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Posted by Dr. Salman in Foreign Policy, Geo-strategic Location & Importance on March 29th, 2017
May 2016
Issue Brief
The following issue brief has been prepared by the NUST Research Team in collaboration with Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly for limited circulation only
Courtesy to Pakistan Think Tank by NUST Research Team
The NUST Research Team (NRT) is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit think tank that works in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs with a vision to innovate future prospects for peace, security and security for Pakistan through intellectual discourse, and contribute to sustainable social, political and economic development.
Copy Rights © NUST Research Team (NRT) and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (FAC)
Conclusions or opinions expressed in the publications and programs are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to NRT.
Authors: NUST Research Team
Acknowledgments: Rushna Shahid, Hamzah Riffat, Ali Tahir
Introduction
Today the world may have come out of its bipolar neurotic race… but it is still composed of a multitude of contesting narratives. Even if limited to simply the state level actors, a mess of ideologies, nationalism, state philosophies and cognitive perceptions and understanding of the world create complex diplomatic narratives. In a world that is ‘widening deepening and speeding up global ‘inter-connectedness’ in all aspects of contemporary life, Diplomacy is no exception.
Pakistan is facing increasingly complex challenges of global influence, in terms of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ state tools of power projection. There are only nine states in the world today with nuclear weapons where Pakistan and India are deemed as two of the most critical and strategic members of the group. A 2014 book ‘Power Rules’ categorizes Pakistan as a Mid-Level State in a Global power pyramid. This is justified by our substantial military strength for self-defense, nuclear assets and strategic location for regional influence.iii India however, by virtue of its economic clout in addition to its strategic assets, holds a prominent position as one of the ‘8 Principals’.iv
USA
8 Principals: China, Japan, India, Russia, UK, France, Germany & Brazil
Oil Producing States: Saudi Arabia, Iran, smaller Gulf States, Venezuela, Nigeria
The Mid Level States localized potential as Regional Players: Pakistan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan Responsible – 50+ states Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, Botswana, Chile etc. Bottom Dwellers/Problem States- 75 states: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Uzbekistan etc.
Non-State Actors: NGOs, International Media, International businesses and TerroristsFigure 1Gelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print
Henry Kissinger’s famous words “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”v, has become the mantra of all diplomatic literature. Even though the channels of state influence have become increasingly complicated and non-traditional, this basic philosophy holds true still. In line with this Pakistan’s traditional India-centric garrison, state policies need to evolve rapidly with the fast-paced globalized diplomatic narratives. Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations have been steadily increasing over the past few years via multiple channels of state diplomatic as well as strategic economic and non-traditional interactions. It is imperative for us to not only understand this evolving trend but also to develop effective and creative long-term policies that can balance India’s steadily increasing regional influence on multiple fronts. This issue brief thus hopes to foray into the recent developments in Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations and their strategic security implications for Pakistan.
The Indo- US strategic partnership encompasses multiple dimensions, such as shared principles of democracy and ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Both countries agree that this stability shroud be is realized through investments in human capital and the joint military cooperation. The relationship has cemented itself in line with common foreign policy objectives, ranging from curbing terrorism in South Asia to establishing defense agreements with Israel. Furthermore, India’s robust relationships with the oil-rich Gulf States, which the United States views as a vital cog in maintaining stability in the Middle East Vis a Vis Israel, is another aspect of the partnership which is of strategic significance.
The partnership in contemporary times heavily relies upon around the corporate sectors influence in both economies, where free market capitalism allows the flow of investments and expertise to either state. Furthermore, India’s status as a nuclear weapons state when it conducted its tests in 1974 has ensured that it creates a credible deterrent to ward off threats to its territorial sovereignty particularly in the aftermath of the 1962 border conflict with China. China’s rise as a potent economic power and its influence being recognized by the close relationships it has with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and particularly, Pakistan; where the latter is a recognized nuclear weapons state and maintains a policy of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ to ward off conventional imbalances with Indian aggression, has meant that India’s relationship with the United States becomes particularly relevant. The United States policy which involves containment of China in sensitive regions such as the South China Sea and South East Asia has meant that both India and the United States converge over the objective of ensuring that China’s economic and military expansion is curbed. China as a factor in the strategic calculus of both India and the United States is extremely important if one has to analyze the strategic disposition of this relationship and partnership.
As of current, India is the world’s largest arms importer with a total cache of $100 million, out of which, $67 million is directed towards Pakistan (Haider, 2016). In the past, this spending has shown an increasing trend when Pakistan has responded to Indian conventional and hegemonic designs through TNWs or Tactical Nuclear Weapons as an option to deploy on the battlefield. The support from lobbies inside the United States which vouch for Pakistan’s containment also allows India to
assume a hardened stance against the country which is characterized by aggressive rhetoric and responding to acts of terrorism allegedly perpetuated through its own soil, with doctrines such as the Cold Start (which involves quick mobilization, punitive strikes on enemy territory and little room for the adversary to respond).
While the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) might signal an alarming trend that could potentially have an impact on the US- India military partnership where the latter wishes to have strategic stability in South Asia, the fact that constraints have been imposed by the US on Pakistan’s dual-use technologies and weapons systems, buttresses the point of the US tilt towards India. In contrast to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program which has been viewed with suspicion over aspects such as command and control and nuclear terrorism, the US-India nuclear deal in 2008 has allowed India to benefit from a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group which permits it to gain access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel. This deal has greatly weakened the Non-Proliferation order in South Asia, where undue favoritism towards India leaving Pakistan with little or no access towards such technologies and having to rely on other partners such as China for investment into the nuclear sector.
Currently, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States has witnessed another jolt in the form of limited convergence over stability in Afghanistan. The United States widely accuses Pakistan of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network and the schisms between both countries which emerged regarding the sale of F-16s underlines how the strategic partnership which already exists between India and the United States gains added relevance. This partnership is likely to cement itself even further, where a Post P5+1 Nuclear Iran allows India to encircle Pakistan by forging amiable ties with Iran, investing heavily in Afghanistan and forging strong ties with states in the Middle East. Though the Middle East has historically allied with Pakistan, but due to several issues such as Pakistan’s policy of neutrality regarding the Yemen crisis, relations have soured particularly with states such as the UAE. The United States pushing for India to capitalize on regional dynamics has meant that Pakistan would need to exercise strategic foresight and prudence to avoid being encircled by India. The strategic partnership will thus, gain more relevance with India’s economic expansion, the US reservations over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and dual-use technologies as well as pushing for more investment and stability in Afghanistan through India’s efforts at the expense of Pakistan which is viewed to have a dualistic policy over terrorism.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 2011, between India and Afghanistan, laid the foundations for a long-term commitment to security and development in Afghanistan. It outlines assistance in the field of infrastructural and institutional development, offers educational guidelines and technological aid to developing Afghan Capacity. More importantly, the agreement encourages investment in Afghan natural resources, provides duty-free access to Afghan exports into Indian markets and aims to strengthen an Afghan-led process of peace and reconciliation. Efforts at high level bilateral political partnerships have materialized in agreements, collaborations, and conferences such as the Heart of Asia peace process and ANAASTU. India advocates a “no exit” policy with regards to Afghanistan, which has been endorsed by Afghan leadership (Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016).
