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Posted by admin in Uncategorized on April 13th, 2025
he USAID “Scandal” and the Playbook of Manufactured Outrage
The dismantling of USAID isn’t about fraud. It’s not about waste. And it’s certainly not about making government more efficient.
Instead, it’s a test case for a new era of governance—one where facts are optional, reality is shaped by cherry-picked narratives, and faith in a leader replaces independent sources of truth.
Rather than conducting an actual audit, Musk and Trump have used a familiar tactic—manufacture a scandal, flood the space with selective outrage, and use it to justify dismantling an agency they already wanted gone. It’s an attack on facts themselves—and if it works here, it will be repeated elsewhere.
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Misinformation doesn’t have to be an outright lie to be effective. The most powerful form of disinformation is cherry-picking—taking a real event or number, stripping it of context, and reframing it for maximum outrag
Take a look at a few of the White House’s official justifications for gutting USAID:
Claim: “USAID spent $6 million on tourism in Egypt.”
Reality: This funding was for education and economic development in North Sinai, not tourism. The grant was announced in 2019 during Trump’s first administration. Stripping away the date and purpose makes it sound like a recent, frivolous expenditure rather than part of an established economic aid initiative.
Claim: “USAID spent $1.5 million to promote workplace diversity in Serbia.”
Reality: This was part of a broader economic initiative to increase job opportunities in Serbia—where workplace discrimination limits economic participation. The program focused on helping businesses grow by improving inclusivity—but was reframed as an ideological “waste” rather than an economic development effort.
Claim: “USAID spent $47,000 on a transgender opera in Colombia.”
Reality: This was not a USAID grant at all—it was issued by the State Department, not USAID. The grant supported an arts program aimed at increasing representation in Colombia’s opera scene. By misattributing the funding to USAID and framing it solely as a “transgender opera”, the claim was designed to provoke cultural outrage rather than discuss arts funding in global diplomacy.
Could an actual audit be conducted on how these funds were used? Absolutely. In a functioning government, there should always be room for debate over whether certain initiatives are priorities or whether they are effective. But that is not what is happening here.
Instead of evaluating whether these programs delivered results or whether better alternatives exist, these numbers were stripped of context and framed for maximum outrage—not to improve policy, but to justify dismantling an agency outright. A real debate would analyze impact and effectiveness, not manipulate selective facts to push a predetermined conclusion.
The biggest red flag? If USAID were truly corrupt, they would be showing full financial audits, not vague accusations.
If the goal were actually to root out inefficiencies, a proper USAID audit wouldn’t be done in a day or two based on cherry-picked spending line items. Audits—even for small organizations—are lengthy, comprehensive, and detail both strengths and weaknesses.
A real audit would:
Be conducted by independent agencies (GAO, OIG, CBO), qualified and experienced leaders, or objective, appointed and vettyed contracted individuals or organizations.
Use full financial forensic analysis, not cherry-picked line items.
Compare USAID to other government expenditures for context.
Provide publicly available, transparent findings.
Recommend measured reforms, not mass firings.
Real audits include:
Positives and negatives—not just failures.
Strengths and weaknesses—where the agency is effective and where it isn’t.
Successes and failures—not just the failures someone wants to highlight.
Annotated findings with full transparency—each claim links back to data.
This takes months, not days—because an audit can’t be done by just extracting data, running it through an algorithm (AI or otherwise), and issuing selective pronouncements.
Instead, Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) simply declared USAID “beyond repair” and started shutting it down—no audit needed.
This isn’t about USAID—it’s about eliminating institutions. And if they can do this to USAID, they can do it to the CDC, NOAA, or any other agency that provides inconvenient facts.
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The attack on USAID is just the beginning. If this strategy works, other congrssionally created and funded agencies that provide oversight, enforce regulations, or provide objective information will be next.
The same manufactured outrage playbook will be applied to:
The CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) – Criticized for interfering in free markets and overregulating financial institutions.
The SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) – Framed as an obstacle to economic growth by restricting corporate and investment practices.
The IRS – Cast as a weaponized agency persecuting political enemies.
The Pentagon – Attacked over spending inefficiencies and social policies.
The Federal Reserve – Accused of economic manipulation and globalist control.
The DOJ & FBI – Portrayed as corrupt institutions waging partisan investigations.
The Department of Education – Framed as a wasteful bureaucracy pushing ideological agendas.
The EPA – Blamed for stifling business growth through overregulation.
Each will be misrepresented and undermined not through comprehensive audits and evidence-based reform, but through cherry-picked data, selective outrage, and preordained conclusions that justify dismantling their authority.
