ISLAMABAD – Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on Thursday decided to deploy SSG commandos for the protection of its air bases and other installations across Pakistan following a fresh attack on one of its key operational bases.

The decision was made at an emergency meeting here at the Air Headquarters chaired by the Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt hours after terrorists stormed into PAF Minhas Base Kamra. During Thursday’s meeting, reportedly attended by the PAF Director General Air Intelligence Air Vice Marshal Hafeezullah, DG Air Strategic Forces Command AVM Ashfaq Arain, Air Officer Commanding Air Defence AVM Faheem Arshad Lodhi and other senior officers,the air command is said to have decided to deploy PAF’s Special Services Group (SSG) commandos in addition to the personnel of Air Defence Branch for the protection of 17 PAF bases and 18 other installations marked as highly sensitive.

Security officials said, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had thrice informed the PAF Air Intelligence of security threat concerning the Minhas Base and PAF’s non-flying Kalabagh Base in Galiyat, located in Abbottabad district, but these security alerts were ignored. “The Kalabagh Base, after Abbottabad Operation, is under constant security threat while Minhas Air base was an easy target for terrorist activity because operational preparedness to counter any untoward incident was not up to the mark there,” officials said.

Reportedly, the PAF had enhanced security at its bases in Risalpur, Kohat, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta and Rawalpindi but ignored high security alerts on Minhas and Kalabagh bases.

In January this year, the DG Air Intelligence AVM Hafeezullah had reportedly informed the PAF command of intelligence reports regarding high security threats to the said couple of bases but the PAF command was of the view that sufficient preventive arrangements had already been taken at Minhas base after 2009 attack at the PAC Kamra and additional security measures were not required.

The ISI had shared latest security threat with Air Intelligence last Friday, officials said. “Our job was to pass on sensitive security information to Air Intelligence. The execution rested with the PAF authorities,” the security officials stated.

The Father of the Nation rightly remarked on 13 April 1948, while addressing a small band of enthusiastic airmen at the fledging nation’s Air Force Flying School:

A country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor; Pakistan must build up her airforce as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient air force, second to none.

The table below gives an idea of the number of aircraft allotted to Pakistan and the number initially given.:

The Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was very well aware of the great importance of the Air Force for the defence of the country. He, therefore, wanted  a strong Air Force to be built up, which was to be second to none. This was done against great odds at the time of partition of the sub-continent, when the Pakistan Air Force came into being on 14 August 1947 along with the Army and the Navy. The PAF after undergoing immense struggle and sacrifice  with a small number of personnel, possessing  an insufficient equipment  emerged into a powerful component of the country’s defence  into a brief period of 10 years. At the time of partition, India  deprived Pakistan of her due share of aircraft and equipment.

Limited War of 1947.  These aircraft were quickly organized into two squadrons (No.5 and No.9). While the Air Force was being organized, the armed struggle in Kashmir started  in December 1947. In 1947 and 1948 the IAF provided direct support to the Indian Army, bombed Murree, attacked the Kohala Bridge several times and an unarmed PAF  transport. The PAF role in Kashmir was transport support there was an urgent need  to drop air supplies for the civilian population of Gilgit and other areas of Gilgit. This was  arranged on a priority basis by the two Dakota aircraft, later another two were added. In 1948, two four engine Halifax bombers were also acquired for airdrops. During 12 months of emergency airdrop operations the PAF did not lose a single aircraft. 437 sorties had been flown and over a million lbs of supplies dropped at Bunji, Sikardu, Gilgit and Chilas. Despite the IAF fighter activity, the PAF  continued air transport operations but limited them to moonlit nights. Our fighters remained employed on “watch  and ward” in the NWFP. An unarmed Fury while engaged in leaflet dropping over a hostile area, was fired upon with a light machine gun. The aircraft sustained some damage but the pilot landed safely at Miranshah, where he quickly took another Fury, this one bristling with weapons and went back to even the score in another sequence — Exemplary action — the RPAF — flew 139 sorties in which 72 bombs, 108 rockets and 4,600 rounds of 20mm ammunition were expanded. The 500-lb high explosive bombs proved useful against mountain hideouts and mudhouses. This employment was termed as heaven on earth. The PAF was  a circus outfit and it performed many air displays, always very good ones. During the 1948 Kashmir war, the strength of Pakistan Air Force as compared to the Indian Air Force was as under:

