People who live in glass houses should not throw stones at neighbors. India should learn the lesson that status of women in the sub-continent is still second class. They should join hands with Pakistan to implement the laws in both penal codes against this devastating crimes against women. Indian news media and politicians were pointing fingers at breakdown of law and order in Pakistan, when Mukhtaran Mai was gang raped. Mukhtaran Mai, now 40, was gang raped in June 2002 on the orders of a village council as punishment after her younger brother was accused of having illicit relations with a woman from a rival clan. But, Indians forgot their own belief in karma. Now, they are victims of their own venomous anti-Pakistan propaganda. Hypocritically, Indians have censored the word Rape, by writing R*pe. If Pakistani media and press uses terms to mitigate the pain of heinous attacks on women and calling it criminal assault. Zia-ul-Haq’s punishment of rapist were considered as cruel and unusual punishment and Indian propaganda machine with Zionist media demonized the people of Pakistan as living in dark ages. Now the chickens are coming to roast. This just the beginning, all of India’s subversions in Pakistan will play out in India, including the secession of India’s states like Karnataka, Telangana, Occupied Kashmir, Manipur/Bodoland. and Khalistan. Stay tuned for more to come.
Delhi R*pe Gang Case:
Once again Delhi people are thriller by a Gang R*pe, which held in Delhi on Sunday 15 December, 2012. A 23-Year old medical student was R*ped repeatedly by six men in a moving Bus on Sunday Evening. After the R*pe crew of the bus beat her brutally with an iron road. A male friend who also traveling with her was also beaten by accuses and then threw out both of the bus. The victim has been admitted to SafdarjungHospital, is struggling for her life after having suffered multiple injuries. Her condition is very critical and admitted in ICU ward.
According to the police, the victim is a medical student from Dehradoon, who is doing her internship in Delhi. Her friend an Engineer both boarded a private bus with tinted glass window from Munirka, south Delhi to Palam around 9.45 Pm. Her friend told police that the men on bus harassing her, which he confronted them. After that all incident happen, he was hit by the iron road several times on his head and the women dragged to driver’s cabin, where she was R*ped and later both victim threw out the bus. Police filed the case against the rapist and send both victim’s to AIIMS, from where main victim refer to Safdarjung Hospital due to her critical condition.
After the incident, police comes on action and took less than 24 hours to track down the main accused in this Gang R*pe. The police studied CCTV footage from the highway cameras to identify the bus. By the help of CCTV footage police found the bus and the iron rod which was used in incident. The Bus belongs to a private Tour & Travels from Noida, Sec-62. Police arrested the four main accused of this horrible gang R*pe. Peoples are in angered, doing protest for the punishment for accused. Bollywood world to Politics world all show ashamed on this incident. Everyone is demanding justice.
New Delhi: Several mediapersons were injured in New Delhi on Sunday in the clash at the India Gate between police and protesters demanding strict action against rapists. A photo journalist clicking photographs got a head injury when a large stone hit his head. The stones that were being hurled by protesters at police, were in turn, hurled back.
The tear gas shells hurled by police were picked up and thrown back at the police. Some news channel camerapersons and reporters also got injured in the melee.
As many as six mediapersons were admitted to Ram Manohar Lohia hospital, sources said adding that many of them were discharged after first aid. Police has claimed that hooligan elements had mingled among the protesters and resorted to stone pelting.
The objective behind writing this article is to acquaint the citizens of India with their national leaders and show how a dynasty has misused the democracy of this country. Several prestigious national assets and schemes are named after these lose-character people to immortalize them. Many other shocking facts are not presented in this article because of lack of supporting evidence.
Indira Priyadarshini perpetuated immorality in the Nehru dynasty.
The Early Years with Feroze Khan and the lonely Indira
Intellectual Indira was admitted in Oxford University but driven out from there for non-performance. She was then admitted to Shantiniketan University but, Guru Dev Rabindranath Tagore chased her out for bad conduct.
After driven out of Shantiniketan, Indira became lonely as father was busy with politics and mother was dieing of tuberculosis in Switzerland. Playing with her loneliness, Feroze Khan, son of a grocer named Nawab Khan who supplied wines etc to Motilal Nehru’s household in Allahabad, was able to draw close to her. The then Governor of Maharashtra, Dr. Shriprakash warned Nehru, that Indira was having an illicit relation with Feroze Khan. Feroze Khan was then in England and he was quite sympathetic to Indira. Soon enough she changed her
religion, became a Muslim woman and married Feroze Khan in a London mosque. Indira Priyadarshini Nehru changed her name to Maimuna Begum.Her mother Kamala Nehru was totally against that marriage. Nehru was not happy as conversion to Muslim will jeopardize her prospect of becoming Prime Minister.
Fool all of the People, all of the Times
So, Nehru asked the young man Feroze Khan to change his surname from
Khan to Gandhi. It had nothing to do with change of religion from Islam to Hinduism. It was just a case of a change of name by an affidavit. And so Feroze Khan became Feroze Gandhi, though it is an inconsistent name like Bismillah Sarma. Both changed their names to fool the public of India. When they returned to India, a mock vedic marriage was instituted for public consumption. Thus, Indira and her descendants got the fancy name Gandhi. Both Nehru and Gandhi are fancy names. As a chameleon changes its colour, this dynasty have been changing its name to hide its real identity.
Sanjay’s Shenanigans
Indira Gandhi had two sons namely Rajiv Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi. Sanjay was originally named as Sanjiv that rhymed with Rajiv, his elder brother’s name. Sanjiv was arrested by the British police for a car theft in the UK and his passport was seized. On Indira Gandhi’s direction, the then Indian Ambassador to UK, Krishna Menon misusing his power, changed his name to Sanjay and procured a new passport.
The Nehru Dynasty Scion Sanjay Gandhi
Thus Sanjiv Gandhi came to be known as Sanjay Gandhi.
It is a known fact that after Rajiv’s birth, Indira Gandhi and Feroze Gandhi lived separately, but they were not divorced. The book “The Nehru Dynasty” (ISBN 10:8186092005) by K. N. Rao states that the second son of Indira (or Mrs. Feroze Khan) known as Sanjay Gandhi was not the son ofFeroze Gandhi. He was the son of another Muslim gentleman named Mohammad Yunus.
Interestingly Sanjay Gandhi’s marriage with the Sikh girl Menaka took place in Mohammad Yunus’ house in New Delhi. Apparently Yunus was unhappy with the marriage as he wanted to get him married with a Muslim girl of his choice. It was Mohammad Yunus who cried the most
when Sanjay Gandhi died in plane crash.
In Yunus’ book, “Persons, Passions & Politics” (ISBN-10: 0706910176) one can discover that baby Sanjay was circumcised following Islamic custom.
It is a fact that Sanjay Gandhi used to constantly blackmail his
mother Indira Gandhi, with the secret of who his real father is. Sanjay exercised a deep emotional control over his mother, which he often misused. Indira Gandhi chose to ignore his misdeeds and he was indirectly controlling the Government.
When the news of Sanjay Gandhi’s death reached Indira Gandhi, her
first question was “Where are his keys and his wrist watch?”. Some deep secrets about the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty seems to be hidden in those objects. The plane accident was also mysterious. It was a new plane that nosedive to a crash and yet the plane did not explode upon impact. It happens when there is no fuel. But the flight register shows that the fuel tank was made full before take-off. Indira Gandhi using undue influence of PM’s office prohibited any inquiry from taking place. So, who is the suspect?
“The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi” (ISBN: 9780007259304) by Katherine Frank
The book “The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi” (ISBN: 9780007259304) by Katherine Frank sheds light on some of Indira Gandhi’s other love affairs. It is written that Indira’s first love was with her German teacher at Shantiniketan. Later she had affair with M. O. Mathai (father’s secretary), then DhirendraBrahmachari (her yoga teacher) and at last with Dinesh Singh (Foreign Minister).
Amb. Natwar Singh-Witness
Former Foreign Minister K Natwar Singh made an interesting revelation about Indira Gandhi’s affinity to the Mughals in his book “Profile and Letters” (ISBN: 8129102358). It states that- In 1968 Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India went on an official visit to Afghanistan. Natwar Sing accompanied her as an IFS officer in duty. After having completed the day’s long engagements, Indira Gandhi wanted to go out for a ride in the evening. After going a long distance in the car, Indira Gandhi wanted to visit Babur’s burial
place, though this was not included in the itinerary. The Afghan security officials tried to dissuade her, but she was adamant. In the end she went to that burial place. It was a deserted place. She went before Babur’s grave, stood there for a few minutes with head bent down in reverence. Natwar Singh stood behind her. When Indira had finished her prayers, she turned back and told Singh “Today we have
had our brush with history.” Worth to mention that Babur was the founder ofMughal rule in India, from which the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty have descended.
College Drop-out Rajiv Gandhi’s Moghul Dreams
It is difficult to count how many institutes of higher education are named after Rajiv Gandhi but, Rajiv Gandhi himself was a person of low calibre. From 1962 to 1965, he was enrolled for a Mechanical Engineering course at Trinity College, Cambridge. But, he left Cambridge without a degree because, he could not pass exams. Next year in 1966, he joined Imperial College, London but, again left it without a degree.
K. N. Rao in the above said book alleges that Rajiv Gandhi became a Catholic to marry Sania Maino. Rajiv became Roberto. His son’s name is Raul and daughter’s name is Bianca. Quite cleverly the same names are presented to the people of India as Rahul and Priyanka.
In personal conduct Rajiv was very much a Mughal. On 15th August, 1988 he thundered from the ramparts of the Red Fort: “Our endeavor should be to take the country to heights to which it belonged about 250-300 years ago. It was then the reign of Aurangzeb, the ‘jeziya’ master and number one temple destroyer.”
The press conference that Rajiv Gandhi gave in London after taking over as prime minister of India was very informative. In this press conference, Rajiv boasted that he is not a Hindu but a Parsi. Feroze Khan’s father and RajivGandhi’s paternal grandfather was a Muslim gentleman from the Junagarh area of Gujarat. This Muslim grocer by the name of Nawab Khan had married aParsi woman after converting her to Islam. This is the source where from the myth of Rajiv being a Parsi was derived. Mind that he had no Parsi ancestor at all. His paternal grandmother had turned Muslim after having abandoned the Parsi religion to marry Nawab Khan. Surprisingly, Parsi Rajiv Gandhi was cremated as per Vedic rites in full view of Indian public.
High School Graduate Antonia Maino a.k.a Sonia Gandhi, daughter of an Italian Fascist
Dr. Subramanian Swamy writes that Sonia Gandhi’s name was Antonia Maino. Her father was a mason. He was an activist of the notorious fascist regime of Italy and he served five years imprisonment in Russia. Sonia Gandhi have not studied beyond high school. She learnt some English from a English teaching shop named Lennox School at the Cambridge University campus. From this fact she boasts of having studied at the prestigious Cambridge University. After learning some English, she was a waitress at a restaurant in Cambridge town.
Sonia Gandhi had intense friendship with Madhavrao Scindia in the UK, which continued even after her marriage. One night at 2 AM in 1982, Madhavrao Scindia and Sonia Gandhi were caught alone together when their car met an accident near IIT Delhi main gate.
When Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were Prime Ministers, PM’s security used to go to New Delhi and Chennai international airports to send crates of Indian treasures like temple sculptures, antiques, paintings etc to Rome. Arjun Singhas CM and later as Union Minister in charge of Culture used to organize the plunder. Unchecked by customs, they were transported to Italy to be sold in two shops named Etnica &Ganpati, owned by Sonia Gandhi’s sister Alessandra Maino Vinci.
Indira Gandhi died not because her heart or brain were pierced by bullets, but she died of loss of blood. After Indira Gandhi was fired upon, Sonia Gandhi strangely insisted that bleeding Indira Gandhi should be taken to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, in opposite direction to AIIMS which had a contingency protocol to precisely deal with such events. After reaching Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, Sonia Gandhi changed her mind and demand that Indira Gandhi should be taken to AIIMS, thus wasting 24 valuable minutes. It is doubtful whether it was immaturity of Sonia Gandhi or a trick to speedily bring her husband to power.
Rajesh Pilot and Madhav Rao Scindia were strong contenders to the Prime Minister’s post and they were road blocks in Sonia Gandhi’s way to power. Both of them died in mysterious accidents.
There are circumstantial evidences pointing to the prima facie possibility that the Maino family have contracted LTTE to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Nowadays, Sonia Gandhi is quite unabashed in having political alliance with those like MDMK,PMK and DMK who praise Rajiv Gandhi’s killers. No Indian widow would ever do that. Such circumstances are many, and raise a doubt. An investigation into Sonia’s involvement in Rajiv’s assassination is necessary.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy’s book“Assassination Of Rajiv Gandhi — Unasked Questions and Unanswered Queries” (ISBN : 81-220-0591-8).
You may read Dr.Subramanian Swamy’s book “Assassination Of Rajiv Gandhi — Unasked Questions and Unanswered Queries” (ISBN : 81-220-0591-8). It contains indications of such conspiracy.
Sonia Gandhi, Rahul, and Priyanka- Italian Citizenship : How many Pakistani politicians have dual citizenship?
In 1992, Sonia Gandhi revived her citizenship of Italy under Article 17 of the Italian Citizenship Law. Under Italian law, Rahul and Priyanka are Italian citizens because Sonia was an Italian citizen when she gave birth to them.Rahul Gandhi’s Italian is better than his Hindi. Rahul Gandhi is an Italian citizen is relevant from the fact that on 27th September 2001 he was detained by the FBI at Boston airport, USA for traveling on an Italian passport. If a law is made in
India that important posts like that of President and Prime Minister should not be held by a person of foreign origin, then Rahul Gandhi automatically disqualifies to contend for the post of Prime Minister.
Rahul Gandhi, a Bilawal Bhutto type party animal or “Munna Bhai, MBBS”
After finishing school education, Rahul Gandhi got admission at the St. Stephens College in New Delhi, not on merit basis but on sports quota of rifle shooting. After a brief stay there in 1989-90, he did his BA from Rollins College, Florida in 1994. Just for doing BA one need not go to the US. The very next year, in 1995 he got M.Phil., degree from Trinity College, Cambridge. The genuineness of this degree is questioned as he has done M.Phil. without doing MA. Amaratya Sen’shelping hand is thought to be behind. Many of you might have seen thefamous movie “Munna Bhai MBBS”.
High Life and Hypocrisy of Gandhi Dynasty : India’s poor can eat cake!
In 2008 Rahul Gandhi was prevented from using an auditorium of the ChandraShekhar Azad University in Kanpur for a students’ rally. Subsequently, the Vice-Chancellor of the university, V.K. Suri, was ousted by the UP Governor. During 26/11 when the whole country was tense about how to tackle the Mumbai terror, Rahul Gandhi was lavishly partying with his friends till 5 AM. Rahul Gandhi advises austerity for all Congress members. He says it is the duty of all politicians to
be austere. On the other hand he has a ministerial bungalow with a fully equipped gym. He is a regular member of at least two of the Delhi’s poshest gyms, one of which is 5-star rated. Rahul Gandhi’s trip to Chennai in 2009 to campaign for austerity cost the party more than Rs 1 Crore. Such inconsistencies show that initiatives taken by Rahul Gandhi are not his own but, workout of his party men only.
Heritage of Sexual Escapades continue: Rahul Gandhi’s Live-in Girl Friend Veronica
During the 2007 election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, Rahul Gandhi said that “if anyone from the Nehru-Gandhi family had been active in politics then, the Babri Masjid would not have fallen”. It doubtlessly shows his Mohammedan affiliation as a loyalty to his ancestors. On Dec 31, 2004, John M. Itty, a retired college professor in Alappuzha district of Kerala, contended that action should be taken against
Rahul Gandhi and his girlfriend Juvenitta alias Veronica for staying together for three days at a resort in Kerela. It is a criminal offense under Immoral Trafficking Act as they are not married. Anyway, one more foreigner daughter-in-law is waiting to rule the tolerant Indians.
Sonia and Rahul Gandhi’s US $2 Billion in Swiss Banks
The Swiss magazine Schweizer Illustrierte’s 11th November 1991 issue revealed that Rahul Gandhi was the beneficiary of accounts worth US $2 billion controlled by his mother Sonia Gandhi. A report from the Swiss Banking Association in 2006 revealed that the combined deposits of Indian citizens are far greater than any other nation, a total of US $1.4 trillion, a figure exceeding the GDP of India. This dynasty rules greater than half of India. Ignoring the center, out of 28 states and 7 union territories, more than half of them have Congress government at any point of time. UptoRajiv Gandhi there was Mughal rule in India, with Sonia Gandhi, the Rome rule on India have started.
Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, Pakistan Navy (Retired)
We have unresolved issues, a history of conflict and now the Cold Start doctrine. Help us resolve these issues. We want peaceful coexistence with India. India has the capability and intentions can change overnight.
