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Archive for category Pakistan’s Hall of Shame

The Metro Bus Flop: Billions wasted by Emotionally Charged CM Shahbaz Sharif on Pet Projects: People Lose: Contractors Win

Lahore citizens crammed into an operational Metro Bus. PHOTO: ONLINE

Lahore citizens crammed into an operational Metro Bus. PHOTO: ONLINEThis is reckless spending which matches the obsessive behaviour of emperors from not so democratic times. PHOTO: AFP

According to the Punjab government, 30 billion rupees is the amount of money spent on the Lahore Metro Bus Service. The actual figure may be a lot more, but let’s just take their word for it and apply a bit of perspective to it instead.

Overall the entire allocated money for Punjab infrastructure development is Rs63 billion which means that 50% or half of the development budget of Punjab was spent in Lahore.

This excludes the cost of the numerous underpasses and overhead bridges that were built in Lahore.

Compare this Rs30 billion to the Rs16.5 billion allocated to the health sector for the entire province of Punjab. Just imagine if this same budget, allocated to the metro service was spent on the health sector instead.

A state of the art hospital like the recently developed Rawalpindi Institute of Cardiology was built within Rs2.8 billion, taking that as our benchmark, we would have been able to build 10 such hospitals with the RS30 billion spent on the Metro Bus!

An interesting perspective, right?

Compare this with the Rs25 billion development budget for education in Punjab for the current year. From this 25 billion a total of Rs5 billion was spent on giving away laptops. Although the goodwill gesture behind the act remains, pragmatism is in severe dearth. Unfortunately, the schools in this country lack basic infrastructure, sanitation and clean drinking water – laptops are a far off dream.

Some may think Punjab as a province is able to afford suchshenanigans but a close look at the economic situation of the province gives a very different picture.

In these hard economic times, under the PPP government, it is Punjab that is the worst performing province.

The province’s annual average growth rate of 2.5% between 2007 and 2011 lagged far behind the 3.4% for the rest of Pakistan, according to the Lahore-based Institute of Public Policy (IPP). Over 83% of the Rs783 billion Punjab budget for the current year will be financed by federal transfers and 12% by provincial tax revenue.

The more worrying factor is that Punjab is generating very little revenue of its own and the provincial government has completely failed to address this problem, in fact it is making it worse by spending billions on projects which will further strain the treasury.

Interestingly, very little is being said about the running cost of the Metro Bus Service as the costs have not been ‘calculated yet’ but conservative estimates are that the subsidies would cost the government a minimum of Rs1 billion a year.

This project has the potential to become another state owned bleeding giant.

This is reckless spending which matches the obsessive behaviour of emperors from not so democratic times. Pakistan is set for harder times economically and the leaders are demonstrating absolutely no sense what so ever or any serious intent to address the actual problems this country faces.

I believe that the Metro Bus Service has nothing to offer this country except further economic misery.

* All figures quoted from the Punjab government site.

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BUREAUCRATS – THE BLOOD SUCKERS OF PAKISTAN: Mojaan hi Mojaan for babus -I

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Mojaan hi Mojaan for babus -I

 

 

Mojaan hi Mojaan for babus -I

 

Politically Incorrect

 

 

Amir Mateen

 

Pakistan is in turmoil. From politicians to the generals to the common man—everybody is embroiled in chaos up to the neck. But there is one exclusive community that basks in luxury and relishes the best of both worlds — super bureaucrats.

There are almost 50 Grade-22 officers now. This excludes the super-duper Salman Farooqui, who as Secretary General in Grade 22 with the status of a State Minister, holds the golden key to the Presidential treasures. Also excluded are half a dozen Grade-22 officers hired on contract including Special Secretaries to the President Mrs Nasreen Haque, Special Secretary Establishment Division Munir Ahmad and the three secretaries of the Election Commission of Pakistan, the Senate and the National Assembly, not to forget the two retired generals monitoring Defence Division and Production. Wow, quite a figure. Well that’s just half of the story.

Another 170 are waiting in Grade-21, half of them having their two-year waiting requirement fulfilled, are pulling every string to get into the Super Club-22. Where will it lead to? The Club-22 ballooning into a 100 or even more, if we allow them to have their way. Remember the Devolution of power. It was meant to, besides provincial autonomy, cut the size of the government. The idea was not to have duplication of ministries. And here it is – the babus keep coming out with new divisions, autonomous and regulatory bodies, wings, departments — all those fancy words that basically come down to more expansion and more perks.

There are 44 Divisions already besides autonomous and regulatory elephants. Why do we have a Human Rights Division?

Ever heard a Grade-22 officer by the name of Shaigan Shareef Malik raising his voice for the Baloch missing people or standing by the Hindu women abducted in Sindh. All we know is that the government is the biggest violator of human rights.

The government may have abolished its privatization policy but the one-time expanded Privatisation Division stays. Do you know about National Harmony Division? What does Inter Provincial Coordination do?  Or the National Food Security and Research Division or the more intriguing National Heritage and Integration Division. Even the CIA could not have coined such dubious names for these outfits. Underneath these fancy names are huge edifices created for our worthy members of the Club-22 to run their small fiefdoms of staff cars, the colonial peons and toilets are clearly marked “For Officer”—tax-payers money be damned. After all, they did not pass that CSS bloody exam 35 years ago to be the ‘public servants,’ goes the saying.

They trick is to keep upgrading these post. The Chairman of the Provincial Planning and Division was a Grade-21 post that got elevated to Grade-22. The same is the case with the Chairman Land Commission and Senior Member of the Punjab Revenue Board. Punjab also has a Grade-22 officer as the Acting Chief Secretary. No wonder Shahbaz Sharif loves these babus so much and holds a contempt for his own political class. His earlier Chief Secretary, Javed Mahmood, who was accused of crushing down a Colonel, the last we heard, was supervising family agriculture in Kasur after taking a long leave. He will still be eligible for all the perks and pension for sure. Club mates take care of each other. In the past, others have worked for Chaudhry Shujaat’s Mill as Manager while keeping their job.

Yet the ground is ripe for making way for more members of the Super Club. About ten vacancies of Grade-22 are still vacant and are being run by acting Heads. This includes the CDA and we all know that the last few heads of this prized outfit have either been pushed out or, such as Kamran Lashari, faces corruption charges before the Courts. By the way, Lashari is now adviser with the Punjab government. Told you Shahbaz Sharif loves them—who cares about the Supreme Court.

Also, the Supreme Court has also ruled that no extensions will be given. Yet the contracts to retired people keep coming. In fact, the two most important Divisions are being run by retired officers on contract. Wajid Rana, who was given a contract in last November, runs the Finance Division. More important, Munir Ahmad has been hired as Special Secretary in Establishment Division for a two year contract. Why? Because he specializes in bending rules and making more room for people like himself. Why should there be a Special Secretary when they already have Taimoor Azmat as the Establishment Secretary. Then why should there be a Special Secretary of Water and Power also?

