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Posted by admin in Pakistan's Hope, Pakistan-A Nation of Many Faiths, Pakistan-A Polaris of Earth, PAKISTANI SOLDIERS on April 26th, 2014
E.mail: [email protected]
Posted by admin in Pakistan's Hope, Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on September 13th, 2013
Editor’s Note: This article was inadvertently published under a wrong authors’ name for which we apologise to its author Mr. Inayet Ullah, a Distinguished Writer for Pakistan think Tank Web Site.
It is being republished as a courtesy and apology to him.
Human Society is not something static, it changes and evolves, with the passage of time. The change may be for better or for worse.
As the circumstances of a country, at a particular time demand, the people of the country are prompted to put their heads together, work for it and bring about a desirable change.
A view of the world map reveals something interesting. As we move from west to east, we see that in addition to the geographical changes, the mental approach to life and social behaviour drastically changes in almost all eastern countries. The people of eastern countries are more religious, more formal and more emotional than those of the western countries. It is very interesting phenomenon that as soon as you enter the eastern region, most of these countries are found to have a remarkably poor economy, poverty, ignorance, backwardness, as if the geographical changes have something to do with the difference in man’s attitude and approach to life..
When things get worse, economy reaches the stage of total collapse, the country reaches the brink of bankruptcy and life becomes miserable, then the people wake up, start thinking, and according to the circumstances and available resources, they make joint efforts and bring about a desirable change. But this does not happen in Pakistan.
The recent figures of foreign exchange reserves in Asian developing countries are like this: (In billion US$) Peoples Republic of China: 3,240, Japan: 1,272, South Korea: 312, Brazil: 372, India: 289, Pakistan: 6.59.
Not until very long ago, the Chinese nation was literally in deep slumber under the influence of opium. A huge population, with too many mouths to feed and very little food available. They realized the seriousness of the situation, made plannings and started working on it and today they are the largest exporters of the world and a booming economy.
South Korea sought advice from Pakistani economic and industrial experts and with the advices and suggestions so obtained, they planned and worked hard and today, after Japan, they are the most industrialized country of Asia.
Until recently, Brazil was known to be in the grip of corruption and poverty, but now they too have come out of their economic depression and are already moving towards a better economy.
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia have come out of their economic recession and are now exporters of their industrial products to the international market. Even Bangladesh is recovering from a poverty stricken economy and is moving towards economic prosperity.
Nothing in Pakistan happens like this. Conditions in Pakistan are ripe enough, perhaps more ripe than in any other country to make the people realize the seriousness of the situation and urge them to act, but nothing happens. We suffer and groan under the burden of corruption, greed, unemployment, poverty, ever rising cost of living, lawlessness, crimes. But it never crosses our mind, like other nations, to think and do somethi8ng to change.
What you have is not important. It is whether you utilize, and how you utilize what you have, is what matters. What we have in Pakistan, we do not use it for our welfare. We either leave it unutilized or plunder and squander it away.
Nature has gifted us with the natural resources like minerals, natural gas, oil, agricultural lands, rivers, sea ports, toiling manpower and talent, needed to put any country on the road of progress and prosperity. With these resources, we can make this country as one of the most prosperous countries of the region in a very short time. What we are lacking is the will to act.
A question that keeps recurring in mind is why this is so. Why we Pakistanis do not ponder and act. Are we doomed? Are we left with not even an iota of self-respect? Can nothing wake us p? Is our conscience completely dead?
I think Pakistan will make a very good subject for the psychologists and sociologists, and it will not be a bad idea at all for them to conduct researches to trace out and identify the roots and causes of our insensibility. Why are we unmindful of and unmoved by our pathetic conditions? Why are we so insensible, impudent and complacent?
Posted by aka in Pakistan's Hope on June 21st, 2013
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The British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947. The Act created two dominions, Indian Union and Pakistan. It also provided for the complete end of British control over Indian affairs from August 15, 1947. The Muslims of the Sub-continent had finally achieved their goal to have an independent state for themselves, but only after a long and relentless struggle under the single-minded guidance of the Quaid.
The Muslims faced a gamut of problems immediately after independence. However, keeping true to their traditions, they overcame them after a while. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was appointed the first Governor General of Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan became its first Prime Minister. Pakistan became a dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The boundaries of Pakistan emerged on the map of the world in 1947. This was accomplished on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory. This theory held that there were two nations, Hindus and Muslims living in the territory of the Sub-continent. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was the first exponent of the Two-Nation Theory in the modern era. He believed that India was a continent and not a country, and that among the vast population of different races and different creeds, Hindus and Muslims were the two major nations on the basis of nationality, religion, way-of-life, customs, traditions, culture and historical conditions.
