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Implications of War on Terror

Posted by admin in Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on April 4th, 2014

Implications of War on Terror

 

Asif Haroon Raja

 

Unlike late Hakimullah Mehsud who disfavored talks, his deputy Waliur Rahman favored dialogue and had convinced sizeable number of TTP Shura members to make an offer of dialogue to the government.  His group suggested Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Munawar Hassan, Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan to act as guarantors to preclude possibility of backtracking from the agreement. The offer was not taken seriously by the PPP led regime and it made it conditional to renunciation of violence.

 

 

 

 

Talks offer was renewed once rightist PML-N and PTI were voted to power after May 11 elections. Offer of talks created division in TTP as well as in the society. A stage was set for a big breakthrough when Waliur Rahman who was the moving force behind peace talks was killed by a drone on May 29, 2013. Jundul Hafsa took revenge by killing ten foreigners at base camp of Nanga Parbat on June 23, 2013.

 

It was generally expected that the TTP leading militancy in the northwest and in Punjab would tone down its acts of terror particularly against civilian targets once PML-N and PTI formed governments in the centre and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) respectively. As a result of their soft approach the TTP had spared these two parties and targeted liberal political parties during election campaign. ANP suffered the most in terms of human losses and in elections.

 

Contrary to high expectations, the Taliban accelerated their terror strikes after the new government took over in early June 2013. Bulk of attacks took place in KP and PTI lost three sitting MPAs. This surge occurred in spite of APC called by the government on September 9, 2013 in which it was agreed by all the participants belonging to different parties and religious groups as well as the Army to enter into dialogue with the militants without pre-conditions and give peace a chance.

The government stuck to its standpoint despite lot of noise made by the liberals. Anti-peace talks lobbies supported by foreign powers and backed by liberals and segment of media launched a concerted campaign to sabotage proposed peace talks and kept picking fault lines in the resolution passed by the APC. Drone strikes also continued.

 

When the TTP offered to talk and welcomed the initiative taken by the APC, it was taken as a sign that the road had been cleared for negotiations. KP government felt so confident that it announced phased withdrawal of troops from Buner, Shangla, Dir, Chitral and Malakand districts starting mid October 2013 and handing over responsibility to civil administration. While the ground was being smoothened for the meeting, an unexpected incident took place. On September 15, Maj Gen Sanaullah Niazi and two were martyred at Upper Dir on account of IED planted by Fazlullah’s militants.

 

We’ve been talking about the financial cost of the War on Terror, and this graphic from our colleague Molly Zisk draws from different studies and sums up the toll in blood and treasure rather concisely, if rather grimly:

 

 

    • 225,000 people dead,

 

    • and $3.7 trillion dollars spent.

 

Peace process got a big jolt when TTP claimed responsibility and vowed to continue hitting military targets. This hostile act in response to Government’s policy of appeasement was regrettable. It angered the rank and file of the Army and put the Federal and KP governments in awkward position but gave a strong handle to the anti-peace lobbies to beat the peace makers with and make fun of them. As the debate between pro-peace and anti-peace lobbies intensified, another gruesome act of terror took place on September 22 in Peshawar where a church was struck by two suicide bombers soon after Sunday prayers killing 84 people and injuring 175.

 

While TTP denied involvement, Jundullah Hafsa, a faction of TTP comprising Punjabi Taliban and led by Asmatullah Muawia claimed responsibility of church attack. In the wake of widespread denunciation inside and outside the country over the dastardly attack on church and condemnation by Ulemas of all schools of thoughts terming the act against the teachings of Quran and Sunnah, TTP Shura urged Muawia to disown the act. Soon after his disownment, another group Jundullah led by Ahmed Marwat based in NW claimed responsibility. In reaction to series of terrorist attacks, precision guided air attacks were carried out on militant’s hideouts in FATA which caused casualties and compelled the militants to declare unilateral ceasefire on March 1 for one month.  

 

As against high expectations of military action, PM Nawaz Sharif disappointed pro-war lobbies by giving peace yet another chance and formed a government committee. TTP responded by giving names of their representatives. After the initial breakthrough, government committee was rehashed. Seven hours long meeting of TTP nominated committee with members of TTP Shura at Bilandkhel village in Orakzai Agency on 26 March under cordial atmosphere has raised hopes and light can be seen at the end of the tunnel. Ceasefire which expired on 31 March is likely to be extended. As a confidence building measure the government released some prisoners and TTP is likely to reciprocate to generate goodwill. Decade old antagonism will take time to tone down and transform into conciliation and brotherhood.

Some of the implications of war are listed here-under:-

The war has halted investments and economic activity has almost come to a grinding halt due to energy crisis and disturbed law and order situation.

Human losses have risen several times higher than the collective losses suffered by coalition forces in Afghanistan while social traumas are incalculable.

War has made Pakistan more dependent upon USA, forcing our rulers to continue clinging to the aprons of USA despite its biased behavior.

Infighting among the Muslims suits the US designs; hence it would like the war to continue.

While the US caught up in a blind alley in Afghanistan is clueless how to exit safely, Pakistan too had no strategy to end the futile war till the start of talks with TTP.

Paradoxically, the key to peace is with hardnosed Taliban.   

Eleven-year war has not only given tremendous experience of fighting guerrilla war to both Pak Army and militants but also has removed inhibitions and fears of each other. Militants fear air power and drones only.

The militants could not have continued fighting for so long without external support and safe sanctuaries across the border. They are more dangerous in cities where they operate as faceless enemies.

Once NATO exits from Afghanistan, TTP will be left with no justifiable cause to continue spilling blood of Muslim brethren.  Once external support dries up, their vigor will wane rapidly and sooner than later they may give up fighting.

The other view is that TTP may become stronger if Taliban government get re-installed in Kabul after 2014 and may then disagree to ceasefire unless all their demands are accepted unconditionally.

The low intensity conflict has caused substantial wear and tear to military’s weapons & equipment.

War has also fatigued the troops living in combat zone amid hazardous environment where life is cheap.

Situation will further worsen in coming months since militancy has spread to every nook and corner of the country.

Civil administration and law courts have not established rule of law in any of the areas recaptured by the Army thereby putting added burden on the Army to hold ground, provide security and carryout rehabilitation/development works. 

Opinions on war on terror whether it is our war or someone else’s war, and whether talks should be held with militants or not are sharply divided. This division in perceptions is to the advantage of militants and disfavors security forces.