Bilateral trade between the two economies has grown steadily (by approximately 0.20% annually) for the past three years. Despite the lack of direct access, India is the second largest market for Afghan exports with total bilateral trade amounting to $684.47 million in the year 2014-15 (BS Web Team, 2016). Naturally, India sees economic interests in Afghanistan, but its objectives in the region also hold political motives. Threatened by armed struggle for freedom in Kashmir, India benefits by cutting terror roots, their ideology and any networks within Afghanistan, that could aggravate the Kashmiri armed struggle (Baloch & Niazi, 2008). The resurgence of legitimate Islamic independent movements challenges India’s social fabric by providing cannon fodder to oppressed minorities. Moreover, eradication of terrorism helps stabilize the region, promoting trade. India benefits from undermining cordial Pak-Afghan relations; geostrategically speaking, Pakistan would always serve as a more suitable ally and partner for trade and commerce, being closer to Afghanistan (Usman, 2008). Geo-economic motives, of capturing Central Asian energy markets fuel India’s long run pursuit of Afghanistan. India’s push to develop Chabahar port in Iran consolidates earlier fears of Pakistan’s encirclement by India. Its presence isolates Pakistan, both politically and economically and also circumvents it, robbing it off its geo-strategic advantage. Furthermore, it nullifies Pakistan ability to use Afghanistan as an asset of strategic depth (Riedel, 2011). Numerous Indian consulates near the Pak-Afghan border are a legitimate cause of concern for Pakistan for two primary reasons. Generally, consulates protect and promote, commercial and individual interests, and hence are opened in areas that are densely populated. However, the majority of
Indian consulates are found in population scarce areas (Cheema, 2013). Pakistan has thrown multiple state level accusations at the Indian establishment and specifically its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for aiding militancy, separatist movements and terrorism on Pakistani soil while using the consulates as ground zero for such operations (Zeb, 2006). Earlier Pakistan has provided intelligence that links Brahimdagh Bugti (son of the late Akbar Bugti) and the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) to Delhi and the former Karzai government (Walsh, 2010). Pakistan’s former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik suspected Brahimdagh Bugti to be responsible for recruiting militants in Afghanistan and went on to accused India and Afghanistan for supporting the insurgent Baloch National Army (BNA) and also charged Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for abduction of foreign nationals (Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, 2013). Recently the Kulbhushan Yadav episode has exposed RAW’s intelligence networks aimed towards destabilizing Pakistan and retrospectively speaking this warrants extreme caution on behalf of Pakistan upon any Indian presence near its borders (Ahmad, 2016).
India has pledged over $2 billion to Afghanistan up till now, as part of a reconstruction and development aid package (Fair, 2010). This is inclusive of institutional development, within which India has constructed a new parliament building for Afghanistan (Hindustan Times, 2015). Immensely closes ties with India were previously also enjoyed by the former Karzai government whose embrace of India was a source of great irritancy to Pakistan in light to the 2005 Indo – US civil nuclear deal (ISAF, 2012). Consequently, Pakistan perceived Indian assisted dam construction in the province of Kunar as a way to divert water resources away from Pakistan (Kiani, 2013). Pakistan’s insecurities over the matter have been a cause of concern to US and India, who point fingers at Pakistan of having ties to the Haqqani network, and allegedly accusing InterServices Intelligence Agency (ISI) for supporting the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul (CNN, 2008). The U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen has gone to refer to the Haqqani network as, “a veritable arm of the ISI” (Bumiller & Perlezsept, 2011).
From the above qualitative analysis, we conclude that Pak-Afghan relations are negatively correlated with Indo-Afghan relations. While all counties would ideally benefit from holistic, all-encompassing political and economic initiatives for growth, miss -trust and historical animosity has pivoted these regional powers against each other’s best interest (Mir, 2015).
Lessons for Pakistan
The negative correlation between the Indo-US strategic partnership and the Indo- Afghanistan partnership with the US-Pakistan and the Pakistan Afghanistan relationship, clearly suggests that Pakistan must capitalize on opportunities which are present in its region and globally through conducting an appraisal of regional dynamics and capitalizing on its relationship with states such as China which has heavily invested in the country and continues to contribute towards its arms buildup. Exercising prudence requires foresight, but to counter the growing India- US strategic partnership, Pakistani policy makers can undertake the following recommendations at the diplomatic level:
1. Capitalization of the strategic partnership with China: Although the indomitable relationship with China is characterized by a high level of mutual trust and convergence of strategic interests, it is imperative for Pakistan to consider the possibility of similar nuclear agreements in line with the Indo-US Nuclear deal, particularly with a state that has a rising global profile and has been benign as far as its investments to Pakistan is concerned. The strategic partnership between the US and India is defined by economic interests as well as a military cooperation and Pakistan should continue to ensure that its economic and military partnership with China acts as a balance to less concessions and avenues for cooperation with the United States. 2. Capitalizing on the limitations of US/ Indian strategic foresight: While the strategic partnership between the US and India has alarming implications for Pakistan’s security it is critical to understand that the US and India have often failed in resolving key disputes with states through erroneous policies which have encompassed military interventions and neglect. US policies in the Gulf region, particularly with regard to Iran have had an impact on Iran’s ability to assert itself as a dominant player in the Middle East. Yet at the same time, in line with the P5+1 Nuclear Deal, Pakistan can cement its relationship with the Islamic Republic by emphasizing on energy deals and projects which have previously been held hostage to sanctions and time lags. Similarly, states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal have grappled with Indian policies which include interference in sovereign affairs. Sri Lanka’s hostility towards India has historically stemmed from India’s peacekeeping force which exaggerated the ongoing civil war with the Lanka Tamil Tiger Eelam as compared to
Pakistan, where the efforts of the Pakistan Army in assisting the downfall of the insurgency has proven to be fruitful and has fostered goodwill amongst both countries. A multidimensional approach towards Pakistan’s foreign policy in its immediate neighborhood is required for the country’s rising regional profile. 3. Reassessment of Pakistan’s Afghan policy: The India- Afghanistan relationship has fostered on the grounds of joint collaborations between both governments over infrastructural development including education, health sectors and building of intellectual capital. Afghan/ Pakistan trust deficits emerge on the security fronts with allegations over cross border terrorism on either side jeopardizing the relationship. Yet a more innovative approach towards dealing with Afghanistan where competition with India centers on increased investments and energy generation could prove to be vital. CPEC’s opportunities allows Pakistan to address its domestic energy concerns and simultaneously vouch for similar investments in Afghanistan which could act as a counter to growing Indo- US strategic convergence over the subject of sustainable stability in Afghanistan. 4. Economic Profile as a diplomatic tool: In an age which is defined by increased regional connectivity and economic cooperation, it is important that Pakistan’s policy makers focus on generating higher productivity for its domestic markets while simultaneously allaying concerns of potential investors. A critical element of the Indo- US Strategic Partnership has been the rising Indian corporate sector which has allowed it to benefit from the 2008 Nuclear Deal despite the fact that it weakened the Non- Proliferation Order significantly and contributed towards instability in South Asia. While differences over the role of TNWs in the battlefield, nuclear terrorism and Pakistan’s policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence will continue to persist alongside accusations of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network; a rising economic profile while simultaneously addressing its domestic energy concerns will at least give Pakistan relatively more strength in its diplomatic negotiations particularly with global powers such as the United States which it has shared a fractious relationship with. 5. Encapsulating ‘Realpolitik’, as a feature of foreign policy: As a concept and as a theory which gains considerable traction in modern times, policy makers in Pakistan need to be made aware of what a dynamic approach is; of which ‘Real Politik’ or diplomacy based on circumstances of given circumstances and factors becomes important. So far the Indo-
Afghan and the Indo- US strategic partnership has been based upon Real Politik and for Pakistan to ensure that such partnerships can be countered, Real Politik as a concept needs to be understood, where relationships are less about ideology, religion and cultural beliefs, but more about political influence, economic clout and military supremacy.