GENERAL ASHFAQ P. KAYANI, THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, PAKISTAN
Around noon on 26 July 2009, Gurushuran Kaur, the wife of the Indian prime minister, broke a single coconut on the hull of a submarine in the fifteen- meter-deep Matsya dry dock at Visakhapatnam (also known as Vizag).1 The oc-
casion marked the formal launch of India’s first indigenously built submarine, a six-thousand-ton nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) known as S-2—also as the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) and, more commonly, by its future name, INS Arihant (destroyer of the enemy).2 The launch ended for In- dia a journey stretching over three decades since the inauguration of the ATV program and including an eleven-year construction period.3
The submarine is intended to form a crucial pillar of India’s strategic deter- rence. Successful trials and integration of S-2’s systems will establish the final leg of India’s nuclear weapons delivery triad, as articulated in the Indian Maritime
Commander Khan’s twenty-three years of commis- sioned service included thirteen years at sea as a surface warfare officer and several command and staff appoint- ments. He saw action in the first Gulf War, serving with the United Arab Emirates navy. He is a graduate of the Pakistan Naval Academy class of 1973 and of the Paki- stan Navy War College and National Defense College, Islamabad. He holds a master’s in war studies (mari- time). Since his retirement in 1998 he has extensively contributed to Pakistani as well as overseas periodicals and media. He is currently a research fellow at the Pakistan Navy War College.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2010, Vol. 63, No. 3
Doctrine and substantiated in the Indian Maritime Military Strategy Doctrine.
The launch is an extraordinary development for the littorals of the Indian Ocean region, including Australia and South Africa, but especially for Paki- stan. It is germane to the military nuclearization of the Indian Ocean and noticeably dents the strategic balance; it has the potential to trigger a nuclear arms race.4 S-2 will also enhance India’s outreach and allow New Delhi a comprehensive domination of the Ara- bian Sea, the Indian Ocean littoral, and even beyond.586 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Costing US$2.9 billion, the ATV project was a joint effort involving the Indian Navy and several government agencies and private organizations.6 India’s nu- clear submarine is the world’s smallest of its type yet will pack a megaton punch. The boat is driven by a single seven-bladed, highly skewed propeller. Special anechoic rubber tiles (to reduce the risk of detection by sonar) coat the steel hull.7 A similar technology was previously used in the Russian Kilo-class subma- rines.8 (Russian help in designing the ATV has long been an open secret; there are also reports of Israeli, French, and German imprints on the project.)9
But more than design or fabrication of hull, it was the downsizing and mating of the ninety-megawatt (120,000 horsepower) low-enriched-uranium-fueled, pressurized light-water reactor that kept the submarine in the dry dock for more than a decade.10 The reactor and its containment vessel account for one-tenth (nearly six hundred tons) of the boat’s total displacement. The hydrodynamics of a vessel with a tenth of its weight concentrated in one place posed a formida- ble naval engineering challenge indeed, one that plagued the program.
Before being commissioned as INS Arihant in late 2011 or early 2012, S-2—serving as a technology demonstrator, a test for future boats of the class—will have to obtain appropriate certification in three crucial areas: stealth features, adequacy of the reactor design, and missile range. The first key test will involve meticulous calibration of S-2’s underwater noise signature, which will determine the degree of its invulnerability to detection and therefore its suitabil- ity as a ballistic-missile platform. This process may necessitate extensive trials, adjustments, and design modifications—if not for S-2, certainly for its succes- sors.11 The second vital area requiring attestation will be to determine the reac- tor’s fuel cycle—that is, the frequency of replacement of the fuel rods. Being of a first- or second-generation technology, with a shorter fuel cycle, the S-2 reactor fundamentally affects the boat’s performance as an instrument of deterrence.12 The replacement of fuel rods is an intricate operation requiring a submarine to be taken out of its operational cycle for an extended period. The net result will be that either the submarine’s patrol areas will remain restricted (fairly close to base) or its endurance (deployment period) will be curtailed.
The third assessment of S-2 will entail test-firing and validation of missile pa- rameters. The platform is currently configured to carry a Pakistan-specific, two-stage submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Sagarika (Oce- anic), expected to become operational after 2010.13 This nuclear-capable missile, powered by solid propellants, is a light, miniaturized system, about 6.5 meters long and weighing seven tons.14 S-2 will have to accommodate missiles not only of greater (intercontinental) range but in greater numbers if it is to have a deter- rent value against China. That would require further underwater launches and flight trials for the follow-on units of the class.15
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE INDIAN NAVY
The Indian Navy began strongly advocating nuclear-related programs at sea in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, and for a valid and legitimate reason—the need for an invulnerable nuclear capability to undergird a posture of “no first use.” At a press conference in 2002, the Indian Navy chief held that “any country that espouses a no first use policy (as India does) must have an assured second strike capability. All such countries have a triad of weapons, one of them at sea. It is significant that the Standing Committee on Defence of the twelfth Lok Sabha [lower house of the Indian Parliament] had advised the government ‘to review and accelerate its nuclear policy for fabricating or for acquiring nuclear subma- rines to add to the (nation’s) deterrent potential.’”16
When in January 2003 the major elements of India’s official nuclear doctrine were brought into the public domain, the Indian government stressed the build- ing and maintenance of a “credible minimum deterrent,” along with a posture of “no first use.”17 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike was to be “massive and de- signed to inflict unacceptable damage.” Significantly, however, the 2003 state- ment did not reiterate the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine’s aim of building a nuclear triad, although all three armed services were keen to deploy nuclear-capable weapon systems.18
If the Indian Navy was disappointed at the lack of official sanction for its submarine-based nuclear deterrent, it tried hard not to show it. Still, the ATV project was under way, with funding and guaranteed political support from the government. It could therefore be concluded that this notable doctrinal silence might have been an attempt not to alarm the international community about In- dia’s multidimensional nuclear program.19
India’s Monroe Doctrine
More than ever, India today demonstrates a striving for regional and global emi- nence. In elucidating India’s Maritime Military Strategy, the former Indian Navy chief Arun Prakash pleaded with Indians to keep it “‘etched in [their] minds that should a clash of interests arise between India and any other power, regional or extra-regional . . . the use of coercive power and even conflict remains a distinct possibility.’ Such ‘Kautilyan’ statements lend credence to [the] notion of a for- ward-leaning India that increasingly inclines to hard power solutions to re- gional challenges.”20
In their nation’s novel bid for sea power, Indians look for inspiration to the Monroe Doctrine, the nineteenth-century U.S. policy declaration that the New World was off-limits to new European territorial acquisitions or any reintroduc- tion of the European political system.21 An identical philosophy for India was first proclaimed by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru in a speech in 1961
justifying the use of force to evict Portugal from Goa: “Any attempt by a foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing that India cannot tolerate, and that, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I lay down.”22 Nehru’s statement was in fact a veiled warning to all external powers against any action anywhere in the region that New Delhi might perceive as im- periling the Indian political system. His injunction against outside interference laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of regional primacy, without med- dling by or influence of external powers. Though at the time it was impossible for India to confront the imperial powers militarily, each succeeding generation in India has interpreted and applied this foundational principle, according to its own appraisal of the country’s surroundings, interests, and power.
While the success or otherwise of India’s Monroe Doctrine can be debated, it has remained an “article of faith for many in the Indian strategic community” and now seems to have entered the Indian foreign-policy lexicon.23 The Monroe Doctrine itself being an intensely maritime concept (the influential nineteenth- century sea-power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan was an outspoken disciple), India has made huge strides in expanding its sea power in recent times. In the process, New Delhi has largely shed its continental way of thinking and reori- ented itself to look beyond the nation’s shores.24 Thus today, in the words of President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, “The economic growth of this region depends on the heavy transportation in the Indian Ocean particularly the Malacca strait. Navy has an increasing role to provide necessary support for carrying out these operations.”25
Advancing the Monroe Doctrine
Regional prominence requires India to develop a robust and self-sustaining do- mestic military industrial and technological complex, one that removes de- pendence on overseas sources. Such an infrastructure must be fully able to sustain the fleet twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year. In that direction, India’s strategic partnership with Washington, including the civilian nuclear deal, is likely to be of great assistance over time. In the short term, however, and taking advantage of the presence of the U.S. Navy, which ef- fectively reduces its own burden, the Indian Navy projects a fleet comprising three carrier battle groups.26 As Admiral Madhvendra Singh, chief of staff of the Indian Navy, declared on 14 October 2003, “Fulfilling India’s dream to have a full-fledged blue-water Navy would need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more frigates, 20 more destroyers with helicopters, and large numbers of missile cor- vettes and antisubmarine warfare corvettes.”27 These battle groups could be or- ganized into a single fleet, depending on New Delhi’s tolerance for risk and the Indian Navy’s ability to keep the fleet in a high operational state.28 Six new and
a few older-vintage destroyers, twelve new and a few old frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, and five new tank landing ships (LSTs) are likely to feature in such an order of battle.
All the new Indian Navy warships, including its projected carriers, will be much more formidable than their predecessors.29 The Indian Defence Ministry has furthermore recently approved three billion dollars to strengthen the navy’s littoral war-fighting capabilities.30 The move represents a push for a larger pres- ence in the Indian Ocean but may also be a response to a more active Chinese presence there.
In the long term, a self-sufficient Indian Navy ably backed by a domestic de- fense industrial complex may feature six to nine carrier task forces and more than a dozen nuclear submarines. In the meantime, the Indian Navy is likely to continue expanding its undersea nuclear deterrent, manifest in fleet ballistic- missile submarines, with nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), though able to operate throughout the Indian Ocean basin and beyond, taking lower priority.31
IN PERSPECTIVE: PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY
Henry Kissinger argues, “The persistence of unresolved regional conflicts makes nuclear weapons a powerful lure in many parts of the world—to intimidate neighbors and to serve as a deterrent to great powers who might otherwise inter- vene in a regional conflict.”32 Unlike India—whose nuclear program is widely believed to be status driven—Pakistan’s nuclear policy is entirely security driven, and it is India-centric. The national discourse on the direction, aims, and objectives of nuclear policy are, however, veiled and mainly confined to official circles. Accordingly, public debate is very generic, in contrast to India’s volumi- nous material in print on the subject.33 The decision not to enunciate publicly a comprehensive nuclear doctrine reflects in part the fact that Pakistan sees no political or status utility in nuclear capability, but rather a purely defensive, security related purpose.
“Pakistan’s threat perceptions stem primarily from India, at the levels of all-out conventional war, limited war, and low intensity conflict. Within the nu- clear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conven- tional war.”34 In other words, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is directed against not only a possible Indian nuclear attack but a conventional one as well.35 Among key characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear policy are maintenance of a minimum level of nuclear deterrence, retention of a first-use option, and reli- ance on ground and air delivery (aircraft and missiles).36 Sea-based delivery means are appreciably missing.
Like NATO, Pakistan continues to keep its options open on “no first use,” but has declared willingness to use nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort. “No first use” declarations have never been the basis of determining the true posture of any nuclear-weapon state. If they were, New Delhi would have accepted the position of China on this issue as well as the latter’s assurances of nonuse of nu- clear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.37
In late 2001, Pakistan declared four broad conditions under which Islamabad might resort to use of nuclear weapons, as described by Lieutenant General Kidwai of the Strategic Plan Division (the secretariat of the National Command Authority):38 a “space threshold,” should New Delhi attack Pakistan and conquer a large part of its territory; a “military threshold,” if India destroyed a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; an “economic threshold,” were India to pursue the economic strangulation of Pakistan; and finally, should India push Pakistan into “political destabilization or [create] a large scale internal subversion.”39
The Pakistan Navy and Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
The May 1998 tit-for-tat nuclear tests by Pakistan in the Ras-Koh mountain range in the Chagai district of Balochistan restored the strategic balance in South Asia.40 The period that followed saw the quarrelsome neighbors expand their respective arsenals, improve their command and control infrastructures, and strive for better CEP (circular error probability), greater mobility and faster reaction time for missiles, and higher yield as well as better yield-to-weight ratios for the warheads.41
Significantly, no efforts to develop a sea-based nuclear capability and thus ex- pand the survivability of nuclear forces have ever surfaced in Pakistan’s policy making. The principal reason for this is perhaps historical “baggage”—a fixa- tion on Afghanistan, in search of strategic depth as against a geographically larger India. But 9/11 was a rude awakening that such a policy was not only un- sound but no longer tenable. By then precious time (1998–2001) that could have gone toward developing undersea deterrence had been lost.
The “military threshold” postulation in Pakistan’s declared nuclear philoso- phy surmises the destruction of a large portion of Pakistan’s “land and air com- ponents” as an inducement to go nuclear. The destruction of a major component of naval forces, however, remains unstipulated. Three deductions could be reached: that the navy continues in its usual low priority in the overall national security calculus, that the possibility of international reaction has pre- cluded a clear articulation of the naval component, and that the naval case is in- cluded in the threshold of “economic strangulation.”
But the term “economic strangulation” is broad and can be interpreted in various ways. Pakistan being an agrarian economy, a prolonged disruption or
drastic reduction in the flow of cross-border rivers by India could impinge on crop yield, triggering widespread unrest, destabilization, and a possible con- frontation.42 But a far more perilous scenario, one that could cause economic strangulation more quickly, resides at sea.
The Pakistan Navy: A Sentinel of Energy and Economic Security?
Pakistan’s commerce, like India’s, is intrinsically seaborne. More than 95 percent of Pakistan’s trade by volume, 88 percent by value, is transported by sea.43 Three sea lines of communication support Pakistan’s maritime trade, viz., from the Far East, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. These arteries carry both imports and ex- ports. The imports include edible oil, tea, sugar, wheat, and other value-added foodstuffs. During the last fiscal year (FY), $3,662,000,000 was spent on food imports alone.44 Much of Pakistan’s oil also comes over the sea. The Gulf, through which the country’s annual oil imports are shipped, constitutes the na- tion’s energy lifeline. With a 5 percent annual growth rate, Pakistan’s oil imports are likely to reach 22.2 million tons during FY 2010–11.45
During FY 2008–2009, the ports of Karachi and Qasim collectively handled im- ports of 24.4 million tons of dry cargo and 20.9 million tons of liquid-bulk cargo, totaling some 45.3 million tons. The sum of exports at these ports during the same period was 18.3 million tons. In addition, the ports handled 1.9 million TEUs’ worth of containerized cargo.46 All in all, Pakistan’s critical overall dependence on sea-based imports is a good deal greater than India’s. India’s superiority over Paki- stan being most pronounced in the maritime field, a blockade of Karachi could se- riously imperil the country’s economy and the war-fighting potential in two or three weeks.47 Given all this and the role the Pakistan Navy is expected to play, it is not difficult to deduce where one must expect Pakistan’s economic and energy se- curity sensitivities—nay, economic threshold—to dwell.48
THE THRESHOLD AND CREDIBILITY ISSUES
According to Indian analysts, of the four threats that Pakistan has identified as ca- pable of invoking nuclear response, only two—territorial loss and military destruction—have credibility. To them, it is difficult to make nuclear escala- tion credible against the other two (economic strangulation and national destabilization). Consequently, they maintain, India might now focus on the latter two and opt for controlled military pressure across the Kashmir Line of Control.49 The thinking of Indian leadership also reflects a presumption that should there be an escalation in tension between India and Pakistan, New Delhi would have the unconstrained support of the international community.
These postulations are deeply flawed. Tension related to water resources is al- ready heating up; Pakistan has complained that India is holding back the waters
of rivers flowing from Indian-administered Kashmir. Left unresolved, in due course the issue will be clubbed together with the Kashmir dispute.50 Any re- duced water flow would then be perceived as a ploy to put additional pressure on Pakistan; the response would be equally unmeasured and misdirected.51 Like- wise, tampering with Pakistan’s sea-lanes could work safely only to an extent. Any large-scale internal unrest on account of food shortages or effective cessa- tion of commercial activity due to blockage of fuel supplies through Karachi would most certainly engender a response beyond a certain point. Once public pressure mounted, Pakistan’s chief security stakeholders would be bound to re- act. In a state of panic or nervousness, a freakish response could not be ruled out.