With so many grave internal and external threats, most of which were invented and thrust upon Pakistan by foreign powers and duly exacerbated by meek and self-serving political leadership, Army’s plate remain full.

War on terror poses a three dimensional threat when viewed in context with twin threat posed by India and Afghanistan.

In case of an Indo-Pakistan war, our current force structure is insufficient and ill-suited to confront three dimensional threats.

Peace is a key to Pakistan’s economic takeoff.   

 

The writer is a retired Brig, defence analyst and columnist. [email protected]

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Afghanistan’s Coming Coup?

Posted by admin in Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on April 4th, 2014

 
 
Afghanistan’s Coming Coup?
 
The Military Isn’t Too Weak — It’s Too Strong
 
By Paul D. Miller, APRIL 2, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghan National Army soldiers march during their graduation ceremony, Sept 2010. (ISAF Media)
 
 
 
 
 

Inline image 1

 

 
In February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan after ten years of brutal counterinsurgency warfare. International observers and Afghan rebels expected the swift collapse of the newly orphaned Afghan communist regime in Kabul, as did the regime itself. Looking to take advantage of the government’s weakness, the Afghan mujahideen temporarily put aside their differences and planned an ambitious assault on Jalalabad, the country’s second most important Pashtun stronghold. In March, the rebels rallied a force of some 10,000 soldiers and marched on the city.
 
They failed spectacularly. Bolstered by Soviet arms, training, and advisers, the Afghan army and its allies easily outgunned, outmaneuvered, and outgeneraled the oncoming force. Although the mujahideen had mastered guerilla tactics and defensive maneuvers on their home turf, they proved incompetent at carrying out a conventional offensive; poor leadership and factional disputes undermined their fighting power. Three years later, the communist regime finally did collapse — not because it was overrun by the superior fighting abilities of the Afghan rebels but because Russia stopped funding its security forces.
 
There is no shortage of experts who warn of the impending demise of the current Afghan government after the withdrawal of most NATO military forces at the end of this year. In 2012, the International Crisis Group, for example, warned of a possible “state collapse.” The military historian Tom Ricks wrote that Kabul’s fall was “all too likely.” Yet the case of 1989 suggests the opposite outcome: the Afghan government is likely to survive the withdrawal of international troops, just as the communist regime did, and it stands a good chance of surviving so long as international donors keep the Afghan army in the field. Although Afghans should expect some decrease in international aid, donors — many fearful that state collapse in Afghanistan could trigger instability in Pakistan — are unlikely to end their military assistance anytime soon.
 
The more appropriate historical analogy to Kabul today is not the Kabul that the Taliban seized in 1992; it is Saigon in 1963, when the Vietnamese military overthrew the country’s civilian leadership. In the next five years and beyond, then, the greatest danger to democratic governance in Afghanistan is not the Taliban but the Afghan army itself. Since 2001, the net effect of the state-building mission in Afghanistan has been the emergence of a strong Afghan army and a weak Afghan state, creating an imbalance that should worry anyone with a cursory knowledge of history or political theory. Time and time again, the same recipe has led to countless military coups: highly professional military officers lose patience for corrupt civilian leaders and, educated to believe they are guardians of the state, seize control of the government to save it, often with public support. Coups may sound old-fashioned, but such was the pattern in Egypt and Mali as recently as 2012.
 
The same could very well happen in Afghanistan, leaving South Asian stability in the hands of a military autocrat — an outcome that yielded poor results in Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf, General Zia ul-Haq, and others before them. U.S. and international policymakers should therefore take a number of steps to “coup-proof” the Afghan government. For one, Washington should continue to support an ethnically diverse Afghan officer corps. It could also explicitly condition reconstruction assistance on the maintenance of civilian authority, much as the Kerry-Lugar bill did for U.S. assistance to Pakistan in 2009. The United States need not threaten to withdraw all aid in the case of a military coup, but could threaten to reduce financial assistance, halt the transfer of certain advanced weapons systems, or stop cooperating with Afghan army leaders.
 
In addition to relying on sticks, however, the United States and its allies must also be able to offer carrots. To that end, Washington needs to sustain a small military presence in Afghanistan, continue investing in relationships with high-ranking Afghan military and civilian officials, provide a steady stream of aid to the army and to the government, and commit to the long and slow process of socializing Afghanistan in the norms of responsible democratic behavior.
 
ARMY STRONG
 
The Taliban are an oddity in the history of insurgencies. The group began as a government before deteriorating into an insurgency. Both in and out of power, the Taliban never developed a capacity to capably govern. During their five-year tenure in Kabul, the Taliban proved singularly inept at governing, with Afghanistan ranking in the bottom three states on all of the World Bank’s governance indicators. (By such measures, Afghanistan was governed about as effectively as Somalia, which lacked a government entirely.) As a result of its incompetence and brutality, the Taliban was unable to expand its support among the Afghan population beyond a core group of Pashtun Islamist supporters, instead relying on rule by fear, bribery, and force. And it espoused an unpopular and foreign ideology derived from Deobandi Islam, rather than the traditional Hanafi Islam familiar to most Afghans.
 
After the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban chose to side with al Qaeda, thereby ensuring that Afghanistan would be visited by yet more war. Once the United States and its allies removed it from power, the Taliban refused to reconcile or participate in the electoral process. Instead, it chose to launch a violent insurgency. But unlike successful insurgents in the past, the Taliban never built up an effective political arm or provided meaningful governance in the areas it controlled.
 
The Afghan army, meanwhile, has grown increasingly capable and effective. It assumed lead responsibility for the country’s security last summer, meaning that it will have 18 months of experience leading the fight before the withdrawal of most international troops at the end of 2014. Late last year, the U.S. Department of Defense said that the Afghan security forces were conducting almost all operations independently and judged that the Taliban was “tactically overmatched” by Afghan forces, which now number more than 350,000 (including police and local defense forces).
 
Observers often invoke the legend of the Afghan warrior to explain why international forces have failed to defeat insurgents there. Yet there is no reason why the same legend cannot apply to the regular Afghan army as well. The Northern Alliance, for example, never surrendered to the Taliban in five years of fierce conventional fighting during the 1990s. After a decade of international investment, including some $60 billion in U.S. security assistance and training from the world’s most professional military forces, the Afghan army is far better trained and equipped than the Northern Alliance ever was. Most important, it is likely to have continued air support from the U.S. Air Force.
 