The Air Force role was defined rightly by the Air Vice-Marshal R.L.R Atcherley when he took over the command of the PAF. He said: The sole preoccupation of every individual in this Air Force, no matter in what sphere of activity he finds himself, is to keep our aircraft flying, ready to fight, equipped and trained for war, down to the last detail.

The Air Force was already going along a well-conceived plan. The target given for March 31, 1948 was for two fighter bomber squadrons of 16 aircraft, one transport squadron of five aircraft and one air observation post (AOP) flight of four aircraft. Gradually the Air Force expanded in the air and also made a progress in the ground facilities. In August 1951, three jet fighter aircraft were assimilated into No. 11 Squadron. With their induction, the young PAF entered into the jet age

Air Vice Marshal Atcherley was of the firm opinion  that the Pakistan Air Force should first take on the enemy Air Force, and then try to isolate the battlefield and after that give direct support to the ground  forces. By 1959/60 the PAF was fully trained and competent in the use of its aircraft. The first conflict between the IAF and the PAF took place on Eid day April 10, 1959, when an Indian Air Force Canberra (R.P) entered Pakistan’s airspace  flying at over 50,000 ft, well above our newly acquired  F-86 Sabre aircraft’s capability. But the Indian Canberra was shot down by the sustained effort of the enthusiastic Pakistan Air Force. In 1959, the last, all PAF exercise “JANUS” was held. Little or no training was conducted with the Army and Navy. The PAF did train with the USAF, RAF, Turkish and Iranian Air Forces who visited Pakistan regularly. Watch and ward  continued in Dir, Bajaur, Kalat and the downing of the IAF Photo Recce (PR) Canberra were added to the PAF’s battle honours.

A strong Air Force that was built up with the hard work and dedication of its officers and airmen helped to defend the country in the two major wars with India. Pakistan had a  much smaller Air Force, yet it was able to dominate the much larger Air Force of our adversary.

The 1965 War. When war broke up in 1965, the Pakistan Army was deployed against the Indians in the Rann of Kutch. To make matters worse, the Pakistani C-in-C was in Bangkok attending a SEATO meeting. In addition, we had three war plans, war against India, war against Afghanistan and the third war against both India and  Afghanistan. The alert phase was also — ’total’, either you were on peace or on full alert. The war plans had no provision for limited action. There was a great demand for security, since the previous Director Plans had been court-martialled, and some of the officers were summarily retired. At this crucial time,   the PAF was able to put  down the much larger Indian Air Force  on the defensive and gained air superiority in four days. It inflicted heavy unacceptable casuallities on the Indian tanks, vehicles and troops. A newspaper wrote:

The performance of the PAF was excellent  as they gained complete victory in the air. The IAF was defeated in all spheres — man to man, machine to machine, mission to mission and sector to sector.

Towards the middle of August 1965, the Army sent an SOS that the Gibralter Force was in trouble and required immediate air drops of food and ammunition. It was decided that  a C130 carry out a night drop. The weather was terrible, rain, low clouds yet the mission flew and satisfactory results were achieved. Air Force Forward Headquarters were activated on 30th August. According to Asghar Khan: “It is true that the PAF’s primary role, in essence, is to assist the Army in every possible way to achieve its objectives. But in order to be able to do this the PAF must achieve a high degree of air superiority over the land battle areas, and it must be equipped to do this effectively. The Army seldom understood or recognized this precondition.”