The irony? Real audits of these agencies would be fantastic. If the goal were truly efficiency, effectiveness, and responsible governance, independent reviews would be welcomed. A thorough, transparent audit of USAID, the CFPB, the SEC, the IRS, or the Pentagon would provide critical insights for better decision-making. But that’s not what’s happening.
Instead of pursuing genuine oversight and accountability, the administration is manufacturing outrage and using it as a justification to dismantle institutions outright—not to fix them, but to eliminate their independence.
The final step in this process isn’t just about cutting waste—it’s about removing any part of the government that isn’t directly controlled by the executive branch.
No independent oversight.
No neutral agencies providing inconvenient data.
No checks on power.
This isn’t about USAID—it’s about whether any institution will be allowed to exist outside the direct control of a single leader.
The next time an agency or institution is suddenly declared “too corrupt to fix,” ask yourself:
Where’s the full audit?
Why is the data missing
Who benefits from removing this institution?
When facts disappear, power takes their place. That’s what’s happening here.
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Posted by admin in Uncategorized on April 12th, 2025
Mr. Justice Babar Sattar
The removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is really an extremely terrible event. It will do seriously long-lasting damage to the Constitution, the rule of law and independence of judiciary, irrespective of the outcome and consequences of the SJC’s decision. Most unfortunate is that the judiciary is proving to be a divided house and extremely opportunistic. But for the immediate-term, I don’t think its over yet or will be over when the SJC finds the CJ guilty of misconduct on Tuesday. It is just the beginning of the end.
http://thenews. jang.com. pk/daily_ detail.asp? id=46441
The intrigue of justice
Legal eye
By Babar SattarThe independence and integrity of t he Judicature has been gravely tarnished with General Musharraf suspending the Chief Justice of Pakistan in violation of Article 209 of the constitution. In theory, independence of the judiciary is a grundnorm of Pakistan’s constitution, ensured in part by the constitutional security of tenure afforded to superior court judges. The constitution states that no judge of the High Court or Supreme Court can be removed (temporarily or permanently) from office except in accordance with the constitution. Article 209 then provides the mechanism wherein the president can remove a judge on the Supreme Judicial Counsel’s recommendation if, after conducting an enquiry, the counsel finds that the judge is (i) incapable of performing the duties of his office or (ii) is guilty of misconduct.
The Supreme Judicial Council comprises the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the two most senior judges of the Supreme Court, and the two most senior Chief Justices of the High Courts. In the event that an inquiry is being conducted against a judge of the Supreme Court, who is also a member of the Supreme Judicial Council, the next judge in the order of seniority is included in the council in place of such judge under inquiry. Under the constitutional system of checks and balances, the president only has limited discretion with regard to removal of a judge in terms of (i) directing the council to conduct an inquiry against a judge, and (ii) removing the judge if found culpable by the council. Neither Article 209 nor any other article of the constitution authorises the president or any other institution or individual to suspend any judge or declare his judicial office dysfunctional pending the Supreme Judicial Council’s inquiry.
The suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhary is extremely disturbing, not just for the disgraceful way in which it was done or being questionable under law, but also for its long-term implications on the already distressed credibility of our justice system.
First, the fundamental principles of law that no man can be condemned unheard (audi alterm partem) and that a man is innocent unless proven guilty has been breached by the Musharraf Regime. The chief justice is not a petty state official who can be suspended pending inquiry. No judge can be condemned without being judged for misconduct and found wanting by the Supreme Judicial Counsel. If the judicial office or a judge under inquiry was required to be temporarily suspended by implication, the constitution should have explicitly provided for such suspension just like it provides a mechanism for a the replacement of a member of the Supreme Judicial Council under inquiry. If a president subject to impeachment proceedings can continue to hold office, there is no reason why the chief justice cannot, so long as he is not found guilty of misconduct by his peers and removed by the president. It would be within the discretion of a judge to refuse to discharge judicial responsibilities pending inquiry, just as it is within his discretion to determine numerous other conflicts of interests that might inhibit a judicious performance of his duties.
Second, the chief justice stands indicted due to his suspension and is unlikely to get a fair inquiry by the Supreme Judicial Council. The appointment of Justice Javed Iqbal as the acting chief justice is a violation of Article 180 of the constitution, which states that an acting chief justice can only be appointed when the Chief Justice of Pakistan is absent or unable to perform the functions of his office. None of the circumstances that necessitate the appointment of an acting chief justice existed. Also, the inclusion of Justice Javed Iqbal in the Supreme Judicial Council creates a conflict of interest. Only finding the chief justice guilty of misconduct would enable Justice Javed Iqbal to become the Chief Justice of Pakistan as otherwise he would retire prior to expiry of the term of the current chief justice. There is scant possibility of a fair enquiry being conducted by a council of peers led by a judge who has a personal interest in the outcome of the inquiry. Further, his appointment as acting chief, if made permanent, will also be a violation of the principle of seniority as Justice Rana Bhagwandas is the senior most judge of the Supreme Court after the chief justice.
