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May 2016
Issue Brief
The following issue brief has been prepared by the NUST Research Team in collaboration with Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly for limited circulation only
Courtesy to Pakistan Think Tank by NUST Research Team
The NUST Research Team (NRT) is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit think tank that works in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs with a vision to innovate future prospects for peace, security and security for Pakistan through intellectual discourse, and contribute to sustainable social, political and economic development.
Copy Rights © NUST Research Team (NRT) and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (FAC)
Conclusions or opinions expressed in the publications and programs are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the fellows, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to NRT.
Authors: NUST Research Team
Acknowledgments: Rushna Shahid, Hamzah Riffat, Ali Tahir
Introduction
Today the world may have come out of its bipolar neurotic race… but it is still composed of a multitude of contesting narratives. Even if limited to simply the state level actors, a mess of ideologies, nationalism, state philosophies and cognitive perceptions and understanding of the world create complex diplomatic narratives. In a world that is ‘widening deepening and speeding up global ‘inter-connectedness’ in all aspects of contemporary life, Diplomacy is no exception.
Pakistan is facing increasingly complex challenges of global influence, in terms of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ state tools of power projection. There are only nine states in the world today with nuclear weapons where Pakistan and India are deemed as two of the most critical and strategic members of the group. A 2014 book ‘Power Rules’ categorizes Pakistan as a Mid-Level State in a Global power pyramid. This is justified by our substantial military strength for self-defense, nuclear assets and strategic location for regional influence.iii India however, by virtue of its economic clout in addition to its strategic assets, holds a prominent position as one of the ‘8 Principals’.iv
USA
8 Principals: China, Japan, India, Russia, UK, France, Germany & Brazil
Oil Producing States: Saudi Arabia, Iran, smaller Gulf States, Venezuela, Nigeria
The Mid Level States localized potential as Regional Players: Pakistan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan Responsible – 50+ states Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, Botswana, Chile etc. Bottom Dwellers/Problem States- 75 states: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Uzbekistan etc.
Non-State Actors: NGOs, International Media, International businesses and TerroristsFigure 1Gelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print
Henry Kissinger’s famous words “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”v, has become the mantra of all diplomatic literature. Even though the channels of state influence have become increasingly complicated and non-traditional, this basic philosophy holds true still. In line with this Pakistan’s traditional India-centric garrison, state policies need to evolve rapidly with the fast-paced globalized diplomatic narratives. Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations have been steadily increasing over the past few years via multiple channels of state diplomatic as well as strategic economic and non-traditional interactions. It is imperative for us to not only understand this evolving trend but also to develop effective and creative long-term policies that can balance India’s steadily increasing regional influence on multiple fronts. This issue brief thus hopes to foray into the recent developments in Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations and their strategic security implications for Pakistan.
The Indo- US strategic partnership encompasses multiple dimensions, such as shared principles of democracy and ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Both countries agree that this stability shroud be is realized through investments in human capital and the joint military cooperation. The relationship has cemented itself in line with common foreign policy objectives, ranging from curbing terrorism in South Asia to establishing defense agreements with Israel. Furthermore, India’s robust relationships with the oil-rich Gulf States, which the United States views as a vital cog in maintaining stability in the Middle East Vis a Vis Israel, is another aspect of the partnership which is of strategic significance.
The partnership in contemporary times heavily relies upon around the corporate sectors influence in both economies, where free market capitalism allows the flow of investments and expertise to either state. Furthermore, India’s status as a nuclear weapons state when it conducted its tests in 1974 has ensured that it creates a credible deterrent to ward off threats to its territorial sovereignty particularly in the aftermath of the 1962 border conflict with China. China’s rise as a potent economic power and its influence being recognized by the close relationships it has with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and particularly, Pakistan; where the latter is a recognized nuclear weapons state and maintains a policy of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ to ward off conventional imbalances with Indian aggression, has meant that India’s relationship with the United States becomes particularly relevant. The United States policy which involves containment of China in sensitive regions such as the South China Sea and South East Asia has meant that both India and the United States converge over the objective of ensuring that China’s economic and military expansion is curbed. China as a factor in the strategic calculus of both India and the United States is extremely important if one has to analyze the strategic disposition of this relationship and partnership.