The Air Force according to the war plan attacked the IAF forward bases on the opening day of the war in West Pakistan. Air action in East Pakistan was delayed to the second  day since  a dusk strike was anticipated. The plan included a single F104 conducting  a “recce” over Halwara, followed by F86s, attacking “guns only” Halwara, Adampur, Pathankot and the various forward radars in the north, with T33s in the South, followed by all available B57’s after sunset.

After attacking the Indians on the 6th, the Air Force expected retaliation by the IAF on the 7th. No effort was made to launch dawn strikes, instead the PAF requested  the Army to launch paratroopers against the IAF forward bases on the night 6/ 7th. Three companies of SSG were launched.

The decision to launch SSG Special Service Group was taken late on the 6th; they left without maps, proper briefing and worst of all with no planning or preparation! The results were disastrous, only a handful returned, most of them were captured or killed. Every PAF base in Pakistan experienced  Indian commando attacks and in their defence thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition was expended at imaginary commandos and the SSG were summoned to save Sargodha.

The operational statistics for 1965 are as under:

To attack the close concentration  of enemy airfields in the north, and to remain out of reach of the Indian  fighter bombers; the bomber wing remained on the hop throughout the war. The pattern often repeated  was to set off from home base, strike inside Indian territory, recover  to another base  to rearm and refuel, and then to strike again before returning to base or to another safe airfield. This enabled them to  be prepared to attack  their targets night after night. By arriving over their targets  in a stream at intervals of about fifteen minutes, the B-57 certainly succeeded, disregarding even the actual damage they inflicted, in achieving  a major disruption of the overall IAF  effort, disabling their optimum attack capability the next morning. The effect on morale of the IAF  personnel was devastating. The effect of fatigue caused to them was most pronounced  on their air and ground crew while they were forced to keep shuttling in  and out of air raid shelters and trenches. This made the task of PAF fighter pilots that much easier to fight them in air the next morning.

Of its 22 B57s, which fought the war PAF lost three, only one due to enemy action. After the first strike on Jamnagar at 6pm, the bombing shuttle was maintained all night by single sorties. One such lone bomber flown by squadron leaders Shabbir Alam Siddiqui and Alam Qureshi, the navigator was doing its third mission  in less than 9 hours. As an overfatigued crew descended lower on the pinpoint its target, the bomber hit the ground and exploded. The second bomber was lost as a result  of enemy anti-aircraft fire on 14th September. The third B57, piloted by Flight Lieutenants MA Butt  and ASZ Khalid was lost in the early hours  of 17th September. While making an approach to land at Risalpur, the B57 encountered adverse weather in the shape of strong wind sheer coupled  with reduced flight visibility. Unable to maintain height, the aircraft crashed south of the runway, instantly killing  both pilot and navigator.

The PAF’s B57 campaign came to an end with a close support mission during the night of 22nd September by four B57s which dropped 28,000 lbs of bombs on enemy artillery and tank concentrations at Atari. Large enemy reinforcements had been seen that day moving towards Atari for a possible assault on the salient eastern bank of  the BRB canal. It was the task of the PAF to prevent these reinforcements from reaching their destination. The bombs from the B57s dropped in train  engulfed the enemy armour and other vehicles concealed under the trees and in the bushes. Very few survived to reach Atari. 

After the 1965 war, the B57 Squadrons trained hard to achieve even higher standards in the light of lessons learned in the war.

After the end of the 1965 war, the United States placed an embargo on our purchase of new equipment. New aircraft of Chinese (MIG-19) and French (Mirage) origin were inducted into the Air Force and quickly integrated.

The 1971 War. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the Pakistan Air Force put up a gallant flight destroying and damaging over 150 Indian aircraft. The Indian Air Force which was at that time expanded to become the fifth largest Air Force in the world was prevented from gaining any form of superiority over Pakistan’s airspace, even after shifting the air element operating against East Pakistan to support operations against West Pakistan, when the Dhaka airstrip had been permanently put down of action. Perhaps this was the main reason why India did not pursue her land operations against West Pakistan after the fall of Dhaka, although the Indian desire was to finish both wings of Pakistan.