A destabilized state in Pakistan’s main urban centers would be a godsend for the lethal cocktail of militant groups hoping to reenact “26/11” (as the 26–29 November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai is known). The existing imbroglio in Karachi is an apt example. Perennially simmering with ethnic and sectarian vio- lence, the metropolis now hosts one of the world’s largest Pashtun concentra- tions. Scores of Taliban and al-Qa‘ida insurgents fleeing Malakand, South Waziristan, and now Helmand have found sanctuary there.52 The recent arrests in Karachi of some top leaders of Afghan Taliban and al-Qa‘ida (including those of Mullah Baradar and Ameer Muawiya by Pakistani and American intelligence forces) are demonstrations of this fact.53
The 26/11 attack lifted off from the shores of Karachi. Its alleged perpetrator, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is now a formidable terror enterprise, endeavoring to compete with al-Qa‘ida. It has relations with factions of the Taliban and several other jihadi outfits.54 The organization is also believed to have developed the ca- pacity to launch sea-based operations. According to reports the founding leader of LeT, Hafiz M. Saeed, wanted by India for involvement in the Mumbai attacks, has suddenly resumed his activities, mouthing venomous anti-India slogans and promising to liberate Kashmir.55 Also, with tens of thousands of fishing boats, small craft, and other unregulated commercial traffic plying continuously along the coasts of Sindh, Makran, Gujrat, and Maharashtra, coastal security in the area is deeply exposed, despite efforts on both sides since 2008.56 Making the most of volatility and coastal vulnerabilities, Karachi-based insurgents could or- chestrate a new terror assault on India, to provoke a reprisal.57
That the international community will always back New Delhi against Paki- stan is, however, a misplaced notion. India may well take a leaf from the recent NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels, where Pakistan not only scored a military/diplomatic triumph but effectively truncated India’s strategic gains in Afghanistan.58
IS COERCION WORN OUT?
Since the overt exhibitions of their nuclear potentials in 1998, Pakistan and In- dia have returned from the brink on three occasions. The years since then have also been studded with diplomatic standoffs. The Kargil conflict in 1999 re- mained a local affair, with the two armies and air forces battling it out on and over the frozen peaks. The Indian Navy too played a role as an instrument of co- ercion. In June 1999, its Western Fleet was reinforced with elements from the Eastern Fleet, prompting Pakistan Navy to go on full alert. A beefed-up Indian Navy force later conducted exercises in the northern Arabian Sea. Also—the lone Indian carrier, INS Viraat, being in refit—trials of the use of a con- tainership deck as a platform for Sea Harrier aircraft were carried out in Goa. The aims of these exercises were to demonstrate the buildup of the Indian Navy’s strength to the Pakistan Navy and to display its assets and readiness for all-out conflict. Between 21 and 29 June 1999 the Indian Navy deployed missile ships and corvettes in a forward posture. Expecting economic blockade, the Pakistan Navy escorted national oil tankers and commenced surveillance sorties along the coast.59 International pressure and a 4 July accord in Washington finally con- strained Pakistan to withdraw to its original position.60
In December 2001 an attack on the parliament in New Delhi induced India to amass four-fifths of its armed forces along the borders with Pakistan. Islamabad reacted in kind.61 The two sides remained “eyeball to eyeball” for almost ten months before India decided to stand down.
In the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Indian leadership was seen spitting fire, threatening Pakistan with a punitive action. News of possible surgi- cal strikes by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan, against the major urban center of Lahore and nearby Muridke, site of the headquarters of LeT, was rife. The incident also brought to a halt the peace process that had begun in June 1997. The tense period saw Indian generals enunciating provocative new mili- tarydoctrinesanditsarmyconducting“ColdStart”exercisesontheborders.Yet all this failed to draw the intended concessions from Pakistan.62 India may have received a nudge from Washington, but by now, after fourteen long months, the prolonged face-to-face was having a telling impact on both sides. Coercion had run out of steam, reached a tipping point. New Delhi indicated willingness to re- sume parleys.63
It is clear that repeated application of coercion is rendering the instrument ineffective. Both sides maintain their critical territorial-cum-ideological stand- points, stemming mainly from the Kashmir issue. Pakistan is not going to allow its own subjugation, and the Pakistan Army is not going to yield to Indian de- mands on issues that it deems central to the nation’s ideology.64 For its part, and
for reasons of politics and regional clout, India must point to Kashmir unrest as externally abetted and all terror attacks as radiating from Pakistan. The persis- tence of the respective stances of each side is further reinforced by the fact that the risks and consequences of nuclear escalation have not yet sunk into the col- lective minds of the two societies; nuclear devastation still remains largely an ab- stract concept. As a result there is no effort to deal with the issue of nuclear-war risk, independent of the Kashmir issue.65 There was no comparably dangerous territorial stake for the nuclear adversaries of the Cold War.
THE OPTIONS
Pakistan’s security situation is precarious, and the future is not bright. On one hand, the differences between Washington and Islamabad that lately irked and angered the latter now seem to be thawing.66 But on the other, New Delhi’s stra- tegic interests being “exactly aligned” with those of Washington, India is getting extensive mileage out of Pakistan’s current predicament.67 Despite the recent diplomatic successes, then, Pakistan’s choices, if it is to address strategic asym- metry and ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces, are contracting rapidly.
Pakistan’s existing means of delivering nuclear strikes are susceptible to air and missile attacks. The Indian air defense system—potentially including the Prithvi Air Defence capability and the upcoming U.S.-Israeli-Russian Ballistic Missile Shield—reduces the possibility of penetration by either missiles or fight- ers.68 The option of missiles with multiple warheads also is open to debate. For now, the dispersal of the nuclear arsenal poses a question mark. The cutting- edge technologies in the Indian inventory—surveillance means like IRS satel- lites and the MiG-25, the day/night-capable Israeli surveillance satellite RISAT, along with platforms like the Phalcon AWACS, Su-30 aircraft, etc.—put its value in question.
Nonetheless, the recent parleys in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) threaten to freeze the imbalance in the stocks of these materials of Pakistan and India to the distinct advantage of the latter. New Delhi gains from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and a consequent Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver that has allowed India to conclude agreements with countries Russia, France, and more recently the United Kingdom to supply it with nuclear fuel.69 Pakistan’s resource imbalance, geographic disproportion (differences in landmass), and now the launch of S-2 provide India a convincing capacity to strike all over Pakistan from the deep south while ensuring the sur- vivability of its own forces.70 In the absence of Pakistani potential to deliver a nu- clear riposte, an economic threshold would certainly be reached in days if Pakistan’s sea-lanes, particularly from the Persian Gulf, were to be obstructed.
Second Strike on board Conventional Submarines: The Agosta 90B
In October 2008, the chief of staff of the Pakistan Navy claimed that his service was capable of deploying strategic weapons at sea.71 The details as to how strate- gic or nuclear weapons would be deployed and whether Pakistan had developed a capability to launch missiles from submarines were not disclosed. But it is widely speculated that work on arming the Pakistan Navy’s conventional sub- marines with nuclear-tipped missiles has been going on now for quite some time. A sea version of the Babur cruise missile is thought to have been developed by the country’s strategic organizations. If that is true, Pakistan would not be the first country to arm conventionally powered submarines with such a capability. Israel’s 1,900-ton Dolphin-class, German-origin submarines are believed to be part of the country’s second-strike capability. They provide Tel Aviv the crucial third pillar of nuclear defense complementing the country’s much vaunted land and air ramparts.72
Pakistan Navy’s Agosta 90B, or Khalid-class, attack submarines (SSKs) carry crews of highly skilled and professionally trained officers and men. The subma- rines, designed by DCN (now DCNS) of France, are a version of the Agosta series, with improved performance, a new combat system, and AIP (air- independent propulsion) for better submerged endurance. A higher level of au- tomation has reduced the crew from fifty-four to thirty-six. Other improve- ments include a new battery, for increased range; a deeper diving capability of 320 meters, resulting from the use of new materials, including HLES 80 steel; and a reduced acoustic signature, through the installation of new suspension and isolation systems.73
Three Agosta 90Bs were ordered by Pakistan in 1994. The first, Khalid (1999), was constructed in France; the second, Saad (2003), was assembled at the Naval Dockyard (Karachi); and the third, Hamza (2008), was constructed and assem- bled in Karachi. These submarines are equipped with diesel-electric propulsion and the MESMA (Module d’Énergie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP system.74 The diesel-electric plant consists of two SEMT-Pielstick 16 PA4 V185 VG diesels, providing 3,600 horsepower, and a 2,200-kilowatt electric motor driving a single propeller.
Pakistan is the only country bordering the Indian Ocean to have acquired AIP submarines. The two-hundred-kilowatt MESMA liquid-oxygen system in- creases significantly the submerged endurance of the submarine at four knots.75 It consists essentially of a turbine receiving high-pressure steam generated by a boiler that uses hot gases from the combustion of a gaseous mixture of ethanol and liquid oxygen.76 The AIP suite causes an 8.6-meter extension of the original 67.6-meter hull, increasing the boat’s submerged displacement from 1,760 tons to 1,980.77
The Agosta 90B is equipped with a fully integrated SUBTICS combat system. SUBTICS processes signals from submarine sensors and determines the tactical situation by track association, fusion, synthesis, and management, as well as trajectory plotting. This track management allows appreciation of the surface picture by the commander and consequent handling of weapons-related com- mand and control functions.
The Agosta 90B submarine has four bow-mounted 1Q63 A Mod 2 torpedo tubes, 533 mm in diameter, and carries a mixed load of sixteen torpedoes and missiles. The boat can also fire tube-launched SM39 Exocet subsurface-to- surface missiles, capable of hitting targets out to twenty-seven nautical miles (fifty kilometers) away. The sea-skimming missile has inertial guidance and ac- tive radar homing and travels at 0.9 Mach.78 Target range and bearing data are downloaded into the Exocet’s computer via SUBTICS. The boat can also launch the DM2A4 wire-guided, active/passive, wake-homing torpedo, adding a new dimension to its firepower. Targets up to forty-five kilometers away can now be engaged.
In the short term (within five years), Pakistan Navy Khalid-class submarines with their cutting-edge technology could be armed to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Several formidable challenges would, however, have to be over- come. Missile installation and subsequent integration with the onboard combat system, as well as with the nuclear command-and-control infrastructure (C4I network), could be daunting tasks.79 The combat system, meant for conven- tional weapons, may require major changes to accommodate nonconventional weapons. During operational deployments a Pakistan Navy submarine carrying nuclear weapons would be under the operational control not of Commander Pakistan Fleet, as in existing practice, but of the National Command Authority.
Perhaps a greater challenge would be ensuring foolproof communications between the submerged submarine and the shore-based command. An elec- tromagnetic pulse following a nuclear burst would disrupt the earth’s elec- tromagnetic spectrum, resulting in a partial or complete breakdown of com- munications, including shore–submarine. The problem is compounded by the absence of domestic communications satellites. A very-low-frequency (VLF) communications system can provide an answer, to some extent.80 A sustained program of tests and trials would be needed to develop a robust communica- tion system that can sustain such a contingency.
The submarine’s crew, obviously specially selected, would also require exten- sive training in handling all kinds of unforeseen events, developing standard op- erating procedures and planning ways to minimize uncertainty on board in the absence of communications.81 Test firings of missiles will be required to ensure crew confidence as well as weapon-systems credibility.
Numerous issues of a technical as well as an operational nature will thus have to be addressed at each tier to integrate the vessel fully into national strategic forces. Close cooperation and coordination between the Development and Em- ployment Control committees under the National Command Authority and strategic organizations like the Kahuta Research Laboratories, the National En- gineering and Scientific Commission, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Re- search Organization, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the Maritime Technology Complex, and the National Development Complex will also be es- sential at every step. These organizations will have to rise above intra- establishment rivalries and jealousies that could get in way of smooth and timely achievement of milestones.
A word of caution may be in order here. The Pakistan Navy once enjoyed a sharp edge over the Indian Navy’s conventional submarines, like the Soviet- designed Foxtrot-class boats, which were noisier than the French submarines operated by Pakistan. But the Indian Navy has not only been catching up but is now on the verge of surpassing Pakistani submarines. Its French Scorpènes are supposedly a generation ahead of the Agosta 90B.82 On a positive note, however, the recent introduction of advance platforms like the SAAB Erieye airborne early warning and control system and Il-78 refuelers by Pakistan Air Force, be- sides bolstering Pakistan’s strategic capability both on land and at sea, will sig- nificantly strengthen the nation’s air defenses.83
Employing the P-3C
The P-3C Orion long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (LRMP) has a proven mar- itime surveillance and reconnaissance record that dates back to the Cold War. Several old and new versions of the aircraft continue to serve in more than eigh- teen countries, including the United States. It is a turboprop, multidimensional aircraft commonly known to the naval community as an “airborne destroyer.”
The Pakistan Navy first acquired P-3Cs in 1991. The present inventory is suit- ably modernized and equipped with cutting-edge sensors and weapons to track, identify, and hunt surface and subsurface targets. The aircraft can carry a mixed payload of eight Harpoon missiles and six torpedoes, besides mines and bombs. It has endurance in excess of eighteen hours and can operate as low as three hun- dred feet, making its detection quite difficult.
In the recent past, the Pakistan Navy brokered a fresh deal with the United States for eight refurbished P-3Cs. In addition to improved sensors, a digital tracking system, electro-optical and infrared sensors, a chaff dispenser, an elec- tronic support measures (ESM) suite, and sonobuoy detection system, the new batch of P-3Cs is to be fitted with inverse synthetic-aperture radar (ISAR). ISAR is a state-of-the-art radar that provides a dual advantage. First, it eases the
Identification problem by displaying a target’s silhouette, a physical image, which improves the overall effectiveness of tracking and attacking. The other advantage is variable power output, which makes ISAR difficult to identify via ESM.
Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian Navy too concluded a deal with the United States for eight of a new type of LRMP—the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA, or P-8 Poseidon, the successor to the P-3C). The In- dian Navy is currently operating older-generation LRMPs, Russian Il-38s and Tu-142s. The jet-driven Poseidon will be suitably converted for anti-surface- vessel and antisubmarine roles. The prototype is, however, not likely to roll out before 2012, after which its true capabilities would be known.
The P-3C is a mainstay of the Pakistan Navy’s offensive arm. With its ad- vanced weapon and sensor outfit, it gives the Pakistan Navy a clear qualitative edge over the Indian Navy’s LRMP capability—at least for now. Thanks to its load-carrying capacity, altitude advantage, and other aerodynamic character- istics, the P-3C could be armed with land-attack missiles or strategic weapons. This modification, however, would require specialized equipment—currently a grey area in the Pakistan Navy. A suitably equipped P-3C could serve as a powerful backup to an undersea second strike on board Agosta 90Bs. A well-thought-out employment strategy could render the P-3C a potent con- stituent of the nuclear triad.
The Medium and Long Terms (beyond Five Years)
The absence of any opposition by the United States or the rest of the interna- tional community to the prolonged and sustained Russian assistance to India in the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent potential was conspicuous. That is not all; the now-shaping Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has never caused any up- roar in the West or among the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Besides raising con- cerns on proliferation, the deal significantly undercuts the efficacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.84 This provides Pakistan enough justification either to lease nuclear submarines or eventually development its own, or both.85 It is not a question of matching nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon but about preserving stability and ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces. The na- tional maritime objectives and tasks assigned to the Pakistan Navy may not war- rant a nuclear submarine in its inventory, but maintenance of deterrence, particularly in the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region, certainly does merit consideration of it.
In China, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently involved in one of the world’s most ambitious submarine expansion and construction pro- grams. It includes acquisition of conventional submarines, like the Russian Kilo
(SS), and the construction of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN and the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN. These submarines are expected to be much more modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation boats.86
In 1983 the PLAN built an eight-thousand-ton Xia-class SSBN, reportedly armed with twelve JL-1 missiles with a range of a thousand miles. The subma- rine twice test-fired its missiles but never ventured beyond China’s regional wa- ters. The new Type 094 Jin, which will replace the single Xia, will carry between ten and twelve JL-2 SLBMs.87 However, the PLAN has major handicaps in its limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea or expose these plat- forms on strategic patrols.88
The once slowly expanding military ties between Beijing and Islamabad have now matured into a strategic partnership, as is evident from local production of the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter, the Al-Khalid tank, and F-22P frigates. This partnership is further evidenced by the PLAN’s regular participation in the large multinational AMAN series of exercises hosted by the Pakistan Navy. Pakistan’s strategic community and Beijing could plan the training and subsequent lease of a nuclear-powered submarine. The PLAN’s Xia submarine could be an appro- priate start. A pool of selected Pakistan Navy officers could be trained to operate an SSBN, with theoretical/academic work ashore followed by operational train- ing at sea and finally a strategic deployment. Though such a plan seems ambi- tious and the PLA Navy’s SSBNs rarely prowl far, this remains a viable choice that would serve the two countries well strategically.89
Deterrence is not a passive concept; it must be stepped up in proportion to an adversary’s increases in arsenal or delivery means. For reasons all too well known, Pakistan’s principal security perceptions will remain India-centric. To keep deterrence credible, the indispensability of continuously bolstering Paki- stan’s nuclear assets, including delivery means, cannot be overstressed. The in- ternational community would react sharply were Pakistan to field a sea-based nuclear deterrent, given the country’s security situation and fears of radicaliza- tion (real or imaginary) in Western minds.90 Timing, therefore, is crucial. Paki- stan is currently too dependent on the American and multilateral financial institutions for keeping its economy afloat, and that situation is not likely to al- ter for the next few years. But if the issue is not addressed, Pakistan’s hard-earned nuclear stability may erode beyond recovery.