References
Ahmad, N., 2016. Analysis: Kulbhushan Yadav’s RAW move. [Online] Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/1074812/analysis-kulbhushan-jadhavs-raw-move/
Baloch, Q. B. & Niazi, A. H. K., 2008. Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making, s.l.: s.n.
BS Web Team, 2016. 6 things to know about the India-Afghanistan relationship. [Online] Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/5-things-to-know-aboutthe-india-afghanistan-relationship-116010400230_1.html
Bumiller, E. & Perlezsept, J., 2011. Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy. [Online] Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-inattack-on-us-embassy.html?_r=0
Cheema, P. I., 2013. Afghanistan’s Crisis & Pakistan’s Security Dilemma. Asian Survey, 23(3).
CNN, 2008. Afghan official: Pakistan spies behind Kabul attack. [Online] Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/08/afghanistan.explosion/index.html?eref=rss_l atest
Fair, C. C., 2010. ndia in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, s.l.: s.n.
Haider, M., 2016. India’s growing military spending threatens Pakistan, says NSA Janjua. [Online] Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1250121
Hindustan Times, 2015. Modi inaugurates new Afghan Parliament built by India in Kabul. [Online] Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-toinaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
ISAF, 2012. State of the Taliban, s.l.: s.n.
Kiani, K., 2013. Pakistan, Afghanistan mull over power project on Kunar River. [Online] Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1038435
Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, (. A. O., 2013. [Interview] (12 Janruary 2013).
Ministry of External Affairs; Government of Inida, 2016. India – Afghanistan Relations. [Online] Available at: http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000
Mir, H., 2015. Indian’s Allegation & Pakistan. [Online] Available at: http://www.currentaffairspk.com/hamid-mir-urdu-column-about-indians-allegationpakistan/
Riedel, B., 2011. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad. s.l.:s.n.
Usman, T., 2008. Indian Factor in Pak-Afghan Relations. Research Journal of Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia).
Walsh, D., 2010. WikiLeaks cables reveal Afghan-Pakistani row over fugitive rebel. [Online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-afghan-pakistanifugitive
Zeb, R., 2006. Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4.
iGrassie, William. “Seeking Truth in a World of Competing Narratives.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-grassie/seeking-truth-in-a-world-_b_1452389.html>.
iiCampbell, Francis. “Has Globalization Changed the Nature of Diplomacy?” Proc. of Ethical Standards in Public Life, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge University, UK. N.p., 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/campbell-2015>.
iiiGelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print.
iv Ibid
v”“America Has No Permanent Friends or Enemies, Only Interests”.” Goodreads. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/633024-americaIndo-US and Indo-Afghan Relations
Security Implications for Pakistan
May 2016
Issue Brief
The following issue brief has been prepared by the NUST Research Team in collaboration with Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly for limited circulation only
The NUST Research Team (NRT) is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit think tank that works in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs with a vision to innovate future prospects for peace, security and security for Pakistan through intellectual discourse, and contribute to sustainable social, political and economic development.
Copy Rights © NUST Research Team (NRT) and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (FAC)
Conclusions or opinions expressed in the publications and programs are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the, fellows, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to NRT.
Authors: NUST Research Team
Acknowledgements: Rushna Shahid, Hamzah Riffat, Ali Tahir
Introduction
Today the world may have come out of its bipolar neurotic race… but it is still composed of a multitude of contesting narrativesi. Even if limited to simply the state level actors, a mess of ideologies, nationalism, state philosophies and cognitive perceptions and understanding of the world create complex diplomatic narratives. In a world that is ‘widening deepening and speeding up’ii global interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary life, Diplomacy is no exception.
Pakistan is facing increasingly complex challenges of global influence, in terms of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ state tools of power projection. There are only nine states in the world today with nuclear weapons where Pakistan and India are deemed as two of the most critical and strategic members of the group. A 2014 book ‘Power Rules’ categorizes Pakistan as a Mid-Level State in a Global power pyramid. This is justified by our substantial military strength for self-defense, nuclear assets and strategic location for regional influence.iii India however, by virtue of its economic clout in addition to its strategic assets, holds a prominent position as one of the ‘8 Principals’.iv
USA
8 Principals: China, Japan, India, Russia, UK, France, Germany & Brazil
Oil Producing States: Saudi Arabia, Iran, smaller Gulf States, Venezuela, Nigeria
Mid Level Stateslocalised potential as Regional Players: Pakistan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan Responsibles– 50+ states: Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, Botswana, Chile etc. Bottom Dwellers/Problem States- 75 states: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Uzbekistan etc.
Non State Actors: NGOs, International Media, International businesses and TerroristsFigure 1Gelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print
Henry Kissinger’s famous words “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”v, has become the mantra of all diplomatic literature. Even though the channels of state influence have become increasingly complicated and non-traditional, this basic philosophy holds true still. In line with this Pakistan’s traditional India centric garrison state policies need to evolve rapidly with the fast paced globalized diplomatic narratives. Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations have been steadily increasing over the past few years via multiple channels of state diplomatic as well as strategic economic and non-traditional interactions. It is imperative for us to not only understand this evolving trend but also to develop effective and creative long-term policies that can balance India’s steadily increasing regional influence on multiple fronts. This issue brief thus hopes to foray into the recent developments in Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations and their strategic security implications for Pakistan.
The Indo-US Strategic Partnership
The Indo- US strategic partnership encompasses multiple dimensions, such as shared principles of democracy and ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Both countries agree that this stability shroud be is realized through investments in human capital and the joint military cooperation. The relationship has cemented itself in line with common foreign policy objectives, ranging from curbing terrorism in South Asia to establishing defense agreements with Israel. Furthermore, India’s robust relationships with the oil rich Gulf States, which the United States views as a vital cog in maintaining stability in the Middle East Vis a Vis Israel, is another aspect of the partnership which is of strategic significance.
The partnership in contemporary times heavily relies around the corporate sectors influence in both economies, where free market capitalism allows the flow of investments and expertise to either state. Furthermore, India’s status as a nuclear weapons state when it conducted its tests in 1974 has ensured that it creates a credible deterrent to ward off threats to its territorial sovereignty particularly in the aftermath of the 1962 border conflict with China. China’s rise as a potent economic power and its influence being recognized by the close relationships it has with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and particularly, Pakistan; where the latter is a recognized nuclear weapons state and maintains a policy of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ to ward off conventional imbalances with Indian aggression, has meant that India’s relationship with the United States becomes particularly relevant. The United States policy which involves containment of China in sensitive regions such as the South China Sea and South East Asia has meant that both India and the United States converge over the objective of ensuring that China’s economic and military expansion is curbed. China as a factor in the strategic calculus of both India and the United States is extremely important if one has to analyze the strategic disposition of this relationship and partnership.