Third, the prima facie evidence of the alleged misconduct and the manner and timing of the media trial conducted to bring the chief justice into disrepute makes the whole exercise suspect. Mr Naeem Bokhari wrote an exceedingly incriminating letter to the chief justice making insinuations regarding nepotism and abuse of office for pomp, apart from charging him with breach of dignity of judges and lawyers and blemished dispensation of justice. Many of Mr Bokhari’s allegations found resonance in the legal fraternity due to the gruff conduct of the chief justice as well as his fascination with cars and media that is considered unbecoming of a judge. But the letter also got appreciated and widely circulated for being seen as a truthful account of a lawyer, written in the interest of justice at the peril of being penalised for candour. While the suspicious saw the missive as part of a larger conspiratorial design, it was only after the chief justice was suspended that the Musharraf Regime’s strategy became obvious.
It is not hard to fathom why the chief justice is being banished: he began to take the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence too seriously and began to poke the judicial finger into holy waters. The chief justice’s judicial activism in the matter of missing people did not sit well with the military. The military regards determination of all security issues as falling within its exclusive domain and discretion. The chief justice’s notion of judicial autonomy and his campaign against the indiscriminate retention of citizens by security agencies were interfering with the military’s notion of operational autonomy. Further, in 2007 the Supreme Court will be called upon to take significant constitutional decisions, including (i) the issue of legality of General Musharraf’s simultaneous holding of the offices of president and chief of army staff, and (ii) whether the present assemblies are competent to elect General Musharraf for another term. Public responses of the chief justice on the judicial outcome of such legal controversies were not reassuring and he could not be relied upon to continue to mould the constitution to keep the general indefinitely in power.
The personal conduct and mannerism of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary has been unbecoming of an exemplary judge. He also seems to lack the vision, charisma and temperament fitting of a leader likely to inspire confidence and transform the judicature into an emblem of public trust. But such critique is no ground for the chief justice to be removed from office. It took eight years after the unceremonious (yet honourable) dismissal of Chief Justice Seed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui along with other esteemed judges for the apex court to acquire a modicum of independence. If the Supreme Judicial Council removes Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary from office out of fear or intimidation or pique, the credibility and integrity of the judiciary, already in scant supply, will suffer grievously. Palace intrigues belong to chambers of power and not to the house of justice. The guardians of the constitution should not get their hands further sullied.
The writer* is currently a Justice in the Pakistan Supreme Court based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes Scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School.
*This article was written before Hon Justice Babar Sattar before he became a Justice of the Justice Islamabad High Court.
Posted by admin in Uncategorized on April 12th, 2025
Can this Fattened Army Fight a War with India?
How did the Pakistan Army grow from 140,000 men in 1947 into the world’s seventh most powerful army, and arguably the country’s “king maker” institution? Ayesha Jehangir explains.
Pakistan’s former military chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa declared at the end of his tenure the military would no longer meddle in politics.
However, the recent arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan – once seen as the “army’s blue-eyed boy” – and the army’s intention to prosecute civilian protesters under military laws proves the men in uniform are still very much in politics.
The recent turmoil in Pakistan also serves as a poignant reminder of the considerable power wielded by the military.
Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only coexist to share power with it.
Khan, whose success in the 2018 general elections was engineered by the military itself before the two drifted apart, has more than 100 cases registered against him now. These cases range from corruption and sedition to terrorism and even blasphemy, which is punishable by death.
His arrest was followed by days of violent anti-army protests across the country. Protesters set fire to police vehicles, damaged public property and mobs stormed into the compounds of army commanders in Lahore and Rawalpindi.
However, days after the military’s intention of using army laws on civilians became public, events changed course rapidly. Peaceful rallies expressing solidarity with the army took the centre stage.
How did a military of roughly 140,000 men at the time of partition of India in 1947 become the world’s seventh most powerful army?
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been under military dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military elite have discreetly engaged in hybrid regimes, exerting influence on civilian governments from behind the scenes.
The British colonial legacy has played a vital role in shaping Pakistan’s military today. British generals continued to head the Pakistan’s military until 1951, when the authority was transferred to General Ayub Khan. Just seven years later, Ayub became Pakistan’s second president through a military coup.