As of current, India is the world’s largest arms importer with a total cache of $100 million, out of which, $67 million is directed towards Pakistan (Haider, 2016). In the past, this spending has shown an increasing trend when Pakistan has responded to Indian conventional and hegemonic designs through TNWs or Tactical Nuclear Weapons as an option to deploy on the battlefield. The support from lobbies inside the United States which vouch for Pakistan’s containment also allows India to
assume a hardened stance against the country which is characterized by aggressive rhetoric and responding to acts of terrorism allegedly perpetuated through its own soil, with doctrines such as the Cold Start (which involves quick mobilization, punitive strikes on enemy territory and little room for the adversary to respond).
While the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) might signal an alarming trend that could potentially have an impact on the US- India military partnership where the latter wishes to have strategic stability in South Asia, the fact that constraints have been imposed by the US on Pakistan’s dual-use technologies and weapons systems, buttresses the point of the US tilt towards India. In contrast to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program which has been viewed with suspicion over aspects such as command and control and nuclear terrorism, the US-India nuclear deal in 2008 has allowed India to benefit from a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group which permits it to gain access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel. This deal has greatly weakened the Non-Proliferation order in South Asia, where undue favoritism towards India leaving Pakistan with little or no access towards such technologies and having to rely on other partners such as China for investment into the nuclear sector.
Currently, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States has witnessed another jolt in the form of limited convergence over stability in Afghanistan. The United States widely accuses Pakistan of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network and the schisms between both countries which emerged regarding the sale of F-16s underlines how the strategic partnership which already exists between India and the United States gains added relevance. This partnership is likely to cement itself even further, where a Post P5+1 Nuclear Iran allows India to encircle Pakistan by forging amiable ties with Iran, investing heavily in Afghanistan and forging strong ties with states in the Middle East. Though the Middle East has historically allied with Pakistan, but due to several issues such as Pakistan’s policy of neutrality regarding the Yemen crisis, relations have soured particularly with states such as the UAE. The United States pushing for India to capitalize on regional dynamics has meant that Pakistan would need to exercise strategic foresight and prudence to avoid being encircled by India. The strategic partnership will thus, gain more relevance with India’s economic expansion, the US reservations over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and dual-use technologies as well as pushing for more investment and stability in Afghanistan through India’s efforts at the expense of Pakistan which is viewed to have a dualistic policy over terrorism.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 2011, between India and Afghanistan, laid the foundations for a long-term commitment to security and development in Afghanistan. It outlines assistance in the field of infrastructural and institutional development, offers educational guidelines and technological aid to developing Afghan Capacity. More importantly, the agreement encourages investment in Afghan natural resources, provides duty-free access to Afghan exports into Indian markets and aims to strengthen an Afghan-led process of peace and reconciliation. Efforts at high level bilateral political partnerships have materialized in agreements, collaborations, and conferences such as the Heart of Asia peace process and ANAASTU. India advocates a “no exit” policy with regards to Afghanistan, which has been endorsed by Afghan leadership (Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016).
Bilateral trade between the two economies has grown steadily (by approximately 0.20% annually) for the past three years. Despite the lack of direct access, India is the second largest market for Afghan exports with total bilateral trade amounting to $684.47 million in the year 2014-15 (BS Web Team, 2016). Naturally, India sees economic interests in Afghanistan, but its objectives in the region also hold political motives. Threatened by armed struggle for freedom in Kashmir, India benefits by cutting terror roots, their ideology and any networks within Afghanistan, that could aggravate the Kashmiri armed struggle (Baloch & Niazi, 2008). The resurgence of legitimate Islamic independent movements challenges India’s social fabric by providing cannon fodder to oppressed minorities. Moreover, eradication of terrorism helps stabilize the region, promoting trade. India benefits from undermining cordial Pak-Afghan relations; geostrategically speaking, Pakistan would always serve as a more suitable ally and partner for trade and commerce, being closer to Afghanistan (Usman, 2008). Geo-economic motives, of capturing Central Asian energy markets fuel India’s long run pursuit of Afghanistan. India’s push to develop Chabahar port in Iran consolidates earlier fears of Pakistan’s encirclement by India. Its presence isolates Pakistan, both politically and economically and also circumvents it, robbing it off its geo-strategic advantage. Furthermore, it nullifies Pakistan ability to use Afghanistan as an asset of strategic depth (Riedel, 2011). Numerous Indian consulates near the Pak-Afghan border are a legitimate cause of concern for Pakistan for two primary reasons. Generally, consulates protect and promote, commercial and individual interests, and hence are opened in areas that are densely populated. However, the majority of
Indian consulates are found in population scarce areas (Cheema, 2013). Pakistan has thrown multiple state level accusations at the Indian establishment and specifically its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for aiding militancy, separatist movements and terrorism on Pakistani soil while using the consulates as ground zero for such operations (Zeb, 2006). Earlier Pakistan has provided intelligence that links Brahimdagh Bugti (son of the late Akbar Bugti) and the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) to Delhi and the former Karzai government (Walsh, 2010). Pakistan’s former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik suspected Brahimdagh Bugti to be responsible for recruiting militants in Afghanistan and went on to accused India and Afghanistan for supporting the insurgent Baloch National Army (BNA) and also charged Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for abduction of foreign nationals (Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, 2013). Recently the Kulbhushan Yadav episode has exposed RAW’s intelligence networks aimed towards destabilizing Pakistan and retrospectively speaking this warrants extreme caution on behalf of Pakistan upon any Indian presence near its borders (Ahmad, 2016).