The role of armed forces was once to win a war if diplomacy had failed; in the nuclear age their role is to prevent warfare from breaking out.91 Despite being on the wrong side of history, Pakistan has no option but to take some hard decisions.
NOTES
The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Pakistan Navy or Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.
1. For the Indian “Cold Start” doctrine, see Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–90. In the epi- graph, General Kayani is explaining why he is India-centric, at the Annual NATO Military Committee meeting, Brussels, in February 2010.
2. “PM Launches INS Arihant in Visakha- patnam,” Times of India, 26 July 2009; “Deep Impact,” India Today, 3 August 2009, p. 48; and Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 August 2009, p. 6. The correct current designation of the In- dian Navy Advanced Technology Vessel is S-2, according to a former Indian Navy chief. The vessel will become INS Arihant only upon commissioning, in due course. See Ad- miral Arun Prakash (Ret.), “A Step before the Leap: Putting India’s ATV Project in Perspec- tive,” Force (September 2009), available at www.maritimeindia.org/.
3. “India Finally Launches ATV,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 August 2009, p. 6.
4. See “India N-sub to Trigger Arms Race,” The Nation, 28 July 2009, available at www.nation .com.pk/.
5. “Second Strike Challenges,” Daily Times, 11 September 2009, available at www.dailytimes .com.pk.
6. A billion dollars were spent in 2005 alone. See Eric Margolis, “India Rules the Waves,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 2005), p. 66.
7. “SSK Kilo Class Attack Submarine, Russia,” Naval-technology.com.
8. See “The Secret Undersea Weapon,” India Today, 28 January 2008, p. 52.
9. “India’s Nuclear Sub,” The Nation, 28 March 2007, available at www.nation.com.pk/.
10. The compact light-water reactor has been variously mentioned in documents as being of 80, 83, 85, and 90 MW capacity.
11. Work on two more Arihant-class SSBNs is al- ready under way. See also Prakash, “A Step before the Leap.”
12. The U.S. Navy has twenty-five different types of submarine reactors and is running the ninth generation since the first was developed and put in use in 1954 on board USS Nauti- lus. See ibid.
13. U.S. Air Force, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, April 2009), p. 23.
14. “Sagarika Missile Test Fired Successfully,” Hindu, 27 February 2008.
15. Capable of carrying twelve tube-launched ballistic missiles, S-2 is planned to be initially armed with 700 km Sagarika (K-15) ballistic missiles, which can carry a payload of 500 kg. The follow-on versions of the submarine are expected to carry the 3,500 km K-X intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with multiple warheads. The ultimate goal is to arm these submarines with the three-stage, 5,000 km Agni III SL (the submarine- launched version of the Agni III IRBM).
16. Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia, China, India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), pp. 243–44.
17. The 4 January 2003 press release was titled “Cabinet Committee on Security’s Review of the Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine.”
18. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis,” Strategic Anal- ysis 33, no. 3 (May 2009), p. 409.
19. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India and Pakistan, Nuclear-Related Programs and Aspirations at Sea,” in South Asia’s Nuclear Security Di- lemma: India, Pakistan, and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2005), p. 82.
20. Quoted and glossed in James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, and Toshi Yoshihara, In- dian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Cen- tury (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 36 [emphasis supplied by Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara]. Kautilya, a court adviser around 300 BC, is famous today as the author of what
some consider an ultra-Machiavellian work of political science, Arthasastra (see, among others, Pakistan Defence, www.defence.pk/ forums/). In the statecraft and formulation of foreign policy, Indian strategists now lean heavily on Kautilyan philosophy.
21. In December 1823, spurred by a dispute over Russian territorial claims in the Pacific Northwest, President James Monroe in- formed Congress “that the American conti- nents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as a subject for future colonization by any European powers” (text available at www.ushistory .org/)—that is, were off-limits not only to Russia but to all imperial powers. Monroe further declared that the United States would “consider any attempt on [any European government’s] part to extend [its] system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety.” In the late 1800s, the economic and military power of the United States enabled it to enforce this “Monroe Doctrine.” The doctrine’s greatest extension came with Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 Corollary, which inverted the original meaning of the doctrine and came to justify unilateral American intervention in Latin America. To this day, the U.S. Navy contin- ues to serve as the implementing instrument of this policy overseas.
22. See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia’s Mari- time Future,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 6 (No- vember 2008), p. 998.
23. Ibid., p. 1000.
24. See Vice Admiral P. S. Das, “Coastal and Maritime Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Indian Defence Review 24, no. 1 (January–March 2009), p. 127.
25. See “Address by the President, Naval Fleet Review, Visakhapatnam, 12 February 2006,” Indian Defence Review 21, no. 1 (January– March 2006), p. 8.
26. “Power Struggle,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 December 2009, p. 22.
27. Quoted in Stephen J. Blank, Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute,
September 2005), p. 23, available at www .carlisle.army.mil/ssi.
28. See also Holmes and Yoshihara, “India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia’s Maritime Fu- ture,” p. 1003.
29. For instance, the Type 15A frigates now nearing completion at Mumbai (Mazagon Dockyard) are expected to be equipped with sixteen vertical-launch Brahmos cruise mis- siles. In addition, some warships are also due to be equipped with the U.S.-supplied Aegis radar system. As a powerful platform for force projection, the forthcoming Indian Navy carriers—INS Vikramaditya (ex– Admiral Gorshkov) and the indigenous carrier designated the “Air Defence Ship” (ADS)—will carry on their decks an array of sixteen to eighteen MiG-29Ks, six to eight Ka-31 antisubmarine and airborne-early- warning helicopters, and a number of antisurface helicopters. This will allow the Indian Navy to maintain a strong presence along both the eastern and western coasts. See Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 79–80.
30. “Experts: India Must Counter China in Littorals,” Defense News, 12 January 2009, p. 14, available at www.defensenews.com.
31. See Holmes and Yoshihara, “India’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia’s Maritime Future,” pp. 1003–1005.
32. Henry A. Kissinger, “Our Nuclear Night- mare,” Newsweek, 16 February 2009, p. 30.
33. See Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective (Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), p. 230.
34. Shireen M. Mazari, “Understanding Paki- stan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Strategic Studies 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), p. 5.
35. Ken Berry, The Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Facilities (Barton, ACT, Australia: Interna- tional Commission on Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament, August 2009), p. 12.
36. See also Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Assessment of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines,” in Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia, ed. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Re- search Institute, 2004), p. 88.
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102 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
37. See Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s Nu- clear Doctrine,” p. 8.
38. Jaspal, “Assessment of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines,” p. 87.
39. “Economic Threat May Push Pakistan to Go Nuclear,” Asia Times Online, 6 February 2002, www.atimes.com/ind-pak.
40. See also Salik, Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, p. 143.
41. Verghese Koithara, Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia, CISAC Working Paper (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Se- curity and Cooperation, March 2003), p. 6. CEP: “An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in deter- mining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a mis- sile’s projectiles are expected to fall.” U.S. De- fense Dept., DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod _dictionary/, s.v. “CEP.”
42. “Drastic Decline in Chenab Water Flows,” Dawn, 21 January 2010; “Pak-India Water Talks Remain Inconclusive,” Dawn, 31 March 2010; “Water Dispute and War Risk,” Dawn Economic and Business Review, 18–24 January 2010; all available at www.dawn.com.
43. The Pakistan National Shipping Corpora- tion’s limited number of national-flag carri- ers transport 45 percent of the country’s liquid, and 5 percent of its dry, cargo. Rear Admiral Mohammad Shafi, “Formulation of Maritime Strategy” (talk delivered at Pakistan Navy War College, 25 September 2006).
44. “Agriculture Productivity and Food Secu- rity,” The News, 1 February 2010, www .thenews.com.pk.
45. According to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, www.mpnr.gov.pk/). Some 16.5 million tons of crude oil and pe- troleum products were imported in FY 2007–2008, at a cost of $7.4 billion. See Dawn Economic and Business Review, 1–7 March 2010, www.dawn.com, and Daily Times, 12 February 2009, available at www.dailytimes .com.pk.
46. “Cargo Handling at KPT&PQA” data ob- tained from KPT. The TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) is a standard measurement of volume in container shipping. One TEU
refers to a container twenty feet long, eight feet wide, and 8.6 feet high. The majority of containers are either twenty or forty feet long; a forty-foot container is two TEUs.
47. See also Koithara, Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia, p. 10.
48. See also “Limited War in Nuclear Overhang,” Dawn, 5 February 2010, www.dawn.com.
49. See Koithara, Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia, p. 26.
50. India maintains that it is not holding back the water, that the reduced flow is a result of climate-based water scarcity. However, as an upper riparian state India is obliged under in- ternational law to take measures to minimize water scarcity. Experts maintain that nonresolution of the problem will aggravate tension between the two bellicose neighbors, as it will be conflated with the Kashmir dis- pute. See “Water War with India,” Dawn, 20 February 2010, www.dawn.com.
51. Ibid.
52. Successive operations by the Pakistan Army—first in Malakand, Rah-i-Rast, later in South Waziristan, Rah-i-Nijat, and now in Operation MOSHTARAK, in neighboring Af- ghanistan—compelled the militants to seek refuge in Pakistan’s southern port city of Karachi, which has a population of roughly twenty million.
53. “On an Upward Curve,” The News, 22 Febru- ary 2010, www.thenews.com.pk; “Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban’s Top Commander,” New York Times, 16 February 2010.
54. The U.S. State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin, recently stated that LeT could become a threat to the West like al-Qa‘ida; it has the size and global reach of Hezbollah. The Nation, 21 January 2010, www.nation.com.pak; Dawn, 21 Janu- ary 2010, www.dawn.com.
55. “Back in Action,” The News, 14 February 2010, www.thenews.com.pk. See also Daniel Markey, Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escala- tion, CFR Memo 6 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2010), p. 1.
56. Das, “Coastal and Maritime Security,” p. 121.
57. See “The Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Visit to New Delhi, and Islamabad, 20 and 22 January 2010,” Siasat Daily, 20 January 2010,
www.siasat.com, and Dawn, 22 January 2010, www.dawn.com.
58. “General in the Hood,” Times of India, 22 March 2010; “Endgame Afghanistan: Impli- cations for Pakistan,” The News, 28 March 2010, www.thenews.com.pk.
59. Y. M. Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (Dehra Dun, India: Natraj, 2002), pp. 436–39.
60. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), p. 865
61. India launched Operation PARAKRAM, the largest military exercise ever carried out by any Asian country. Its prime objective is still unclear but appears to have been to prepare the Indian Army for any future nuclear con- flict with Pakistan.
62. The Indian Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Deepak Kapoor, spoke of the possibility of “a limited war in a nuclear overhang”; General Kayani responded that the “Pakistan Army is fully alert and alive to the full spectrum of threat, which continued to exist in conventional and unconventional domains. As a responsible nuclear capable state, Pakistan Army would contribute to strategic stability and strategic restraint as per the stated policy of the gov- ernment. But at the same time, it [the mili- tary] will continue to maintain the necessary wherewithal to deter and if required, defeat aggressive design, in any form or shape such as a firmed up proactive strategy or a Cold Start doctrine.” As reported in The News, 2 January 2010, www.thenews.com.pk, and Dawn, 2 January 2010, www.dawn.com. For the statement of General Kapoor, Dawn, 25 November 2009, www.dawn.com, and The Current Affairs.com, 24 November 2009. Also Maleeha Lodhi, “Limits of Coercive Di- plomacy,” The News, 9 February 2010, www.thenews.com.pk. See also Markey, Ter- rorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation, p. 2.
63. In the last week of January 2010 the Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, called her Pakistani counterpart, inviting him to Delhi for talks.
64. See Markey, Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Es- calation, pp. 2–3.
65. See also Koithara, Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia, p. 25. For an examina- tion of the likely consequences, see Paul D.
Taylor, “India and Pakistan: Thinking about the Unthinkable,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 40–51.
66. “Rebuffing U.S., Pakistan Balks at Crack- down,” New York Times, 15 December 2009.
67. Fareed Zakaria, “The Prize Is India,” Newsweek, 30 November 2009, p. 5.
68. Maleeha Lodhi, “India’s Provocative Military Doctrine,” The News, 5 January 2010, www .thenews.com.pk; “Meeting India’s Military Challenge,” The News, 28 January 2010, www.thenews.com.pk.
69. Maleeha Lodhi, “FMCT and Strategic Stabil- ity,” The News, 26 January 2010, www.thenews .com.pk. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multinational body formed in 1974 to reduce nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and transfer of materials usable in nuclear- weapon development. The original seven member nations had grown by 2009 to forty-six.
70. See Koithara, Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia, p. 16.
71. Dawn, 15 October 2008, www.dawn.com; “Pak Navy Capable of Deploying Strategic Weapons at Sea,” Defence Talk, 17 October 2008, www.defencetalk.com/.
72. “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves with Subma- rine Missile Test,” Sunday Times (London), 18 June 2000.
73. “SSK Agosta 90B Class Attack Submarine, France,” Naval-technology.com.
74. Diesel generators and MESMA both charge batteries that drive the propulsion motors when the vessel is submerged.
75. “Pakistan Commissions AIP-Equipped Agosta,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 October 2008, p. 31
76. “SSK Agosta 90B Class Attack Submarine, France.”
77. “Pakistan Commissions AIP-Equipped Agosta,” p. 31.
78. Jyotirmoy Banerjee, “Readying the Indian Navy for the Twenty-first Century,” Asian Af- fairs 26, no. 1 (January–March 2004), p. 9.
79. Integration will be required unless the missile is a “stand-alone system,” complete in itself, like the Harpoon. C4I: command, control,
MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN 103
104 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
communications, computers, and intelligence.
80. In VLF communications, a submarine tows a long reception antenna, to which a huge shore-based antenna transmits messages. Such an antenna is vulnerable to air strikes. Currently no such arrangement exists in the Pakistan Navy.
81. The elite crew on board Israeli submarine Dolphin is specially selected. Nicknamed “Force 700” for the average 700 points (equivalent to an IQ of 130–40) its crew members score in psychological tests devised by the Israelis, the vessel carries five officers, also specially selected, responsible solely for the missile warheads. “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves with Submarine Missile Test.”
82. Banerjee, “Readying the Indian Navy for the Twenty-first Century,” p. 9.
83. The Nation, 30 December 2009, available at www.nation.com.pk.
84. On 29 November 2009, the Indian prime minister announced that India was willing to join the NPT as a nuclear-weapons state. The move was seen as a ploy to deflect arguments that New Delhi had to accept CTBT, an agreement that would ban all testing of nu- clear weapons. Newsweek, 14 December 2009, p. 18.
85. “Strategic Stability in South Asia,” The News, 1 August 2009, www.thenews.com.pk.
86. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Moderniza- tion: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities —Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL 33153 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, up- dated 4 April 2008), p. CRS-7, available at fpc.state.gov/. See also Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008), p. 83, and Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Maturing Navy,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 93.
87. Kelvin Fong, “Asian Submarine Forces on the Rise,” Asian Defence Journal (May 2009), p. 25; “China Expands Sub Fleet,” Washington Times, 2 March 2007.
88. U.S. Defense Dept., Military Power of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009), p. 24.
89. Banerjee, “Readying the Indian Navy for the Twenty-first Century,” p. 14.
90. Views elicited from defense analyst Gen. Talat Masood (Ret.), in an online exchange.
91. K. Subrahmanyam, “Generally Speaking,” Yahoo India News, 8 January 2010, www.in .news.yahoo.com.
The Enemy’s Mind: Indian view of Pakistan’s defence strategy
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Pakistan’s Strategies in Central Asia
“Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia … We offer the critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra- regionally and interregionally”
— President Gen. Pervez Musharraf
June 15, 2006
Pakistan took due notice of the geo-strategic importance of Central Asian states in the changed security paradigm after the end of the Cold War. Initial efforts by Pakistan to make some inroad into Central Asia may not have succeeded because of its unclear foreign policy objectives, but Pakistan remains an important player in the region. In fact, its geo-strategic location makes it difficult for Central Asian regimes to ignore Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have improved. In the unfolding geo-political situation, the current Central Asian regimes are trying to build new equations with Islamabad.