Given such realities, there is virtually no chance that the Taliban will overwhelm and defeat the Afghan army in battle, march on Kabul, or spur a popular revolution in its favor. The Taliban’s longevity says more about the Afghan government’s weakness and Pakistani complicity than about Taliban strength. Its only chance at outright victory is if the United States and its allies follow in Russia’s footsteps and stop funding the Afghan army. If that were to happen, the army would likely fracture along ethnic lines, giving the Taliban the opportunity to ally with Pashtun units and seize control of the south and east as springboards for national conquest. But U.S. President Barack Obama has already made clear his commitment to providing long-term military and financial support to Afghanistan. So long as he does, the Taliban may continue its sporadic, small-scale attacks, but it won’t win.
 
ANATOMY OF A COUP
 
The biggest long-term danger to democracy in Afghanistan is not the Taliban but the Afghan army itself, which could overturn the country’s weak civilian government. There would be nothing particularly unusual about a military coup in Afghanistan; military rule, after all, is one of the oldest forms of human political organization. But why do coups happen when they do? Scholars have tended to distinguish between the events that trigger coups, such as the personal ambitions of military leaders or particular political crises, and the underlying structural features that make coups possible in the first place. The first set of variables are unpredictable and, presumably, universal: Afghan officers are as likely to be as ambitious as those in any country, with perhaps more cause to be disgruntled than most. And, of course, Afghanistan has no shortage of crises that officers could use to their advantage. The second set of variables distinguishes countries that are especially vulnerable to a coup. This is where the picture in Afghanistan gets especially worrying: almost every model of coup risk suggests that Afghanistan faces the very real danger of a military takeover.
 
For example, the British political scientist Samuel Finer suggested that the ideal window for a military to launch a coup is in wartime or during a national emergency — precisely when the civilian government in most dependent on the military and the military is most popular among the people. Militaries almost always justify their coups by accusing their erstwhile civilian masters of a level of incompetence, corruption, or criminality that endangers the state. That sounds a lot like Afghanistan; the country is in the middle of a protracted war in which the civilian government is entirely dependent on the Afghan army, and during which the government has faced widespread accusations of corruption and incompetence. Last year, Afghanistan ranked 175th on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index — the third-worst in the world. It is easy to imagine Afghan corps commanders and the general staff refusing to take orders from Kabul or undermining its control over defense finances.
 
Another prominent model of coup risk focuses on the size of military establishments. A 1983 study of African coups in the mid-twentieth century by the political scientists Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat McGowan concluded that, in states where the military was relatively large and “central because of its role in repression and because of its claim on state revenue,” generals were more likely to become active in civilian politics. That, again, sounds rather similar to Afghanistan. Kabul’s defense budget dwarfs all others. The government collects only about $2.3 billion in domestic revenue, whereas Washington committed $5.1 billion to the Afghan Security Force Fund in 2013. The defense budget is so large, in fact, that it constitutes nearly a quarter of Afghanistan’s $22 billion GDP. With such a large defense establishment, the Afghan army has more resources at its command than the rest of the government put together.
 
Such an imbalance in resources will naturally give the military greater political influence in shaping Afghanistan’s war strategy, defense posture, and eventually its foreign policy — allowing a coup by evolution. If civilian leaders resist such influence, they risk precipitating a crisis in which the army overtly seizes control. And it could. There are 185,000 troops under the command of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense and over 350,000 Afghan security personnel in total, more than enough to easily oust the country’s parliament, occupy the palace, seize the most important governors’ mansions, and impose martial law in Kabul and Kandahar.
 
According to the same study, the history of coups in Africa also suggests that rapid population growth in a capital city makes a nation more susceptible to a military coup. Consider, then, Kabul’s population, which has skyrocketed from under one million in 2001 to over 3.3 million in 2013. Inundated with an endless flood of refugees, the city is regularly wracked by protests and civil unrest. A similar period of rioting during Afghanistan’s last experiment with democracy in the 1960s led to a widely welcomed coup in 1973.
 
Other models of coup risk, put forward by the political theorist Rosemary O’Kane and others, emphasize economic and social factors, since a military’s accusations of civilian incompetence often turn on the government’s mismanagement of the economy. Poverty, inequality, recession, high inflation, and volatile commodity markets can leave populations frustrated with their governments. And even growth can have downsides when it is too rapid, disrupting traditional social networks. In Afghanistan, economic and demographic factors are not favorable. The country remains one of the poorest in the world — even though it is one of the fastest-growing. Afghanistan had the 14th lowest GDP per capita in the world in 2013, but the 15th highest average GDP growth rate from 2001 to 2014. Such figures suggest that Afghans are at once poor and experiencing major disruptions in their way of life. Given these circumstances, a nationalist military with a traditionalist appeal could easily win over Afghans eager for structure and familiarity.
 
Structural factors also make the Afghan state susceptible to a military takeover. The political scientist Edward Luttwak has argued that three preconditions must be met for a coup to be successful. First, political participation must be limited to a small fraction of the population. (Voting does not count as meaningful participation; countries that hold elections, such as Pakistan, still experience coups because their civil societies are weak relative to their military establishments.) Second, foreign influence must be limited. And third, the state must be centralized. Afghanistan has a weak civil society; it will have less foreign influence after 2014; and its government is famously one of the most highly centralized in the world because the republican constitution gave the president many of the same powers that belonged to the former monarchy. A general who ousted the Afghan president, then, could quickly assume dictatorial powers.
 
Perhaps the risk factor on which there is the widest agreement is the public’s perceptions of the government’s illegitimacy alongside admiration for the army. A study conducted by the scholars Aaron Belkin and Evan Shofer in 2003 reviewed 21 purported causes of coups and concluded that the three most important variables were the strength of civil society, the level of the regime’s legitimacy, and the past history of coups in the country. This is the most worrying model, because the Afghan state has grown weaker just as its army has grown stronger.
 
According to the World Bank, the post-Taliban government has improved Afghanistan’s rankings on free speech (not hard considering the Taliban’s repression), government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. Even in these categories, however, Kabul remained at or near the bottom tenth percentile of countries surveyed. In the remaining categories, including political stability, control of corruption, and the rule of law, the democratic government is indistinguishable from its Taliban predecessor, stuck near the bottom of world rankings. Only 47 percent of Afghans say that they trust the Afghan parliament to do its job, 45 percent trust government ministers, and 43 percent trust the court system. A vast 77 percent of them identified corruption as a major nationwide problem.
 