India has pledged over $2 billion to Afghanistan up till now, as part of a reconstruction and development aid package (Fair, 2010). This is inclusive of institutional development, within which India has constructed a new parliament building for Afghanistan (Hindustan Times, 2015). Immensely closes ties with India were previously also enjoyed by the former Karzai government whose embrace of India was a source of great irritancy to Pakistan in light to the 2005 Indo – US civil nuclear deal (ISAF, 2012). Consequently, Pakistan perceived Indian assisted dam construction in the province of Kunar as a way to divert water resources away from Pakistan (Kiani, 2013). Pakistan’s insecurities over the matter have been a cause of concern to US and India, who point fingers at Pakistan of having ties to the Haqqani network, and allegedly accusing InterServices Intelligence Agency (ISI) for supporting the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul (CNN, 2008). The U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen has gone to refer to the Haqqani network as, “a veritable arm of the ISI” (Bumiller & Perlezsept, 2011).
From the above qualitative analysis, we conclude that Pak-Afghan relations are negatively correlated with Indo-Afghan relations. While all counties would ideally benefit from holistic, all-encompassing political and economic initiatives for growth, miss -trust and historical animosity has pivoted these regional powers against each other’s best interest (Mir, 2015).
Lessons for Pakistan
The negative correlation between the Indo-US strategic partnership and the Indo- Afghanistan partnership with the US-Pakistan and the Pakistan Afghanistan relationship, clearly suggests that Pakistan must capitalize on opportunities which are present in its region and globally through conducting an appraisal of regional dynamics and capitalizing on its relationship with states such as China which has heavily invested in the country and continues to contribute towards its arms buildup. Exercising prudence requires foresight, but to counter the growing India- US strategic partnership, Pakistani policy makers can undertake the following recommendations at the diplomatic level:
1. Capitalization of the strategic partnership with China: Although the indomitable relationship with China is characterized by a high level of mutual trust and convergence of strategic interests, it is imperative for Pakistan to consider the possibility of similar nuclear agreements in line with the Indo-US Nuclear deal, particularly with a state that has a rising global profile and has been benign as far as its investments to Pakistan is concerned. The strategic partnership between the US and India is defined by economic interests as well as a military cooperation and Pakistan should continue to ensure that its economic and military partnership with China acts as a balance to less concessions and avenues for cooperation with the United States. 2. Capitalizing on the limitations of US/ Indian strategic foresight: While the strategic partnership between the US and India has alarming implications for Pakistan’s security it is critical to understand that the US and India have often failed in resolving key disputes with states through erroneous policies which have encompassed military interventions and neglect. US policies in the Gulf region, particularly with regard to Iran have had an impact on Iran’s ability to assert itself as a dominant player in the Middle East. Yet at the same time, in line with the P5+1 Nuclear Deal, Pakistan can cement its relationship with the Islamic Republic by emphasizing on energy deals and projects which have previously been held hostage to sanctions and time lags. Similarly, states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal have grappled with Indian policies which include interference in sovereign affairs. Sri Lanka’s hostility towards India has historically stemmed from India’s peacekeeping force which exaggerated the ongoing civil war with the Lanka Tamil Tiger Eelam as compared to