It’s a total mess. Salman Farooqui refuses to give way at 70 plus whereas hundreds of junior officers in non-DMG grades sulk for years for the promotion board to just sit down.

Nargis sethi has an additional charge while the most senior 22-grader in officialdom, Zafar Mahmood, sits at home for the last four months for a ‘posting’. By the way, it was again His Lordship who caused this anomaly. A recent holy judicial scripture makes it mandatory for the government to give reasons if they send an Officer on ‘Special Duty’, the official-speak for the notorious acronym OSD. Trust the bureaucrats to find novel ways of beating the law. They just make them sit at home without salary for months, which is worse than being an OSD. What a send-off for one of their own kind who retires after 35 years of service in April…retirement without salary.

 

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GLOBAL COMMUNITY, GLOBAL MEDIA, HUMAN RIGHTS ORGS, CIVIL SOCIETY HOLD PM NAWAZ SHARIF RESPONSIBLE: 8000 PAKISTANI GIRLS FROM POOR HOMES KIDNAPPED INTO SEX SLAVERY OR ENTER INTERNAL SLAVE TRADE-IMRAN KHAN’S “TAKRAR” EXPOSE

 

9-year-old Pakistani girl kidnapped and gang-raped  

 

 

An archive photo of  a Pakistani girl. (Reuters / Fayaz Aziz)

An archive photo of a Pakistani girl. (Reuters / Fayaz Aziz)

 

 

 

 

 

Shakira Parveen was prostituted by her husband.

 

 

By 

 

 

Meerwala, Pakistan

 

 

Note: 

Mr.Kristof is a New York Jew and writes particularly vicious articles for the Jewish Newspapers like  The New York Times and Washington Post about Muslim societies like Pakistan, ignoring the 1 million cases of unreported rapes in

his home country.Pakistan allows these Jewish reporters, who cleverly hide their identity to roam around in Pakistan, and even to spy for Israel and India. Pakistan’s security agencies can only keep an eye on them, our executive and Judiciary protects them.

Our an enemy can only point out our flaws. It is for us to fix them

 
Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

Nicholas D. Kristof

Nicholas D. Kristof

Shakira Parveen, far right.

If the thought has ever flitted through your mind that your spouse isn’t 100 percent perfect, then just contemplate what Shakira Parveen is going through. And give your own husband or wife a hug.

When Ghulam Fareed proposed marriage to Ms. Parveen, he fingered prayer beads and seemed gentle and pious. Ms. Parveen didn’t know him well, but she and her family were impressed.

“The first month of marriage was O.K.,” Ms. Parveen recalled. “And then he said, you have to do whatever I tell you. If I tell you to sleep with other men, you have to do that.”

It turned out that Mr. Fareed was running a brothel and selling drugs, and he intended Ms. Parveen to be his newest prostitute. “I said, ‘No, I don’t want to sleep with other men,’ ” she said, but he beat her unconscious with sticks, broke her bones and at one point set fire to her clothes. Finally, she broke and assented.

Her “husband” locked her up in one room, she said, and the only people she saw were customers. “For two years, I never left the house,” she said.

This kind of neo-slavery is the plight of millions of girls and young women (and smaller numbers of boys) around the world, particularly in Asia. A major difference from 19th-century slavery is that these victims are dead of AIDS by their 20s.

Finally, Ms. Parveen was able to escape and return to her family, but Mr. Fareed was furious and began to torment her family, saying he would let up only if she returned to the brothel as his prostitute. Then Mr. Fareed’s gang pressured Ms. Parveen by kidnapping her younger brother, Uzman, who was in the fifth grade. Uzman says that his hands and feet were shackled, and he was raped daily by many different men, apparently pimped to paying customers.

The gang members explained that they would release the boy if Ms. Parveen returned to the brothel, and she contemplated suicide.

After six weeks, Uzman escaped while his captors became drunk and left him unshackled. But when Ms. Parveen and her parents went to the police, the officers just laughed at them. Mr. Fareed and other gang members worked hand in glove with the police, the family says.

Indeed, the police even arrested Ms. Parveen’s father, who is one-legged because of a train accident (that is one reason for the family’s poverty). Apparently on the gang’s orders, the police held him for two weeks, in which time he says he was beaten mercilessly. The police are also searching for Ms. Parveen’s brothers, who have gone into hiding.

Mr. Fareed also threatened to kidnap and prostitute Ms. Parveen’s younger sister, Naima, a 10th-grader who was ranked first in her class of 40 girls. Panic-stricken, the parents pulled Naima out of school and sent her to relatives far away. So her dreams of becoming a doctor have been dashed. (For readers who want to help, I’ve posted some suggestions on my blog:www.nytimes.com/ontheground.)

This nexus of sex trafficking and police corruption is common in developing countries. The problem is typically not so much that laws are inadequate; it is that brothel owners buy the police and the courts.

But Ms. Parveen’s tale arises not only from corruption, but also from poverty.

“If I had money, this wouldn’t be happening,” said Ms. Parveen’s mother, Akbari Begum. “It’s all about money. In the police station, nobody listens to me. The police listen to those who sell narcotics.”

“God should never grant daughters to poor people,” she added. “God should not give sisters to poor brothers. Because we’re poor, we can’t fight for them. It’s very hard for poor people, because they take our daughters and dishonor them. There’s nothing we can do.”

Yet in a land where poor women and girls are victimized equally by pimps and by the police, they do have one savior — Mukhtar Mai. She is the woman I’ve visited and written about often (she also uses the name Mukhtaran Bibi).

After being sentenced to be gang-raped by a tribal council for a supposed offense of her brother, Mukhtar refused to commit suicide and instead prosecuted her attackers. And then she used compensation money (and donations from Times readers) to run schools and an aid organization for Pakistani women.

 

 

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It was in Mukhtar’s extraordinary sanctuary that I met Ms. Parveen. In my Sunday column, I’ll tell more about Mukhtar today.

 
 

 

 

 

 

A nine-year-old Pakistani girl has been taken to the hospital in critical condition after being kidnapped and brutally gang-raped. The girl’s mother has named the abusers, but no arrests were made.

The girl was admitted to a hospital in Bahawalpur after being raped on Wednesday. She remains in critical condition due to loss of blood and internal injuries, the Express Tribune reported, quoting the hospital’s doctors. 

Local police have launched a criminal case against seven men for the kidnap and rape; no arrests have been made yet. 

The girl’s mother named five of the seven suspects. She reportedly told police that she hesitated to inform law enforcers because the kidnappers threatened to kill her and the girl if the woman spoke to authorities.

