It happens every year without fail – come January and the expectation of the new work plan of the CD in Geneva, that a campaign is launched targeting Pakistan’s nuclear programme, spearheaded by the US through its media and the support of dollar dependents in Pakistan. 2014 has continued that trend but with a difference: this time Pakistan’s quest for energy through nuclear power has been targeted also; probably because the targeting of the nuclear weapons was becoming a trifle passé. After all, the same hackneyed attack on the short range missile Nasr was losing ground, given that the need for this SRBM, as a tactical not battlefield weapon, has been explained ad nauseum and I will do so again.
One: the dynamics of maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrence altered with the Indo-US nuclear deal and its fallout, especially India’s enhanced weapons grade fissile stockpiles.
PAKISTANS DETERRENCE TO INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE
Two: India’s development of a Missile Defence capability also directly impacted Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Three: India’s Cold Start Doctrine, now renamed and sustained conceptually in terms of the use of rapid deployment of armed brigades and divisions in surprise and rapid attacks into Pakistan created a gap in the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence premised on MRBMs. The Nasr plugs that gap. Its deterrence value is precisely to deter such “rapid deployment” conventional attacks.
Equally important is the fact that the Nasr has not yet been inducted, so it allows both countries to bring the issue of doctrines to the table of a strategic dialogue, along with other issues. So far, the Nasr is a technology-demonstrative missile – that is, signalling the acquisition of tactical missile capability and miniaturization technology. This will allow our already developed cruise missiles – the Hatf VIII (Ra’ad) which is air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)and the Hatf VII (Babur) which is a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) – to be miniaturised for sea-launched submarine capability in order to move on to second-strike capability. This capability stabilises nuclear deterrence by removing the need for pre-emption.
So with the Nasr critique losing ground, especially in the face of India’s expanding nuclear programme aided and abetted by the US through the 123 Agreement and NSG waivers, a new line of attack has been resorted to in the form of criticising Pakistan’s nuclear energy development. Many years earlier the IAEA-safeguarded Chashma reactors were targeted by a particular Anti-Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme Group (APNPG) – theirs is not a critique on principle but is Pakistan-specific – and the arguments proved invalid. Now their guns are fired at the K2 and K3 nuclear power reactors being planned along the coast, near KANUPP, outside of Karachi city.
IAEA
From the safety issue to environmental issues to the budget allocations – attacks based on conjectures have been launched while basic facts have been ignored. For instance all of Pakistan’s power reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards and the sites are selected after IAEA consultations regarding safety and security practices and studying data relating to seismic, oceanic and underground features. Pakistan is not new to building power plants and even in earlier ones all this safety data was incorporated into the design of the plant. Ironically nuclear accidents have happened in developed states like the US or the old Soviet Union where carelessness seems to have played a role; or where a combination of an earthquake and Tsunami caused the disaster as in Japan. Interestingly Japan had failed to implement recommendations of the IAEA relating to nuclear safety and emergency preparedness. Also, unlike Pakistan which now has an independent nuclear regulator, the PNRA, Japan has no such independent regulatory body. Incidentally, the Sindh Environment Protection Agency was on board for the K2 and K3 projects and the Chairman PAEC apparently invited concerned civil society groups and NGOs to visit the Karachi Coastal Power Project (KCPP) and discuss their concerns on the project.
The APNPG seems totally unconcerned about the growing energy crisis Pakistan is facing which will become more acute unless nuclear energy is developed. Selective information is also being disseminated about how states are moving away from nuclear energy when the facts show that according to the IAEA at least 30 new countries are either planning to or already constructing nuclear power plants. China has 29 nuclear power plants under construction. While Germany is planning to phase out its nuclear energy, it will buy electricity from France which has the bulk of its power generation coming from nuclear energy.
DISINFORMATION BY INDIA & ZIONIST PRESS & MEDIA
Disinformation is also being spread about the K2/K3 reactor design being experimental which is not the case. China is itself constructing an ACP-1000 reactor and so far China has had an excellent reactor safety record and vast experience in reactor construction. Having checked with the PAEC, I was informed that the lessons of Fukushima are also being incorporated in the safety design of these reactors which are based on an advanced Chinese version of French pressurised water reactors – a technology which China acquired in the 1990s and has now had two decades of developing and safely operating.
APNPG
The final whine of the APNPG is to try and show that the Pak-China civil nuclear agreement is not in keeping with NSG guidelines. Fact is that the NSG is not an international treaty, but a supplier cartel which has no international law credentials. Nevertheless since China is a member of the NSG it has chosen o comply with NSG guidelines. The 1986 agreement with Pakistan predates China’s membership so it is in line with NSG requirements and is protected by the grandfather clause. Ironically, the NSG has circumvented its own guidelines in its India waiver.
If the APNPG was really concerned about nuclear safety or viability they would be focusing on the US with its faulty command and control system (2007an USAF plane took off with live nukes and no authorization); and on seeking answers as to why the NSG is encouraging India’s nuclear weapons development through NSG waivers. That would be genuine commitment not simply a dollar-dependent “Get Pakistan” agenda.