This foundation led to the establishment in 1948 of the spy agency Inter Services Intelligence. It gained remarkable influence in the 1980s, when the US covertly waged a war in Afghanistan using Pakistan as a proxy against the declining Soviet Union.
This period also saw the execution of an elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Then came the era of religious extremism under General Zia-ul-Haq. This consolidated Pakistan’s obsession with the “strategic depth” for interference in Afghanistan.
In later years, Pakistan saw the assassination of an elected prime minister, Benazir Bhutto under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf. This was the time of enforced disappearances of civilian dissidents. Pakistan also became a safe haven for Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden while receiving funds from the US as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism.
Pakistan’s army received substantial financial backing from the US during the Cold War. This bolstered its might domestically while allowing it to undertake adventures abroad for which it was unaccountable.
Traces of the Pakistani military’s involvement could also be seen in the Arab conflicts and the Bangladesh “rape camps”.
Pakistan is on the verge of an economic meltdown, weighed down by harsh pay-back terms from international lenders. With only A$5.2 billion worth of state reserves and a debt of over A$13.5 billion owed to the International Monetary Fund, the army nonetheless received an increased payment of A$11.27 billion in last year’s budget.
Between 2011 and 2015 alone, the army’s assets grew by 78%. By 2016, the armed forces in Pakistan ran over 50 commercial entities, including public sector organisations and real estate ventures worth A$30 billion. Today, their commercial assets are worth over A$39.8 billion.
Top military officers, including former army chief General Qamar Jawed Bajwa and army spokesman, General Asim Saleem Bajwa, have been revealed to have experienced significant financial gains within a relatively short time. Bajwa’s immediate family amassed substantial wealth, transforming into billionaires within six years.
General Asim Saleem Bajwa and his brother established a business empire that included 133 restaurants across four countries, operating under the Papa John’s pizza franchise. An investigation was also launched into real estate corruption by the brothers of former army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who for many years was the most powerful figure in the country.
The Pandora Papers exposed a long list of Pakistan’s former military officers who had accumulated immense wealth through tax evasions and corruption.
Over time, the military’s economic interests have gained prominence. This includes military-owned businesses, significant onshore and offshore land and property holdings, influence over defence contracts, as well as alleged involvement in ventures linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects.
The military’s influence in Pakistan extends beyond politics and the economy. To control information dissemination, the military employs a combination of traditional and social media censorship. It also utilises vaguely worded draconian laws.
These laws effectively criminalise any form of “ridicule” directed at the army, carrying severe penalties such as long prison sentences and hefty fines. Slain journalist Arshad Sharif was charged with “sedition” under the same laws for allegedly spreading hate against the military and disrespecting state institutions.
As a nuclear state, Pakistan’s military is much like Voltaire’s description of Frederick II of Prussia: it is a state within itself, benefiting from its sheer size, a great deal of money, and an advantageous geopolitical positioning.
The military’s rise to power in Pakistan is linked to cultivating a collective ethos that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning itself as the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.
It is because of this approach that despite corruption within the military, it has successfully distanced itself from the prevalent political culture, which is characterised by kinship ties, factionalism, patronage networks, and most importantly, corruption.
Ayesha Jehangir, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Media Transition, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Technology Sydney