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation last year, 93 percent of Afghans said the Afghan army was “honest and fair,” 91 percent believed it had helped improve security in Afghanistan, and 88 percent said they had confidence in the institution. Remarkably, these numbers have been largely consistent since at least 2007. Afghans identified the army as the second most honest institution, after the public health-care system. Given Afghan history and its political culture — coups overthrew the government in 1973 and 1978 — it would be easy for frustrated Afghan army officers to convince the public that it needed to take over for the civilian government.
 
By nearly every measure, then, Afghanistan is at high risk of a military coup in coming years. Some scholars and policymakers, however, might argue that a military government would actually be more effective at waging a counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban and cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism goals. A strong government capable of enforcing law and order could deprive the Taliban of the only real issue on which it credibly claims superiority over a democratic government. By this logic, the international community should quietly wait for the looming coup and continue business as usual after it happens.
 
That would be a monumental mistake, not least because the Afghans prefer democracy to the alternatives. They continue to express support for political participation, equal rights under law, the freedoms of speech and press, and elections. In the very long run, their support for democracy is a net gain for the United States, Pakistan, and the world. Established democracies tend to be more stable and more economically productive than authoritarian regimes, produce fewer refugees, experience fewer famines, and are less likely to harbor terrorists. And studies suggest that democracies impose fewer costs on their neighbors and on the international community.
 
Even putting aside the long-term benefits of democracy, which may take decades to realize, accepting a military government in Kabul would be shortsighted in the near term. During the Cold War, Washington often sided with autocratic regimes in the name of defending democracy. The policy succeeded in stemming Soviet influence, but it undermined U.S. credibility, bred anti-Western sentiment in the developing world, and may have indirectly contributed to the rise of nationalist, sectarian, and extremist political movements among populations disillusioned with the rhetoric of democracy.
 
Moreover, relying on strongmen makes U.S. foreign policy dependent on a single personality. Such rulers generally lose credibility as time wears on and inevitably leave office against their will. Washington would similarly lose out in Afghanistan if, after helping the Afghan army defeat the Taliban, it lost the support of the Afghan people. If Washington wants long-term influence in Afghanistan — something vital to stabilizing Pakistan — it must prioritize its relationship with the Afghan people, not just a few favored military officers.
 
THE COUP-PROOFING PLAYBOOK
 
Because Washington has an interest in deterring a coup in Afghanistan, it should push a series of “coup-proofing” policies in the months and years to come. Many states that were otherwise at high risk for a coup, such as Colombia and Iraq, have successfully held their military establishments at bay through a canny mix of patronage, international alliances, ethnic balancing, and support for redundant security organizations. Although some of these tactics are problematic for democracy, if they are pursued in combination with other measures to bolster the government’s legitimacy, they can ultimately help sustain democracy in Afghanistan.
 
One of the most effective coup-proofing strategies is the exploitation of ethnic and sectarian loyalties. Civilian regimes must either depend on a single ethnic community capable of defending the regime against the rest of the nation or else incorporate a mix of the most powerful groups — one that could overwhelm other communities while maintaining a balance of power within the armed forces. The first approach is often repressive, undemocratic, and unreliable, for it ensures the permanent dominance of one ethnic group over all others. The Syrian government’s attempt to rely exclusively on the Alawite community demonstrates the danger of that strategy. The Afghan government might, in principle, depend on a military staffed entirely by ethnic Pashtuns, who may constitute 40 to 45 percent of the population. But Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others who fought against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban are unlikely to accept a Pashtun-dominated army.
 
Fortunately, the international community has already set the Afghan army on the second course, ensuring that its ranks are ethnically mixed. Tajiks are overrepresented, constituting 39 percent of the officer corps, well above the official target of 25 percent. But their overrepresentation comes at the expense of the smallest groups, including Uzbeks and Hazara, not Pashtuns. Pashtuns made up 42 percent of the officer corps and 43 percent of the enlisted ranks, just below the official target of 44 percent.
 
The army’s balance between Tajiks and Pashtuns is one of the most important guarantors of its viability as a national fighting force under democratic authority. Pashtun officers keen to launch a coup would be unlikely to get support from Tajik officers, and vice versa. Ethnic diversity in the senior ranks may even help deter coups because it would be difficult for a Pashtun cabal, for example, to coordinate without senior Tajik officers getting wind of it. The ethnic balance in the army also carries a risk — if the army were to fragment, it would split along ethnic lines. But if the military is to remain subordinate to civilian authority, its ethnic diversity is an essential bulwark against a military takeover. Afghan, NATO, and U.S. policymakers should keep a close watch on appointments and promotions to senior positions to monitor the army’s ethnic balance.
 
A second coup-proofing strategy is to support competing security services. If the regular army plots a coup, it can be deterred by a national guard, a police force, or an intelligence service. The Afghans already have the beginnings of a redundant security system; its national police acts much like a gendarmerie under the command of the Interior Ministry, although it still lacks the funding, training, and equipment required to buffer the army. The Afghan government has also raised local defense forces to defend against Taliban attacks, but they are still too small and poorly equipped to check the regular army. Perhaps the most effective security service outside of the army is the National Directorate for Security, Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. Although it is not a fighting force, its large network of surveillance and intelligence operatives is probably the best resource available to the civilian government to detect disaffection or mutinous plotting within the army. U.S. and Afghan officials should therefore ensure that the NDS devotes at least some of its resources to watching the Afghan army in addition to the Taliban.
 
A third means of deterring coups involves allowing international influence on a state’s security affairs. The presence of foreign forces from countries devoted to civilian control over the military introduces more uncertainty into the political and security environment (Will foreign forces defend the regime?) and makes it harder for potential coup plotters to know what might happen if they attempt a coup. Foreign funding of a state’s military also gives international donors the power of conditionality over the army.
 
The presence of external actors and foreign funding is no guarantee of stability, of course, as the coup in South Vietnam in 1963 attests, but it introduces an extra obstacle that coup plotters must overcome. In this respect, Afghanistan is particularly well positioned. The 2012 strategic partnership agreement and the proposed Bilateral Security Agreement have already laid the groundwork for an enduring international military presence in Afghanistan. (The BSA is almost certain to be signed later this year, once a new president takes power, as every candidate has pledged to accept it.) The Afghan army might still dare a coup if it believed that Washington was unwilling to stop it or that U.S. policymakers felt there was no other choice for denying safe haven to al Qaeda. But a military presence surely gives Washington more leverage than otherwise.
 