The B57 force of PAF gave its very best in 1971 war. Of the available strength of 16 B57s  at the outset of the war, 15 were launched the very first night as a follow up to the pre-emptive strike on the 3rd December. 12 IAF runways were targeted the first night and a total of 183 bombs were dropped. Although no immediate assessment of the damage was available, yet confirmation came much after the war  from a very unlikely source. Air Chief Marshall PC Lal, the Chief of IAF during the 1971 war, in his memoirs titled My Days with the IAF  provides full detail of the destruction caused by PAF, naming every IAF  airfield attacked.

The PAF’s night bombing campaign was continued with good effect throughout the war  and reflected great credit upon the courage and perseverance of the B57 crew, six of whom embraced Shahadat over enemy airfields.

A serious situation developed in the South when Indian ground forces penetrated along the Khokhrapar-Chor railway line upto Umerkot and Chachro and to Nagar Parkar itself. PAF was called upon to blunt its attack and prevent the enemy further advance in land. B57 from No 7 Squadron were also pressed into daring daylight raids to save Hyderabad from falling into enemy hands. F86s  and F104s provided top cover. The armed reconnaissance and interdiction mission achieved the destruction of enemy trains and this virtually choked the flow of supplies vital to the enemy advance. Emboldened by their success, the B57 crew followed their bombing attacks by several strafing runs on the freight wagons and stopped the enemy dead in his tracks forcing him to abandon his planned offensive.

The PAF provided air support to the Navy at Karachi, on a report from a PIA aircraft flying reconnaissance for the Navy, the morning CAP (combat air patrol) at Masroor was asked to investigate, the result was that the PNS Zulfiqar took 900 hits of point 5 inch ammo killing several officers and men, with many more injured.

The operating statistics of 1971 war  are as under:

PAF, however, did recognize the services of its bomber crew in both the wars. As a tribute to PAF’s B57 crew who valiantly faced the highest loss rate of the war and persisted doggedly each night, and its navigators who, despite their rudimentary bomb  aiming devices and  the difficulty of map reading at low level on pitch dark nights, carried the war deep into the enemy’s heartland. The Government of Pakistan awarded 15 Sitara-e-Jurrats (6 posthumous) and 2 posthumous Tamgha-e-Jurrats to B57 pilots and navigators.  

Recommendations for the Future. India continues to enlarge her Armed Forces by purchasing and producing new equipment  possessing the latest technology available at home and abroad. This is most dangerous for us as India’s overall aim of destroying Pakistan as an independent entity remains. In this regional scenario, the Pakistan Air Force is getting a bit out of date, urgently requiring the induction of new aircraft. The Pakistani nation must know  that if we want a strong and viable defence, we should be prepared to pay for it. The requirements of the Air Force are urgent and genuine and must be catered for by those who are in power and for those who are in the government responsible for the nation’s defence and well-being. The Pakistani government and nation must locate and expose those elements home and abroad who make endless efforts to see that our defence capability is slowly eroded.

Historically, the PAF except for a very short period in 1965, performed well below the required. It is a relatively small force, the support that it can provide to the Army and Navy must be its main role. But unfortunately, the PAF has not  been provided with such assistance as necessarily required. Because the PAF role remains a debate. It should assist the Army and the Navy and not fight its own war. Whereas, the three services must fight the same war and not their own separate battles.