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
| No | Name | Listed Assets | Unlisted Assets | Total Assets (Rs. in Millions) |
| 1 | Dawood | 557.8 | – | 557.8 |
| 2 | Saigol | 529.8 | – | 556.5 |
| 3 | Adamjee | 437.6 | – | 473.2 |
| 4 | Jalil | 419.8 | – | 419.8 |
| 5 | Colony | 325.4 | – | 342.7 |
| 6 | Fancy | 280.4 | – | 330.5 |
| 7 | Valika | 320 | – | 320 |
| 8 | Bawany | 237.4 | – | 237.4 |
| 9 | Crescent | 199.7 | – | 199.7 |
| 10 | Wazir Ali | 132.7 | – | 199.7 |
| 11 | Gandhara | 153.2 | – | 153.2 |
| 12 | Isphani | 90.8 | – | 154 |
| 13 | Habib | 128.1 | – | 136.2 |
| 14 | Khyber | 127.5 | – | 127.5 |
| 15 | Nisaht | 64.6 | – | 128.9 |
| 16 | Beco | 113.8 | – | 113.8 |
| 17 | Gul Ahamad | 21.1 | – | 109.2 |
| 18 | Arag | 32.4 | – | 105.4 |
| 19 | Hafiz | 100 | – | 105.3 |
| 20 | Karim | 95.4 | – | 95.4 |
| 21 | Milwala | 96 | – | 96 |
| 22 | Dada | 48 | – | 90.6 |
| 23 | Hyesons | 68.4 | – | 90.4 |
| 24 | Premier | 77.3 | – | 89.3 |
| 25 | Hussain Ibrahim | 88 | – | 88 |
| 26 | Monnoo | 79.9 | – | 79.9 |
| 27 | Maula Bakash | 58.9 | – | 79 |
| 28 | Adam | 45.1 | – | 78 |
| 29 | A K Khan | 74.9 | – | 74.9 |
| 30 | Ghani | 41.2 | – | 71.2 |
| 31 | Rangoonwala | 44.5 | – | 68.2 |
| 32 | Harijanss | 61 | – | 61 |
| 33 | Shafi | 60.2 | – | 60 |
| 34 | Fakir Chand | 59 | – | 59 |
| 35 | Hasham | 53.9 | – | 58.9 |
| 36 | Dadabhoy | 53.9 | – | 53.9 |
| 37 | Shahnawaz | 52.7 | – | 52.7 |
| 38 | Fateh | 48 | – | 48 |
| 39 | Noon | 36 | – | 46 |
| 40 | Hoti | 40.6 | – | 45.8 |
| 41 | Dost Mohammad | 20.4 | – | 45 |
| 42 | Farooq | 36.7 | – | 36.7 |
Source: Industrial Concentration and economic power in Pakistan by Lawerence White.
| S. No | Group | Assets (Rs. in Millions) |
| 1 | Habib | 5781 |
| 2 | Crescent | 4237 |
| 3 | Dawood | 3265 |
| 4 | Saigol | 2618 |
| 5 | Wazir Ali | 2279 |
| 6 | Nishat | 2279 |
| 7 | Saphire | 1755 |
| 8 | Lakson | 1559 |
| 9 | Fazalsons | 1384 |
| 10 | Gandhara | 1344 |
| 11 | Dewan | 1344 |
| 12 | Bawany | 1213 |
| 13 | Adamjee | 1141 |
| 14 | Al-Noor | 1124 |
| 15 | Ghulam Farooq | 1091 |
| 16 | Gul Ahmad | 1066 |
| 17 | Ghani | 1034 |
| 18 | Pakland | 1006 |
| 19 | Atlas | 956 |
| 20 | Hashwani | 808 |
| 21 | Service | 734 |
| 22 | Colony | 728 |
| 23 | Fazal | 719 |
| 24 | Fateh | 458 |
| 25 | Ittefaq | 398 |
Source: The Monthly Herald June 1990.
| S.No | Name | Manufacturing Assets | Fianancial Assets (Rs. million) |
| 1 | Nishat | 27,792 | 165,145 |
| 2 | Saigol | 15,202 | 9,004 |
| 3 | Crescent | 10,586 | 12,353 |
| 4 | Dewan | 10,113 | — |
| 5 | Ittefaq | 10,000 | — |
| 6 | Chakwal | 9,264 | 5,530 |
| 7 | Habib | 7,612 | 4,657 |
| 8 | Saphire/ Gulistan | 7,583 | 4,657 |
| 9 | Gul Ahmad/ Al-Karam | 5,220 | 915 |
| 10 | Packages | 5,168 | 12,822 |
| 11 | Chakwal | 4,592 | 5,530 |
| 12 | Atlas | 4,359 | 2,555 |
| 13 | Hashwani | 4,251 | 382 |
| 14 | Bibojee-Saifullah | 3,806 | 637 |
| 15 | Dawood | 3,780 | 1,605 |
| 16 | Monnoos | 3,605 | — |
| 17 | Fecto | 3,542 | — |
| 18 | Lakson | 2,876 | — |
| 19 | Gatron | 2,870 | — |
| 20 | Fateh | 2,843 | — |
| 21 | Sargodha | 2,743 | — |
| 22 | Al-Noor | 2,573 | — |
| 23 | Ghulam Farooq | 2,465 | — |
| 24 | Ibrahim | 2,333 | 336 |
| 25 | United | 2,237 | 3,644 |
| 26 | Bawany | 2,189 | 53 |
| 27 | Zahoor | 2,178 | — |
| 28 | Schon | 2,038 | 2,259 |
| 29 | Dadabhoy | 2,016 | 151 |
| 30 | Jehangir Elahi | 2,038 | — |
| 31 | Fazalsons | 2,000 | — |
| 32 | Rupali | 1,910 | 12,833 |
| 33 | Servis | 1,707 | — |
| 34 | Yunus Bros | 1,689 | 997 |
| 35 | Tawkkal | 1,678 | 644 |
| 36 | Sitara | 1,619 | — |
| 37 | Colony | 1,620 | 94 |
| 38 | Premier | 1,501 | — |
| 39 | Shahnawaz | 1,299 | — |
| 40 | Sunshine/ Sunrays | 1,265 | — |
| 41 | Fazal/ Fatima | 1,263 | — |
| 42 | Calico | 1,235 | — |
| 43 | Tata | 1,060 | 102 |
| 44 | Raja | 1,020 | — |
| 45 | Nagina | 1,013 | — |
A comparison of 45 groups in 1997 and 1970 reveals 24 new names which means 24 shining stars of the 1970 have disappeared from the corporate horizon without leaving a trail. Those who have disappeared or do not rank among the top industrial families now, include Adamjee, Fancy, Valika, Isphani, BECO, ARAG, Hafiz, Karim, Milwala, Hyesons, Hussain Ibrahim, Maula Baksh, Adam, A K Khan, Ghani, Rangoonwala, Harijan, Shafi, Fakir Chand, Hasham, Khyber Textile, Hoti, Noon and Dost Mohammad.