Station House Officer Irshad Joyia said they were ordered to arrest the suspects, but later were informed that the men had fled to Alipur village, the Express Tribune said. 

According to a First Information Report (FIR) prepared by police, the girl was beaten and then kidnapped by three women and a man in front of her house in Manzoorabad in Rahim Yar Khanby. The kidnappers reportedly took her to another location where she was gang-raped by three men, one of whom was named in the FIR. 

The girl was then allegedly taken back to the place from which she was kidnapped. The girl’s mother told police she found her bloodied daughter near their house. She then took the child to Sheikh Zayed Hospital for examination and treatment.

The rape came weeks after a similar shocking case when a six-year-old Hindu girl was allegedly raped in Pakistan’s southern Sindh province at the beginning of December. The child was also reportedly kidnapped and gang-raped. Residents of the province staged several protests in response to the incident. 

These two recent cases in Pakistan coincide with a horrifying gang-rape in India that claimed the life of a 23-year-old student raped on a bus by six men, the youngest of whom reportedly was a minor. The six men have all been charged with murder, gang-rape, attempted murder, kidnapping and other felonies. They are expected to appear in court on Monday. 

The case sparked mass protests in New Delhi. Demonstrators, particularly women, demanded the rapists be punished and called for the creation of new laws to protect Indian women.

The incident has drawn international attention to the high rates of violence against women in India, where rape victims often do not report to the police for fear of shaming their families or being ignored by law enforcement.

Read more: http://reviewpakistan.com/showthread.php?783131-Takrar-(-16th-June-2013-)-Full-ExpressNews-Young-girls-kidnapped-and-being-sold-all-o&s=f20d5cf6de42075517b4adb321f91edb#ixzz2WPbXEf00

RaiseForWomen

$1,190,655 raised for women
 

The American government has just gone into the anti-honor-killing “business.” Given my extensive academic and legal work documenting and opposing honor killing, I support this venture. I do find it a bit odd that the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem has just launched such a campaign–but for Palestinian women only.

I have written about honor killing among Palestinians and among Israeli Arabs; I also interviewed Palestinian feminist Asma Al-Ghoul about how she was fired and then arrested for her anti-honor-killing advocacy both in Gaza and on the West Bank. Thus, I favor some U.S. intervention in the matter.

However, I wonder: Why not branch out to Pakistan or Afghanistan where honor killing and honor-based violence is, possibly, even more epidemic?

Last night, I watched an excellent and heartbreaking Frontline documentary by Habiba Nosheen about honor-based violence in Pakistan: “Outlawed in Pakistan.” Thirteen-year-old Kainat Soomro was chloroformed, drugged, kidnapped, and then gang-raped for three or four days by four men who threatened to kill or sell her.

Amazingly Kainat escaped, in her bare feet and without her headscarf.

I am very partial to a story about a girl or woman who escapes a life-threatening captivity in the “Wild East,” as I once did, in Kabul, long ago. I write about this in my forthcoming book, An American Bride in Kabul.

But, I was a foreigner, an American, and once I got out I had a second chance. Kainat is now and forevermore a ruined child, an “outlaw,” whose family was meant to kill her for having “dishonored” them.

Amazingly, her loving family refused to do so. Unlike so many honor-killing families in which parents and siblings are either hands-on perpetrators or collaborators in the murder of their daughters and sisters, Kainat’s mother weeps and kisses her. Her father and older brother proudly supported Kainat’s search for justice.

This family deserves a major prize for having the courage and the sanity to stand up to tribal misogyny.

The Soomros turned to the police who refused to act. Instead, they said to kill her according to tribal custom. “She has shamed you.” The police do no sperm or DNA testing, and do not secure the crime scene. They ensure that charges of rape are almost impossible to prove.

Perhaps the U.S. Consulates in Peshawar and Karachi can donate rape kits to the Pakistani police.

Instead of becoming a bandit queen, as the gang-raped Phoolan Devi did in Uttar Pradesh, India; instead of killing herself — Kainat wanted justice. She wanted these men “sentenced to death” because they ruined her life. And they have. Probably, no one will marry her, and Kainat’s plans to become a physician may be permanently on hold. The death threats against this honorable family became so serious, that Kainat’s 18-person family was forced to flee their home for two rooms in Karachi.

Men who rape girls in tribal areas feel no guilt. Kainat’s accused rapists were enraged when their victim dared speak out. They hotly denied Kainat’s charges.

In Karachi, Sarah Zaman, of War Against Rape, a grassroots feminist group, decided to help Kainat and found her a dedicated pro bono lawyer. Zaman knew that powerful village men routinely rape girls and then have them killed for having shamed their families. In Afghanistan, raped women are either honor-killed or jailed as criminals. Kainat bravely agreed to endure a 5- to 10-year legal process, one in which she will be grilled in humiliating ways. The pro bono lawyer who represented the accused men, is also representing the President of Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Kainat’s lawyer managed to have the four men jailed and held in jail without bail for three years. This, too, is amazing.

Nevertheless, the accused rapists prevail. We see dozens of their village supporters descend on the courthouse yelling that “Kainat is a whore.” Their winning defense is ingenious: They claim that Kainat married one of them and he produces her thumbprint on a marriage document and a photo of the two of them, smiling. Kainat repeats that she was drugged and does not remember this. Her presumed bridegroom demands that she return to him.

Kainat was only 13 and did not have the right to consent to a marriage under secular law. However, under Sharia law, if she has reached puberty, she can do so. Sharia law prevails in the matter and the accused are all freed.

Despite claims to the contrary, Sharia law and Sharia courts are dangerous for women.

Kainat’s story is a victory and like all such victories, the price is high and the risk is even higher.

For a poor girl and her family to have four powerful men jailed for three years is extraordinary. The price: They allegedly killed her supportive brother, Sabir. And despite national headlines, the police closed the murder investigation. Kainat quietly says that her “life is a living hell.”

Kainat and her family live under police protection. Again, this is extraordinary.

I suggest that the U.S. Consulates also consider funding Kainat’s education as a physician. Perhaps the entire family should be air-lifted out of the Pakistani Badlands and into America for their safety.

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THE TWO CASTES OF PAKISTAN: JINS & JUNKIES

Pakistan has a Caste System Based on History and Economics. There are only two Castes in Pakistan, the Jagirdars/Industrialists (the JINS-e.g.Nawaz Sharif & Sharif Family) and the 99 percent who are fed the opiate(JUNK) of democracy and pain of loadshedding make up rest of the people (Junkies).