For the last few years there is a debate on buying  a very expensive weapons system for the Air Force because of the “Fighter Gap”. It is also being debated that whether this system to be used to defend the fighter establishment, defend Pakistan or just another gimmick for the kickbacks. According to a report, India had as many as 232 high tech aircraft as opposed to the 32 F16s of the Pakistan Air Force. Since the role of the PAF is a pivotal one, Pakistan must do something as the Air Force was losing  some seven to eight aircraft every year on account of  phasing out and partly because of attrition. According to Air Chief Marshall Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi, “The growing  technological disparity between the Indian and Pakistan Air Forces has now assumed “acute proportions”. Referring to the addition of sophisticated aircraft to the IAF and the inability of the PAF to come up with a matching response, Air Marshall Mehdi Qureshi said: “If this widening technological disparity between India and Pakistan is not plugged or narrowed down within the next 36 to 48 months, it would pose a direct threat to national security”. Perhaps this could be called a ‘Fighter Gap’. As the “Fighter Gap” does not relate to technology and numerical disparity but to the organization, employment and training. Therefore, it should be seriously taken into consideration by the higher authorities.

The absolute necessity for the PAF is to concentrate mainly on the destruction of the enemy tanks and to cause damage to the enemy’s capabilities and to provide direct as well as indirect support to its  Armed  Forces.

The small Pakistan Air Force should be trained primarily for the support of the Pakistani Army, Navy and  it should be equipped to come up with this task with suitable aircraft. The Army/Air and the Navy/Air cooperation should be perfected, especially as regards to recce, the production of the airpower enhancement and the direct support of the Air Force conjunction with Artillery should be directed in the destruction of the enemy tanks. The direct tactical support of the Army attacks on enemy’s ammunition and supply convoys should be studied.

Historical factors reveal that  the Pakistan Army has shown concern and assistance in the development of  the Pakistan Air Force on the right line.

With the arrival of American equipment the PAF entered into an important phase in its development. It is often not appreciated that reasonably modern equipment is essential for all the three companies of the Armed Forces, but for the Air Force it is absolutely vital.

In the recent years, however, there  has been a weakening of our governments resolve to adequately strengthen the Pakistan Air Force, as the Quaid had directed. If the present policy continues it will place the country  “at the mercy of an aggressor”. as the Quaid had rightly said. In our case the aggressor is  our neighbour India with whom we have fought three wars and two border conflicts short of war. An immense shooting war continues at present  in Kashmir where the troops are deployed  since the last more than 50 years on both sides of the ceasefire line or LOC (Line of Control) and also in the Siachin Glacier area  which is the world’s highest and most destructive battle ground. Only after 24 years of its independence, India split Pakistan  into two pieces by use of force, while the UN watched in silence. The freedom struggle of the poor Kashmiris continues even today. Kashmiris are being raped, killed, tortured while the world community watches in silence. At this crucial time when the fate of Kashmiris remains undecided, can we afford to lower our guards under the circumstances is the burning question of the day. The answer is obviously NO. Therefore, Pakistan must continue her efforts to build up her Air Force whether equipment, manpower, aircraft as quickly as possible in order to lower the already existing FIGHTER GAP between Pakistan and her biggest and numerically much larger adversary.

Courtesy:Defence Journal of Pakistan

Pakistan’s SSG

Pakistan’s most Elite and well-armed force, the Special Services Group (Commando Group) works under the guidance of Pak-Army. Its group combining high level training and expertise.

The SSG was formed ten years after the independence. Its main objective is to work where the regular army is not considered suitable to accomplish the Op as well as being assigned special tasks and covert ops. This may include high crisis situations on the National border to Hostage Rescue operations in country capitals, the SSG is trained to handle sorts of situations. The recruitment procedure for the group is to test the candidates from all three regular forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) whom are recommended by the Chiefs of the force. Those who pass the initial test are sent to the group’s HQ, based in a remote area of the northern side of the country for extensive training, the course is one year long. The recruitment standards are extremely tough to pass.

The course combines specializations in assault, sniping, survival, demolitions, grenade throwing, rappelling, MG firing, FIBUA (Fighting In Built Up Areas), CQB (Close Quarter Battle), Para-jumping, stealth and espionage, marine courses, physical and psychological training as well as criminal psychology courses and many other courses. After the course, the passedcandidates have the choice to go and join their initial forces or remain in the SSG.