The new entrants who have replaced them are, Ittefaq, Dewan, United, Saphire-Gulistan, Atlas, Chakwal, Fecto, Hashwani, Gatron, Lakson, Rupali, Tawakkal, Fatima, Servis, Ibrahim, Sargodha, Elahi, Schon, Kohistan, Fazalsons, Sitara, Nagina, Tata, Shahnawaz and Zahur.
The 42 groups ranked by White in the 1970 included 24 Karachi-based groups, 12 from Punjab and five from NWFP while I could not place whether Dost Mohammad was based in Karachi or Punjab. On the other hand, the 1997 ranking include 24 groups based in Punjab, 18 based in Karachi and three based in NWFP. At least 15 of Punjabi groups were Chiniotis while there were nine Memons, three Ismaeeli Khojas but not a single native Sindhi or Baluchi group. In fact, it is difficullt to identify more than a dozen companies on the KSE except for a few sugar mills headed by a sindhi or for that matter a Baluch Chief Executive.
The Karachi-based based groups have not only gone down in number but also in ranking. Except for Maula Baksh, Adamjee and Noon, all the families disappreaing from the 1970 list were headquartered in Karachi. Adamjee, at number 3 in 1970 do not appear in the ranking based on manufacturing assests, Dawood, no 1 in 1970 has gone down to14th position, Habib at no 1 in 1990 has relegated to sixth position, Bawany and Gul Ahmad have fallen from commanding heights in the 1970 to the bottom of the list in 1997.
Three top and seven of the top ten positions in 1997 are held by business groups from Punjab but a fundamental and structural change that has taken place between 1970-97 is the fall of Memons and the rise of Chiniotis.
In 1970’s every fourth company in Pakistan was owned by the Memons but in 1997 one in every seven companies listed on KSE belonged to Chiniotis. The two business communities of Chiniotis and Memons together own 206 of the 725 KSE companies.
The top 44 business groups of 1997 include 15 Chiniotis, 9 Memons, Three Ismaeelis, One Khoja and three Pathans from the NWFP.
As stated earlier in the chapter, ranking based on the listed companies does not reflect their actual economic muscle since they have consciously take steps to appear small, hiding a big part of their wealth in private and unlisted public limited companies. Although Ittefaq group has only four listed companies and Monnoos have none, it was possible to rank them because of govt. reports and estimates of the assets given out by the group members, in interviews or statements.
The main monnoo group headed by Jehangir Monnoo has up to 20 textile and sugar mills, big live stock and poltry forms. Several of Pakistan’s biggest industrial families like the Tabanis, the Haroons, Kasim Dada, Chaudrys of Gujrat, Raja group of Industries and Jaffer Bros have none or just one listed company but their wealth is legendary.
Tabanis do not appear in ranking of the rich of the rich families either in the 1970 or 1990 but with an origin going back to early 19th century they are undoubtedly one of the richest families of Pakistan today. According to a group profile Tabanis had opened their offices in Japan, Singapore and London, as early as 1920. The group currently has ten companies its fold including a private airline and is general sale agent for Uzbekistan Airline and is also sole agent for Ukraine Airways, Turkmenistan Airways, Kazakhstan Airways and Volga Dnepr. The group enjoys monopoly in barter trade with the former Soviet Union and its exports in 1992 were valued at 300 million dollars. It owns and operates a hotel in Tashkent, is setting up a garment factory in Uzbekistan and a cigarette factory in another Central Asia Republic. However, it does not have a single company listed on the Stock Exchange.