Pakistan, where the efforts of the Pakistan Army in assisting the downfall of the insurgency has proven to be fruitful and has fostered goodwill amongst both countries. A multidimensional approach towards Pakistan’s foreign policy in its immediate neighborhood is required for the country’s rising regional profile. 3. Reassessment of Pakistan’s Afghan policy: The India- Afghanistan relationship has fostered on the grounds of joint collaborations between both governments over infrastructural development including education, health sectors and building of intellectual capital. Afghan/ Pakistan trust deficits emerge on the security fronts with allegations over cross border terrorism on either side jeopardizing the relationship. Yet a more innovative approach towards dealing with Afghanistan where competition with India centers on increased investments and energy generation could prove to be vital. CPEC’s opportunities allows Pakistan to address its domestic energy concerns and simultaneously vouch for similar investments in Afghanistan which could act as a counter to growing Indo- US strategic convergence over the subject of sustainable stability in Afghanistan. 4. Economic Profile as a diplomatic tool: In an age which is defined by increased regional connectivity and economic cooperation, it is important that Pakistan’s policy makers focus on generating higher productivity for its domestic markets while simultaneously allaying concerns of potential investors. A critical element of the Indo- US Strategic Partnership has been the rising Indian corporate sector which has allowed it to benefit from the 2008 Nuclear Deal despite the fact that it weakened the Non- Proliferation Order significantly and contributed towards instability in South Asia. While differences over the role of TNWs in the battlefield, nuclear terrorism and Pakistan’s policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence will continue to persist alongside accusations of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network; a rising economic profile while simultaneously addressing its domestic energy concerns will at least give Pakistan relatively more strength in its diplomatic negotiations particularly with global powers such as the United States which it has shared a fractious relationship with. 5. Encapsulating ‘Realpolitik’, as a feature of foreign policy: As a concept and as a theory which gains considerable traction in modern times, policy makers in Pakistan need to be made aware of what a dynamic approach is; of which ‘Real Politik’ or diplomacy based on circumstances of given circumstances and factors becomes important. So far the Indo-
Afghan and the Indo- US strategic partnership has been based upon Real Politik and for Pakistan to ensure that such partnerships can be countered, Real Politik as a concept needs to be understood, where relationships are less about ideology, religion and cultural beliefs, but more about political influence, economic clout and military supremacy.
References
Ahmad, N., 2016. Analysis: Kulbhushan Yadav’s RAW move. [Online] Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/1074812/analysis-kulbhushan-jadhavs-raw-move/
Baloch, Q. B. & Niazi, A. H. K., 2008. Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making, s.l.: s.n.
BS Web Team, 2016. 6 things to know about the India-Afghanistan relationship. [Online] Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/5-things-to-know-aboutthe-india-afghanistan-relationship-116010400230_1.html
Bumiller, E. & Perlezsept, J., 2011. Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy. [Online] Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-inattack-on-us-embassy.html?_r=0
Cheema, P. I., 2013. Afghanistan’s Crisis & Pakistan’s Security Dilemma. Asian Survey, 23(3).
CNN, 2008. Afghan official: Pakistan spies behind Kabul attack. [Online] Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/08/afghanistan.explosion/index.html?eref=rss_l atest
Fair, C. C., 2010. ndia in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, s.l.: s.n.
Haider, M., 2016. India’s growing military spending threatens Pakistan, says NSA Janjua. [Online] Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1250121
Hindustan Times, 2015. Modi inaugurates new Afghan Parliament built by India in Kabul. [Online] Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-toinaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
ISAF, 2012. State of the Taliban, s.l.: s.n.
Kiani, K., 2013. Pakistan, Afghanistan mull over power project on Kunar River. [Online] Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1038435
Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, (. A. O., 2013. [Interview] (12 Janruary 2013).
Ministry of External Affairs; Government of Inida, 2016. India – Afghanistan Relations. [Online] Available at: http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000
Mir, H., 2015. Indian’s Allegation & Pakistan. [Online] Available at: http://www.currentaffairspk.com/hamid-mir-urdu-column-about-indians-allegationpakistan/
Riedel, B., 2011. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad. s.l.:s.n.