The SSG has really well equipped itself with the latest and most advanced weapons. It has a wide arsenal in its use to suit its needs. It includes the famed Heckler and Koch 9mm MP5 SMG, Heckler and Koch 7.62 x 51mm Gewher-3 (G3, a.k.a. HK91 in USA) assault rifle, China made Type- 56 7.62 x 39mm autos (Chinese version of Russian AK47), the new Steyr’s 5.56mm NATO A.U.G assault rifle. In their Sniper weapons, they use scoped up G3s, Finnish Tikka bolt actions, as well as Steyr SSG 69 7.62 x 51mm (.308 win) bolt actions. The pistols in use are Austrian 9mm Glock 15, the Berretta M9 (M92F), the SIG Pro 226. The latest Fabrique Nationale Herstal’s (FN-Herstal) 5.7x28mm P90 SMG is also reserved for very high-risk applications.

The high standard of training has won the SSG titles such as Crème de La Crème (Best of the Best). The main strike team is called the “Zarrar Jareeh” company, (Zarrar Jareeh means “Seek and Destroy”) It works on the motto: Ambush, Engage and Destroy (or Let the regular army destroy their target) Another strike team is called Iqbal Buland (Meaning “Highly Praised”)

The SSG was used in border situations and covert operations mostly, until 1985, when a PAN AM airliner was hi-jacked by anonymous terrorists. They were four in number, clad in ASF (Airport Security Force), beneath their cloths they were able to conceal Russian AKSU SMGs (7.62 x 39mm a.k.a. .30-.30 calibre) and TT33 30 bore pistols.

Fortunately, an airhostess had discovered the fact, it was a really critical situation as all the passengers had boarded the plane along with the hijackers, and the pilot was preparing for take-off, the airhostess on discovering the fact rushed to the cockpit and reported to the pilot. The crew considered it wise to leave the plane unnoticed through the emergency hatch in the cockpit, hence disabling the plane from taking-off. News reached the ASF chief who reported the matter to the government and army. All this took place within an hour or so. When the hijackers discovered that the crew had deserted the plane, they fell in minor flux, as their plan seemed to have backfired.

Soon, government officials who offered to negotiate the matter contacted them but the hijackers seemed very unproductive in that matter, and also threatened to shoot the passengers if they were not allowed to leave unharmed. The SSG was put on stand-by. During that time the government discussed the situation then the commander of the SSG, the Late Brig Tariq Mahmood (K.I.A. Also awarded ARMY’S MEDAL FOR BRAVERY) was given a go signal to execute the plan which was to breech and kill all the resistance in the plane.

After that, at nighttime the SSGs operatives took action, they were armed with HK MP5 SMGs, Heckler and Koch’s P7 9mm semiautomatic pistols as well AK47s (7.62 x 39mm a.k.a. 30-30) and Heckler and Koch G3 (7.62 x 51mm). They wore black uniforms and light body armor. They entered the plane by banging down the doors of the plane, the hijackers who were expecting an operation, resisted and opened fire on the commandos. Unfortunately, the passengers were not prepared for the fire and fell in disorder when the lights of the plane were shut down, so suddenly. SSG on the other hand was not accustomed to such situations and also had to open fire. Due to which many passengers were caught in the deadly firefight of lethal automatic weapons and heavy casualties took place. Although all the terrorists were killed and the coup ended, but not without 10+ innocent casualties. The SSG was not much commended the operation was called a failure. The case quietly sat down.

It was suggested that the cause for the failure of the operation was the use of inappropriate weapons and tactics. The SSG was not yet trained to handle CQBs (Close Quarter Battles) at that time.

The Second Test
During the recent years, the Special Services Group has re-amped itself, acquiring more extensive training, especially in the tactics of CQB (close quarter Battle) advanced equipment and preparing itself for any such situation. The second test eventually came after nine years…in 1994, Islamabad.