Analysis of Pakistan’s strategies in the Central Asian region constitutes the principal focus of this paper. It argues that various economic and geo strategic factors have shaped Pakistan’s policy towards Central Asia, but fear of India’s influence in this region remains a predominant factor in the formulation of its strategies. In fact, Pakistan’s foreign policy, since its very inception, has been conditioned by two interrelated factors, i.e., the fear of India and an urge to seek a strategic balance with India. Another important element of its foreign policy has been its self-proclaimed strong attachment to Islamic ideology.1 These strands determine Islamabad’s policy towards Central Asia as well. Therefore, Pakistan’s relation with the CARs needs to be examined in the context of its overall foreign and military policies.
Pakistan’s adversarial relations with neighbouring India play a vital role in the formation of its national security plans.2 Time and again this has been articulated within Pakistan.3 Its policy towards the United States (US) has always been premised on the consideration that military assistance from the US would help Pakistan attain parity with India.4Its strong politico-military ties with China also seek to counterbalance India’s influence in the region. At another level, its desire to be the leader of the Islamic bloc is premised on the consideration that this would enhance Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic bloc, which, in turn, can be used against India. Pakistan has always tried to project itself as the only country that can stand up to India in the region. This has been the cornerstone of Islamabad’s strategic thinking.5
Pakistan’s foreign policy-making is highly personalised and centralised, but the army plays a big role in setting the parameters within which Islamabad conducts its relations with the outside world. The military has a significant influence that even elected governments cannot ignore. The role of the intelligence agencies, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is equally significant. Also, the religious orientation of the state accords a special legitimacy to the role of religion in the training of the military personnel. There is, hence, a curious blend of loyalties of the armed forces to the state of Pakistan and the religion of Islam that serves as the ideological glue. Some scholars believe that “religion is very-very central to the Pakistan’s military strategic thinking.”6
A few scholars have argued that Pakistan’s foreign policy-making process is influenced by three contending schools of thought but that are united in their hostility towards India. They differ on the strategy to be pursued by them to counter India. The first school of thought lays emphasis on ‘surrender’ and believes in a uni-polar world. It maintains that Pakistan has little choice but to rely on and surrender its policy options to the US as a balancer. The second school of thought advocates ‘independence’ and has a multipolar worldview. While acknowledging the importance of the US, it wants Pakistan to reach out to and benefit from its relationship with other major powers like Japan, China and Russia. This school argues that such a relationship would offer Islamabad considerable flexibility. The third school of thought emphasises on ‘Islam’ and the Islamic nature of the Pakistani state. It also subscribes to the unipolar worldview and argues for alliances based on Pakistan’s ideological and religious interests.7
It is also often argued that within the Pakistani establishment there are either “hawks or liberal pacifists, but no realists”.8 These varied nuances demand serious consideration. It is important to note that Pakistani rulers and the military in particular, at some point of time, have been influenced by these three schools of thought while formulating Pakistan’s policy towards the CARs. Before examining Pakistan’s present-day strategies in the CARs, it is important to understand its involvement in Central Asia and Afghanistan prior to the emergence of the independent Central Asian states in 1991.
Background
Pakistan’s quest for security led to its involvement in Central Asia much before the CARs emerged as independent states in 1991.The military regime under President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq encouraged the Afghan mujahideen to spread out to the erstwhile Central Asian republics within the then Soviet Union and the CIA supplied arms to the mujahideen through the ISI to conduct these forays. The fear of expanding Soviet influence in Afghanistan and beyond led to Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia.9
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 added a new dimension to Pakistan’s existing threat perception. It was of the view that after consolidating its position within Afghanistan, Moscow would try to access the ‘warm waters’ of the Arabian Sea through Pakistan.10Islamabad was able to sell this idea to Washington and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it became a ‘frontline’ state for the US. This threat perception was crafted by the Pakistani leadership to cement its ties with Washington, which otherwise was at an all-time low since the military takeover in 1977. It also helped Pakistan achieve its larger strategic goal of acquiring more military and economic aid from the US so as to attain parity with India.11 To counter India’s influence in Afghanistan, because of its earlier ties in Kabul, Pakistan always wanted to see a friendly Pashtun government in Kabul since the 1950s. And since the 1980s, Pakistan projected Afghanistan as a source of its “strategic depth” in the event of war with India.
As part of a strategy to destabilise the Soviet Union, a conscious policy was adopted by Pakistan to encourage Islamic influence in and infiltrate Islamist mujahideen into the Central Asian states. In 1984, Afghan groups trained by Pakistani intelligence sent 5,000 copies of the Koran across the border. This group had drawn in people living in northern Afghanistan– mainly Uzbeks. Moreover, the base camps of groups entering Soviet territory were located north of Peshawar in Chitral district on the border with Afghanistan. In fact, the policy of exporting jihad to Central Asia had an impact there during the Soviet era, which was visible in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Agreements of April 1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The Tajik civil war broke out immediately after the Central Asian republics gained independence in 1991.
In the late 1970s, dissident Islamic underground parties had began to form in Tajikistan, and the Tajik nationalists were seen to be gaining in popularity and influence by the end of the 1980s. However, real disturbances did not occur until the early 1990s. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and Tajikistan declared its independence in 1991. The Tajik civil war started in 1992 and continued till 1997.
Islamabad did not make any change in its military-political strategy during Benazir Bhutto’s period. Reports of the Pakistani intelligence services and their role in promoting Islamic radicalism in Central Asia appeared in the writings of General A.A. Liakhovskii, a participant in the Afghan war. According to him, the organisation “Islamic Union of the Northern Peoples of Afghanistan” (Islamskiisoiuz severnykh narodov Afghanistan), created in 1988, launched subversive activities in areas of Central Asia contiguous with Afghanistan, with the goal of liberating Soviet Muslims and creating a “free Turkestan”. Azad Beg headed this organisation, which had its headquarters in Peshawar. According to Liakhovskii, the field commanders of this organisation shipped narcotics, weapons, and subversive (mainly Islamic) literature to the USSR.12
However, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of Cold War considerably altered the geo-strategic scenario in the region. Pakistan lost its role as a ‘frontline state’ thus losing its strategic relevance to the US. The Gulf War further dented Pakistan’s geo-strategic advantage with Washington reinforcing its links with the Persian Gulf region. This period also witnessed improved relations between India-US and India-China. Therefore, the 1990s offered a very different geo-strategic configuration. Another important development during this period was the emergence of the Taliban and its strong ties with Pakistan. The Taliban connection was used by Islamabad to sponsor cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan and Afghanistan became the hub of terrorist activities. These developments had serious implications for the newly independent countries of Central Asia. Jihadi elements from Afghanistan and Pakistan started infiltrating into the neighbouring Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The events of 9/11 once again changed the geo-political landscape with new alignments and realignments taking shape in Central Asia. For the US and Pakistan, Central Asia became an area of great strategic significance. Islamabad, while forced to cooperate with Washington in its global war against terrorism, could manage much-needed economic and military aid for its services in Afghanistan and its sudden reversal of policy towards that country. Post-9/11, Pakistan tried to make inroads into Central Asia with an improved image. It offered shorter routes for Central Asian goods and connectivity with the rest of the world.
Pakistan’s Objectives in Central Asia
Pakistan’s objectives in Central Asia are determined by its political and security imperatives; its economic and commercial gains; countering India’s influence and its desire to be an energy transit-corridor13 in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.14 Pakistan has always desired to expand its influence in Afghanistan and beyond.15 Central Asia is seen as an area of natural expansion for Pakistan. Hafeez Malik believes that Central Asia presents Pakistan with a new security environment “…freed from the nutcracker squeeze the Soviet Union had created through an alliance between Afghanistan and India.”16
Related to Pakistan’s ambition to expand its influence is the desire to be the leader of the Islamic bloc. Albeit this idea has not crystallised, but it has always dominated the thinking of the Pakistani leadership, including Prime Minister Bhutto in the 1970s and Gen. Zia in the 1980s. The debate still remains pertinent to Pakistan’s geo-strategic formulations. The Islamic groups and parties viewed Central Asia as paving the way for an Islamic bloc thus providing an opportunity to unite Muslims in the CARs, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was felt that such a strategic bloc would acquire a central role in securing strategic interests vis-à-vis India or even the Christian-Jewish threat. The emergence of the CARs were perceived as an opportunity to form a large regional grouping stretching from the Arabian Sea in the south to the Black Sea in the west based on the common religious identity of Islam. Importantly, it was seen to offer a huge political and economic benefit to Pakistan.17
In fact, Central Asia does provide Pakistan with numerous opportunities in terms of trade in raw material and manufactured goods, contracting for regular power supply and opening up communications. The resourcerich Central Asia18 is seen as a future source of energy for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Strategies
Geo-Political
After the emergence of the CARs, Pakistan moved actively into Central Asia,19 but policy makers were clearly divided as to what Pakistan would gain out of Central Asia. While some wanted an Islamic revolution in Central Asia, others wanted open trade links through Afghanistan. The dichotomy of views revealed the limits of Pakistan’s Central Asia Policy. Moreover, during this period, the Central Asian leaders were extremely wary of Pakistan because of its involvement in the Afghan war and its support to the mujahideen.20 During the Pakistan-backed Taliban era in Afghanistan, bilateral relations between Pakistan and the Central Asian states touched rock bottom.
After Pakistan joined the global war against terrorism as a frontline state, bilateral relations began to be revisited. During the past few years, frequent visits by Central Asian and Pakistani officials (See Appendix I for Pakistani officials’ visits to CARs) to each other’s states reflect the changing nature of their bilateral relations. A number of agreements have been signed covering such areas as trade and tourism, cultural and economic cooperation during these visits. Pakistan has developed institutionalised arrangements for this purpose. Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) have been established with all the Central Asian states. Under a Special Technical Assistance Programme (STAP) initiated in 1992-93, Pakistan provides training facilities, which are fully funded by Islamabad. The programme includes courses ranging from English language, banking and accountancy to diplomacy.21
In this context President General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 was significant.22 Earlier, the two-day official visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in December 2003 to Islamabad was a step towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. During this visit, both the leaders decided to hold annual foreign ministerial consultations. While speaking at the Pakistan- Kazakhstan Business Forum, President Nazarbayev identified three zones of technological parks of information and biotechnology where Pakistani companies could invest significantly.23
It is important to note that during the Tajik Foreign Minister’s visit to Islamabad in January 2004, he assured President Musharraf that Tajikistan would not allow Indian military bases on its soil.24This was followed by the visit of Tajik President Emomali Rahmanov to Islamabad in May 2004. During this visit, eight agreements were inked covering abolition of visas for holders of diplomatic passports, avoidance of double taxation, cooperation between the education ministers and justice ministers, combating drug trafficking, and cooperation between official news agencies and promotion and protection of investment.25
Pakistan-Uzbekistan relations have also been improving over the past few years given the changed security paradigm.26 During Uzbek President Karimov’s recent visit to Islamabad in May 2006, both sides agreed to expand trade and economic ties and coordinate anti-terrorism activities. It was also planned to extend road and rail links that would enable the CARs, particularly Uzbekistan, to make use of Pakistan’s seaports to develop commerce with other regions. A joint fight against extremism and terrorism has, of late, been on top of the list for both the countries. During his March 2005 visit President Musharraf assured the Uzbek leader of his determination to wipe out terrorists, including a substantial number of Uzbek nationals, from the tribal areas.27 How far these promises will be fulfilled is yet to be seen.
In an attempt to build strong ties with Central Asia, Pakistan has sought to use its cultural links with this region. It is perceived that Pakistan is the cultural extension of the Central Asian region that in turn is seen to be in fusion with the South Asian social milieu. In this context, a Pakistani scholar opined, “Pakistan’s political existence and emergence on the world map would not have materialised but for the primordial relationship that glues us together. The roots of our faith, undoubtedly, lie in the Arabian soil but our cultural linkages are with Central Asian civilisation, which in itself is an amalgam of diverse influence and cross-cultural fertilisation”28
Cooperation in the fields of education and culture is an important aspect of Pakistan-Central Asia relations. There are number of Central Asian students studying in Pakistan and similarly Pakistani students in the CARs. The lack of information makes it difficult to provide the total number of Pakistani students studying in all CARs. However, the example of Kyrgyzstan can be cited. Kyrgyz students have been pursuing studies in Pakistani educational institutions in various fields such as engineering, business administration, information technology and the English language. Kyrgyz civil servants also attend training programmes in Pakistan. Conversely, over 350 Pakistani students are currently pursuing studies, mainly in medical colleges, in Kyrgyzstan.29
Quest for “Strategic Depth”
The emergence of Central Asia was viewed as an opportunity for Pakistan to spread its sphere of influence beyond Afghanistan thus providing “strategic depth” against India. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s desire to expand its influence in Afghanistan has been very central to Islamabad’s strategic thinking. In the view of Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, “…Afghanistan will be a great source of strength to Pakistan to face any crisis and danger that it may encounter. In fact, the security of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan is interlinked and is indivisible…” 30
While examining Pakistan’s Afghan policy, it has been argued that its defence planning has been handicapped by the lack of territorial depth to absorb an attack by India and then to retaliate. This elusive quest for strategic depth has guided Pakistan in its ambitious involvement in Afghanistan in spite of the multiple implications for its social fabric and political culture. Thus, Pakistan’s Afghan policy was constructed with an objective to create a subservient government in Afghanistan that would be friendly to Pakistan, militarily too weak to question the Durand line and unstable to raise the Pushtunistan issue. In addition to this, the military strategists argued that a friendly Afghanistan would give Kashmiri militants a base from where they could be trained, funded and armed.31The Central Asian region was seen as an extension of Pakistan’s strategic space.
The end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has not brought any fundamental change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Afghanistan is still very central to Pakistan’s strategic thinking, and is akin to being Pakistan’s backwaters. Wary about how the current situation would unfold in Afghanistan, Islamabad is trying to cement its ties with the current regime in Kabul while supporting Taliban elements and has not given up its grand strategy of establishing a friendly government in Kabul. It is believed that Pakistan’s new proxy war in Afghanistan is slowly unravelling itself. There is the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban are supported by the Pakistani establishment itself – from low-level military officers and some ministers to religious parties and their jihadi infrastructure. The ISI too has been proactively working to bring the Taliban back to its life.32
There has been constant accusation by Afghanistan of Pakistan’s interference and its support to the Taliban and Al Qaida elements to create trouble for Kabul.33Afghan President Hamid Karzai during his visit in February 2006 provided evidence to President Musharraf implicating Pakistan in the recruitment, training and equipping of Islamic radical suicide bombers. The senior Afghan official who accompanied President Karzai said, “In places like Karachi, Pakistani extremist groups working on behalf of the Taliban for a fee, carry out the recruitment and then bring them to safe houses in Balochistan for training and equipping with vests.”34 In a recent visit to Islamabad, Gen. Johan Abizaid, the head of the US Central Command reportedly showed the Pakistanis, intelligence photographs of Taliban training camps at an undisclosed location and asked for them to be shut down.35
Three years ago, Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt, Associate Professor of Strategy and policy at the US Naval War College, in a hearing before the House Committee on International relations in October 2003 accused Pakistan of providing sanctuary to terrorist groups, that enjoy strong support among active and retired Army officers and intelligence officials. He said: “So long as Pakistan relies on terrorism to achieve its political objectives, it will be impossible to eliminate terrorism and the Al Qaeda presence in the region.”36
Islam as a Tool
Religion is seen as an important factor in developing relations between Pakistan and the Central Asian states. It is felt that since the majority of the Muslim people living in most of the CARs were Sunnis, they would naturally gravitate towards Pakistan. Sardar Assef Ali, Minister of State for Economic Affairs, who led the Pakistani delegation to Central Asia in December 1991 said: “They (Central Asians) have problems with Iran. Besides bitter legacies of the past, a majority of people living in Central Asia are Turks. Also 95 per cent of them are Sunni Muslim of Naqashbandi order. So they are uneasy with Iran because of these factors”.37 Leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami expressed similar views. In a press statement on September 2, 1991, Jamaate- Islami Chief Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmed stated: “Independence of the three Muslim states of the Soviet Union–Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan–is the realisation of the dream of the Muslim Ummah at a critical juncture of history”. He also said that the CARs were “looking up to Pakistan as their ideal owing to its ideological foundations. Besides, due to its role in Jehad-e-Afghanistan, these states also regard Pakistan as their benefactor and have pinned many hopes on it.”38
The Jamaat-e-Islami supported the Tajik fundamentalists in 1992 and 1993. According to Gen Liaskhovskii, one attempt to intervene in the civil war in Tajikistan was undertaken at the end of January 1993. In Peshawar, a conference of representatives of Muslim countries reviewed the measures to provide assistance to “Tajik brothers” in the “holy war” and resolved to place, at the head of the Tajik armed units, Afghans who had acquired combat experience in the war against the Soviet army. In addition, substantial material funds were allocated for Tajik Islamists.39 Pakistan supplied assistance to 60,000-80,000 Tajik refugees stranded in northern Afghanistan. When Tajik opposition leader Himatzadeh visited Pakistan in 1993, not only were his associates given access to the Foreign Office but also his criticism of the Tajik government was ignored. Meanwhile, the ex- Director General of the ISI, General Hameed Gul, even issued a statement in favour of the Tajik opposition.