Usman, T., 2008. Indian Factor in Pak-Afghan Relations. Research Journal of Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia).
Walsh, D., 2010. WikiLeaks cables reveal Afghan-Pakistani row over fugitive rebel. [Online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-afghan-pakistanifugitive
Zeb, R., 2006. Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4.
iGrassie, William. “Seeking Truth in a World of Competing Narratives.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-grassie/seeking-truth-in-a-world-_b_1452389.html>.
iiCampbell, Francis. “Has Globalization Changed the Nature of Diplomacy?” Proc. of Ethical Standards in Public Life, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge University, UK. N.p., 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/campbell-2015>.
iiiGelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print.
iv Ibid
v”“America Has No Permanent Friends or Enemies, Only Interests”.” Goodreads. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/633024-americaIndo-US and Indo-Afghan Relations
Security Implications for Pakistan
May 2016
Issue Brief
The following issue brief has been prepared by the NUST Research Team in collaboration with Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly for limited circulation only
The NUST Research Team (NRT) is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit think tank that works in collaboration with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs with a vision to innovate future prospects for peace, security and security for Pakistan through intellectual discourse, and contribute to sustainable social, political and economic development.
Copy Rights © NUST Research Team (NRT) and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (FAC)
Conclusions or opinions expressed in the publications and programs are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the, fellows, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to NRT.
Authors: NUST Research Team
Acknowledgements: Rushna Shahid, Hamzah Riffat, Ali Tahir
Introduction
Today the world may have come out of its bipolar neurotic race… but it is still composed of a multitude of contesting narrativesi. Even if limited to simply the state level actors, a mess of ideologies, nationalism, state philosophies and cognitive perceptions and understanding of the world create complex diplomatic narratives. In a world that is ‘widening deepening and speeding up’ii global interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary life, Diplomacy is no exception.
Pakistan is facing increasingly complex challenges of global influence, in terms of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ state tools of power projection. There are only nine states in the world today with nuclear weapons where Pakistan and India are deemed as two of the most critical and strategic members of the group. A 2014 book ‘Power Rules’ categorizes Pakistan as a Mid-Level State in a Global power pyramid. This is justified by our substantial military strength for self-defense, nuclear assets and strategic location for regional influence.iii India however, by virtue of its economic clout in addition to its strategic assets, holds a prominent position as one of the ‘8 Principals’.iv
USA
8 Principals: China, Japan, India, Russia, UK, France, Germany & Brazil
Oil Producing States: Saudi Arabia, Iran, smaller Gulf States, Venezuela, Nigeria
Mid Level Stateslocalised potential as Regional Players: Pakistan, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan Responsibles– 50+ states: Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, Botswana, Chile etc. Bottom Dwellers/Problem States- 75 states: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Uzbekistan etc.
Non State Actors: NGOs, International Media, International businesses and TerroristsFigure 1Gelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print
Henry Kissinger’s famous words “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”v, has become the mantra of all diplomatic literature. Even though the channels of state influence have become increasingly complicated and non-traditional, this basic philosophy holds true still. In line with this Pakistan’s traditional India centric garrison state policies need to evolve rapidly with the fast paced globalized diplomatic narratives. Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations have been steadily increasing over the past few years via multiple channels of state diplomatic as well as strategic economic and non-traditional interactions. It is imperative for us to not only understand this evolving trend but also to develop effective and creative long-term policies that can balance India’s steadily increasing regional influence on multiple fronts. This issue brief thus hopes to foray into the recent developments in Indo-US and Indo-Afghan relations and their strategic security implications for Pakistan.
The Indo-US Strategic Partnership
The Indo- US strategic partnership encompasses multiple dimensions, such as shared principles of democracy and ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Both countries agree that this stability shroud be is realized through investments in human capital and the joint military cooperation. The relationship has cemented itself in line with common foreign policy objectives, ranging from curbing terrorism in South Asia to establishing defense agreements with Israel. Furthermore, India’s robust relationships with the oil rich Gulf States, which the United States views as a vital cog in maintaining stability in the Middle East Vis a Vis Israel, is another aspect of the partnership which is of strategic significance.