As of current, India is the world’s largest arms importer with a total cache of $100 million, out of which, $67 million is directed towards Pakistan (Haider, 2016). In the past this spending has shown an increasing trend when Pakistan has responded to Indian conventional and hegemonic designs through TNWs or Tactical Nuclear Weapons as an option to deploy on the battlefield. The support from lobbies inside the United States which vouch for Pakistan’s containment also allows India to
assume a hardened stance against the country which is characterized by aggressive rhetoric and responding to acts of terrorism allegedly perpetuated through its own soil, with doctrines such as the Cold Start (which involves quick mobilization, punitive strikes on enemy territory and little room for the adversary to respond).
While the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) might signal an alarming trend that could potentially have an impact on the US- India military partnership where the latter wishes to have strategic stability in South Asia, the fact that constraints have been imposed by the US on Pakistan’s dual use technologies and weapons systems, buttresses the point of the US tilt towards India. In contrast to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program which has been viewed with suspicion over aspects such as command and control and nuclear terrorism, the US-India nuclear deal in 2008 has allowed India to benefit from a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group which permits it to gain access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel. This deal has greatly weakened the Non Proliferation order in South Asia, where undue favoritism towards India leaving Pakistan with little or no access towards such technologies and having to rely on other partners such as China for investment into the nuclear sector.
Currently, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States has witnessed another jolt in the form of limited convergence over stability in Afghanistan. The United States widely accuses Pakistan of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network and the schisms between both countries which emerged regarding the sale of F-16s underlines how the strategic partnership which already exists between India and the United States gains added relevance. This partnership is likely to cement itself even further, where a Post P5+1 Nuclear Iran allows India to encircle Pakistan by forging amiable ties with Iran, investing heavily in Afghanistan and forging strong ties with states in the Middle East. Though Middle East has historically allied with Pakistan, but due to several issues such as Pakistan’s policy of neutrality regarding the Yemen crisis, relations have soured particularly with states such as the UAE. The United States pushing for India to capitalize on regional dynamics has meant that Pakistan would need to exercise strategic foresight and prudence to avoid being encircled by India. The strategic partnership will thus, gain more relevance with India’s economic expansion, the US reservations over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and dual use technologies as well as pushing for more investment and stability in Afghanistan through India’s efforts at the expense of Pakistan which is viewed to have a dualistic policy over terrorism.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 2011, between India and Afghanistan laid the foundations for a long-term commitment to security and development in Afghanistan. It outlines assistance in the field of infrastructural and institutional development, offers educational guidelines and technological aid to develop Afghan Capacity. More importantly the agreement encourages investment in Afghan natural resources, provides duty-free access to Afghan exports into Indian markets and aims to strengthen an Afghan led process of peace and reconciliation. Efforts at high level bilateral political partnerships have materialized in agreements, collaborations and conferences such as the Heart of Asia peace process and ANAASTU. India advocates a “no exit” policy with regards to Afghanistan, which has been endorsed by Afghan leadership (Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016).
Bilateral trade between the two economies has grown steadily (by approximately 0.20% annually) for the past three years. Despite the lack of direct access, India is the second largest market for Afghan exports with total bilateral trade amounting to $684.47 million in the year 2014-15 (BS Web Team, 2016). Naturally, India sees economic interests in Afghanistan, but its objectives in the region also hold political motives. Threatened by armed struggle for freedom in Kashmir, India benefits by cutting terror roots, their ideology and any networks within Afghanistan, that could aggravate the Kashmiri armed struggle (Baloch & Niazi, 2008). The resurgence of legitimate Islamic independent movements challenges India’s social fabric by providing cannon fodder to oppressed minorities. Moreover, the eradication of terrorism helps stabilize the region, promoting trade. India benefits from undermining cordial Pak-Afghan relations; geo strategically speaking, Pakistan would always serve as a more suitable ally and partner for trade and commerce, being closer to Afghanistan (Usman, 2008). Geo-economic motives, of capturing Central Asian energy markets fuel India’s long run pursuit of Afghanistan. India’s push to develop Chabahar port in Iran consolidates earlier fears of Pakistan’s encirclement by India. Its presence isolates Pakistan, both politically and economically and also circumvents it, robbing it off its geostrategic advantage. Furthermore, it nullifies Pakistan ability to use Afghanistan as an asset of strategic depth (Riedel, 2011). Numerous Indian consulates near the Pak-Afghan border are a legitimate cause of concern for Pakistan for two primary reasons. Generally, consulates protect and promote, commercial and individual interests, and hence are opened in areas that are densely populated. However, the majority of
Indian consulates are found in population scarce areas (Cheema, 2013). Pakistan has thrown multiple state level accusations at the Indian establishment and specifically, it’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for aiding militancy, separatist movements and terrorism on Pakistani soil while using the consulates as ground zero for such operations (Zeb, 2006). Earlier Pakistan has provided intelligence that links Brahimdagh Bugti (son of the late Akbar Bugti) and the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) to Delhi and the former Karzai government (Walsh, 2010). Pakistan’s former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik suspected Brahimdagh Bugti to be responsible for recruiting militants in Afghanistan and went on to accused India and Afghanistan for supporting the insurgent Baloch National Army (BNA) and also charged Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for the abduction of foreign nationals (Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, 2013). Recently the Kulbhushan Yadav episode has exposed RAW’s intelligence networks aimed towards destabilizing Pakistan and retrospectively speaking this warrants extreme caution on behalf of Pakistan upon any Indian presence near its borders (Ahmad, 2016).
India has pledged over $2 billion to Afghanistan up till now, as part of a reconstruction and development aid package (Fair, 2010). This is inclusive of institutional development, within which India has constructed a new parliament building for Afghanistan (Hindustan Times, 2015). Immensely closer ties with India were previously also enjoyed by the former Karzai government whose embrace of India was a source of great irritancy to Pakistan in light to the 2005 Indo – US civil nuclear deal (ISAF, 2012). Consequently, Pakistan perceived Indian assisted dam construction in the province of Kunar as a way to divert water resources away from Pakistan (Kiani, 2013). Pakistan’s insecurities over the matter have been a cause of concern to US and India, who point fingers at Pakistan of having ties to the Haqqani network, and allegedly accusing InterServices Intelligence Agency (ISI) of supporting the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul (CNN, 2008). The U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen has gone to refer to the Haqqani network as, “a veritable arm of the ISI” (Bumiller & Perlezsept, 2011).
From the above qualitative analysis, we conclude that Pak-Afghan relations are negatively correlated with Indo-Afghan relations. While all counties would ideally benefit from holistic, all-encompassing political and economic initiatives for growth, miss -trust and historical animosity has pivoted these regional powers against each other’s best interest (Mir, 2015).
The negative correlation between the Indo-US strategic partnership and the Indo- Afghanistan partnership with the US-Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, clearly suggests that Pakistan must capitalize on opportunities which are present in its region and globally through conducting an appraisal of regional dynamics and capitalizing on its relationship with states such as China which has heavily invested in the country and continues to contribute towards its arms buildup. Exercising prudence requires foresight, but to counter the growing India- US strategic partnership, Pakistani policymakers can undertake the following recommendations at the diplomatic level:
1. Capitalization of the strategic partnership with China:
Although the indomitable relationship with China is characterized by a high level of mutual trust and convergence of strategic interests, it is imperative for Pakistan to consider the possibility of similar nuclear agreements in line with the Indo-US Nuclear deal, particularly with a state that has a rising global profile and has been benign as far as its investments in Pakistan is concerned. The strategic partnership between the US and India is defined by economic interests as well as a military cooperation and Pakistan should continue to ensure that its economic and military partnership with China acts as a balance to fewer concessions and avenues for cooperation with the United States.