The Uzbek government has referred to the activities of the Jamaat-e- Islami as a part of the grand Islamic alliance against the Tajik government and its support to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) at various intervals.40 It is believed that the ISI’s discreet support to IMU has remained fairly consistent. It also reportedly gave refuge to IMU leader Yuldeshev in 1990s and arranged Namangani’s frequent clandestine visits to Pakistan. It is also believed that unlike the Taliban, ISI does not trust the IMU but at the same time it wants to keep the IMU on its payroll for tactical reasons. It wishes to use the IMU as leverage within Central Asia.41 The post-Taliban period has not seen any major reversal in Pakistan’s support to these jihadi elements. As mentioned earlier, there are still strong elements within the Pakistani establishment wanting to install a weak and friendly government in Afghanistan. Such a government will also provide Islamabad easy access and influence in the CARs.
After 9/11, Pakistan followed a dual policy towards the Central Asian states. On the one hand, it adhered to a state policy of friendly relations with the CARs but on the other, it continued to back dissident groups to get more leverage over the régimes. In March 2004, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked Pakistan to extradite a number of Al Qaida fighters of Uzbek origin captured during operations in Wana.42
In addition to ISI’s support, one also sees the involvement of other non-state actors such as extremist Islamic parties; Al Qaida; the truck and transport smuggling mafias; and drug traffickers who have close links with IMU and Taliban. This has resulted in an explosion of self-interest groups in Pakistan who have benefited from the Afghan civil war and the Islamic insurgency in the CARs. Therefore, these groups are interested in weakening the state authority, which in turn enables their business interests and Islamic agenda to flourish.43
Pakistan’s desire to use Islam as a tool to win over these states however received a major setback because of its support to extremist groups in the Tajik civil war. After this, a wave of extremist activities engulfed the region especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and these states began to view Pakistan with great suspicion. Therefore, the much desired goal of the Pakistani policy makers to have a security belt stretching from Turkey to Pakistan with Central Asia as the ‘Islamic heartland’, providing it “strategic depth” and much-needed allies, in its policy struggle over Afghanistan and Kashmir, did not materialise. On the contrary, the secular Central Asian regimes looked towards Russia, China and the West for their security cooperation rather than Pakistan. The CARs signed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Security Treaty in May 1992 and in 1996 joined Shanghai Five Forum, which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001. They also joined NATO’s partnership of peace programme.
Regional Organisations
Apart from using its Islamic card to tie the CARs in its strategic fold against India, Islamabad also sought to use multilateral bodies in the region.44 Its desire to balance India through regional organisations got manifested in their wooing neighbouring Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and the CARs into the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO). Under this forum, states are expected to develop closer economic interaction.45
In November 1992, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan created an extended Muslim economic bloc linking Asia and Europe. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif noted in a speech marking the occasion that the ECO “now corresponds to the boundaries of the ancient area, which brought prosperity and civilisation through fruitful exchanges along the historic silk route. The people of these lands have a shared history and common spiritual and cultural values.” Nawaz Sharif added his belief that extensive investment in infrastructure and encouragement of the private sector were the most important immediate objectives. He noted that Pakistan was building a major highway network to link Central Asia to the Arabian Sea and that its railroads were “poised to link not only member-states but also ECO with Europe, Russia, and South Asia.” He added: “peace in Afghanistan is essential for political harmony and fruitful cooperation in our entire region.”46
Speaking about the achievements of ECO, Pakistani foreign minister Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri stated that it had made considerable progress in the trade, transport and energy sectors. The second ECO Commerce Ministers’ Meeting held in Islamabad in July 2003 approved the ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA). The agreement envisages reduction of tariffs up to 15 per cent over a period of eight years (15 years in case of Afghanistan) on at least 80 per cent of goods on tariff lines. Para-tariff and non-tariff barriers would be eliminated within a period of two years. He further stated that the implementation of ECOTA would pave the way for economic integration of the region. New strategies and plans are expected to be adopted to make the organisation more effective.47
Despite claims made by Pakistan’s ministers about ECO’s progress, it has so far been a non-starter. The establishment of a free trade zone is difficult when basic infrastructure necessary in this regard is lacking. Moreover, the competing interests of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey limit the role ECO can play in the region. Instability in Afghanistan remains a major obstruction for expanding the area of cooperation.
Islamabad also sponsored the membership of the newly independent Central Asian countries in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). This was yet another drive to bring the CARs into the Ummah.48 Pakistan has also been keen to join the SCO.49 In early 2001, Pakistan applied for observer status but the Central Asian members of the organisation blocked its entry. A major stumbling block was Pakistan’s support for the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Though China supported Pakistan’s membership, Russia wanted India to simultaneously join SCO. It was only in June 2005 that the applications of Pakistan, Iran and India were simultaneously considered and approved with consensus for granting observer status in the SCO at the Council of Heads of States Meeting in Astana on July 5, 2005. Pakistan is also a member of Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Much to the chagrin of Pakistan, India is included in both these organisations.
Geo-Economic
Transport Corridors and Access to Warm Waters: Many Pakistani leaders refer to their country as the gateway to Central Asia and strongly believe that good relations with the region would not only enhance its security but also provide enormous economic opportunities. In the post-Cold War period, Islamabad tried to revive its fortunes with the West by selling its new geo-strategic importance. This brings us to the question, is Pakistan the gateway to Central Asia? Geographically, Pakistan provides a gateway to Central Asia from south/southeast; but it is not the only gateway to the seas of the south. This is the impression that Pakistani leaders50 have tried to create in an attempt to identify themselves with Central Asia, further their co-operation with the region and make Pakistan more relevant not only to the CARs and its neighbouring states but also to the West. In fact, Iran provides another gateway to Central Asia and has done a great deal to develop good communication systems with the region. Yet another gateway is via Turkey in the southwest.51
Pakistan has been trying to make itself more relevant to Central Asia by offering the states several proposals for creating trade and transport corridors and access to ports. President General Pervez Musharraf has emphasised this time and again. He said, “…our geo-strategic significance can’t be reduced. We need to realise that we have understood that and therefore we have constructed a new port at Gwadar which is at the mouth of the Gulf almost.”52 In March 2005, he stated again: “we are fully focused on making use of our central location and constructing ports and putting in place a network of infrastructure.”53 Recently, he has approved a railways reconstruction programme, which would link Gwadar with the other countries via rail. It is believed that this could make Pakistan the economic and trade hub for the CARs, Gulf, Western China and South Asia.54
Pakistan’s geo-strategic location admittedly makes it difficult for Central Asia to ignore it. For Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan, the shortest route to the sea lies through Iran, but for all other states, the shortest route is through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Karachi is the nearest port city for Central Asia and by air Islamabad is closer to Tashkent than it is to Karachi. Dushanbe is only an hour’s flight from Islamabad, and by road through Afghanistan the distance from Dushanbe to Karachi is 2,720 km. In contrast, the port of Bandar Abbas is 3,400 km, Vladivostok 9,500 km and Rostov on the Don 4,200 km away.55 This makes Pakistan important for the CARs. Despite little success so far, Pakistan is trying to improve its connectivity to the CARs through Afghanistan and China.
In this respect, the ADB has offered $2 billion to the Pakistan railway network, which will enable Pakistan to become one of the most attractive international trade routes to the CARs, Iran and China. Pakistan and Afghanistan have already agreed to lay a 103-km railway track between Chaman and Kandahar, which would be extended to Turkmenistan and other CARs. The feasibility study of the Quetta-Kandahar railway track has been completed and Pakistan would construct the 10-12 km railway track to the Afghan border. The track from the Afghan border to Kandahar would be the responsibility of the Afghan government.56 The World Bank has agreed to provide $1.8 billion to Pakistan for its $6 billion National Trade Corridor (NTC) improvement programme to meet domestic transportation requirements and provide transit facilities to Central Asia, Western China, Afghanistan and Iran.57
Pakistan has also proposed to construct a $90-million road through the Boroghil Pass in the Yarkhun valley to link it with the CARs. Of the 13 passes, which lead to Afghanistan from Chitral district, the Boroghil Pass is the easiest and lowest in altitude. This pass remains closed for a very short period late in winter. The road will extend to Wakhan, 13-65 km wide strategic strip in northeast Afghanistan. The area links Afghanistan with Pakistan in the south, Tajikistan in the north and China in the east. The Wakhan-Boroghil route has been preferred against the one passing through the central parts of Afghanistan due to the security situation. This road will connect the 12,484-foot-high Boroghil pass at the northwest of the Yarkhum valley in Chitral with Sarhad-i-Langar in Wakhan at a distance of about 95 km and move on to Iskashim in Tajikistan leading to the Tajik capital Dushanbe via the Korung-Kalai Chumb and Kulob areas. From the Boroghil Pass, the road will traverse over 300 km long valley and reach Peshawar. The distance from Tajikistan to Peshawar via the Wakhan-Chitral route is estimated to be 700 km. This road will also branch off to the northern areas via the 10,500-foot-high Shandur Pass and merge into the Karakoram Highway. The Pakistan government has already sanctioned a number of road projects to interlink the northern areas and Chitral.58
The quadrilateral agreement signed by Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan is expected to give a boost to trading activities among member-nations through the Karakoram Highway.59 On October 10, 2006 a road connection along the Karakorum route, Islamabad-Kashgar- Bishkek-Almaty, was opened by Pakistan.60 Pakistan has also offered use of the Gwadar deep-sea port to the CARs.61 This port would serve as a mother port at the strategic location opposite to the Strait of Hormuz and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.62The first phase of this project is already over. The completion of the Gwadar Port would be a milestone for Pakistan in this context. When it comes online alongside Karachi, it will provide the shortest access to the Arabian Sea for large parts of Central Asia.63 On December 31, 2005, a meeting of Pakistan-Uzbekistan Joint Ministerial Commission was held in Tashkent, where the two sides agreed to enter into a trilateral transit trade agreement with Afghanistan to benefit from land routes and the Gwadar port facility.64
During Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev’s two-day visit to Pakistan on January 17-18, 2005, it was agreed that Pakistan would import electricity from Kyrgyzstan and both countries would build roads to improve trade. It was decided to strengthen links through Kashgar in China and on to Bishkek and also through the Karakoram Highway. The road being constructed on the Karakoram Highway to link the two countries would be completed by 2006, promoting Pak-Kyrgzy trade.65Establishment of a railway link from Gwadar to Taftan in Iran via Saindak is also being planned. A road from Gwadar to Sandak, running parallel to the Iran- Pakistan border, will make it the shortest route to reach Central Asia from the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Another 515-km long highway connecting Gwadar via Pangur, Khaan, Chaghi and Rabat up to the heart of Western Afghanistan is being planned. This would link Pakistan by road directly with the CARs.66
Pakistan is also giving priority to road and rail links and related facilities for more effective and mutually beneficial access to Central Asia. Air services to Tashkent and Almaty have already been resumed.67 Similar services to other parts of the region are under active consideration. The laying of railway tracks from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan is an important part of this programme. Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways has completed a feasibility study for a Chaman-Kandahar rail project. Its report will be discussed at the next meeting of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Economic Commission. The quadrilateral agreement is also gradually being implemented. The completion of the Murghab-Kulma road from Tajikistan to China linking the Karakoram Highway to Pakistan is also a significant development. Once operational, it will boost transit trade between Pakistan and Central Asia.68
Energy and Pipeline Politics: Pakistan is also looking at the huge energy resources of Central Asia. It wants to make Pakistan the energy-transit corridor in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, which will bring huge economic gains for the country. Pakistan is most likely to face a energy crisis in natural gas, power and oil in the next 3-4 that could choke its economic growth for many years to come.69 It is estimated that Pakistan’s total energy requirement would increase by about 48 per cent to 80 million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) in 2010 from about 54 MTOE currently.
According to official energy demand forecast, the demand for natural gas, having about 50 per cent share in the country’s energy consumption would increase by 44 per cent to the 39 MTOE currently. The power shortage is expected to be little over 5,250 MW by 2010. Oil demand would also increase by over 23 per cent to about 21 million tonnes in 2010 from the current demand of 16.8 million tonnes.70 Therefore, Central Asia could be a future source of energy for Pakistan. (See Appendix II for Pakistan’s Proposed Regional Gas Pipeline Routes.)
Pakistan’s importance for Central Asian countries needs to be viewed in the context of the entire pipeline politics in the region. As a transit country, Pakistan provides these states with an outlet of their energy resources. In view of the instability in Afghanistan and Balochistan, the success of these pipelines from Central Asia however remains a big question mark. Despite these uncertainties Pakistan wants to keep the Central Asian states engaged with the hope of providing a transit route for their energy resources.
In pursuit of its strategy to control the pipelines and gain greater influence, it is trying to sign various agreements with these Republics. Pakistan has signed 21 agreements and MoUs in oil, gas, energy, trade, science and culture with Turkmenistan. In the energy sector, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (TAP) signed an agreement in December 2002 for a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan, whose estimated cost is $2.5 billion.71 The ADB is the lead coordinating partner. It has, in addition to financial and technical assistance, played an important role in integrating efforts to realise the project. Several sessions of the Steering Committee on the TAP Gas Pipeline Project have been held so far. During a ministerial level TAP meeting on February 16, 2006, in Ashkabad, Turkmenistan agreed to provide sovereign guarantees to Pakistan to supply 3.2 billion cubic feet gas per day for 30 years.72 This assurance was restated during Pakistan Foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri’s visit to Turkmenistan in May 2006.73 However, a major hurdle to the project remains the volatile situation in Afghanistan.
While Turkmenistan can provide gas to Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have the potential to be substantial producers of hydroelectric power. Being geographically closest to Tajikistan, Pakistan stands to benefit from its hydroelectric potential.74 An inter-governmental agreement to that effect has already been signed. Pakistan’s Water and Power Minister Liaquat Ali Jatoi has recently said, “the government is considering importing electricity from CARs via Afghanistan as an option to meet its demand and has signed an MoU with Tajikstan to import 1000 MW as well as initiated transmission routing assessment to bring such power to Pakistan.”75 An advisor to Kyrgyz Prime Minister Omarov said that his government was also considering a transmission line from China to Pakistan with an estimated cost of $1.4 billion.76 Pakistan has also signed an agreement to import electricity from Kyrgyzstan through Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Indubitably, terrain and weather conditions are clear impediments to this project, yet both states appear determined to pursue it.77
Trade
With the emergence of the newly independent Central Asian States, the business elite group in Pakistan viewed this region as offering immense economic opportunities. Central Asia was seen not only as a source of needed raw materials but also as a potential export market. Some estimates even suggested that the region had a potential market of $80 billion and if Pakistan secures even 5 per cent of this market, it could earn up to $4 billion a year.78 In December 1991, a 23-member delegation was send to Central Asia headed by the then Minister of Commerce Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali. A $30-million credit facility was given to Uzbekistan and $10 million to all other Central Asian Republics. These credit lines were not utilised by the Central Asian countries and Pakistan was unable to keep its commitment to provide the credit lines in future. The effort to open a fullfledged National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) met with complete failure. The NBP representative office was set up in 1995 in Tashkent but it could not facilitate the opening of a branch till 2002.79
Despite high hopes, the trade between Pakistan and Central Asia remains limited. During 1992-93 Pakistani exports to the region amounted to $5.6 m and imports were $0.51 m.80 The figures for 1993-1995 (Table 1) indicate an increase as compared to 1992-93.81 During 1997-98 Pakistan’s total trade with Kazakhstan accounted for $19.9 m.; for Kyrgyzstan 07.91m; Tajikistan $10.29m; Turkmenistan $07.75m; and Uzbekistan $35.34m.82 However, in subsequent years the trade figures (Tables 2 and 3) do not indicate any major increase.
Table 1: Pakistan’s Imports and Exports to CARs
1993-1995 (in US$ million)
Source: Musa Khan Jalazai, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and the United States,
Bookbiz, Lahore, 2003, pp. 2007-2008.
Table 2: Geographical Distribution of Merchandise Exports,
Pakistan-CARs 1999-2004 (In US$ million)
Table 3: Geographical Distribution of Merchandise Imports,
Pakistan-CARs 1999-2004 (in US$ million)
Source: “Central Asia: Increasing Gains from Trade through Regional Cooperation in Trade Policy, Transport, and Customs Transit”, July, 2006, at http://www.adb.org/ Documents/Report/ca-trade-policy/
Note: Trade figures for Turkmenistan could not be included due to unavailability of
data.