The politicization of the Muslim community came about as a consequence of three developments:
While the antecedents of Muslim nationalism in India go back to the early Islamic conquests of the Sub-continent, organizationally it stems from the demands presented by the Simla Deputation to Lord Minto, the Governor General of India, in October 1906, proposing separate electorates for the Indian Muslims. The principal reason behind this demand was the maintenance of a separate identity of the Muslim nationhood.
In the same year, the founding of the All India Muslim League, a separate political organization for Muslims, elucidated the fact that the Muslims of India had lost trust in the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress. Besides being a Hindu-dominated body, the Congress leaders in order to win grass-root support for their political movements, used Hindu religious symbols and slogans, thereby arousing Muslim suspicions regarding the secular character of the Congress.
Events like the Urdu-Hindi controversy (1867), the partition of Bengal (1905), and Hindu revivalism, set the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, further apart. Re-annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911 by the British government brought the Congress and the Muslim League on one platform. Starting with the constitutional cooperation in the Lucknow Pact (1916), they launched the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements to press upon the British government the demand for constitutional reforms in India in the post-World War I era.
But after the collapse of the Khilafat Movement, Hindu-Muslim antagonism was revived once again. The Muslim League rejected the proposals forwarded by the Nehru Report and they chose a separate path for themselves. The idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of Northern India as proposed by Allama Iqbal in his famous Allahabad Address showed that the creation of two separate states for the Muslims and Hindus was the only solution. The idea was reiterated during the Sindh provincial meeting of the League, and finally adopted as the official League position in the Lahore Declaration of March 23, 1940.
Thus these historical, cultural, religious and social differences between the two nations accelerated the pace of political developments, finally leading to the division of British India into two separate, independent states, Pakistan and India, on August 14 & 15, 1947, respectively. (Courtesy: Story of Pakistan)
Posted by Azahir in Pakistan's Hope, Pakistan's Strategic & Security Focus, Pakistan-A Polaris of Earth on June 21st, 2013
Pakistaniaat : A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011)
Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’
Reviewed by David Waterman
Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State.’ Maleeha Lodhi, ed. London: Hurst and
Company, 2011. 391 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1-84904-135-5.
Maleeha Lodhi, as the editor of Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State,’ has managed
to assemble some of Pakistan’s most influential academics, writers, economists
and policymakers in one volume, designed to give an insider’s perspective on
Pakistan’s “crisis” from diverse angles, and more importantly, to suggest
solutions regarding Pakistan’s obvious potential for a better future. The book is
not a collection of conference proceedings, but rather the product of a virtual
conference in cyberspace, discussing themes of “governance, security, economic
and human development and foreign policy […] what binds all the distinguished
contributors is their belief that Pakistan’s challenges are surmountable and the
impetus for change and renewal can only come from within, through bold reforms
that are identified in the chapters that follow” (3).
The first few chapters concentrate on Pakistan’s history and the sense of a
Pakistani identity, now that the country has existed in very concrete terms for
sixty-five years or so. Ayesha Jalal suggests that Pakistan’s path toward a
national identity for its heterogeneous people has been interrupted, as its history
has been co-opted for “political and ideological reasons” (11). Pakistan’s position
vis-à-vis India, militant Islam and 9/11 are all important factors in the equation as
well. Akbar Ahmed recalls Jinnah’s role not only in the founding of the nation,
but his continuing legacy in terms of an equilibrium between Islam and the State;
Jinnah’s thoughts are in large part gleaned from his speeches and letters, as he left
no monograph before his death (23). Mohsin Hamid, author of Moth Smoke and
The Reluctant Fundamentalist (filming for the movie has apparently begun),
assumes his mantle of engaged journalist in an essay entitled “Why Pakistan will
Survive.” His argument is best summed up as follows: “we are not as poor as we
like to think” (41), highlighting Pakistan’s strength in diversity, and in economic
terms, Hamid suggests that something as simple as a coherent, fair tax code could
allow the nation to concentrate on schools and healthcare, while cutting the
strings of American aid and its corresponding intervention in Pakistan’s affairs.
Maleeha Lodhi’s own chapter is a detailed overview of contemporary history,
calling attention to political asymmetry, clientelist politics and borrowed growth
David Waterman
as well as security concerns and regional pressures on national unity; ultimately
she calls for a “new politics that connects governance to public purpose” (78).