The partnership in contemporary times heavily relies around the corporate sectors influence in both economies, where free market capitalism allows the flow of investments and expertise to either state. Furthermore, India’s status as a nuclear weapons state when it conducted its tests in 1974 has ensured that it creates a credible deterrent to ward off threats to its territorial sovereignty particularly in the aftermath of the 1962 border conflict with China. China’s rise as a potent economic power and its influence being recognized by the close relationships it has with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and particularly, Pakistan; where the latter is a recognized nuclear weapons state and maintains a policy of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ to ward off conventional imbalances with Indian aggression, has meant that India’s relationship with the United States becomes particularly relevant. The United States policy which involves containment of China in sensitive regions such as the South China Sea and South East Asia has meant that both India and the United States converge over the objective of ensuring that China’s economic and military expansion is curbed. China as a factor in the strategic calculus of both India and the United States is extremely important if one has to analyze the strategic disposition of this relationship and partnership.
As of current, India is the world’s largest arms importer with a total cache of $100 million, out of which, $67 million is directed towards Pakistan (Haider, 2016). In the past this spending has shown an increasing trend when Pakistan has responded to Indian conventional and hegemonic designs through TNWs or Tactical Nuclear Weapons as an option to deploy on the battlefield. The support from lobbies inside the United States which vouch for Pakistan’s containment also allows India to
assume a hardened stance against the country which is characterized by aggressive rhetoric and responding to acts of terrorism allegedly perpetuated through its own soil, with doctrines such as the Cold Start (which involves quick mobilization, punitive strikes on enemy territory and little room for the adversary to respond).
While the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) might signal an alarming trend that could potentially have an impact on the US- India military partnership where the latter wishes to have strategic stability in South Asia, the fact that constraints have been imposed by the US on Pakistan’s dual use technologies and weapons systems, buttresses the point of the US tilt towards India. In contrast to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program which has been viewed with suspicion over aspects such as command and control and nuclear terrorism, the US-India nuclear deal in 2008 has allowed India to benefit from a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group which permits it to gain access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel. This deal has greatly weakened the Non Proliferation order in South Asia, where undue favoritism towards India leaving Pakistan with little or no access towards such technologies and having to rely on other partners such as China for investment into the nuclear sector.
Currently, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States has witnessed another jolt in the form of limited convergence over stability in Afghanistan. The United States widely accuses Pakistan of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network and the schisms between both countries which emerged regarding the sale of F-16s underlines how the strategic partnership which already exists between India and the United States gains added relevance. This partnership is likely to cement itself even further, where a Post P5+1 Nuclear Iran allows India to encircle Pakistan by forging amiable ties with Iran, investing heavily in Afghanistan and forging strong ties with states in the Middle East. Though Middle East has historically allied with Pakistan, but due to several issues such as Pakistan’s policy of neutrality regarding the Yemen crisis, relations have soured particularly with states such as the UAE. The United States pushing for India to capitalize on regional dynamics has meant that Pakistan would need to exercise strategic foresight and prudence to avoid being encircled by India. The strategic partnership will thus, gain more relevance with India’s economic expansion, the US reservations over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and dual use technologies as well as pushing for more investment and stability in Afghanistan through India’s efforts at the expense of Pakistan which is viewed to have a dualistic policy over terrorism.
The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 2011, between India and Afghanistan laid the foundations for a long-term commitment to security and development in Afghanistan. It outlines assistance in the field of infrastructural and institutional development, offers educational guidelines and technological aid to develop Afghan Capacity. More importantly the agreement encourages investment in Afghan natural resources, provides duty-free access to Afghan exports into Indian markets and aims to strengthen an Afghan led process of peace and reconciliation. Efforts at high level bilateral political partnerships have materialized in agreements, collaborations and conferences such as the Heart of Asia peace process and ANAASTU. India advocates a “no exit” policy with regards to Afghanistan, which has been endorsed by Afghan leadership (Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016).