Pakistan’s recent initiatives in Central Asia involve strengthening economic ties with the CARs. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan has established JECs with all the CARs. In its trade policy for 2006-07, Pakistan seeks to focus on export growth in regional Muslim countries, particularly Iran, Afghanistan and the CARs. It has been decided to establish export centres and warehouses at Peshawar and Quetta and an export centre in Islamabad.83
In this context the visit of Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev on January 17, 2005 is of significance. Both countries signed a MoU on cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two countries on different regional and international issues. Two agreements were signed on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs related matters and avoidance of double taxation. President Akaev also offered to provide electricity to Pakistan.84 This was his third visit, earlier ones being in 1994 and 1995. Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan are signatories to the Quadrilateral Agreement along with China and Kazakhstan, effective since May 2004, which aims at promoting regional trade through Pakistan’s Karakoram Highway. During the first meeting of the Pakistan-Kyrgyz Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) in Islamabad, both sides negotiated on issues of taxation, culture, and visa restrictions for enhancing the volume of bilateral ties.85 Pakistan is also exploring the possibility of investing in the pharmaceutical sector in Turkmenistan.86
As mentioned earlier the ECO provides another common platform to generate economic activity in the region. Within the framework of the ECO the volume of trade has not increased significantly. In fact, the ECO has failed to bring about great economic or commercial results. Competition among the member-states has been the major limitation for the success of this organisation. As Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz recently emphasised, the organisation needs to be used for making result-oriented policies instead of offering mere lip service. ECO can be an effective organisation if the ECO Trade Agreement, Transit Transport Agreement and the Trade and Development Bank become operational.87 So far, Pakistan has not been able to achieve much in terms of building economic and trade ties with the CARs. Their efforts to set up banks and hotels have received severe setbacks in Central Asia.
Pakistan’s Limitations in Central Asia
Pakistan faces a number of obstacles in its relations with Central Asia. First, these secular Central Asian states are wary about Islamabad’s intentions and involvement with the jihadi elements active in these republics. Links of IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) with Pakistan and Afghanistan are of great concern to the Central Asian states. Central Asian leaders believe that the ISI has until recently been supporting the IMU and other radical Islamic groups in their countries. Pakistan’s support for Taliban and the Pashtuns, and Gen Musharraf’s rejection in the summer of 2001 of non- Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan as irrelevant to Pakistan’s interests has antagonised the leaders of Central Asia.88 Despite successive Pakistani governments promising to curb the support given by the ISI to extremist groups in Central Asia, Islamabad has failed to implement these measures. In fact the IMU, the HT, and Chechen rebels have been sending their young men to study in Pakistani madarassaa, where these men are turned into ideologically committed Islamic radicals for future fighting in Central Asia. Clearly, Pakistan’s Central Asian policy is operating at two levels. While at the official level, it has tried to follow the friendly policy, at the other level, the ISI has been supporting dissident groups in Central Asia to win more leverage over these Central Asian regimes.89In sum, Pakistan’s strategies in Central Asia clearly indicate that Islamabad wants to use its geo-strategic location to make itself more relevant to Central Asia, without completely severing its links and support to the extremist groups in Afghanistan and Central Asia.90 But this is a risky game and may not work for Islamabad at all.
Second, Pakistan faces tough competition from India, Iran and Turkey in the region as they enjoy certain advantages. However, it is also important to mention that despite competition with Iran, there are areas of convergence as well, particularly in the sector of energy. Third, stability in Afghanistan is crucial for Pakistan’s involvement in Central Asia. Any effort on Pakistan’s part to bring pipelines or electricity from this region would neither be cost effective nor possible until Afghanistan stabilises.91 Indubitably, increasing violence and resurgence of the Taliban has left Afghanistan more destabilised and vulnerable to the spread of Islamic extremist groups.92 In such a situation, foreign entrepreneurs would be reluctant to invest in any project.
Fourth, despite sharing a common history and religion, Islamabad cannot overplay the Islamic card in Central Asia for strengthening its economic relations. Their ties need to have an economic basis. Some of the recent writings in Pakistan reflect this idea. They argue that instead of selling the idea of Pakistan as a gateway to Central Asia, there is a need to acknowledge the other routes via Iran, Turkey, Russia and China. Pakistan needs to work in collaboration with them. In fact, Central Asia wants to be a part of a much broader world than what Pakistan is envisioning for the region.93
Finally, even if the Gwadar Port comes up, law and order has to improve a great deal to make this port a hub of commercial activities. The situation within Balochistan remains volatile. In the past five years, there have been around 500 attacks on the Sui gas pipelines and installations.94 Related to the instability in Balochistan is the US interest in this region. Former National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that the Soviet Union might be tempted to cross into Balochistan and occupy either the Gulf oilfields or the fishing harbours of Gwadar and Pansni. According to him such a situation may create serious problems for the freedom of navigation. The US naval chief had suggested over two decades ago building an American naval base at Gwadar and Gen. Zia reportedly offered it to the Pentagon.95 A similar viewpoint cannot be ruled out within US Administration vis–a-vis China getting the facility of Gwadar Port.
Ramifications for India
Pakistan’s policy towards the CARs does reflect its desire to gain influence beyond Afghanistan so as to counter-balance India in this region. Nevertheless, the significance of this region for India’s security is immense.96 It may be useful to highlight some of the realities that India needs to take into consideration given the recent developments.
So far, Pakistan has failed to obtain any kind of support from the Central Asian states for its perceived strategic goals against India. After 9/ 11, the emerging security alignment and changing parameters in the geostrategic balance in the region have greatly thwarted Pakistan’s ambition of obtaining the “strategic depth” in Afghanistan and Central Asia. New Delhi’s increasing presence and improving ties with Kabul make Islamabad extremely nervous and insecure. The Pakistani establishment sees with great suspicion the opening of Indian consulates in Kandahar, Mazar-i- Sharif, Jalalabad, and Herat and its presence at Ayni in Tajikistan.
Though Pakistan cannot compete with India in Afghanistan, it would constantly seek to deny India a foothold in Afghanistan. It is important to note that the security situation in Afghanistan is fluid; the Taliban is still a force to reckon with; and Pakistan’s ethnic linkages provide ample opportunity to ISI to counter any Indian plans in Afghanistan. While Pakistan is in no position to neutralise India’s influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, it can restrict the pace of India’s infrastructural projects in Afghanistan.
Central Asia with its geo-strategic location provides India a security belt of friendly and cooperative states. Unlike the past, India is now entering this region with a pragmatic and focused policy. It is in the process of implementing new economic and strategic initiatives to achieve its short term and long-term goals in the region. Though India is not a key player in Central Asia, it is an important player. As an emerging power India cannot be boxed in South Asia. In Central Asia, India has to leverage its relations (apart from bilateral ties with the CARs) through Russia and US as well.
Close cooperation with Afghanistan is crucial for India’s security. This is the best way to keep Pakistan in check. India’s greater presence and engagement with Afghanistan will allow it to keep a tab on Pakistani activities in the area. India cannot afford to let Afghanistan become a pawn in the Pakistani plan to export jihad into India. Moreover, Afghanistan is keen to establish a strategic partnership with India based on “common values and goals”97 mainly because it sees Pakistan as exporting terrorism to Afghanistan at the moment. Recently, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan was quoted as saying that Afghanistan is facing “the expansionist foreign policy of some countries that try to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy.”98
The other important factor, which needs attention, is Sino-Pakistan collaboration in Central Asia. As mentioned earlier, one school of thought within Pakistan believes that China is the only external ‘patron’ that has supported Pakistan politically, militarily and economically since the 1960s.99 Their military and nuclear linkages are no secret.100 It has also been argued that China’s arms sales policies have greater strategic rather than commercial rationale. The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan101 has serious security implications for India. The geo-political necessity and a complementarity of interests between China and Islamabad are visible in their policies towards the CARs. China has always supported Pakistan’s case in the SCO. An important question here that needs closer scrutiny is what does it mean for Pakistan to get this observer status in SCO and how it will use this forum to further its interests in the region? Before we analyse this aspect, it is also important to note that so far the role, responsibilities, obligations and right of a state with observer status are not very clear.102 Nevertheless, Islamabad’s design to use this forum in its favour on the Kashmir issue needs consideration.
Pakistan is hoping to become a full-fledged member of the SCO. In this context Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has also acknowledged that: “the day when Pakistan becomes a full-fledged member is not far off.”103 Within Pakistan, some analysts are of the opinion that Pakistan will have to play a pro-active role in the SCO framework in order to meet the new challenges and benefit from the new opportunities. They also believe that since the SCO has extensive experience in resolving boundary disputes, India and Pakistan as member-states can utilise this framework for settling bilateral border issues. Besides, SCO membership is also viewed as providing Pakistan an opportunity to expand its defence and security relations with Russia, as well as expanding the operational area of Pakistan’s security and economic considerations.104 These perceptions on SCO and its utility for Pakistan should be seen in the light of Islamabad’s anti-India rhetoric and its effort to balance India.
Both Pakistan and China are working on providing connectivity to Central Asia. Pakistan has offered to lay pipelines to enable China to procure gas and oil through Iran and the CARs. Both will soon undertake upgradation of the Karakoram highway to convert it into an all-weather corridor to facilitate bilateral trade.105 The importance of Gwadar and its use in times of any major conflict cannot be ruled out in future. It is also argued by strategists in Pakistan that the Gwadar Port may ultimately help the CARs to actively participate as ECO members and help open trade channels through Pakistan and can also go a long way in strengthening Pakistan’s position in the region vis-à-vis India.106
To improve politico-economic ties with the Central Asian region, the creation of new organisation comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran and the five Central Asian states has been articulated in some Pakistani writings. It is believed that such an arrangement will effectively foreclose the possibility of “Indian design to isolate and encircle Pakistan in the region”.107 Nonetheless, Pakistan’s designs in Central Asia are conditioned by numerous strategic uncertainties: issue of stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s involvement in internal affairs of Afghanistan; ‘new great game’ in Central Asia and its security implications; Pakistan’s relations with US in the light of increasing Indo-US ties; and, finally, the future of MMA as a strong political force in Pakistan.
As compared to Pakistan, India has more advantage in this region. From a Central Asian perspective, India is a friendly partner. It enjoys goodwill within the regional states and has over a period of time established a coherent policy towards this region.108 None of the Central Asian states has any apprehensions or suspicions about India’s changing profile in the region. They see India as a country with technology and experiences, which are more suited to their needs. While terrorism remains the major issue of cooperation between the two, the CARs are also looking for Indian involvement in the IT sector in a major way and for sharing India’s experience in setting up various industrial units related to agriculture and defence, providing training in the financial and banking sectors, and helping build their economies through scientific and technological cooperation. It has also been argued that India could be an organic driver in establishing the system of cooperation among these states.109 Central Asians view India as a beacon of hope and a route to progress in what they perceive as their “southern arc of instability” involving Afghanistan and Pakistan.110
India’s only limitation in the region is its geographic connectivity with Central Asia over land. India, therefore, is trying to improve this connectivity through Iran and Afghanistan. It is important to note that Turkey can be the other gateway to Central Asia for India. New Delhi needs to further strengthen its ties with Turkey to explore the possibility of accessing energy resources of the Caspian region.
Conclusion
Recent initiatives taken by Pakistan in cementing its ties with Central Asia indicate that there has been improvement in its relations with the CARs. Visits by Central Asian heads of state also indicate that these regimes are trying to develop new equations with Pakistan. This shift can be attributed to the new security situation, which is unfolding in the region, with US influence in relative decline and Chinese and Russian influence on the rise. Countries such as Uzbekistan are looking for new allies. Moreover, two factors make it difficult for Central Asian regimes to ignore Pakistan. First, its geo-strategic location, and second, its links with and influence on the extremist groups such as IMU which Pakistan has used as leverage over the Central Asian régimes.
However, Central Asia continues to present considerable diplomatic challenges for Pakistan. Consequently, Islamabad will have to find a balance between its support for Taliban and efforts to seek closer economic and political relations with Central Asia. This could further get complicated if Islamist parties and groups become the dominant force in the Pakistani establishment. Therefore, the effectiveness of Pakistan’s balancing diplomacy as well as stability in Afghanistan will determine to a large extent its inroad into Central Asia.
In future, despite its good relations with the CARs, India will have to manage its relations under the complexity of the situation, where at one end it will have to engage Pakistan and at other level increase its involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia without getting into direct confrontation with any power, regional or extra regional, in the region. Today, confrontation is not the buzzword; rather engagement and cooperation are the drivers for foreign policymakers. Would India and Pakistan see themselves cooperating in the Central Asian region in this changing security paradigm? So far, India-Pakistan relations have evolved in an atmosphere where misperceptions, suspicions and misunderstandings have been the dominant factors.111 However, today some mechanism can be formulated, where geo-economics finds an appropriate place for managing these relations. Such a mechanism would provide a win-win situation for India, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
Appendix-I
Important Visits by Pakistan’s President, Ministers and Senior Officials to CARs (2001-2006)
06 November 2001 General Pervez Musharraf visited Turkmenistan
07 November 2001 General Pervez Musharraf visited Kazakhstan
02 June 2002 General Pervez Musharraf met Tajikistan President
at Dushanbe
03 June2002 General Pervez Musharraf met Kazakh President
at Almaty
June 2002 General Pervez Musharraf visited Turkmenistan
27 December 2002 Prime Minister Jamali visited Askhabad
(Turkmenistan)
13 September 2004 Prime Minister Aziz met Prime Minister of
Kazakhstan and President of Tajikistan at
Dushanbe
05 March 2005 President Musharraf visited Uzbekistan
07 March 2005 President Musharraf paid a two-day official visit to
Kyrgyzstan
04-05 July 2005 Prime Minister Aziz visited Kazakhstan
16 February 2006 Ministerial level meeting was held between
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan in
Ashkabad
03 May 2006 Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri visited Ashkabad
Source: Chronology in Pakistan Horizon (2001-2006); POT Pakistan, May 2006
Pakistan’s Strategies in Central Asia 825
Appendix-II
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Sujit Dutta for suggesting work on this topic and going through the draft, S.D. Muni for his comments on the paper, and Samina Yasmeen, Baber Shah and Nausheen Wasi for providing the study material and data which was not available in India.
References/End Notes
1.Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Cautious Foreign Policy”, Survival, 36 (2), Summer 1994, pp. 115; Shaid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 39-50.
2.Islamabad has even tried to attract foreign forces into the region in order to balance India.
3.One such view was articulated by Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, a former Ambassador, in his recent writing where he says, “Having been created in the teeth of India’s opposition, whose Hindu majority considered the division of “Bharat Mata” (Mother India) a sacrilege, Pakistan has had to contend with India’s hostility from its very birth. Imperatives of national survival have largely determined our defence and foreign policy, impelled our entry into western pacts and shaped our strategic partnership with China as well as our nuclear policies that have been aimed at safeguarding our sovereignty and independence.” See Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, “Challenge of co-existence with India”, Dawn, Karachi, April 30, 2006, at http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/30/ed.htm
4.Shaid M. Amin, no.1, pp. 39-50 ;Prakash Nanda, “Between the US and China: Pakistan’s Uncertain Strategic Manoeuvres Since 9/11″, in Ajay Darshan Behera, C. Mathew Joseph (eds), Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2004, p. 107.
5.Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Buildup,1979-99, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 13-19; Mehnaz Isphani, Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity, Adelphi Paper, 246, IISS, Winter 1998-90, p. 30. According to General Mirza Aslam Beg, “There is an element of power prosperity which induces India to behave typically as a military “Frankenstein” to intimidate its neighbours and mount tension in the region” He goes on to say that “The security of Pakistan is adequately established to counter India’s hegemonic aspirations in the region.” For details see Mirza Aslam Beg, National Security Diplomacy and Defence, Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, 1999, p. 18.
6.Interaction with Ayesha Siddiqa in New Delhi on December 3, 2005.
12.Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, “ Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia: The Influence of Pakistan and Afghanistan”, in Boris Rumer (ed.), Central Asia at the End of the Transition,, M.E.Sharp, New York, 2005, pp. 157-158.
13.Nirupama Subramanian, “Musharraf hails China’s SAARC Status”, The Hindu, New Delhi, June 16, 2006.
14.Azmat Hayat Khan, “Pakistan’s Geo-Economic Interests in Central Asia”, Central Asia Journal, University of Peshawar, (55), Winter 2004, p. 84.
15.For details, see Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2005, pp. 159-197.
16.Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, Macmillan Press, UK, 1994, p. 134.
17.Nausheen Wasi, “Pakistan’s Interests in Central Asia”, Pakistan Horizon, Karachi, 55 (4 ),October 2002; Mushid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: New Challenges”, Nation, September 4, 1993; Tarik Jan, (ed.), Foreign Policy Debate: The Years Ahead, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1993, pp. 9-19, cited in Samina Yasmeen, no. 1, pp. 115-133.