Fazal (Fatima) group based in Multan is ranked at number 37 on the basis of five listed companies but comprises of 24 industrial units.
The House of Habib is corporate enigma. As stated in last chapter, its Habib Bank had provided a loan of Rs 80 million to Pakistan govt. in 1947, Pakistan’s first industrial unit, Dentinic limited was launched by Habibs, none of its manufacturing units was lost in Bhutto’s nationalization or seperation of East Pakistan and in 1984, it comprised 90 public and private limited companies. Judged by the yardstick of known assets, Habib group comes at number 7, even after Dewan and Saphire who were born as recently as 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps the low ranking of the House of Habib, dispropotionate to the image of the Habibians can be explained by an article in the Souvenir published on the occasion of 50 years of Habib Bank which had observed that Habibian make considerable effort to ” hide the light under a bush, in the religious belief strongly held that to win the pleasure of Allah is worth infinitely more than to seek the plaudits of the public.“
Hashwani’s Hashoo group is at 21 in the national ranking of the top 44 companies but the assets acquired by the group during first two years of Bhutto govt. and the no of private and public companies in its fold tell another story. His catapulation under Benazir Bhutto is comparable to that of Mian Mohammad Mansha under Nawaz Sharif.
Adamjee, one of the biggest names of the 1970s could not end up at the bottom of the 45 families. But has the group realy gone down, considering that it has 15 private limited companies but only 4 listed companies in its fold? The group operates Pakistan’s biggest insurance companies with assets of over Rs 3 billion.
Reference
Posted by admin in Uncategorized on April 12th, 2025
The US Toppling of Imran Khan
A principal instrument of U.S. foreign policy is covert regime change, meaning a secret action by the U.S. government to bring down the government of another country. There are strong reasons to believe that U.S. actions led to the removal from power of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022, followed by his arrest on trumped-up charges of corruption and espionage, and sentencing this week to 10 years imprisonment on the espionage charge. The political objective is to block Pakistan’s most popular politician from returning to power in the elections on February 8.
The key to covert operations of course is that they are secret and hence deniable by the U.S. government. Even when the evidence comes to light through whistleblowers or leaks, as it very often does, the U.S. government rejects the authenticity of the evidence and the mainstream media generally ignore the story because it contradicts the official narrative. Because editors at these mainstream outlets don’t want to peddle in “conspiracy theories,” or are simply happy to be the mouthpieces for officialdom, they give the U.S. government a very wide berth for actual regime-change conspiracies.
Covert regime change by the U.S. is shockingly routine. One authoritative study by Boston University professor Lindsay O’Rourke counts 64 covert regime change operations by the U.S. during the Cold War (1947 and 1989), and in fact the number was far larger because she chose to count repeated attempts within one country as a single extended episode. Since then, U.S. regime change operations have remained frequent, such as when President Barrack Obama tasked the CIA (Operation Timber Sycamore) with overthrowing Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. That covert operation remained secret until several years after the operation, and even then, was hardly covered by the mainstream media.
All of this brings us to Pakistan, another case where evidence points strongly to U.S.-led regime change. In this case, the U.S. desired to bring down the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the charismatic, talented, and hugely popular leader in Pakistan, renowned both for his world-leading cricket mastery and for his common touch with the people. His popularity, independence, and enormous talents make him a prime target of the U.S., which frets about popular leaders who don’t fall into line with U.S. policy.
Imran Khan’s “sin” was to be too cooperative with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, while also seeking normal relations with the United States. The great mantra of U.S. foreign policy, and the activating principle of the CIA, is that a foreign leader is “either with us or against us.” Leaders who try to be neutral amongst the great powers are at dire risk of losing their positions, or even their lives, at U.S. instigation, since the U.S. does not accept neutrality. Leaders seeking neutrality dating back to Patrice Lumumba (Zaire), Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia), Viktor Yanukovych (Ukraine), and many others, have been toppled with the not-so-hidden-hand of the U.S. government.
Like many leaders in the developing world, Khan does not want to break relations with either the U.S. or Russia over the Ukraine War. By sheer coincidence of prior scheduling, Khan happened to be in Moscow to meet Putin on the day that Russia launched the special military operation (February 24, 2022). From the start, Khan advocated that the conflict in Ukraine should be settled at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. The U.S. and E.U. arm-twisted foreign leaders including Khan to fall into line against Putin and to support Western sanctions against Russia, yet Khan resisted.