 

Junkies are named so, because 99 percent Pakistanis are addicted to poverty. They are fed an opiate of poverty as being “ordained” by Allah Almighty. It is a part of their Kismet. A concept light years removed from the social dynamics; and the emphasis on effort to enhance ones economic condition, as described by Islam. Pakistan’s wealth, economy, political power, and opportunities are controlled by the Jagirdars/Industrialist Axis (the JIN Axis).The JINS preach the gospel of Status Quo.  Don’t rock the boat, the big bad wolf from India will come and get you, if you did.  So in 65 years, the JIN are the rulers and the Junkies are the ruled.  The JINS use their wealth to gain an unfair advantage over the Junkies.  Any one person or entity, including a religious scholar turned activist like Tahirul Qadri or a political party like Tehreek-i-Insaf or MQM, tries to act as proponent of parity or equal distribution of wealth are labeled as foreign agents or corrupt. Pakistani media is owned by the JINS, because without it, they could not maintain their hold on wealth and power. But,  who laid the foundation of this institution of  JINS and Junkies.

Here is the history of how it all began:

herald96bThis is an in-depth article on the genesis of the curse of Jagirdari in Punjab and Waderas in Sindh. How the likes of  the Jatois of Sindh, the Noons, the Tareens, the Mazaris, the Legharis, the Qureshis, the Syeds of Sindh, the Hayats, the Tiwanas, the Daultanas, of Punjab became powerful in Pakistani politics.  Their roots date back to a more than a hundred years. These families were collaborators with the British and fought the Freedom Fighters during the 1857 Struggle for Independence.

Rewards for Ghadaars-Noons, Syeds, Sheikhs, Qureshis, Hayats, and Tiwanas: Collaborators of British during 1857 Struggle for Independence 

 Landowners accounted for over 60 per cent of the Punjab’s restricted electorate. This stood at just over of two and a quarter million voters, just 1 in ten Punjabis. Moreover, non-agriculturalists were still disallowed from contesting rural constituencies. This resulted in men committed to the imperial connection dominating every government which was elected in the new era of provincial autonomy...

Ian Talbot quoted from Khizr Tiwana, The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India, Routledge, 1996. 

David Page quoted from Prelude to Partition,  The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932, OUP, 1982.

The British dependence on Punjab for  military manpower after the 1857 mutiny heavily influenced  British policies towards land, administration, franchise and demands for self-rule in that province. These quotes provide glimpses  of the particularity exercised towards Punjab by the British.  

Punjab and the 1857 mutiny
Ian Talbot writes:
John Lawrence, the first Chief Commissioner of the British Punjab favoured the interests of the cultivators rather than the landowners. He fell out with his brother Henry, a fellow member of the Punjab Board of Administration, over the treatment of the jagirdars left by Sikh rule. The debate raged fiercely over the fate of the Sikh jagirdars of the central Punjab. But the British were keen to confirm the landed authority of the Tiwanas and other ‘tribal’ leaders who had supported them against the Sikhs in the conflicts of 1845-6 and 1848-9 in the West Punjab. Such families as the Noons, Tiwanas, and Hayats of Wah were to subsequently play central roles in the future colonial administration to the localities.

The British recognition of such ‘tribal’ leaders paid a rich dividend in 1857. Historians remain divided over the causes and nature of the uprising of that year but agree that this was the supreme moment of truth for the British in India. The crucial support of the Punjab’s chiefs safeguarded the Raj. It ended any doubts concerning the desirability of maintaining the influence of the rural intermediaries.

On 10 May 1857, soldiers of the Bengal Army mutinied at Meerut. News of this event reached the Punjab at midnight two days later. The concentration of European troops in this key frontier region left towns in the Gangetic Plan open to attack. The fabric of Government collapsed in Oudh which had been recently annexed by the British and also in the North Western Provinces. Henry Lawrence was killed in the fighting in Oudh to which he had been recently transferred. John Lawrence organised irregular forces of Punjabi cavalry to snuff out disturbances in the region before mounting an attack to recapture Delhi.

Groups of sepoys mutinied in their Punjabi cantonments of Ferozepore, Jullunder, Ambala and Jhelum. When a body of sepoys massed for an attack on the British district headquarters at Shahpur, Malik Sahib Khan rode over from Mitha Tiwana to parley with the anxious British deputy commissioner. Their meeting entered the Raj’s folklore.

Malik Sahib stood before Mr. Ousley, salaamed and offered him the handle of his sword with the point directed to his own body and said ‘I have fifty horsemen and I can raise three hundred. I can clothe them and feed them, and if no questions are asked, I can find them arms too. They and my life are yours.’ Malik Sahib Khan’s dramatic gesture was the first offer of assistance to the beleaguered authorities in the West Punjab. Moreover, it was proffered at a time when the triumph of British arms was uncertain. The deputy commissioner was well aware that he could have mounted only token resistance, if the Tiwana chief had jointed the ‘rebels’. The British thereafter remembered that the Tiwanas’ loyalty had stood firm when it had been put to the test.

Malik Sahib Khan’s forces defeated the sepoys of the Bengal Army in battles at Jhelum and Ajnala during the course of July. In one episode they captured 200 ‘rebels’ without firing a shot. In August, the Tiwana troops joined the forces which John Nicholson was massing in Amritsar to recapture Delhi. By this stage the Tiwana contingent had been swollen to a thousand sowars with the addition of the forces of his brothers,.. and great nephew.. They joined the British forces on the Ridge outside Delhi. The besieged city finally fell on 14 September. The aged Mughal Bahadur Shah escaped with his life, but the British exacted a heavy retribution on its other Muslim citizens.

Following the siege of Delhi, Malik Sahib Khan with his brothers took part in several other actions including the battle of Kalpu which sealed the fate of the Rhani of Jhansi. Malik Sahib Khan then accompanied General Napier on his campaign in central India. The British were so impressed by the fighting capacity of the Tiwana irregulars that a detachment was incorporated in the regiment of the 2nd Mahratta Horse at Gwalior which was raised for duty in central India. In the military reorganization at the end of the revolt, the unit became the 18th Bengal cavalry.

When the Prince of Wales(the future George V) visited India in 1906 he became Colonel in chief of the regiment which changed its title to the 18th(Prince of Wales’ Own) Tiwana Lancers. Finally in 1921, the 19th Bengal Lancers amalgamated to form the 19th King George V’s Own Lancers. Both Umar and Khizr[Tiwana, Malik Sahib Khan’s descendants] displayed great pride in wearing the regiment’s scarlet uniform and blue pagari in their capacity as Honorary-Colonel. Tiwanas held most of the regular Indian commissions in the regiment, as the British saw their ‘natural leadership’ as vital to discipline in a fighting force recruited entirely from the Salt range.