2. Capitalizing on the limitations of US/ Indian strategic foresight:
While the strategic partnership between the US and India has alarming implications for Pakistan’s security it is critical to understand that the US and India have often failed in resolving key disputes with states through erroneous policies which have encompassed military interventions and neglect. US policies in the Gulf region, particularly with regard to Iran have had an impact on Iran’s ability to assert itself as a dominant player in the Middle East. Yet at the same time, in line with the P5+1 Nuclear Deal, Pakistan can cement its relationship with the Islamic Republic by emphasizing on energy deals and projects which have previously been held hostage to sanctions and time lags. Similarly, states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal have grappled with Indian policies which include interference in sovereign affairs. Sri Lanka’s hostility towards India has historically stemmed from India’s peacekeeping force which exaggerated the ongoing civil war with the Lanka Tamil Tiger Eelam as compared to
Pakistan, where the efforts of the Pakistan Army in assisting the downfall of the insurgency has proven to be fruitful and has fostered goodwill amongst both countries. A multidimensional approach towards Pakistan’s foreign policy in its immediate neighborhood is required for the country’s rising regional profile.
3. Reassessment of Pakistan’s Afghan policy:
The India- Afghanistan relationship has fostered on the grounds of joint collaborations between both governments over infrastructural development including education, health sectors and building of intellectual capital. Afghan/ Pakistan trust deficits emerge on the security fronts with allegations over cross-border terrorism on either side jeopardizing the relationship. Yet a more innovative approach towards dealing with Afghanistan where competition with India centers on increased investments and energy generation could prove to be vital. CPEC’s opportunities allow Pakistan to address its domestic energy concerns and simultaneously vouch for similar investments in Afghanistan which could act as a counter to growing Indo- US strategic convergence over the subject of sustainable stability in Afghanistan.
4. Economic Profile as a diplomatic tool:
In an age which is defined by increased regional connectivity and economic cooperation, it is important that Pakistan’s policy makers focus on generating higher productivity for its domestic markets while simultaneously allaying concerns of potential investors. A critical element of the Indo- US Strategic Partnership has been the rising Indian corporate sector which has allowed it to benefit from the 2008 Nuclear Deal despite the fact that it weakened the Non- Proliferation Order significantly and contributed towards instability in South Asia. While differences over the role of TNWs in the battlefield, nuclear terrorism and Pakistan’s policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence will continue to persist alongside accusations of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network; a rising economic profile while simultaneously addressing it’s domestic energy concerns will at least give Pakistan relatively more strength in its diplomatic negotiations particularly with global powers such as the United States which it has shared a fractious relationship with.
5. Encapsulating ‘Realpolitik’, as a feature of foreign policy:
As a concept and as a theory which gains considerable traction in modern times, policy makers in Pakistan need to be made aware of what a dynamic approach is; of which ‘Real Politik’ or diplomacy based on circumstances of given circumstances and factors becomes important. So far the Indo- Afghan and the Indo- US strategic partnership has been based upon Real Politik and for Pakistan to ensure that such partnerships can be countered, Real Politik as a concept needs to be understood, where relationships are less about ideology, religion, and cultural beliefs, but more about political influence, economic clout, and military supremacy.
References
Ahmad, N., 2016. Analysis: Kulbhushan Yadav’s RAW move. [Online] Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1074812/analysis-kulbhushan-jadhavs-raw-move/
Baloch, Q. B. & Niazi, A. H. K., 2008. Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making, s.l.: s.n.
BS Web Team, 2016. 6 things to know about the India-Afghanistan relationship. [Online] Available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/5-things-to-know-aboutthe-india-afghanistan-relationship-116010400230_1.html
Bumiller, E. & Perlezsept, J., 2011. Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy. [Online] Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-inattack-on-us-embassy.html?_r=0
Cheema, P. I., 2013. Afghanistan’s Crisis & Pakistan’s Security Dilemma. Asian Survey, 23(3).
CNN, 2008. Afghan official: Pakistan spies behind Kabul attack. [Online] Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/08/afghanistan.explosion/index.html?eref=rss_l latest
Fair, C. C., 2010. India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, s.l.: s.n.
Haider, M., 2016. India’s growing military spending threatens Pakistan, says NSA Janjua. [Online] Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1250121
Hindustan Times, 2015. Modi inaugurates new Afghan Parliament built by India in Kabul. [Online] Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-toinaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
ISAF, 2012. State of the Taliban, s.l.: s.n.
Kiani, K., 2013. Pakistan, Afghanistan mull over power project on Kunar River. [Online] Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1038435
Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, (. A. O., 2013. [Interview] (12 January 2013).
Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016. India – Afghanistan Relations. [Online] Available at http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000
Mir, H., 2015. Indian’s Allegation & Pakistan. [Online] Available at http://www.currentaffairspk.com/hamid-mir-urdu-column-about-indians-allegationpakistan/
Riedel, B., 2011. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad. s.l.:s.n.
Usman, T., 2008. Indian Factor in Pak-Afghan Relations. Research Journal of Area Study Centre (Russia, China, and Central Asia).
Walsh, D., 2010. WikiLeaks cables reveal Afghan-Pakistani row over fugitive rebel. [Online] Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-afghan-pakistanifugitive
Zeb, R., 2006. Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4.
iGrassie, William. “Seeking Truth in a World of Competing Narratives.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-grassie/seeking-truth-in-a-world-_b_1452389.html>.
iiCampbell, Francis. “Has Globalization Changed the Nature of Diplomacy?” Proc. of Ethical Standards in Public Life, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge University, UK. N.p., 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/campbell-2015>.
iiiGelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print.
iv Ibid
v”“America Has No Permanent Friends or Enemies, Only Interests”.” Goodreads. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/633024-america
Posted by admin in Central Asian States (CIS), FOREIGN AFFAIRS on June 25th, 2016
CASA-1000 deal with Tajikistan disastrous for Pakistan’
Chinese offer is the best option for Pakistan.CASA-1000 deal will make $ in Billions for Corruption Laden Nawaz Sharif Family
Salem-News.com Foreign Affairs
Being a Central Asian country, Tajikistan feels the largest threat from the religious hardline groups.
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Map of Tajikistan courtesy: lonelyplanet.com
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(SALEM, Ore.) – Events in West Asia are developing fast, and the impact is affecting neighboring regions in Central Asia. Political observers and analysts remain confused.
The emergence of the ISIS terrorist group with a joint Western-Arabic design, as well as Turkey’s negative role in Syria and Iraq, has paved the way for the persistence and growth of the so called Islamic takfiri and ideological movement in the susceptible region.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is among the most vulnerable countries open to the ISIS rise and development.
ISIS members are largely comprised of mercenaries only aim to make more money. Other members fight for their ideology. Combined, the movement would be able to access Central Asia, Tajikistan in particular.
Some experts familiar with the region’s development predict that that after a decrease in ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq and after settling down the Yemeni crisis, penetration of the ISIS in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan would be the priority of the US and its allies.