Bilateral trade between the two economies has grown steadily (by approximately 0.20% annually) for the past three years. Despite the lack of direct access, India is the second largest market for Afghan exports with total bilateral trade amounting to $684.47 million in the year 2014-15 (BS Web Team, 2016). Naturally, India sees economic interests in Afghanistan, but its objectives in the region also hold political motives. Threatened by armed struggle for freedom in Kashmir, India benefits by cutting terror roots, their ideology and any networks within Afghanistan, that could aggravate the Kashmiri armed struggle (Baloch & Niazi, 2008). The resurgence of legitimate Islamic independent movements challenges India’s social fabric by providing cannon fodder to oppressed minorities. Moreover, the eradication of terrorism helps stabilize the region, promoting trade. India benefits from undermining cordial Pak-Afghan relations; geo strategically speaking, Pakistan would always serve as a more suitable ally and partner for trade and commerce, being closer to Afghanistan (Usman, 2008). Geo-economic motives, of capturing Central Asian energy markets fuel India’s long run pursuit of Afghanistan. India’s push to develop Chabahar port in Iran consolidates earlier fears of Pakistan’s encirclement by India. Its presence isolates Pakistan, both politically and economically and also circumvents it, robbing it off its geostrategic advantage. Furthermore, it nullifies Pakistan ability to use Afghanistan as an asset of strategic depth (Riedel, 2011). Numerous Indian consulates near the Pak-Afghan border are a legitimate cause of concern for Pakistan for two primary reasons. Generally, consulates protect and promote, commercial and individual interests, and hence are opened in areas that are densely populated. However, the majority of
Indian consulates are found in population scarce areas (Cheema, 2013). Pakistan has thrown multiple state level accusations at the Indian establishment and specifically, it’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for aiding militancy, separatist movements and terrorism on Pakistani soil while using the consulates as ground zero for such operations (Zeb, 2006). Earlier Pakistan has provided intelligence that links Brahimdagh Bugti (son of the late Akbar Bugti) and the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) to Delhi and the former Karzai government (Walsh, 2010). Pakistan’s former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik suspected Brahimdagh Bugti to be responsible for recruiting militants in Afghanistan and went on to accused India and Afghanistan for supporting the insurgent Baloch National Army (BNA) and also charged Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for the abduction of foreign nationals (Major Dr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, 2013). Recently the Kulbhushan Yadav episode has exposed RAW’s intelligence networks aimed towards destabilizing Pakistan and retrospectively speaking this warrants extreme caution on behalf of Pakistan upon any Indian presence near its borders (Ahmad, 2016).
India has pledged over $2 billion to Afghanistan up till now, as part of a reconstruction and development aid package (Fair, 2010). This is inclusive of institutional development, within which India has constructed a new parliament building for Afghanistan (Hindustan Times, 2015). Immensely closer ties with India were previously also enjoyed by the former Karzai government whose embrace of India was a source of great irritancy to Pakistan in light to the 2005 Indo – US civil nuclear deal (ISAF, 2012). Consequently, Pakistan perceived Indian assisted dam construction in the province of Kunar as a way to divert water resources away from Pakistan (Kiani, 2013). Pakistan’s insecurities over the matter have been a cause of concern to US and India, who point fingers at Pakistan of having ties to the Haqqani network, and allegedly accusing InterServices Intelligence Agency (ISI) of supporting the 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul (CNN, 2008). The U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen has gone to refer to the Haqqani network as, “a veritable arm of the ISI” (Bumiller & Perlezsept, 2011).
From the above qualitative analysis, we conclude that Pak-Afghan relations are negatively correlated with Indo-Afghan relations. While all counties would ideally benefit from holistic, all-encompassing political and economic initiatives for growth, miss -trust and historical animosity has pivoted these regional powers against each other’s best interest (Mir, 2015).
The negative correlation between the Indo-US strategic partnership and the Indo- Afghanistan partnership with the US-Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, clearly suggests that Pakistan must capitalize on opportunities which are present in its region and globally through conducting an appraisal of regional dynamics and capitalizing on its relationship with states such as China which has heavily invested in the country and continues to contribute towards its arms buildup. Exercising prudence requires foresight, but to counter the growing India- US strategic partnership, Pakistani policymakers can undertake the following recommendations at the diplomatic level:
1. Capitalization of the strategic partnership with China:
Although the indomitable relationship with China is characterized by a high level of mutual trust and convergence of strategic interests, it is imperative for Pakistan to consider the possibility of similar nuclear agreements in line with the Indo-US Nuclear deal, particularly with a state that has a rising global profile and has been benign as far as its investments in Pakistan is concerned. The strategic partnership between the US and India is defined by economic interests as well as a military cooperation and Pakistan should continue to ensure that its economic and military partnership with China acts as a balance to fewer concessions and avenues for cooperation with the United States.