The creation of the Tiwana regiment climaxed the ‘tribe”s emergence as military sub-contractors of the state. Henceforth military service and their local power as landholders were closely enmeshed. Army pay and pensions enabled Tiwana chiefs to both increase agricultural productivity in their home villages, and invest in land elsewhere. No other Muslim Rajput ‘tribes’ formed their own regiments, but they were heavily recruited in the Indian Army from the late 1870s onwards… The economic multiplier effects of military service enabled the transition from ‘tribal’ chief to West Punjab landlord to be completed. A military-agriculturalist lobby also emerged. Provincial autonomy which was introduced by the 1935 Government of India Act gave it full expression. The Unionist Party became its mouthpiece and fittingly a Tiwana served as the last Unionist Premier.

British policy in Punjab 1857-1920
Ian Talbot writes:
The loyalty of the Muslim and Sikh landowners of the newly annexed Punjab region in 1857 confirmed the school of thought associated with Henry Lawrence. This sought to govern with the assistance of rural intermediaries. The British richly rewarded those who had stood by them in their darkest hour. The Tiwanas were the most successful but by no means the only rural family which embarked at this time on what were to prove lengthy and lucrative ‘loyalist’ careers. The Noons and Hayats shared a similar history.

Officials recognised the need for securing the support of the rural elites, however, not only because they were local peacekeepers, but because they were military contractors. The Tiwanas, as we have noted, exemplified this role, although it was played by many other Rajput ‘tribes’ following the Punjabisation of the Indian Army. This resulted from the thorough overhaul of military organisation after 1857.

By the end of the First World War, the Punjab so dominated the Indian Army that three-fifths of its recruits were drawn from the region. Moreover, they hailed from a narrow range of Hindu Dogra, Sikh Jat and Muslim Rajput  ‘martial castes’ which represented less than 1 per cent of the subcontinent’s total population. Punjabis saw action  in the mud of Flanders, in the deserts of Arabia and in the bush of East Africa, winning over 2,000 decorations, including three Victoria Crosses. The Punjabi ‘martial castes’ continued to dominate the Indian Army throughout the inter-war years.

At no time did the Punjabi contingent drop below three-fifths of the total strength. The imperative to secure the loyalty of the ‘martial castes’ understandably exerted a profound impact on the Punjab’s political economy.

The British adopted a number of policies to secure rural stability in the sword arm of India. Overriding all other considerations, until it was fatally dislocated by the Second World War, was the imperative to defend the rural power structure. This was achieved by the following methods: first by associating the ‘natural leaders’ of the ‘agriculturist tribes’ with their executive authority; second, by ensuring that the rural leaders politically controlled the economic forces set in train by the colonial encouragement of a market-oriented agriculture; third by using the resources which this produced to reward the agriculturalist population rather than stimulate industrial development; fourth by establishing a framework of political representation which institutionalised the division between the ‘agriculturalist’ and ‘non-agriculturalist’ population.

The British identification of the ‘tribe’ as the focus of rural identity underpinned all of these policy initiatives. Indeed, the maintenance of the tribal structure of rural society became the legitimising principle of British rule, thereby obscuring realpolitik imperatives. However, as David Gilmartin has revealed, the definition of the ‘tribe’ was vague and ‘workable principles of tribal grouping were extremely elusive’. The British therefore created their own around the artificial construct of the ‘agriculturalist tribe’. Although this built on pre-existing social structures, it was a political definition enshrined in the 1900 Alienation of Land Act. This measure not only ‘crystallized the assumptions underlying the British Imperial administration’ but ‘translated’ them into popular politics. Henceforth, both the justification of British rule and the programme of the leading men of the ‘tribes’ and clans who banded together eventually in the Unionist Party was the ‘uplift’ and ‘protection’ of the ‘backward’ agriculturalist tribes.

The British co-opted the ‘natural leaders’ of rural society into their administrative system by means of the semi-official post of the zaildar.This was unique to the Punjab’s local administration…Subordinate to it but serving a similar purpose was the post of sufedposh. ‘Tribal’ chiefs and landowners were also tied to the administrative system by being made honorary magistrates and members of the darbar… Posts were also reserved for agriculturalists in the official ranks of the local administration.  Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s governorship witnessed an especially sharp increase in the agriculturalists tribes’ representation in the public services. In the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department this rocketed from 29 to 66 per cent of the officials. Such reservation strengthened ‘tribal’ as against ‘communal’ identity.

The Pax Britannica encouraged the commericalisation of agriculture. The British also vastly extended irrigation facilities and slashed transport costs. The West Punjab underwent an agricultural revolution as arid subsistence production was replaced by commercialised production of huge amounts of wheat, cotton and sugar.

The Shahpur district stood at the forefront of this transformation. The Lower Jhelum Canal converted the waste of the Kirana bar into first class irrigated land. This was parceled into 337 colony villages or ‘chaks’. New market towns came into existence where the agriculturalists brought their commercial crops. These were lined by rail to Sargodha from where 500,000 tonnes of wheat were being annually dispatched to Karachi by the 1920s. At this date the Punjab produced a tenth of British India’s total cotton crop and a third of its wheat. The region thus emerged as the pace-setter of the subcontinent’s agricultural development well before independence. At the most conservative estimate, per capita output of all crops had increased by nearly 45 per cent between 1891 and 1921.

The Lower Jhelum was just one of the Punjab’s nine Canal Colony areas. These transformed the endless waste and scrub of the Jhang, Lyallpur and Shahpur districts into flourishing agricultural regions. The Lyallpur district which had been only sparsely populated by nomadic herdsmen possessed a million inhabitants within thirty years of the opening of the Chenab Canal in the 1880s. Three and a half million rupees worth of crops were annually produced from its Lower Chenab Canal Colony. The whole area was neatly laid out into plots of land known as squares, with market places, towns and villages spaced along the roads and railways which criss-crossed the Colony. By thus ‘creating villages of a type superior in civilisation to anything which the region had previously experienced’ the British hoped to establish a model for the Punjab’s development.

The Canal Colonies were also intended to mop up surplus population from the crowded districts of the central Punjab. Large number of Sikh Jats migrated to the Lower Chenab Canal Colony where they eventually owned a third of the land. In all, a million Punjabis moved to the nine Canal Colonies. They not only relieved congestion but formed a market for the produce of other regions, as the colonists specialised in cultivating a narrow range of cash crops. Furthermore, they remitted much of their income to their home villages.

The Canal Colonies’ creation coincided with the Punjab’s emergence as the sword arm of India. Indeed enlistment was encouraged by the British policy of rewarding ex-servicemen with lucrative grants of land in the Canal Colonies. Much land in the Lower Bari Doab Canal Colony was set aside for this purpose. The vast increase in productive land also enabled the British to earmark large areas for breeding horses and cattle for the Indian Army. During the First World War, the Lyallpur Canal Colony provided huge amounts of wheat and flour for the troops and gifts of horses and mules were made to the Army. The Shahpur District was, however, the main areas for Army horse breeding. In all 200,000 acres within it were leased for this purpose….