The essays then move into more political themes, and the first among them
discusses the army as a central element of Pakistani political, and indeed
corporate, life. Shuja Nawaz argues that while the army has historically been a
significant power broker, the generation of commanders from the Zia and
Musharraf eras is about to retire, thus promising the possibility of change,
including the realization that “counterinsurgency operations are 90 per cent
political and economic and only 10 per cent military” (93). Saeed Shafqat also
discusses the political role of the military, saying that while elections are of
course essential to democracy, more attention needs to be paid to the rule of law
and the incorporation of cultural pluralism (95), never forgetting the role of
various elites within the process; he suggests that the emergence of coalition
politics is a hopeful sign. Islam’s role in politics is the focus of Ziad Haider’s
essay, tracing its evolution from Jinnah’s comments through the Munir report,
Islamization under Zia and Talibanization to the “This is Not Us” movement
(129) and the hope that moderate Islam represents the future of Pakistan. A
chapter entitled “Battling Militancy,” by Zahid Hussain, continues the discussion,
tracing the development of jihadist politics given the situation in Afghanistan.
The focus then shifts to economic policy, beginning with Ishrat Husain’s
insistence that economic policies cannot remain sound without solid institutions
behind them; he cites the long-term nature of economic progress, while successive
governments seem interested only in short-term horizons (149-150). Meekal
Ahmed follows the Pakistani economy from the early sixties and periods of
relative health, through Ayub Khan’s era, also a time of economic stability, which
changes under Bhutto and his nationalization programs, and since then has gone
from crisis to crisis, both the government and poor IMF oversight bearing a share
of the blame. Competitiveness is the key concept for Muddassar Mazhar Malik,
who reminds us that Pakistan is “open for business” despite many challenges to
overcome, citing economic potential, natural resources and strategic location as
strong points (201). Ziad Alahdad then shifts the focus to energy, a sector in
crisis which then has an enormous impact on Pakistan’s economy, all of this in a
country with abundant natural energy resources; a more coherent exploitation of
Integrated Energy Planning would be part of an overall solution (240).
Strategic issues then occupy several chapters, beginning interestingly with
education as part of the formula, as advanced by Shanza Khan and Moeed Yusuf,
who suggest that politically-neutral education is the foundation not only of
Pakistaniaat : A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011)
economic development but also the means to resist violent extremism by building
expectations and supplying hope, especially for the young. Pakistan of course
possesses nuclear weapons, and Feroz Hassan Khan asks the question, wondering
if its nuclear capability has allowed Pakistan to focus itself on other priorities, in
other words averting wars rather than fighting them, to paraphrase Bernard
Brodie, cited in Khan’s essay (268). Munir Akram’s essay, “Reversing Strategic
‘Shrinkage,’ highlights Pakistan’s current challenges: the Pakistani Taliban’s
attacks in KP and large cities; Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan; Balochi
alienation; economic stagnation; energy crises; growing poverty, all of which
have contributed to “a dangerous mood of national pessimism,” according to
Akram (284). Afghanistan occupies Ahmed Rashid’s attention, as it has for over
thirty years now; he critiques strategic claims that have become worn with time,
such as the need for strategic depth for Pakistan (although the notion of ‘strategic
depth’ changes when a country becomes a nuclear power), or India’s desire
(among other countries) to gain influence in Kabul (314-315). The final essay,
“The India Factor,” culminates the volume by tracing the tumultuous relations
between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, the bumpy road to peace, the effect of
the 2008 Mumbai attacks, all within the context of peoples who have not
forgotten the trauma of Partition and the secession of East Pakistan. In spite of
the obstacles, Syed Rifaat Hussain lists many of the promising agreements that
have been reached or are in progress, an encouraging sign and a reminder that
good relations are beneficial to both nations.
Human development, Maleeha Lodhi remarks in a concluding note, must
be Pakistan’s priority, and is within reach, as all of the contributors to the volume
insist. Lodhi summarizes thus: “Electoral and political reforms that foster greater
and more active participation by Pakistan’s growing educated middle class will
open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional,
patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people
and meet their needs” (350). Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ is a fine piece
of work, written by specialists for an audience of intelligent non-specialists, and
achieves its objective admirably. Maleeha Lodhi has succeeded remarkably in her
edition of this gathering of clear-sighted experts, who never lose sight of
Pakistan’s potential beyond its current challenges.