18.Turkmenistan possesses the world’s fifth largest reserves of natural gas. According to the country’s programme for economic development until 2010, Turkmenistan should reach oil output of 48 million tonnes a year. See “Turkmenistan ready to meet gas requirements of Pakistan”, at http:// pakistantimes.net/2005/01/12/top8.htm
19.Pakistan was quick to send a 23-member delegation to these states, which had industrialists, businessmen and subject experts, in November 1991.This was followed by many more such visits by important political leaders, technical experts and government officials. The heads of government and administration from both sides have visited each other and more than 55 protocols, agreements and memoranda have been signed. Pakistan extended a credit of $10 million to each of the Central Asian States with $20 million additional to Kazakhstan. See Tahmina Mahmood, “Pakistan and Central Asia” Eurasian Studies , Ankara, 3 (4), Winter 1996-97, pp. 79-92; Mohammad Anwar Khan, “Perspective on the Relationship and Central Asia after the Break up of the Former Soviet Union”, in Musa Khan Jalalzai (ed.) Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and the United States, Book Biz, Lahore, 2003. p. 202.
20.Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia Islam or Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Karachi 1994, p. 215; also see Ahmad Rashid, no. 9, pp. 212-213.
21.“Pakistan Focused on Energy, Transport, Economic Integration with Central Asia”, interview with Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, August 26, 2004, at http://www.newscentralasia.com/ modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=858
22.Deirdre Tynan, “Mussharraf closes successful Central Asian Visit”, The Times of Central Asia , Bishkek, 7(19), (313), March 10, 2005, p. 2; Chronology, Pakistan Horizon, 58 (2) April 2005, pp. 117-119, 135.
23.Chronology, Pakistan Horizon, 57 (1), January 2004, pp. 104-105.
31.Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Islam, Oil and New Great Game in Central Asia, I.B.Tauris, London, 2000, p. 186; Smruti S. Pattanaik, “In Pursuit of Strategic Depth: The Changing Dynamics of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy”, 2006, Forthcoming Paper.
32.K. Alan Kronstadt, “International Terrorism in South Asia”, CSR Report for US Congress, November 3, 2003, athttp://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21658.pdf ; Talk by Zalmay Khalilzad at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, April 4, 2004, at http://www.csis.org/events/ afghanistan_Transcript.pdf; “Taliban planning Spring strikes against US forces”, The Times of India, New Delhi, February 13, 2004.
33.During his three-day visit to Pakistan in February 2006, President Karzai said that, “ We have provided Musharraf with a lot of very detailed information on acts of terrorism being carried out in Afghanistan, and we have discussed in great details what actions Pakistan could take,” in Ahmed Rashid, “Afghan President confronts Pakistani Counterpart Over Suicide Bombers”, at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022106_pr.shtml; There was a large catch of arms caught in the Afghan-Pakistan border. This is a clear indication of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. The arms and ammunition seized included 100 RPG-7 rockets, 437 current ignition missiles (small), 7 current ignition missiles (large), 229 mortar bombs, 193 mortar bombs 60mm, 12 rockets 107mm, 54 RR rounds 75mm , 42 boxes of 20mm gun rounds, 331 anti- personnel mines, 4 anti-tank mines, 145 fuses (long), 129 bombs, 918 premier, 1,487 fuses, 45 pressure switches, 40 mine triggers, 3 batteries, 2 missiles with fins, 1 artillery round, 210 ammunition 20mm gun, 4 magazine 20mm gun, 7 hand grenades, 2 mortars (3 inch), 2 guns 12.7mm, 1 mortar 82mm, 1 mortar 60mm and other ammunition. See Zulfiqar Ali, “Six Stinger Missiles Seized” Dawn , September 27, 2005.
34.Ahmed Rashid, “Afghan President Confronts Pakistani Counterpart over Suicide Bombers”, at http;//www.eurasia .org/departments/insight/articles/eva022106_ pr.shtml; Ahmed Rashid, “US-Pakistan Relations in Downward Spiral”, at http;/ /www.eurasia .org/departments/insight/articles/eva051706_pr.shtml
38.“Quazi welcomes independence of Soviet Muslim states,” The News, September 3, 1991.
39.Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia: The Influence of Pakistan and Afghanistan”, no. 12 , pp. 186-187.
40.I.A. Rahman, “Pakistan Must Work for Tajik Peace”, Frontier Post, August 12, 1993; Ahmed Rashid, no. 20, pp. 214-215; K. Warikoo, “Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics 1991-1996”, in K. Warikoo and Mahavir Singh (eds), Central Asia Since Independence, Shipra Publications, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 140-171; for details, see Eshan Ahrari, Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2001.
49.“ Musharraf seeks full SCO membership”, POT Pakistan, 34 (140), June 17, 2006, pp. 2-4.
50.Leaders like Benazir Bhutto spoke of Pakistan as the gate way to Central Asia in the early 1990s, the Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf spoke in the same vein in 2004-05.
51.Sultan Ahmad, “ If Pakistan is the Gateway to Central Asia”, at http:// www.defencejournal.com/2000/july/gateway-asia.htm; Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Karachi 1994, p. 214.
52.“People, Governments want peace in Sub-Continent: Musharraf”, at http:// pakistantimes.net/2005/04/24/top1.htm ; In recently held SCO Summit in Shanghai President Musharraf articulated the idea of Gwadar Port providing the shortest route for oil producing Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. See Nirupama Subramanian, no. 13
54.“Musharraf for taking advantage from Pak Geo-Strategic Importance”, POT Pakistan, 34 (177), July 31, 2006, pp. 22-23; “Comments: Gwadar’s Strategic Value”, POT Pakistan, 34 (188), August 12, 2006, pp. 25-26. More details on this can be seen at http://www. pakistanlink.com/Headlines/July06/30/07.htm .
59.“Pakistan-Kyrgyzstan Agree to enhance trade ties”, at http://paktribune.com/ news/index.php?id=64865
60.On October 8, 2006, the first lorry carrying a 40-tonne container left the Pakistani capital for Almaty.The Pakistani Pak Caspian Trade Link Transport Company will operate this route. “Kazakh-Pakistani Road link Inaugrated in Islamabad”, CEF Weekly Newsletter, (32), October 9-17, 2006, at http://www.silkroadstudies.org
61.The Port provides Central Asian Republics direct access to the warm waters through Afghanistan and Balochistan, as an alternative both to the routes through Iran, and trade routes to Europe. The port facility has also the potential to be possible alternative to Dubai, which is lately becoming a hub for major economic activities in the region. For details see “Comments: Gwadar’s Strategic Value”, POT Pakistan, 34 (188), August 12, 2006, pp. 25-27.
66.“The Afghan Corridor: Prospects for Pakistan-Central Asia Relations in Post- Taliban Afghanistan?” Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad, September 2002, p. 14.
67.“Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan agree to improve road links”, no. 65.
74.During the OIC Summit in December 2005 President Musharraf and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov discussed expediting talks on the electricity transmission project between the two countries.
75.“ Central Asian Republics Keen to Export Electricity”, POT Pakistan, 34 (107), May 13, 2006, p. 6.
77.Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 6, 2005; no. 33.
78.News, August 19, 1992; Anwer Hussein Sindhu, “Unfulfilled Promises to Central Asian States: Pak Credibility at Stake”. News, June 23, 1992, cited in Samina Yasmeen, no. 1.
80.Uzbekistan was the biggest buyer for the Pakistani goods worth Rs 1.32 million in 1991-92 and Rs 84.41 million in 1992-93. Samina Yasmeen, n. 1, p. 129.
90.At a press conference in Islamabad on May 25, 2000 Pakistan’s Chief Executive (later president), General Pervez Musharraf, gave the clearest articulation to date of the reasons for Pakistan’s continued backing of the Taliban. He explained that in view of the demographic and geographic pattern, Afghanistan’s majority ethnic Pashtuns “have to be on our side. This is our national interest. Pashtuns are represented by the Taliban at the moment, and Taliban cannot be alienated by Pakistan.” He added that “we have a national security interest there”, in Ahmed Rashid, no. 9, p. 260.
91.Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said recently that “Afghanistan is key to the energy, trade and transport corridor Pakistan wants to establish with the countries of Central Asia and a stable Pakistan is critical to these links” see “ Afghanistan Key to Trade Energy, Says Shaukat”, POT Pakistan, 34 (148), June 27, 2006, p. 9.
96.Meena Singh Roy, “India’s Interests in Central Asia” Strategic Analysis, 24 (12), March 2001; Meena Singh Roy, “India-Uzbekistan: Emerging Partnership for Peace and Development”, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 9 (1-2), Jan-Jun 2005, pp. 93-123.
97.RFE/RL Newsline, Central Asia Report, 10 (152), Part III, August 18, 2006.
100.Recently Pakistan has clinched a $600-million defence deal with China, which includes construction of four F-22P frigates for the Pakistani Navy, upgrading of the Karachi dockyard and transfer of technology for indigenous production of modern surface fleet. In “Pak, China finalise defence deal”, The Tribune Chandigarh, May 24, 2006.
101.Jasjit Singh, “China and the Shifting Balance of Military Power”, Security and Society, 1 (1), Winter 2004, pp. 56-71.
102.SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang said, “the role of an observer lies not only observing ,there should be cooperation among observer and memberstates; it should take part in the process of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation…currently we are focusing our basic attention on developing cooperation within Organisation, we did not have enough time to study carefully the questions concerning establishing a cooperation between the SCO and its Observer. We will thoroughly consider this issue after the summit.” See Press Conference by SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang on July 1, 2005, www.sectsco.org
104.Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan Embraces the ‘Shanghai Spirit”, Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 25(3), Autumn 2005, pp. 47-50. “Comments: Pakistan’s Quest for Full SCO Membership” POT Pakistan, 34 (148), June 27, 2006, pp. 12-13.
105.K.J.M. Varma, “Pak Offers Oil Pipeline to China”, The Tribune , May 24, 2006.
108.From India’s point of view, former External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh announced that India would be seeking a proactive role in Central Asia. After the SCO summit in July 2005, he said, “….It’s our backyard. Now we plan to strengthen missions in Central Asian countries so that we can enhance our role in the region.” Hindustan Times, July 6, 2005.
109.Views based on discussion during the Conference on “3rd India Central Asia Regional Conference”, November 6-8, 2003, Tashkent; Interaction with the scholars, officials and other experts in Tashkent.
110.P. Stobdan, K. Santhanam, “Central Asia is Central to India”, Indian Express, New Delhi, November 28, 2003.
111.For example, former Ambassador Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty is of the view that, “We have important assets in a campaign to counter India’s sheer power through economic, cultural and ideological activism. We have regional linkages with South and Central Asia and historical and cultural links with the Islamic world. We should also maintain and reinforce our close and time-tested relations with China;” see Dawn, April 30, 2006. Some Pakistani writings have highlighted that while managing its relations with Pakistan, India has to come out of its traditional perception that it “is an irritant that must be taught a lesson or disciplined”, see Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, no. 5, p. 18; whereas others are of the perception that “Islamabad would like to negotiate peace with India as an equal partner, and therefore, will have to invest more in building its military capability. A military superior neighbour with a long history of rivalry can never be trusted unless it makes the right moves to show its sincerity in durable peace”, see “Quest for Supremacy”, at http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2005-daily/05-12-2005/oped/ editorial.htm
The phenomenon of female infanticide or missing girl child is as old as many cultures, and has likely accounted for millions of gender-selective deaths throughout history. It remains a critical concern in a number of “Third World” countries today, notably the two most populous countries on earth, China and India. In all cases, specifically female infanticide reflects the low status accorded to women in most parts of the world; it is arguably the most brutal and destructive manifestation of the anti-female bias that pervades “patriarchal” societies. Female infanticide is the intentional killing of baby girls due to the preference for male babies and from the low value associated with the birth of females.
In India, family and social pressures to produce a son are immense. In most regions, sons are desired for reasons related to kinship, inheritance, marriage, identity, status, economic security and lineage. A preference for boys cuts across caste and class lines and results in discrimination against girls even before they are born.
Though some regions of India have a history of female infanticide, declining sex ratios are now also attributed to the use of new technologies for sex selection. There are no firm statistics at either the state or national levels on sex-selective abortion. However, a study by UNFPA concluded that sex-selective abortions from 1996 to 1998 in the northern states of Haryana and Punjab accounted for an estimated 81 per cent and 26 per cent of total abortions, respectively.
India has a highly masculine sex ratio, especially the northern states. Thus women in these states die before reaching adulthood. India shows a very mixed bag. “In some parts there are no signs of any unnatural imbalances, in other parts the numbers are grotesque.” Tribal societies in India have a less masculine sex ratio than all other caste groups. This, in spite of the fact that tribal communities have far lower levels of income, literacy and health facilities. It is therefore suggested by many experts, that the highly masculine sex ratio in India can be attributed to female infanticides and sex-selective abortions.
All medical tests that can be used to determine the sex of the child have been banned in India, due to incidents of these tests being used to get rid of unwanted female children before birth.
The selective abortion of female feotuses is most common in areas where cultural norms value male children over female children, especially in parts of People’s Republic of China, Korea, Taiwan, and India. A 2005 study estimated that over 90 million females were “missing” from the expected population in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan alone, and suggested that sex-selective abortion plays a role in this deficit. Gender bias can broadly impact a society, and it is estimated that by 2020 there could be more than 35 million young “surplus males” in China and 25 million in India. Sex-selective abortion has been seen as worsening the sex ratio in India, affecting gender issues related to sex compositions of Indian households. According to the 2001 census, the sex-ratio in India is 107.8 males per 100 females, up from 105.8 males per 100 females in 1991. The ratio is significantly higher in certain states such as Punjab (126.1) and Haryana (122.0). If one were to look at China it can be argued that by having a one-child policy, the rate of abortion of female fetuses has increased, thus accelerating a demographic decline.
Some research suggests that culture plays a larger role than economic conditions in gender preference and sex-selective abortion, because such deviations in sex ratios do not exist in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Other demographers, however, argue that perceived gender imbalances may arise from the underreporting of female births, rather than sex-selective abortion or infanticide. Sex-selective abortion was rare before the late 20th century, because of the difficulty of determining the sex of the fetus before birth, but ultrasound has made such selection easier. Prior to this, parents would alter family sex compositions through infanticide.
Eliminating the practice requires changes in the way girls and women are valued by society. In India, UNFPA supports the Government in a comprehensive approach that includes building media interest, creating community-based networks to advocate against the practice, sensitizing health providers and involving youth and other key stakeholders. In Haryana State, where the sex ratio imbalance is one of the highest, jagriti mandalis (“forums of awakening”) function as women’s social action groups that promote the rights of daughters. These groups have convinced families and doctors not to practice sex selection.
Following a campaign by health and human rights activists, legal measures to ban the use of prenatal diagnostic techniques for sex selection were first passed in the Indian state of Maharashtra in 1986. Following a campaign by health and human rights activists, legal measures to ban the use of prenatal diagnostic techniques for sex selection were first passed in the Indian state of Maharashtra in 1986. Similar efforts at the national level resulted in the enactment, in 1994, of the Prenatal Diagnostics Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act. Though the law became operational in 1996, it proved difficult to enforce. The amendments were passed in 2002, and the new law now prohibits determination and disclosure of the sex of the fetus, outlaws advertisements related to preconception and prenatal determination of sex, and prescribes punishments for violators
Among the advocates against female infanticide were United Nations organizations, including UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO, who were working alongside international NGOs and India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Together and in support of national partners, the UN agencies mobilized resources to build media interest and concern, create networks, sensitize the health system, train partners, conduct research, support civil society groups, and develop literacy and training materials. These efforts were bolstered by the provisional reports of the 2001 census that highlighted the increasing differential between the sexes. That, along with the earlier UNFPA study, helped generate a climate of concern among policy makers, the media, religious leaders and women’s groups.
Laws have been passed in India to prohibit sex-selective abortion. But a broader campaign is needed to address this and other harmful practices that are rooted in a cultural preference for sons and influenced by social and economic factors.
Legal action by itself is not enough to eliminate harmful traditional practices. To be effective, legislation should be part of a broad and integrated campaign that involves opinion makers and custodians of culture. In the case of sex-selective abortion, the campaign should also address structural issues underlying gender discrimination, in particular a widespread preference for sons.
The effective dissemination of research findings can bring controversial issues to national attention. In India, research informed an understanding of sex-selective abortion not only as a cultural issue, but one with social and economic dimensions.
Confronting harmful practices that are national in scope can best be addressed through a broad coalition of actors, each of whom can bring their own expertise in creating awareness and moving the issue forward.
The strategy, which seeks to address the structural issues underlying gender discrimination, was accepted by the Government of India and is expected to be adopted and operationalized by state governments. Though it is widely acknowledged that eliminating the practice will require a concerted, long-term effort, a positive start has been made.