Although the bulk of the land in the Canal Colonies was sold to peasant proprietors, the Punjab Government reserved areas to reward both the ‘martial castes’ and the ‘landed gentry’. At the end of the First World War over 420,000 acres of Colony land were distributed to just 6,000 Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Army Officers. Under the terms of the ‘landed gentry status’ seven and a half per cent of the Lower Bari Doab Canal Colony alone was earmarked for the landowning elite. It is important to note that such land was among the best in the whole of the subcontinent and was highly valued….

The Tiwanas

 

 

A file picture of 1945 in which viceroy Lord Wavell (left), convener of the conference greeting Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (centre), premier of Punjab while premier of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (2nd from left) and Bhulabhai Desai look on, at Simla conference, in Simla.

The Collaborator


 

 

VICEROY WAVELL

A file picture of 1945 in which viceroy Lord Wavell (left), convener of the conference greeting Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (centre), premier of Punjab while premier of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (2nd from left) and Bhulabhai Desai look on, at Simla conference, in Simla.

   
Credit : (Source: The Times Of India Group)
© BCCL
Photograph Date: : 01/06/1945 (tentative)
     
     
     
 
 

 

The Tiwanas like other Punjab chiefs shared in this bonanza. When Umar was a minor, about 90 squares of land in the Chenab Colony was purchased on his behalf at an auction. The main village was called Umarpur. The Government also gave him 43 squares on nazrana terms during his minority.

British rule, however, also swept away the barriers which had previously prevented moneylenders from acquiring land in the countryside. As land prices rose- the result of the Pax Britannica, as well as improved communications and irrigation- it became increasingly tempting for landowners to pledge land in return for easy credit. Moneylenders supported by a westernised legal system foreclosed mortgages on the lands of agriculturalists debtors. In other parts of India, most notably Bengal, following the Permanent Settlement of 1793, land had changed hands dramatically in this way. A similar process in the Punjab, however, would threaten political stability in a region of immense importance to wider Imperial interests. Furthermore, it would strike at the heart of its administration’s strongly held assumptions and beliefs.

S.S. Thorburn in his book ‘Mussulmans and Moneylenders in the Punjab’ sounded the tocsin. Thorburn, a Deputy Commissioner in the Dera Ghazi Khan district highlighted the alarming rate at which land was being alienated to money lenders. The large Muslim landlords of the trans-Indus districts were not, however the moneylenders’ only victims. The Hindu Rajputs of the submontane districts of Ambala Division also suffered at the hands of powerful moneylenders who ‘exact free services and free fuel fodder and ghi and (take their) dues as much in grain as in cash. The Hindu Jat cultivators of the agriculturally poor Rohtak district also suffered from the moneylenders’ exploitation…’

The British first attempted to solve this problem with piecemeal measures. They took a large number of encumbered estates under the wing of the Court of Wards Administration. It soon became apparent, however, that more sweeping action was required. After a sharp internal debate concerning the virtues of intervention against sticking to laissez-faire principles, the Punjab Government implemented the 1900 Alienation of Land Act. It barred the transfer of land from  agriculturalist to non-agriculturalist tribes. The former were designated by name in each district. They included not only the Rajput martial caste landowners and Jat, Arain and Gujar cultivators, but the Muslim religious elites-the Syeds, Sheikhs, Qureshis. The measure not only halted their expropriation by the non-agriculturalist commercial castes of Khatris and Banias, but also provided the framework for the structuring of politics around the idiom of the ‘tribe’, rather than that of religious community. The Unionists Party’s agriculturalist ideology was directed rooted in this legislation. ..

The British had in fact earlier prepared the ground for a rural domination of Punjab politics… ..Only members of the agriculturalist tribes, as defined by the 1900 Alienation of Land Act were allowed to stand as candidates for the rural constituencies of the New Legislative Council created by the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms.[1919].

1900-1920s British military recruitment in Punjab and allied concerns
David Page writes:
  ‘..out of a total of 683,149 combatant troops recruited in India between August 1914 and November 1918, 349,688 came from the Punjab….Out of the 250,000 soldiers recruited up till April 1918, the lion’s share had been provided by three main communities, the Muslims of West Punjab, the Jat Sikhs of Central Punjab and the Hindu Jats of the Ambala Division.

The first community provided 98,000 combatant troops, the second 65,000 and the third 22,000. The finest record, however, belonged to the Muslim majority districts of the Rawalpindi division. From Rawalpindi and Jhelum over thirty per cent of the manhood of the district went to the War; in Attock the figure was sixteen per cent, in Gujrat thirteen per cent and in Shahpur ten per cent. These five districts were amongst the eight most heavily recruited districts in the entire Punjab, the other three being Ludhiana and Amritsar, the two main Sikh recruitment areas, which sent fourteen and eleven per cent respectively, and Rohtak, the main Hindu Jat recruitment area which sent fifteen per cent.’

..In the 1920s, the total rural electorate excluding soldiers amounted to 216,324 while 163,085 had the right to vote on account of their military services to Government.

Ian Talbot writes:
By 1928 over Rs. 140 lakhs were being paid annually paid out in pensions. There were 16,000 military pensioners in the Rawalpindi district alone.

David Page writes:
The Governor of Punjab Michael O’Dwyer said this in the Imperial Council in in 1917 : “The great improvement in the pay, pensions and allowances of the Indian army has already given a powerful stimulus to the fighting classes, the earmarking of 180,000 acres of colony land for allotment to men who have rendered distinguished services in the field is a further encouragement, which the recent announcement in regard to the grant of Commission will specially appeal to the landed gentry.”

Next, after casting aspersions on the courage of the urban classes and hinting at further legislation to regulate usury, he laid stress on the importance of the Land Alienation Act. “It is to it[he continued] that we owe the fact that we are appealing today not to be a sullen, discontented and half-expropriated eager perhaps for a change which might restore them to their own, but to a loyal and contented body of men who realise that Government has stood and still stands between them and ruin and who consequently rally in their tens of thousands to its support.”