Touching on fast developments in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, many circulating reports are speculating on the existence or absence of the ISIS group in these countries.
The objective and neutral reporters claim that the US and its allies will make efforts to contaminate the Central Asia region especially Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan with extremist groups in the name of Islam, using the terrorist groups like ISIS and Afghanistan’s susceptible geography.
The attempt intends to engage powers such as China, Russia, and Iran in dealing with security threats to pave the way for the West to easily proceed toward its objectives.
The fact is that the security and political arena in Central Asia, including Tajikistan, is facing new challenges and security crises, and the activities of the takfiri extremists in the country could be interpreted as a continuation of war in Afghanistan and even developments in West Asia.
Recent attacks were carried out by a group led by Abdulhalim Nazarzadeh, Tajikistan’s former deputy defense minister, on the country’s security and government’s centers, resulting in the deaths of dozens of government forces.
The attacks have provided Tajikistan’s president Emomali Rahmon with the pretext to counteract and even try to remove the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. The Tajik government argued that the recent terrorist attacks on the capital, Dushanbe, and Abdulhalim Nazarzadeh’s insurgent band, are both linked to the party.
There are two different viewpoints about the new developments in Central Asia.
The first viewpoint stresses that all regional development, including developments in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, stem from foreign interventions; insisting that the world’s domineering hegemonic powers utilize the regional governments’ weaknesses, ethnicism, poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment to spread chaos, and propagate Takfiri and extremist currents there.
The first view overcomes the second view which takes absence of a strong central government or inefficiency of the governments as well as internal differences and ignoring the political, religious and economic rights as the main factors helping create the grounds for the growing increase of extremism and insecurity.
Taking into account the issue of the Takfiri movement’s spill over into Tajikistan, some questions have been raised, such as: What is the aim of Takfiri groups in the present time? How susceptible is Tajikistan’s security and political circumstance to these groups? How the Tajikistan government, regional and international players would react to these groups?
Being a Central Asian country, Tajikistan feels the largest threat from the religious hardline groups. The feeling of threat is serious for several reasons.
First, Tajikistan has a religious and conventional community, and there had been a religious and belief vacuum during the Soviet Union period, that provide grounds for the activity of extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hizb ut-Tahrir and ISIS.
The second reason is that Tajikistan one the one hand shares borders with unstable Afghanistan, and on the other hand shares borders with other countries like Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan in Fergana Valley, where radical religious groups are active.
Moreover, since onset of the US-led campaign against terrorism, so many of the leaders of religious movements like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have established links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban, an issue which has added to Central Asian countries’ concerns.
A very crucial point to consider is the Tajikistan government’s concerns over the expanding wave of extremism and ISIS that urged it to imprison the members of extremist groups in the country. Meanwhile, in recent weeks, on the pretext of Abdulhalim Nazarzadeh’s terrorist actions, the government has mounted pressure on leaders of the moderate Islamist groups like Islamic Renaissance Party, they have also detained a religious leader and adopted anti-religious laws in the country.
These events come while the Islamic Renaissance Party has expressed its deep concerns over the security conditions and the recent conflicts in the country, asking its members and supporters to fully cooperate with the government to help ease the tense conditions in the country.
The leadership of the party, in a statement on September 11, has condemned any illegal, violent and anti-government action, expressing its condolences to the families of the victims of the 04 September attacks.
However, the Islamic Renaissance Party has blamed the 04 September attacks on government personnel. Tajik officials have detained dozens of people, charging them with having links to extremist and terrorist groups such as ISIS.
Meanwhile, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Justice issued a statement, accusing the country’s Islamic Renaissance Party of several cases of “systematic violations of the law”, and asked the leaders of the party to stop the party’s activities.
Omar Hussein, the deputy leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Tajikistan’s major opposition party and the only religious party in the country, was also detained by security forces. Intending to travel to Kazakhstan’s Almaty on September 16, Omar Hussein was detained while on board a plane at the Dushanbe airport.
Additionally, Muhammadali Hayet, another deputy leader in the party, had been arrested previously, and Rahmatullah Rajab and Vahed Khan Ghasedudinov, two activists in the party, were banned from traveling out of the country.
These arrests take place while the government is carrying out operations against Abdulhalim Nazarzadeh’s insurgent group. During a military operation in a mountainous area called Ramit Valley, government forces killed the insurgent leader Nazarzadeh and 11 of his accomplices.
Following the 2015 legislative elections, Muhidddin Kabiri, the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, left the country, and since then has been living abroad, leaving his deputy Omar Hussein, in charge of the party’s affairs in the country.
During this period, Tajik officials have launched an expansive campaign to ban this opposition party, though some human rights institutions, including Human Rights Watch, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and the Central Asian Institute for Human Rights, in a joint statement, have warned that the closure of the party violates the rights and the political and civil liberties of the citizens, as it could possibly break the peace and destabilize the country. Being the second most influential political party after Tajikistan’s ruling People’s Democratic Party led by President Emomali Rahmon, and having over 40,000 members, the Islamic Renaissance Party was a major side in the five-year civil war from 1992-1997 in the country, which ended after signing a peace and power-sharing deal between the government and the opposition forces.
Nevertheless, the Tajik government’s pressures on opposition forces, specifically the Islamic Renaissance Party, have kept mounting, as the government published books of Sayid Abdullah Nuri, the party’s founder, labeled as sources of extremism.
Tajikistan’s security authorities accused the party’s leadership of planning the attacks against the security committee, airport, TV station and some other strategic organizations.
The government also claimed that the party’s Chief Muhiddin Kabiri has advised his supporters to hesitate for some more days until the ground and situation is proper to join the president Rahman regime’s opposition forces.
The claims come as government authorities detained 13 top leaders of the Islamic party on September 17, accusing them of having links to the insurgent group of former army general Abdulhalim Nazarzadeh. Denying the accusations, Muhiddin Kabiri has described them as politicized and biased, adding that the government’s objective is banning the Islamic Renaissance Party’s activities in the country.
The fact is that since the country’s independence, the Tajik government has opposed the Islamic movements, specifically the Islamic Renaissance Party, and recent attacks against government forces that resulted in dozens being killed, provided the government with the much-needed excuse to repress and remove the Islamic party, and at the same time adopt an iron fist and violent policy in dealing with the Islamists who possibly have links to the Islamic Renaissance Party.
The Tajikistan’s government launching a widespread propagandistic campaign against the insurgents, and relating them to the country’s Islamic party, and then arresting the party’s some top leaders as well as imposing travel bans on some others will only complicate and deteriorate the country’s political and security circumstance because the charges that the Islamic party had a hand in attacks against the security forces are not only unproven but also such measures, having in mind the West and US propaganda on the rise of ISIS in Central Asia, could trigger the extremism wave.
This, while the Islamic Renaissance Party has been involved in enlightening activities, and always resisted different plots arranged against it by the extremist takfiris in the country.
Being close to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the party has been a target of the government-backed Wahhabi and takfiri groups on the one hand, and on the other hand it has been exposed to the security authorities’ suspicions and repressions.
Participation of the party’s officials in religious and political conferences in Iran has led to an increase in the attacks on the party by the Tajik government and radical groups, causing remarkable problems for it.
