and which displaced some two million people, risking the actual destabilization of the whole northwestern region of Pakistan. It went in part:

 

“[T]he security forces during search operation at Banjut, Swat, recovered 50 mules loaded with arms and ammunition, medicines and ration and also apprehended a few terrorists. During search operation at Thana, an improvised explosive device (IED) went off causing injuries to a soldier. As a result of operation at Tahirabad, Mingora, the security forces recovered surgical equipment, nine hand grenades and office furniture from the house of a militant.”

The unfamiliar place names, the attention to confiscated mules, and the fear of tribal militancy differed little from the reports in the Pioneer from nearly a century before. Echoing Viceroy Rufus Isaacs, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on July 14th, “Our national security as well as the future of Afghanistan depends on a stable, democratic, and economically viable Pakistan. We applaud the new Pakistani determination to deal with the militants who threaten their democracy and our shared security.”

As in 1921, so in 2009, the skirmishes were ignored by the general public in the West despite the frenzied assertions of politicians that the fate of the world hung in the balance.

A Paranoid View of the Pashtuns, Then and Now

On July 21, 1921, a “correspondent” for the Allahabad Pioneer — as anonymous as he was vehement — explained how some firefights in Waziristan might indeed be consequential for Western civilization. He attacked “Irresponsible Criticism” of the military budget required to face down the Mahsud tribe. He asked, “What is India’s strategical position in the world today?” It was a leading question. “Along hundreds of miles of her border,” he then warned darkly in a mammoth run-on sentence, “are scores of thousands of hardy fighters trained to war and rapine from their very birth, never for an instant forgetful of the soft wealth of India’s plains, all of whom would descend to harry them tomorrow if they thought the venture safe, some of whom are determinedly at war with us even now.”

Note that he does not explain the challenge posed by the Pashtun tribes in terms of typical military considerations, which would require attention to the exact numbers, training, equipment, tactics and logistics of the fighters, and which would have revealed them as no significant threat to the Indian plains, however hard they were to control in their own territory. The “correspondent” instead ridicules urban “pen-pushers,” who little appreciate the “heavy task” of “frontier ward and watch.”

Not only were the tribes a danger in themselves, the hawkish correspondent intoned, but “beyond India’s border lies a great country [Afghanistan] with whom we are not even yet technically at peace.” Nor was that all. The recently-established Soviet Union, with which Afghanistan had concluded a treaty of friendship that February, loomed as the real threat behind the radical Pashtuns. “Beyond that again is a huge mad-dog nation that acknowledges no right save the sword, no creed save aggression, murder and loot, that will stay at nothing to gain its end, that covets avowedly a descent upon India above all other aims.”

That then-Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin, who took an extremely dim view of colonialism and seriously considered freeing the Central Asian possessions of the old tsarist empire, was then contemplating the rape of India is among the least believable calumnies in imperial propaganda. The “correspondent” would have none of it. Those, he concludes, who dare criticize the military budget should try sweet-talking the Mahsud, the Wazir and the Bolsheviks.

In our own day as well, pundits configure the uncontrolled Pashtuns as merely the tip of a geostrategic iceberg, with the sinister icy menace of al-Qaeda stretching beneath, and beyond that greater challenges to the U.S. such as Iran (incredibly, sometimes charged by the U.S. military with supporting the hyper-Sunni, Shiite-hating Taliban in Afghanistan). Occasionally in this decade, attempts have even been made to tie the Russian bear once again to the Pashtun tribes.

In the case of the British Empire, whatever the imperial fears, the actual cost in lives and expenditure of campaigning in the Hindu Kush mountain range was enough to ensure that such engagements would be of relatively limited duration. On October 26, 1921, the Pioneer reported that the British government of India had determined to implement a new system in Waziristan, dependent on tribal mercenaries.

“This system, which was so successfully inaugurated in the Khyber district last year,” the article explained, “is really an adaptation of the methods in vogue 40 years ago.” The tribal commander provided his own weapons and equipment, and for a fee, protected imperial lines of communication and provided security on the roads. “Thus he has an interest in maintaining the tranquility of his territory, and gives support to the more stable elements among the tribes when the hotheads are apt to run amok.” The system would be adopted, the article says, to put an end to the ruinous costs of “punitive expeditions of merely ephemeral pacificatory value.”

Absent-minded empire keeps reinventing the local tribal levy, loyal to foreign capitals and paid by them, as a way of keeping the hostiles in check. The U.S. Council on Foreign Relations reported late last year that “U.S. military commanders are studying the feasibility of recruiting Afghan tribesmen… to target Taliban and al-Qaeda elements. Taking a page from the so-called ‘Sunni Awakening’ in Iraq, which turned Sunni tribesmen against militants first in Anbar Province and then beyond, the strategic about-face in Afghanistan would seek to extend power from Kabul to the country’s myriad tribal militias.” Likewise, the Pakistani government has attempted to deploy tribal fighters against the Taliban in the Federally Administered areas such as Bajaur. It remains to be seen whether this strategy can succeed.

Both in the era between the two world wars and again in the early twenty-first century, the Pashtun peoples have been objects of anxiety in world capitals out of all proportion to the security challenge they actually pose. As it turned out, the real threat to the British Isles in the twentieth century emanated from one of what Churchill called their “civilized” European neighbors. Nothing the British tried in the North-West Frontier and its hinterland actually worked. By the 1940s the British hold on the tribal agencies and frontier regions was shakier than ever before, and the tribes more assertive. After the British were forced out of the subcontinent in 1947, London’s anxieties about the Pashtuns and their world-changing potential abruptly evaporated.

Today, we are again hearing that the Waziris and the Mahsuds are dire threats to Western civilization. The tribal struggle for control of obscure villages in the foothills of the Himalayas is being depicted as a life-and-death matter for the North Atlantic world. Again, there is aerial surveillance, bombing, artillery fire, and — this time — displacement of civilians on a scale no British viceroy ever contemplated.

In 1921, vague threats to the British Empire from a small, weak principality of Afghanistan and a nascent, if still supine, Soviet Union underpinned a paranoid view of the Pashtuns. Today, the supposed entanglement with al-Qaeda of those Pashtuns termed “Taliban” by U.S. and NATO officials — or even with Iran or Russia — has focused Washington’s and Brussels’s military and intelligence efforts on the highland villagers once again.

Few of the Pashtuns in question, even the rebellious ones, are really Taliban in the sense of militant seminary students; few so-called Taliban are entwined with what little is left of al-Qaeda in the region; and Iran and Russia are not, of course, actually supporting the latter. There may be plausible reasons for which the U.S. and NATO wish to spend blood and treasure in an attempt to forcibly shape the politics of the 38 million Pashtuns on either side of the Durand Line in the twenty-first century. That they form a dire menace to the security of the North Atlantic world is not one of them.

Juan Cole is the Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History at the University of Michigan. His most recent book, Engaging the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), was published this spring. He has appeared widely on television, radio, and on op-ed pages as a commentator on Middle East affairs, and has a regular column at Salon.com. He has written, edited, or translated 15 books, and authored 65 journal articles and chapters. He is the proprietor of the Informed Comment weblog on current affairs. 

 
By Juan Cole, Tomdispatch.com
Posted on July 28, 2009, Printed on July 28, 2009
http://www.alternet.org/story/141593/

© 2009 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
View this story online at: http://www.alternet.org/story/141593/

 

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