“But [he continued] we have not only done what legislative and administrative measures could do to maintain the zemindars in possession of their paternal acres, we have also relieved congestion and increased their prosperity by opening up to them several million acres in the great canal colonies. In allotting those lands we have invariably given them priority seeking not so much the profit of the Government as the advantage of the rural population…
..
Again, take the question of land revenue settlement. The Punjab government has long accepted it as a principle of revenue administration that the peasant proprietors, especially in those districts from which the Indian army is  largely drawn, shall receive special favour in assessment. The re-assessment of all the rich districts of the Central Punjab has been completed within the last 5 or 6 years and I am in a position to say that Government has rarely imposed a demand above half of the half net rental which is supposed to be the standard of assessment in the Province. At the same time, where agricultural conditions are fairly stable and fully developed it has raised the terms of settlement from 20 to 30 years. The result of this leniency is to appreciate enormously the value of proprietary rights which 50 years ago sold at from 5 to 10 times by now sell at an average of 170 times the land revenue demand, a figure which excites the envy and admiration of other provinces, even those under permanent settlement.

All these things are done in the interests of our zemindars and especially of those tribes and classes which enlist so freely in the Indian Army…”

Post-World War I British crackdown on Punjab
Encyclopedia Britannica writes:
Politically, as well as economically, the postwar years proved depressing to India’s high expectations. After the war British officials, who in the first flush of patriotism had abandoned their ICS posts to rush to the front, returned to oust the Indian subordinates acting in their stead and carried on their prewar jobs as though nothing had changed in British India. Indian soldiers also returned from battlefronts to find that back at home they were no longer treated as invaluable allies but reverted immediately to the status of ”natives.” Most of the soldiers recruited during the war had come from Punjab, which, with only 7 percent of India’s population, had supplied over 50 percent of the combatant troops shipped abroad.

Indian Support of the British

It is thus hardly surprising that the flash-point of postwar violence that shook India in the spring of 1919 was Punjab province. The actual issue that served to rally millions of Indians, arousing them to a new level of disaffection from British rule, was the government of India’s hasty passage of the Rowlatt Acts early in 1919. 

Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus in a United Front

These ”black acts,” as they came to be called, were peacetime extensions of the wartime emergency measures passed in 1915 and had been rammed through the Supreme Legislative Council over the unanimous opposition of its Indian members.

Indian leaders viewed the autocratic enactment of such legislation, following the victorious conclusion of a war in which India had so loyally supported Britain, as a confession of British treachery and duplicity and the abandonment of the promised policy of reform in favour of a new wave of repression. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the Gujarati who had returned from South Africa shortly after the war started and was by then recognized throughout India as one of the most promising leaders of Congress, called upon his country to take sacred vows to disobey the Rowlatt Acts, launching a nationwide movement for the repeal of those repressive measures. Gandhi’s appeal received the strongest popular response in the Punjab, where the nationalist leaders Kichloo and Satyapal addressed mass protest rallies from the provincial capital of Lahore to Amritsar, sacred capital of the Sikhs. Gandhi himself had taken a train to the Punjab early in April 1919 to address on of those rallies, but he was arrested at the border station and taken back to Bombay by orders of the tyrannical lieutenant governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O’Dwyer.

On April 10, in Amritsar, Kichloo and Satyapal were arrested and deported from the district by deputy commissioner Miles Irving, and when their followers tried to march to Irving’s bungalow in the camp to demand the release of their leaders they were fired upon by British troops. With several of their number killed and wounded, the enraged mob rioted through Amritsar’s old city, burning British banks, murdering several Englishmen, and attacking two Englishwomen.

Gen. R.E.H. Dyer was sent with troops from Jullundur to restore order, and, though no further disturbances occurred in Amritsar until April 13, Dyer marched 50 armed soldiers into the Jallianwallah Bagh (Garden) that afternoon and ordered them to open fire on a protest meeting attended by some 10,000 unarmed men, women, and children without issuing a word of warning. It was a Sunday, and many neighboring peasants had come to Amritsar to celebrate a Hindu festival, gathering in the Bagh, which was a place for holding cattle fair and other festivities. Dyer kept his troops firing for about ten minutes, until they had shot 1650 rounds of ammunition into the terror-stricken crowd, which had no way of escaping the Bagh, since the soldiers spanned the only exit. About 400 civilians were killed and some 1200 wounded. They were left without medical attention by Dyer, who hastily removed his troops to the camp. 

Sir Michael O’Dwyer fully approved of and supported the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre, and on April 15, 1919, issued a martial law decree for the entire Punjab: The least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce . . . from a military point of view, not only on those who were present, but more specially throughout the Punjab.”

Dyer was relieved of his command, but he returned to England as a hero to many British admirers, who presented him with a collected purse of thousands of pounds and a jeweled sword inscribed “Saviour of the Punjab.”

 The Jallianwallah Bagh massacre turned millions of patient and moderate Indians from loyal supporters of the British raj into national revolutionaries who would never again trust to British “fair play” or cooperate with a government capable of defending such action. The following year, Mahatma Gandhi launched his first Indian satyagraha (“clinging to the truth”) campaign, India’s response to the massacre in Jallianwallah Bagh.

 

(http://www.usp.nus.edu.sg/post/india/history/colonial/massacre.html)

British policy towards rural indebtedness in Punjab in the 1930s
Ian Talbot writes:
.. The 1935 Government of India Act and the Communal Award which had preceded it, reflected Fazl-i-Hussain’s powerful influence.

Landowners accounted for over 60 per cent of the Punjab’s restricted electorate. This stood at just over of two and a quarter million voters, just 1 in ten Punjabis. Moreover, non-agriculturalists were still disallowed from contesting rural constituencies. This resulted in men committed to the imperial connection dominating every government which was elected in the new era of provincial autonomy…

[..The 1930s witnessed a growing problem of rural indebtedness, brought on mainly by falling agricultural prices, but also partly by the kind of conspicuous consumption we have noted above. The Batra moneylenders of Sahiwal and Girot, like their counterparts elsewhere in the province, grew fat on the indiscretions of the landowning class. By 1937 rural indebtedness amounted to about Rs. 200 crores and the Punjab’s farmers annually paid back in interest on their loans 4 to 5 times the aggregate amount of land revenue and the water rate. ]

..The Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act was another retrospective piece of Unionist legislation. Sunder Singh Manjithia introduced the measure in the Assembly in June 1938. It enabled farmers to recover all the land which they had mortgaged before the passage of the 1900 Alienation of Land Act. The Hindu and Sikh moneylenders claimed it was merely a cover for the expropriation of their land. They wanted it to cover transactions involving the agriculturalist money lending class which had grown up after 1900. This demand was of course rejected. The upshot was that over 200,000 Hindus and Sikhs had to return an estimated 700,000 acres to its original owners. ..

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Bilal Khan: Revolution Observer: Pakistan’s Air Force, an obstacle to US Interests?

 

 

 Bilal Khan, Revolution Observer: Pakistan’s Air Force, an obstacle to US Interests?