Governments must also avoid or end crises that the military could use as a pretext for intervention. In Afghanistan, that means resolving the war against the Taliban in a way that is satisfactory to the country’s Pashtuns while addressing the legitimate concerns of the various non-Pashtun minorities, such as the Tajiks. This is one of the trickiest issues for the Afghan government and its international partners; the most likely coup scenarios would involve Pashtun officers moving against a government that they believed was oppressing Pashtuns in the course of the war against the Taliban — or Tajik officers against a government that they believed had compromised too much in its eagerness to secure peace. The longer the war lasts after 2014, the greater the chances that tribal grievances outweigh loyalty to the regime. A negotiated solution to the war is a plain necessity, but securing support for such a solution from all of Afghanistan’s major stakeholders will be critical to the survival of the democratic regime.
 
Finally, the most important measure a state can take to minimize its coup risk is to bolster its own legitimacy. Militaries tend to launch or support coups because they genuinely feel that the survival of their nation or their way of life is at stake. The good news here is that, although Afghans have little confidence in their government and mistrust most of its officials, they continue to support the idea of democracy. Despite some skeptics’ warnings that democracy is unlikely to take root in Afghan soil, the Afghans have proved remarkably patient, and many still hope that democratic norms will eventually take hold.
 
Since the Afghan government’s dwindling legitimacy is due more to its poor performance than its democratic ideology, the international community can help repair some of the damage. Although much of the burden of cracking down on corruption and nepotism falls on Afghan officials, the international community can equip them with much-needed resources and support. Afghanistan has a weak government and strong army in large part because that reflects the pattern of funding and assistance from the international community since 2001. Most of the international aid to Afghanistan has taken the form of security and economic assistance — training the army and police and completing high-profile, big-ticket reconstruction projects. A comparatively small amount of money has been spent on the civilian government, and most of that has been spent on elections. Yet Afghanistan needs money for the unglamorous and tiresome work of training bureaucrats, which is the work that might make the largest difference in Kabul’s governance and its legitimacy. As Washington and its allies draw down their military presence, they should increase their support for governance reform and capacity building. Improved government performance will remove the most common pretext for military intervention in politics.
 
Too often, the United States has ignored the danger of military coups and military governments in allied and partner states. In nearly every case, Washington has found that although military governments can make things easier in the short term, democratic governments allow for a stronger and deeper bilateral relationship. The list of countries taken over by military establishments allied with or trained, equipped, or funded by the United States is embarrassingly long. It includes at least the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Nicaragua, Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Turkey. Due in large part to the massive investment of U.S. time, money, and resources in the Afghan military since 2001, and to Washington’s relative neglect of the civilian government, Afghanistan is facing a very real risk of becoming the latest entry on that list. There is still time to forestall that outcome. But if it happens, no policymaker — American, Afghan, or European — should be surprised.
 

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PAKISTAN HAD TO SEE SUCH DAHI BHALLA WALAS AS PRESIDENT

Posted by admin in Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on April 4th, 2014

 
 
 
 
PAKISTAN HAD TO SEE SUCH DAHI BHALLA WALAS AS PRESIDENT

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHAME on U Mr President….!
Look at your president – Afsoos but this is true

Mamnoon is really mamnoon to his Master:

Isn’t it strange that President behaves this way?
He could not remember that in protocol Prime Minister comes after him.
Moreover nobody briefed him about the simple drill of flag hoisting.
Poor state of Affairs!
This picture depicts a lot, apart from the dictatorial mindset of “Sharif from Lahore”.
President seems to be afraid of him and very obliged /(mamnoon) too.
Watch the body language in particular the special eyes.

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DEFILING ISLAM’S FAIR NAME: PMLN GOVT PATRONAGE OF ABOUT 300 PROSTITUTION DENS IN “ISLAMABAD”

Posted by admin in Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on April 3rd, 2014

300 PROSTITUTION DENS IN ISLAMABAD: MNAS HOSTEL-A PROSTITUTES PARADISE, PEDOPHILIA,WHISKEY & BEER — — USED FREELY,SADO-MASOCHISM

PAKISTAN’S LEGISLATORS ARE INTO DRUGS AND PROSTITUTION AS DISCLOSED BY JAMSHED DASTI, ONE OF THE FEW HONEST POLITICIANS IN PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
PROSTITUTES ARE FOUND EARLY MORNING LEAVING ROOMS ALLOCATED TO PMLN MNAs…JAMSHED DASTI IS AN EYEWITNESS
SOME MNAs ARE PEDOPHILES AND AB– — USE YOUNG BOYS & GIRLS in MNA HOSTELS
RIGHT UNDER THE NOSE OF ISLAMABAD POLICE.
THEY ARE PMLN UNTOUCHABLES. POLICE’S HANDS ARE TIED. IF ARRESTED, THEY ARE RELEASED IN HOURS, AFTER CALLS ARE RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTERS SECRETARY
THE SAME POLITICIANS ARE ALSO ON COCAINE, HEROIN, ECSTASY & LSD
PAKISTAN IS BEING LOOTED & ENJOYED FOR PERSONAL CARNAL PLEASURE BY NAWAZ SHARIF’S PMLN POLITICIANS
F,G,& H BLOCKS IN ISLAMABAD ARE INFESTED WITH HO– — USES OF PROSTITUTION. WOMEN FROM CENTRAL ASIA, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN,TURKMENISTAN, KAZAKHISTAN,
THAILAND, PHILIPPINES, MYANMAR ARE FOUND UNDER PAKISTANI PIMPS & MADAMS. 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EARMARKED FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN EACH MNAs JURISDICTION ARE SPENT ON ALCOHOL & WOMEN
 
THIS IS QUAID-I-AZAM PAKISTAN UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF KIM BARKER FAME SEXUAL HARASSER NAWAZ SHARIF, WHOSE WIFE HAS GROWN TOO FAT TO SERVICE HIS SEXUAL ADDICTION.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE USING THESE PROSTITUTES TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ON PAKISTAN’S  STRATEGIC & NUCLEAR SITES
 

300 PROSTITUTION PLACES FOUND IN ISLAMABAD

December 23, 2013 in News insight, Pakistan

 

Prostitution
Islamabad: It is a very shameful news for all the Pakistani Nation who calls themselves as the believer of Islam and proud to have the name tag of Islamic Republic of Pakistan should lay down their heads because 300 Prostitution places are found in the Federal Capital Islamabad. All the high commands designated persons hold their offices in the capital but how come it is possible that they are unknown of this fact.