Actually, the wave of arrests of the Islamic Renaissance Party members has began two years ago, when representatives of the party were detained in the early 2014 in Badakhshan, capital of Kharogh province, and Khujand, capital of Saghand province, and all of the businesses owned by the party were confiscated.
While Tajik Governments are detaining Islamic Renaissance Party’s leaders, the extremist groups linked to the terrorist group ISIS and Wahhabism or other fundamentalist movements, seduce the Tajik youths to join to Takfiri groups and be deployed to fight in Syria and perform the so-called jihad duty.
By
It is noteworthy that during his visit to Balochistan, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif on April 15, this year warned foreign forces and spy agencies against destabilizing Pakistan by supporting insurgents in Balochistan. Gen. Raheel elaborated, “Army will continue supporting the Balochistan government till terrorism is wiped out…those found involved in funding and facilitating terrorists will be dealt with iron hands.”
During the historical visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan, on April 20, this year, he and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed 51 agreements for cooperation in various fields, related to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), energy, infrastructure, agriculture, research, technology, education etc.
The establishment of CPEC between deep Gwadar seaport of Balochistan and the historic Silk Road city in western regions-Xinjiang of China will connect Gilgit-Baltistan through Khunjerab Pass. Beijing would also build an international airport at Gwadar, while the roads infrastructure in Gwadar would link the communication network of rest of the country to facilitate transportation of goods.
When Gwadar seaport becomes fully operational, it would connect the landlocked Central Asian states with rest of the world. Being the commercial hub, the port is likely to increase volume of trade, bringing multiple economic and financial benefits to Pakistan like the Suez Canal which changed the destiny of Egypt when Israel returned it to the former. It will enable high-volume cargo vessels to move in the major oceans. Gwadar project will not only uplift the impoverished people of Balochistan by providing thousands of employment opportunities and is likely to develop whole the province by redressing their grievances. The resulting prosperity in the province would trickle down to the Baloch people and damp the separatist sentiments, which the hostile elements, supported by anti-Pakistan powers do not want.
Recall, when during the Musharraf regime, Islamabad initiated the construction of Gwadar deep-seaport in Balochistan in March 2002 with Chinese assistance, sirens went off in the capitals of foreign countries, especially the US, India and Israel which took it as a threat to their global and regional plans.
Located on the southwestern coast of Pakistan, Balochistan’s Gwadar seaport is close to the Strait of Hormuz from where more than 17 million barrels of oil passes every day. Its ideal location among three key regions, South Asia, the oil-rich Middle East, and oil and gas-resourced Central Asia has further increased its strategic significance. Its development has shifted the Great Game of Central Asia to Pakistan. Hence, sirens still continue alarming in the foreign countries.
Besides, Balochistan’s abundant mineral resources like gas, coal and gold, entailing Pakistan’s close ties with China also pinches the eyes of the US, India, Israel and some western countries which intend to destabilize Pakistan for their collective aims.
Therefore, major challenge to Pak-China strategic alliance is that with the tactical support of American CIA and Israeli Mossad, Indian RAW has continuously been assisting the Baloch separatist groups and Baloch Sub Nationalists to conduct subversive acts—and using terrorist elements in Balochistan to threat Pak-Chinese interest in the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. And, Afghanistan has become a hub from where external secret agencies have been funding and arranging subversive activities in other parts of Pakistan—especially in Balochistan through their affiliated militant groups at the cost of Pakistan, China and Iran. In the past few years, they abducted and killed many Chinese and Iranian nationals in Pakistan.
It is of particular attention, that Indian former Army Chief Gen. VK Singh openly admitted that during his tenure, he supervised special army unit, Tactical Support Division (TSD) on the instructions of the then defence minister to sponsor acts of sabotage in Pakistan, particularly Balochistan.
As regards the deteriorating situation of Balochistan, everyone knows that Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and their affiliated outfits including another group, Jundollah (God’s soldiers) which have been fighting for secession of the province gets logistic support from RAW and other anti-Pakistan spy agencies—these militants kidnapped and killed many innocent people and the security personnel in the province. They also massacred many persons through suicide attacks, bomb blasts, targeted killings and sectarian violence. Therefore, they are responsible for dumped bodies and extrajudicial killings in the province. On a number of occasions, these insurgent groups claimed responsibility for their subversive acts. The main aim behind is to create unrest in Balochistan and to discourage Beijing for the development of Gwadar port.
While, in May, 2013, a day before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang arrived in Islamabad; Chinese engineers being driven through Clifton Block-1 in Karachi escaped a major bomb attack. Taking note of the foreign powers’ anti-Pakistan designs, during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Islamabad made extraordinary security arrangements.
It is notable that a Gallup survey of the UK official body, DFID, conducted on July 20, 212, had disclosed that the vast majority of the Baloch people oppose the idea of an independent Balochistan.
As a result of the general elections 2013, the government led by the nationalist leader Chief Minister Balochistan Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch was established in Balochistan, while on December 7, 2013; local bodies elections were largely held in a peaceful manner in the province. These elections proved that majority of the Baloch are loyal to the federation, and have rejected the case of separatists, being projected by external forces which are weakening Pakistan by supporting the anti-state elements in Balochistan.
It is noteworthy that during his visit to Balochistan, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif on April 15, this year warned foreign forces and spy agencies against destabilizing Pakistan by supporting insurgents in Balochistan. Gen. Raheel elaborated, “Army will continue supporting the Balochistan government till terrorism is wiped out…those found involved in funding and facilitating terrorists will be dealt with iron hands.”
In fact, Gen. Raheel Sharif was compelled to expose conspiracy against Pakistan after the gunmen killed 20 laborers in Turbat district of Baluchistan in the deadliest attack on April 11, who were working at a dam construction site.
It is worth-mentioning that during China’s visit, Gen. Raheel Sharif, on January 25, 2015, China’s Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission Gen. Fan has assured that China will assist Pakistan in every challenge.
Nevertheless, foreign entities shall pose a major challenge to Pak-China strategic alliance through terror-acts. Hence, the intelligence agencies and security forces of both the countries must be well-prepared to cope with these elements.
It is noteworthy that during his visit to Balochistan, Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif on April 15, this year warned foreign forces and spy agencies against destabilizing Pakistan by supporting insurgents in Balochistan. Gen. Raheel elaborated, “Army will continue supporting the Balochistan government till terrorism is wiped out…those found involved in funding and facilitating terrorists will be dealt with iron hands.”
Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations
Email: [email protected]
Posted by admin in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Foreign Policy on November 3rd, 2014
Posted by admin in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDIA SPONSORED TERRORISM IN KARACHI, INDIA STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN, INDIA TRAINED SUICIDE BOMBERS FROM AFGHANISTAN on December 5th, 2013
Indian Scheme of ‘Great Wall’ along LoC in Kashmir
By Sajjad Shaukat
With the technological advancement, new era of economic development has changed the world in a global village. Long-awaited agreement which was concluded between Iran and six world powers on November 24, this year has endorsed this fact that Tehran is more interested in the welfare of its people than to continue war of nerves with the US-led European countries on the issue of its nuclear programme.