It was a normal day in the National Capital, when the news of the kidnapping of a school bus carrying more than 35 primary school children, all of whom were below 12 years of age, as well as two teachers and a driver. Authorities immediately fell in stress and pressure about how to stop this chaotic situation. Not only were the Government worried about the lives of the children, they were also trying to figure out a way handle the mediocrity.

It was learned that the kidnappers were 6 Afghan militants, their motif was to get the Pakistani government to accept some of their extremely inexhorbitant demands that included giving them military assets along with fighter jets in the Pak-Airforce.

The news played hell with the parents of the children, who were on the verge on going hysterical. Parents and media both stormed the offices of the authorities, trying to find out what steps were being taken to end the situation.

The government fell a very tricky and difficult situation as the terrorists pressurized them at the same time. They indicated the terrorists that their demands were under consideration and the government will need a little time to fulfill their demands. The terrorists replied by saying that they will be allotted 72 hours before any “unpleasant event occurs”. Then they asked for food for themselves and the hostages, which they were immediately given.

Internally the government had decided to no to give in their demands, and they were planning to take the terrorists down. Many tactical and intelligence teams were called to the operation. Including ISI and SSG, it was decided that there should be a way of contact with the inside world. The terrorists had drawn the curtains of the place so there was virtually no contact inside. It was figured out that the terrorists might be convinced to let an ill child hostage and a teacher walk out of the house and receive medical treatment then they will be returned to the terrorists. That was made their key to the inside world, the two hostages were allowed free. They reported that the hostages were held in separate rooms, guarded by armed terrorists, the terrorists were armed with Kalashinkov assault rifles and pistols, they were wearing typical Afghan dress and army boots and MAY have body armor.

During all that time they were supplied with food and water.

Day one had passed, the next day the hostages were contacted and told that an operation would be carried out at sunset time and it will be aimed to kill all the terrorists on the spot, therefore the hostages had to be prepared for the sudden outbreak of the breach. The hostages had to shift themselves on the floor or under any furniture just 1 minute before the showdown. Any confusion or carelessness could result in severe casualties. The news quietly spread between the hostages during mealtime.

The next day, at the given time the hostages moved to the appropriate locations. The terrorists were really very attentive now; they had their guns ready at all time, and seemed very less hesitant towards taking the lives of the hostages. It was also discovered later that they wore masked that covered their one eye so that they would only have point and fire without worrying to aim.

Then after one minute, a volley of gas and smoke grenades was fired through the house’s windows and into the rooms. After an interval of 3 or 4 seconds SSG’s commandos of the “Zarrar Jareeh” began entering through windows and doors, they were armed with MP5 sub-Machine guns, and Laser trained Glock and Beretta pistols. They were wearing camouflage dress, kevlar vests, and Gas masks, and spare gas grenades. The terrorists were not ready for the attack, but they blindly returned fire, putting lives of the hostages at risk.

It was difficult for them to see through the smoke and gas fumes irritated their eyes. Thankfully, no hostages went hysterical by the heavy the gunfire that rocked the whole neighborhood. By the first 40 seconds 2 terrorists lay dead, they were accurately chest and head shot through the deadly MP5 9mm bursts. The rest of the four terrorists also fell victims of the commandos’ bullets within the next 1 minute! The commandos worked like greased lightening, they stormed the whole house with their guns on the ready, and every terrorist that fell in their way. One terrorist tried to shoot the hostages, just as he was about to execute one of them, two SSG-ians entered the room and pumped him full of lead. It was a really close call, were they late of a second, there might have casualties.

The breech ended within 2 minutes, all terrorists lying dead, all hostages rescued, with no casualties. The Afghan government denied any responsibility of the militants. The parents of the children commended the government and SSG especially for carrying out such a successful operation. IT was therefore proved that what happened in 1985, may not necessarily have to happen again.

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