According to the report published in the newspaper some Police officers have react to this news immediately and raided on the mentioned places in the various areas of Islamabad. The police have also arrest many persons and took them in their custody.

The Islamabad police is continuously working on this and it is also conducting out the raids at constant interval on the mentioned places. While this is very shameful that all these types or centers are operating in Islamabad.

The allegedly mention places where these centers found are G-11, G-10, Shahzad Town, Ghauri Town, Alipur, Burma Town, Pakistan town and others.

– See more at: http://www.desitvonline.org/300-prostitution-places-found-in-islamabad/#sthash.OKNM01tT.dpuf

 
 

At 15, Shiny was the brightest student and scored straight A’s in her O-Level Examinations. Her parents were busy doctors minting a fortune and wanted her to score straight A’s in A-Levels to join a medical college in the UK. Pressures on her to perform were very high and parental care nonexistent. Browsing on the internet, she found names of anti-sleeping pills to stay awake. She used them, but fell into a depression. Within a year through friends on Facebook, she progressed to charas, heroin injections and amphetamines. Her parents, too busy with their routine, attributed dark circles around her eyes and loss of hair to over work, but never bothered to check her arms for punctures. She fell back in class and died of drug overdose before she was 17.
Adnan’s mother is a widow with two sons and a daughter. She has worked hard to educate her two elder children who are now employed aboard with hefty salaries. Five years ago, they moved to Baharia Town. With no supervision, Adnan got hooked to sheesha, hash and ecstasy. He started becoming violent and would often injure himself or cut his wrists. He was expelled from the college. He reacted by bringing gangsters outside the schools and colleges where his friends studied and involved in fights with firearms. He has abandoned education and operates a gang of drug addicts, who are involved in fights outside schools and colleges. The mother, who once defended him stoutly, is now helpless. For Adnan, it is a matter of time.
Meena is a foreign educated business developer. Working in a BPO, she got hooked on to drugs through young executives working at night at call centres. Out of job due to drug abuse, she now heads a gang of young addicts and peddles for the elites of Islamabad and Bharia in heroin and crack. Two of her friends have died of overdose.
These are alarming events and tip of the iceberg. It is a devil that haunts the urban elite education centres and call centres where youngsters are vulnerable and the nouveaux riches, who have no time for their children.

 

A decade back, hash and heroin was deemed to be a poor man’s refuge due to the prohibitive cost of imported liquor. However, the trends are now changing. Hash, heroin, amphetamines, hallucinogens, ecstasy and Ketamine compounds have proliferated into the urban elites of Pakistan. The route of entry is invariably private education institutions and BPOs operating night shift of youngsters, who attend school or college at day. Invariably, it always begins with efforts to keep awake and ends in tragedy. Outside the premises of these institutions, peddlers and criminals operate with impunity to befriend new customers. Rave parties, dancing events and attractive satanic captions splash pages on the social media. Sheesha centres in urban malls and posh localities located in farm houses are the high points of the nouveaux riches addicts where ecstasy, syringes and crack are a token of status. Once hooked there is no return.
Pakistan’s drug statistics are shocking. According to one report, over eight million Pakistanis are using drugs. The numbers are likely to touch 15 million in the next few years. Over 57 percent amongst these use heroin. According to another report amongst the women, 47 percent are college or university educated professionals. Nearly half of all urban addicts are school/college going students studying in private institutions and live in posh upcoming housings. According to DG Narcotics, private educational institutions are more vulnerable than the government educational institutions to attract the students towards drug addiction, mainly because the elites can spend more. He also expressed the opinion that addiction rate was proportional to tuition rates, where both parents were working and where parents don’t have enough time for their children. The drug of choice for the rich urban elites is not heroin but crack, a derivative of cocaine traded in dollars and euros.
Private education institutions from schools to universities have failed to check this rising menace within and outside their bounds. Most hostels of boys and girls also have dens from where this trade is run. In hostels, students experiment with chemicals to manufacture stimulants and hallucinogens in which Ephedrine and Ketamine are the basic drugs of choice. Recently, a hostel in Islamabad was found to be both a drug and prostitution den. In street corners, Garda, a lethal mix of tobacco, charas and stimulants in readymade cigarette rolls is available to anyone across the counters; usually the high school students.
In Pakistan’s urban centres, no one seems willing to take on the challenge. The district and municipal administrations despite tremendous civic powers at their disposal prefer looking the other way. Action by police is usually to extort more money from the peddlers and addicts. Private educational institutions in their desire to earn money prefer to keep their eyes closed, even to galas and dinners held in their own premises. Academicians lack the administrative fist and the leader’s prowess to deter, cajole or convince students. Nobody cares to inspect the hostel premises or why students have dropped semesters. Tutorial and social care groups are nonexistent. Visiting faculties consider having their hands washed of all responsibility and accountability. Cases instead of being reported to police and ANF are hushed up by disciplinary committees. There is a total absence of any dissuasive or punitive policy.
The time for holding ceremonial seminars on drug abuse as a compulsive expenditure should now be over. It is time to act. Detecting and preventing drug abuse is a social, civic and collective responsibility and not confined to police and ANF. Urban administrators, cantonment boards, institutional administrations and civil society groups need to wake up to this challenge and evolve aggressive action plans to combat this menace before we lose more youngsters to this social evil.

The writer is a retired officer of Pakistan Army and a political economist.
    Email: [email protected]

Islamabad: The country’s capital Islamabad, has become a hub of drug addicts.

Saach.TV, after receiving complaints from the people, visited several areas and found shocking incidents that involve also the premises of a fast-food chain. The areas also include parking lots.

Youth of Islamabad often come around here to enjoy their evenings and conduct social gatherings.

However, this recreation now involves drug use, besides sale and purchase.

A visit by the scribe revealed the amount of drug consumption in the parking lot as well as the adjacent park near the restaurant.

Unfortunately, there are no checks and balances, though there are check posts of police round these corners.

There is no police present inside the premises as the restaurant has its own security outside to inspect the vehicles for any security-threatening object.

Such activities are also taking part in different areas of Islamabad including prominent universities.

A student of Quaid-e-Azam University disclosed to the scribe that weed is very much open in university premises and there is no check from the police.