 

As of May 2013, Pakistan became the fourth country in the world to start using China’s navigational satellite network system, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS).[1] A direct equivalent to the American Global Positioning System (GPS), BDS is expected to achieve global coverage by the year 2020. With its existing network of 16 satellites, BDS is currently active for use in the Asia-Pacific region.[2]
However, given how widely used GPS is for private commercial purposes in Pakistan, the country’s shift to BDS seems to be driven by specific strategic and security priorities.[3] In particular, it is apparent that access to BDS is of great strategic significance to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which is poised to make the most wide-scale use of BDS.[4] Security analysts, among them the retired PAF general, Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, believes thatPakistan’s shift to BDS is driven in large by the PAF’s need to secure its strategic assets and ensure that its capacities to address external threats are immune from Western (and in particular, American) interference.[5]
Security analysts believe that the PAF will seek to integrate BDS into the following areas:
1.  Its inventory of land-attack cruise missiles (Ra’ad) and bombs (such as the H-4), thereby allowing it to maintain precision-strike capabilities at stand-off (~300km) and tactical (<120km) ranges.[6]
2.  Its overall combat information and management network connecting its fighter aircraft, drones, airborne and land-based surveillance assets, etc. In effect, BDS will allow the PAF to become a “network-centric” force, i.e. becoming more aware and responsive in times of conflict.[7]

 

These advances indicate that the PAF operates with a perspective that focuses on Pakistan’s external military threats, a deviation from General Kayani’s emphasis on internal threats.[8] Officially, the PAF communicated that it would be willing to intercept U.S incursions provided that it is a policy of the Pakistani government.[9] The PAF also supports an elaborate implementation of this perspective with strong support from the Pakistani defense industry. In addition to the JF-17 fighter, a flagship program pursued with China worth billions of dollars, the PAF is also at the forefront of armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) development.
As a result of insufficient access to GPS, Pakistan was unable to continue developing a drone similar in range and capabilities to the U.S Predator. Satellite communication is integral to being able to control medium-altitude and long-endurance UAVs similar to the Predator.[10] Access to BDS will enable Pakistan to expand its UAV programs, and it had reportedly been offered technical support from China in this regard.[11] Leaders of Pakistan’s defense industry have voiced their disapproval of U.S drone strikes, and are of the belief that Pakistan attaining armed-drones would demonstrate the country’s capacity to manage its internal security without external intervention.[12]
Overall, the PAF’s intention for maintaining territorial sovereignty from external threats is reflected in its organizational goals. In addition to frequently engaging in large-scale exercises with other regional powers (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and China), PAF has made several strategic acquisitions that are characteristic of projecting power. These procurements include a fleet of aerial refueling aircraft, airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) systems, long-range air-to-surface weapon-systems and as of late, a renewed effort to develop armed-UAVs similar to the U.S Predator.
Incidentally, these strategic assets had come under attack by militants over the past two years.In 2011 and 2012, militants armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades undertook a series of coordinated attacks against a number of air bases housing strategic assets. These attacks resulted in the destruction of two maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft and an Erieye AEW&C system valued at $250 million.[13] The facilities targeted – among them the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) that manufactures the JF-17 – were well outside the Waziristan/Afghan theater, and had little to do with the military’s campaigns in that area.[14]
For the most part, these attacks were against assets that are oriented towards protecting against external military threats. The direct benefactors of these attacks include India, whose increasing capabilities are constantly diluted by the PAF’s modernization, as well as the United States. PAF officials, serving and retired, repeatedly called for Pakistan to distance itself from the U.S-led War on Terror, to take independent ownership of its internal security affairs, and reduce reliance on U.S financial and technical support.[15] The PAF’s investment in Chinese and indigenous systems is reflective of this stance, and offers a feasible alternative to security-ties with the U.S.
However, because the PAF and its officials have abstained from pursuing their policy views outside of their legal mandate (which is to obey the civilian government), they cannot be considered active change-makers. Ultimately, the PAF’s achievements will be tempered by such excuses as budgetary constraints, as well as the government’s neglect of the concerns the PAF has managed to prioritize over the years. Nonetheless, it is clear that the PAF has support within Pakistan’s wider security circles; support which has allowed it to sustain its programs over the past five years. Whether this desired direction openly opposes the way Pakistan is heading politically; i.e. the emphasis of peace with India and the prioritization of the country’s internal security problems in favour of its external concerns, remains to be seen.
[1] Ellyne Phneah. “Beidou to build stations in Pakistan for location accuracy.” ZDNet. 20 May 2013. Available at: http://www.zdnet.com/cn/beidou-to-build-stations-in-pakistan-for-location-accuracy-7000015580/
[2] Ibid.
[3] Michael J. Listner. “Pakistan to have Functioning Global Navigational Satellite System by June 2013.” Space Safety Magazine. 7 November 2012 Available at: http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/2012/11/07/pakistan-functioning-global-navigational-satellite-system-june-2013/
[4] Usman Ansari. “Pakistan Employs China’s Beidou Guidance System, but Access Not Guaranteed.” Defense News International. 7 May 2013. Available at:http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130507/DEFREG03/305070030/Pakistan-Employs-China-s-Beidou-Guidance-System-Access-Not-Guaranteed
[5] Ibid.
[6] Usman Ansari. “Despite Missile Integration, Nuke Role Unlikely for Pakistan’s JF-17.” Defense News International. 7 February 2013. Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130207/DEFREG03/302070024/Despite-Missile-Integration-Nuke-Role-Unlikely-Pakistan-8217-s-JF-17
[7] Usman Ansari. “China Provides Key to Pakistani Bandwidth Requirements.” Defense News International. 27 March 2013. Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130327/DEFREG03/303270016/China-Provides-Key-Pakistani-Bandwidth-Requirements
[8] Katharine Houreld. “Pakistan army will be watching Sharif’s cozying up to India.” Reuters. 19 May 2013. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-pakistan-military-idUSBRE94I0CR20130519
[9] TV interview with Air Marshal (retired) Shahid Lateet: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itbq7Mb50OA (Urdu)
[10] Usman Ansari. “China Provides Key to Pakistani Bandwidth Requirements.” Defense News International. 27 March 2013. Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130327/DEFREG03/
[11] Christopher Booden. “China Emerging as New Force in Drone Warfare.” Yahoo News via Associated Press. 3 May 2013. Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/china-emerging-force-drone-warfare-080503327.html
[12] Dion Nissenbaum. “Pakistan Moves to Build Its Own Drones, Push Aside U.S.” Wall Street Journal. 18 December 2012. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324712504578133483559620340.html
[13] TV interview with Air Marshal (retired) Shahid Lateet: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=itbq7Mb50OA (Urdu)
[14] Ben West. “In Pakistan, Mixed Results from a Peshawar Attack.” Stratfor Global Intelligence. 20 December 2012. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/pakistan-mixed-results-peshawar-attack
[15] Ibid.

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