Taking cognizance of the modern world trends, Pakistan signed a number of trade agreements with India, which allowed India exports of multiple items across the Wagah border. During the visit of India’s External Affairs Minister S M Krishna to Pakistan on September 9, 2012, both the countries also signed a memorandum of understanding on cultural exchanges in addition to agreeing on new cross-Line of Control (LoC) Confidence Building Measures related to trade and travel. It was due to Islamabad’s positive efforts through Aman-Ki-Asha and back door diplomacy that it is sincere in building bridges of peace with New Delhi. In this regard, while addressing the recent International Literary Cultural Conference at Lahore, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pledged to resolve all outstanding issues with India besides lifting the visa restrictions. In the recent past, Pakistani prime minister’s foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz who visited New Delhi held a meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to defuse tension at the Line of LoC and to restore the peace process. While keeping pressure on Pakistan, Khurshid said that “the conditions of the dialogue cannot be met till there is peace and tranquility on the LoC.”
Unfortunately, India has failed to reciprocate with the same spirit to improve relations with Pakistan. Instead, it has always acted upon duplicity by raising false allegations against Pakistan, its army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for sponsoring terrorism inside India and especially in the Indian occupied Kashmir. In this respect, recently, tension arose between both the countries when Indian military conducted a series of unprovoked firings across the LoC, and international border killing a number of soldiers of Pak Army and innocent civilians in wake of war-like strategy which still continues. On January 6, 2013, Indian soldiers crossed over the LoC in Kashmir and attacked a Pakistani check post, killing one Pakistani soldier and injuring many troops. Similarly, Indian troops also shot dead two Pakistani soldiers on January 10 and 15.
In order to justify its open aggression, India concocted a fabricated story of accusing Pakistan Army of killing its five soldiers on August 6, 2013. In this context, Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, Defence Minister AK Antony and the opposition fundamentalist party BJP including Indian media blamed Pakistan Army for killing its five soldiers.
It is mentionable that on September 29, 2013, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held a meeting in the sidelines of the annual UN summit. Afterwards, Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon told reporters, “Both agreed that the precondition for forward movement in the relationship, which they both desire, is really an improvement of the situation on the Line of Control.” However, their dialogue ended with optimistic note, but in his speech in the General Assembly on September 28, Prime Minister Singh had allegedly said, “It is equally important that the terrorist machinery that draws its sustenance from Pakistan be shut down.” Showing New Delhi’s contradictory approach, he also said that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India, and in this context there could never be a compromise.
Nevertheless, talking about the twin terrorist attacks in the Indian occupied Kashmir, which targeted a police station and a military camp, killing 14 personnel of army and police, Salman Khurshid wrecked the Nawaz-Manmohan talks when he blamed Pakistan’s ISI and the army in this context.
While, Indian military high command failed in producing dead bodies of alleged terrorists who had crossed the LoC from Pakistan to Indian-held Kashmir. The ground realities proved that it was just propaganda against ISI, and Pak Army, as indicated by the Indian media, Congress Vice-president Rahul Gandhi and leaders of the Hindu fundamentalist party, BJP.
On the one hand, Indian top officials have been accusing Pak Army and ISI of sponsoring terrorism in India and the Indian-held Kashmir, on the other, India’s media revealed in September, this year that on a defence ministry directive, asking for the creation of covert capability—the military intelligence unit, Technical Services Division (TSD) was set up by the Indian Army Chief Gen. VK Singh (R), which conducted covert operations in Pakistan. Besides, in an Indian TV Channel, Gen. VK Singh openly confessed that TSD was raised by India to operate inside Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan and Azad Kashmir to conduct terrorism and to bribe the politicians in the Indian-held Kashmir to crush the militancy (Kashmiri freedom fighters).
In fact, under the pretext of cross-border terrorism, New Delhi not only suspended the peace process of dialogue with Pakistan, but also decided to implement its scheme of erecting a Great Wall along the LoC in Kashmir. A recent report published in the Economic Times disclosed that Indian authorities are planning to construct a 10-meter high embankment along 198-km stretch of international border which separates Indian held Kashmir from Pakistan. The security wall will be higher and wider than both the Berlin Wall and serpentine barrier being created by Israel. It will be 135-feet wide and will pass through 118 villages of Districts Jammu, Kathua and Samba.
Reportedly, initial work on the wall has begun and revenue papers for designated land in 86 villages have been processed to get NOC from the state government. A joint land demarcation in 44 villages is likely to start soon. Although the total cost estimation has not been made public, yet it has been decided that Indian Home Ministry will fund the project, while it will be handled by Border Security Force (BSF).
Nonetheless, besides new pretension of the LoC violations, in the past too, New Delhi availed various crises to suspend the process of Pak-India talks. For example, in 2002, under the pretension of terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, India postponed the dialogue process. Again, in 2008, India suspended the ‘composite dialogue’ under the pretext of Mumbai terror attacks which were in fact, arranged by its secret agency RAW.
In the recent past, the Indian former officer of home ministry and ex-investigating officer Satish Verma disclosed that terror-attacks in Mumbai and assault on the Indian Parliament were carried out by the Indian government to strengthen anti-terrorism legislation, particularly in the Indian occupied Kashmir.
While, Indian top officials have always accused Pakistan of various subversive acts of terrorists, but it is quite silent over Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) terror which has obtained a new face, as Indian RAW, country’s high officials and fundamentalist parties have co-relationship.
Particularly, in January 2013, Indian Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde revealed that organized training camps run by the fundamentalist parties, RSS and BJP were promoting Hindu Terrorism, and were behind the Samjhauta Express, Meccca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif and Malegaon blasts. He also disclosed that these parties were involved many times in Hindu Muslim violence in India, especially Gujarat and Babri Masjid incident.
It is noteworthy that Indian Hindus are followers of Chanakya (Say some thing else and do some thing else). This fact has been verified by the misdeeds of Hindu fundamentalist parties like BJP, RSS, VHP, Shiv Sina and Bajrang Dal which have missed no opportunity to communalize national politics of India even under the Congress rule. With the support of Indian officials and RAW agents, these parties have been launching anti-Christian and anti-Muslim bloodshed coupled with the dissemination of Hindutva.
Notably, although the purpose of the Great Wall is to deter cross-border intrusions into the Indian controlled Kashmir by Pakistan, yet New Delhi intends to conceal its own state terrorism in Kashmir, and seems determined to keep its illegitimate control on that region. While, with the help of Israel, India has already built 12-feet high twin fences along the LoC, running parallel to each other with an eight-foot gap in the middle-filled with coils of razor-sharp concertina wire. India has also installed special instruments like thermal imagers and sensors to make the fence impregnable. In this context, the construction of the Great Wall will symbolize the by-gone days of the Cold War. Such a decision not only runs against the demands of time, but also uncovers real face of New Delhi-indicating Indian deep seated animosity and hatred against Pakistan.
India must know that Kashmir is a disputed territory and it would be illegitimate to erect such a Great Wall which would also further stretch distance between the people of Kashmir, living both sides of the LoC which divides Azad Kashmir and Indian occupied Kashmir. This scheme will also be rejected by the Kashmiri people, as they desperately desire to have closer contacts with their Kashmiri brethren across the LoC.
Regrettably, Indian war-like diplomacy, followed by another move like the scheme of Great Wall will further escalate tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. It is likely to take them away from the peace process by creating obstacles in the practical solution to their bilateral issues, particularly of Kashmir. This plan could further intensify arms race between both the neighboring nuclear countries, ultimately resulting into regional instability, turning hope for peace and prosperity into state of distress.
Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations
Email: [email protected]
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