An ex-addict told the scribe that the weed is easily available in Islamabad. He said, “Mostly people take drugs to relax themselves. The culture has been imported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and most of the weed comes from that place.”

Talking about the suppliers of weed, he said, “The suppliers of weed are easily available at different places and they work on a small scale. Main handlers of the suppliers operate from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.”

Giving his expert opinion on the matter, Dr. Wahab Yusufzai, a Consultant Psychiatrist and Assistant Professor at Shifa College of Medicine told Saach.TV that it is very unfortunate that this epidemic has spread in our society.

He praised the role of media in identifying the issue and urged the government to run an awareness campaign.

He strictly criticized the increasing culture of Sheesha among the youth and termed it as a catalyst to take youth at the verge of drugs.

Talking about the technicalities and solutions to eradicate this menace from the society, he emphasized, “Police has to take measure in controlling the supply and trafficking being done. Stopping the supply will surely decrease the addiction.”

He also asked the parents and universities to play their part in monitoring the youth. He said, “There should be a strong liaison among the parents and teachers and they should keep a watchful eye over the children. Parents must scrutinize the behaviour of children and also put a full stop on the increasing habit of youth to stay awake at night and sleep all day.”

Saach.TV tried to contact the Inspector General of Police, Islamabad but he was unavailable. His Public Relations Officer (PRO) said, “Islamabad Police has been cracking down on these elements daily and it is evident from their daily press releases.”

– See more at: http://www.saach.tv/2012/05/18/islamabad-an-easy-drug-place/#sthash.2VrHmAUd.dpuf

 

Who is this Pakistani Spy?

Posted on January 18, 2010 by alaiwah

 

About two years ago, a British military attaché in Islamabad was dismissed after he “lost the confidence of the British High Commission” following what London called his “inappropriate relationship” with a Pakistani female ‘spy’.

Brigadier Andrew Durcan, 56, was recalled in January 2007.

All hell broke loose after Aroosa Alam of an Islamabad daily, Pakistan Observer, ventured with what she claimed was an expose on how the drama involving the British military attachÈ and the female spy played out.

Alam pointed to a certain research fellow, who happens to work for the ISS as the spy in question. This infuriated Dr Shireen Mazari, the ISS boss, who then went to town with a rejoinder that attempted to cut Alam down to size, but which in turn, drew the fury of the offended daily. Credibility was at stake, after all.

It is no secret that in diplomatic missions, some officials serve time for work other than their stated job-description. It is quite probable that Brigadier Durcan had a few skeletons in his cupboard, which is, in part explained by his rather secretive dismissal following a “loss of confidence” at the High Commission. Islamabad’s statement that it was never informed of the decision is, again, a pointer.

British Ministry of Defence, which seconds senior officers to the Foreign Office as military attaches in embassies around the world, confirmed the dismissal but declined to discuss the disgraced official’s future postings or whereabouts.

“The High Commissioner in Islamabad considered his platonic friendship with a Pakistani national inappropriate and, as a result, lost confidence in him. He has been investigated and cleared over potential breaches of security,” is what a statement from the ministry said following the revelation.

The married Durcan is a former commander of the Gordon Highlanders, 52nd Lowland Brigade and deputy inspector-general of the Territorial Army. He was nicknamed “the tartan barrel” by officers under his command in Scotland because of his girth.

But to most Pakistanis, it is the alleged involvement of their compatriot, a female at that, which is the most intriguing element of the soap opera.

Aroosa Alam, the daredevil reporter, decided to put them out of their misery with this expose:

“Careful and thorough investigation and a number of background interviews with military diplomats close to Brigadier Durcan revealed that a research fellow from Institute of Strategic Studies is the lady behind the whole affair.

“Holding dual nationality, one Pakistani and other British, Ms M K, has been associated with the Institute for many years. She deals with a number of defence-related issues and has written many research papers particularly on conflict resolution, non-proliferation, and EU.

“She frequently travelled between England and Pakistan. In Pakistan, she sought many interviews with various high-level defence officials even in Pakistani military hierarchy. She came under suspicion by M16 undercovers in Islamabad mission when she sought interviews with defence officials of the High Commission to be used in her research papers.

“According to sources, she would ask some very pointed and pertinent questions. But when she went back she never used these interviews and wrote nothing on these issues. Intelligence authorities in the High Commission were then alarmed and started suspecting that these questions were asked by her for not her own research papers but for the consumption of some one else. This was some time last fall. The girl and the Brigadier were monitored. Phones were bugged. Even the room and the house of the British Military Attache were bugged.

“Some sources claimed that some filming was also done to prepare incriminating evidence. Both were also spotted intimately together at some social functions. Sources claimed that the Brigadier also travelled to England many times to spend time with her and his engagements in England were also watched and closely monitored.

“A team arrived from London in early January this year after Christmas holidays and the Brigadier was confronted for the first time about the status of his relations with the young lady. He was asked to report back to London where, according to sources, he appeared before a three-member military tribunal along with the internal inquiry report, and evidence based on phonic conversations and perhaps with some pictures”.

Aroosa Alam drew a swift riposte from Mazari, who called a press conference the very next day, refuting the allegations point-by-point. She said although the research fellow mentioned in Alam’s report did work for ISS, all references to her subordinate’s name – right from the work specifics to foreign travel and dangerous liaisons with the disgraced British official – were factually wrong.

Mazari was clinical in her assertion and rounded off the rearguard by demanding an apology from both the reporter and her paper, failing which she threatened to seek legal redress.

However, her charge that the paper was undermining national interests and becoming a tool for vested interests, drew a scathing rejoinder from the paper, which made no secret of its displeasure by stating that it did not need a sermon from someone under the microscope.

In fact, it went on to suggest that it had done a favour to Mazari by publishing what it did since that “put an end to wild guesses being made in the city about some of the known media-related female academics, including Dr Mazari herself, for being the lady in question”.

The prime time battle was apparently, won by Mazari, when the paper finally, issued a front-paged “clarification” by its editor, regretting the “inadvertent” nomination of the ‘spy’ (MK) in the story, which it denied was true.

It has now emerged that the alleged ‘spy’ is, indeed, not the one named in Alam’s controversial story but someone else. However, some contents of her story, apparently, do hold ground.

For instance, the incriminating evidence one got to see clearly belies London’s claim that its official did not have the kind of relations with the ‘spy’ that a certain Bill Clinton allegedly had with the most known intern in history.