Khan probably sealed his fate on March 6 when he held a large rally in northern Pakistan. At the rally, he berated the West, and especially 22 EU ambassadors, for pressuring him to condemn Russia at a vote in the United Nations. He also excoriated NATO’s war against terror in next-door Afghanistan as having been utterly devastating to Pakistan, with no acknowledgment, respect, or appreciation for Pakistan’s suffering.
Khan told the cheering crowds, “EU ambassadors wrote a letter to us asking us to condemn and vote against Russia… What do you think of us? Are we your slaves … that whatever you say, we will do?” He added, “We are friends with Russia, and we are also friends with America; we are friends with China and with Europe; we are not in any camp. Pakistan would remain neutral and work with those trying to end the war in Ukraine.”
From the U.S. perspective, “neutral” is a fighting word. The grim follow-up for Khan was revealed in August 2023 by investigative reporters at The Intercept. Just one day after Khan’s rally, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu met in Washington with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S., Asad Majeed Khan. Following the meeting, Ambassador Khan sent a secret cable (a “cypher”) back to Islamabad, which was then leaked to The Intercept by a Pakistani military official.
The cable recounts how Assistant Secretary Lu berated Prime Minister Khan for his neutral stance. The cable quotes Lu as saying that “people here and in Europe are quite concerned about why Pakistan is taking such an aggressively neutral position (on Ukraine), if such a position is even possible. It does not seem such a neutral stand to us.”
Lu then conveyed the bottom line to Ambassador Khan. “I think if the no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister succeeds, all will be forgiven in Washington because the Russia visit is being looked at as a decision by the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I think it will be tough going ahead.”
Five weeks later on April 10, with the U.S. blunt threat hanging over the powerful Pakistani military, and with the military’s hold over the Pakistani parliament, the Parliament ousted Khan in a no-confidence vote. Within weeks, the new government followed with brazenly manufactured charges of corruption against Khan, to put him under arrest and prevent his return to power. In utterly Orwellian turn, when Khan made known the existence of the diplomatic cable that revealed America’s role in his ouster, the new government charged Khan with espionage. He has now been convicted on these charges to an unconscionable 10 years, with the U.S. government remaining silent on this outrage.
When asked about Khan’s conviction, the State Department had the following to say: “It’s a matter for the Pakistani courts.” Such an answer is a vivid example of how U.S.-led regime change works. The State Department supports Khan’s imprisonment over Khan’s public revelation of U.S. actions.
Pakistan will therefore hold elections on February 8 with its most popular democratic leader in prison and with Khan’s party the subject of relentless attacks, political murders, media blackouts, and other heavy-handed repression. In all of this, the U.S. government is utterly complicit. So much for America’s “democratic” values. The U.S. government has gotten its way for now—and has deeply destabilized a nuclear-armed nation of 240 million people. Only Khan’s release from prison and his participation in the upcoming election could restore stability.
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Posted by admin in Uncategorized on April 10th, 2025
(Xinhua) 09:50, April 09, 2025
Pakistan is reportedly considering acquiring China’s J-31 or J-35 stealth fighter jets, potentially becoming the first export customer. This would be a significant deal, as it would be China’s first export of a fifth-generation fighter jet to a foreign ally. The J-31, also known as the FC-31 or Gyrfalcon, is a multi-role stealth fighter, and Pakistan’s acquisition would mark a major step in its modernization efforts.
Pakistan is reportedly in negotiations to acquire 40 J-35A stealth fighter jets from China, which could be the first export of China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter. This move would significantly boost Pakistan’s air capabilities and potentially shift regional dynamics, especially concerning India.
Pakistan is reportedly in negotiations to acquire 40 J-35A stealth fighter jets from China. This would mark the first export of China’s most advanced military aircraft and could significantly boost Pakistan’s air power. The deal is expected to deliver the jets within two years, potentially replacing Pakistan’s aging fleet of F-16s and Mirage fighters.
Here’s a more detailed look at the situation:
Elaboration:
BEIJING, April 8 (Xinhua) — China’s Minister of National Defense Dong Jun met with Pakistan Air Force Chief Zaheer Ahmad Babar in Beijing on Tuesday.
Speaking highly of the cooperation between Chinese and Pakistani militaries in recent years, Dong said China is willing to work with the Pakistani side in strengthening strategic communication and cooperation, deepening practical cooperation, and jointly safeguarding international and regional security and stability.
Babar said Pakistan highly values the traditional friendship between the two countries. The Pakistan Air Force is willing to strengthen exchanges and institutional cooperation with the Chinese side, maintain a high standard in joint exercises and training, and make positive contributions to jointly addressing the evolving security challenges, he added.
(Web editor: Zhang Kaiwei, Zhong Wenxing)
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