 

A report has been submitted in Islamabad High Court by a senior official who belongs to Islamabad Police. In the report it is identified by the police officer that at least 58 locations in Islamabad are being used for the immoral trade or in other words, illegal business of prostitution centres is being run in these locations.

These brothels are mostly present in sector G and sector F of Islamabad. These areas are populated with middle class and upper middle class people. Tariq Mehmood Jahangri who has formerly served as Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Prosecutor General, said that women involved in prostitution in Islamabad joined this business due to poverty. Their husbands either left them or were on drugs and in order to earn their daily living, they had to find some source of earning and as a result they had to join this immoral business. Some of the women who joined prostitution were sexually exploited by senior officials of their offices and employers as they were not getting paid and they had to sexually satisfy their employers first in order to get paid.

If the situation is judged from various views, it is revealed that Islamabad has more than 300 brothels and this business is on the rise as new brothels are introduced every day. Poverty is on the rise and people who are desperately in need of the money are growing day by day. This is a favourable situation for prostitution to grow.

Sources claim that police is well aware of these brothels and some of the brothels are favourite place for certain influential officials.

Below is a full list of number of brothels in different sectors of Islamabad and the police station under which these areas fall.

Number of Brothels

 Police Station Jurisdiction Situated in

11

 Shalimar Police G-10, G-11/1, F-10/2 and 3, F-11/3, F-10 Markaz and F-11 Markaz

10

 Ramna Police G-10/1, G-10/2, G-10/3, G-11/4

10

 Margalla Police F-8/1,2,3 and 4 and G-9/3 and 4

9

 Sabzi Mandi Police Sabzi Mandi and surrounding areas

5

 Koral Police Tarlai Kalan and Ghauri Town localities

4

 Industrial Area Police I-8/2 and 4

4

 Kohsar Police F-6/1,F-7/1 and F-7/4

3

 Aabpara Police G-6, G-7/1 and 2

1

 Golra Police Golra area

1

 Bhara Kahu Police Bhara Kahu

 

 

Reference

Reference

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Pakistan’s chameleon

Posted by admin in Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on April 3rd, 2014

Pakistan’s chameleon

 

Published: March 29, 2014 at 11:36 AM

Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI Editor at Large

 

 WASHINGTON, March 28 (UPI) — Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is the human equivalent of a lizard that can change the color of its skin to look like the colors that are around it.

 

In his last trip to Washington, Nawaz, as everyone calls him, gave his American interlocutors no reason to doubt his democratic credentials. Back in Islamabad, or in his native Punjab province, Nawaz, whose family is immensely wealthy, is virulently anti-U.S.


Nawaz also believes TTP (Taliban terrorists) that killed 33,000 civilians in the past couple of years, should be eased into power, or at least be given a big slice of it.


The Pakistani army, exasperated by Nawaz’s prestigidator’s sleight of hand, finally decided to ignore him. In close liaison with U.S., it readied a major offensive against Taliban in mountainous North Waziristan.


It was in Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan, that Nawaz had agreed to send his ranking team to negotiate a cease-fire with TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan). Reluctantly, he agreed the army should have its own representative at any negotiations with the “enemy.”


TTP chieftain Mullah Fazlullah’s representatives had three conditions for agreeing to a permanent cease-fire:


· Pakistani army to cease operations in N. Waziristan.
· U.S. drone attacks to end immediately.
· About 30 Taliban prisoners to be released by the Army.


The army made clear to Nawaz all three conditions were unacceptable and that nothing now stood in the way of a major army offensive in the tribal areas on the Afghan border.


A solemn meeting of the three service chiefs, chaired by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Rashid Mehmood,, and another of the ten corps commanders under Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif, agreed not to take part in any further negotiations with TTP.


 This time, some said privately, there would be no half measures. The next operation would be “full scale maximum effort.”


One of them said “TTP will not be given an inch to breathe. Major surgery is now urgently required and has been agreed to remove the cancer of terrorism.”


Nawaz wants TTP to play a decisive role in the name of Jihad or Holy War. “His decision to involve the army in negotiations with Pakistan’s Taliban,” reported regional expert Ammar Turabi, “was a ploy to undermine the army and to gain more time as he had done before. But this time the upper echelons of the army are convinced that the evil nexus should be completely destroyed.”


“The corps commanders were unequivocal and agreed this had been the very last time they would lend their prestige and authority to Nawaz’s dilatory tactics,” added Turabi.


Taliban guerrillas ignored a month-long ceasefire and launched a wave of attacks while talks were underway. Fazlullah has always opposed any kind of a cease-fire and told his allies that their only purpose should be to disrupt the army’s offensive plans.


The army’s top commanders have now agreed that full scale war against TTP is the only option.
TTP, in its propaganda, says Pakistan is a “slave of America” that has become “an American colony.” And Fazlullah is convinced he has the secret backing of Nawaz Sharif, whose anti-U.S. credentials are beyond dispute.


Adding to a confusing mix of groups and splinter factions is Ahrar-ul-Hind that specializes in suicide attacks against government installations.


The Pakistani army has taken over from the police and arrested local Taliban leaders from Karachi to Peshawar.


The only bright spot in Pakistan is a renewed friendship and close working military relationship with the U.S. Much of the heavy equipment shipped out of Afghanistan for the U.S. via Pakistan is being turned over to the Pakistani army as military assistance.


About $7 billion worth of U.S. equipment will be moving through Pakistan in coming months on its way back to the U.S. Some of it will stay in Pakistan as U.S. military assistance. 


The determination of Pakistan’s military leaders to wipe out TTP has led to a reassessment in Washington about the need to close ranks with Pakistan’s military.


The U.S. is also moving heavy equipment from Afghanistan via Russia, traffic that was not interrupted by the crisis over Russia’s annexation of Crimea.


As U.S. influence declines, Moscow is scoring points in Afghanistan where the Soviet Union was defeated in 1989.


The supreme geopolitical irony would be yet another reversal of superpower roles in Afghanistan.


 The U.S. would lose Afghanistan and regain Pakistan. Some would argue that’s not much of a bargain.


In the global scheme of things — e.g., Syria’s civil war with its toll of 140,000 dead, or Crimea and Ukraine — none of this would matter much. 


But Pakistan is a nuclear power.

© 2014 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Read more: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2014/03/29/Pakistans-chameleon/1521396033560/print#ixzz2xQqnV1tt

 

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