2. Capitalizing on the limitations of US/ Indian strategic foresight:
While the strategic partnership between the US and India has alarming implications for Pakistan’s security it is critical to understand that the US and India have often failed in resolving key disputes with states through erroneous policies which have encompassed military interventions and neglect. US policies in the Gulf region, particularly with regard to Iran have had an impact on Iran’s ability to assert itself as a dominant player in the Middle East. Yet at the same time, in line with the P5+1 Nuclear Deal, Pakistan can cement its relationship with the Islamic Republic by emphasizing on energy deals and projects which have previously been held hostage to sanctions and time lags. Similarly, states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal have grappled with Indian policies which include interference in sovereign affairs. Sri Lanka’s hostility towards India has historically stemmed from India’s peacekeeping force which exaggerated the ongoing civil war with the Lanka Tamil Tiger Eelam as compared to
Pakistan, where the efforts of the Pakistan Army in assisting the downfall of the insurgency has proven to be fruitful and has fostered goodwill amongst both countries. A multidimensional approach towards Pakistan’s foreign policy in its immediate neighborhood is required for the country’s rising regional profile.
3. Reassessment of Pakistan’s Afghan policy:
The India- Afghanistan relationship has fostered on the grounds of joint collaborations between both governments over infrastructural development including education, health sectors and building of intellectual capital. Afghan/ Pakistan trust deficits emerge on the security fronts with allegations over cross-border terrorism on either side jeopardizing the relationship. Yet a more innovative approach towards dealing with Afghanistan where competition with India centers on increased investments and energy generation could prove to be vital. CPEC’s opportunities allow Pakistan to address its domestic energy concerns and simultaneously vouch for similar investments in Afghanistan which could act as a counter to growing Indo- US strategic convergence over the subject of sustainable stability in Afghanistan.
4. Economic Profile as a diplomatic tool:
In an age which is defined by increased regional connectivity and economic cooperation, it is important that Pakistan’s policy makers focus on generating higher productivity for its domestic markets while simultaneously allaying concerns of potential investors. A critical element of the Indo- US Strategic Partnership has been the rising Indian corporate sector which has allowed it to benefit from the 2008 Nuclear Deal despite the fact that it weakened the Non- Proliferation Order significantly and contributed towards instability in South Asia. While differences over the role of TNWs in the battlefield, nuclear terrorism and Pakistan’s policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence will continue to persist alongside accusations of doing less to counter the Haqqani Network; a rising economic profile while simultaneously addressing it’s domestic energy concerns will at least give Pakistan relatively more strength in its diplomatic negotiations particularly with global powers such as the United States which it has shared a fractious relationship with.
5. Encapsulating ‘Realpolitik’, as a feature of foreign policy:
As a concept and as a theory which gains considerable traction in modern times, policy makers in Pakistan need to be made aware of what a dynamic approach is; of which ‘Real Politik’ or diplomacy based on circumstances of given circumstances and factors becomes important. So far the Indo- Afghan and the Indo- US strategic partnership has been based upon Real Politik and for Pakistan to ensure that such partnerships can be countered, Real Politik as a concept needs to be understood, where relationships are less about ideology, religion, and cultural beliefs, but more about political influence, economic clout, and military supremacy.
References
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Haider, M., 2016. India’s growing military spending threatens Pakistan, says NSA Janjua. [Online] Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1250121
Hindustan Times, 2015. Modi inaugurates new Afghan Parliament built by India in Kabul. [Online] Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-toinaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
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Kiani, K., 2013. Pakistan, Afghanistan mull over power project on Kunar River. [Online] Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1038435
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Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India, 2016. India – Afghanistan Relations. [Online] Available at http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000
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Riedel, B., 2011. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad. s.l.:s.n.
Usman, T., 2008. Indian Factor in Pak-Afghan Relations. Research Journal of Area Study Centre (Russia, China, and Central Asia).
Walsh, D., 2010. WikiLeaks cables reveal Afghan-Pakistani row over fugitive rebel. [Online] Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-afghan-pakistanifugitive
Zeb, R., 2006. Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4.
iGrassie, William. “Seeking Truth in a World of Competing Narratives.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-grassie/seeking-truth-in-a-world-_b_1452389.html>.
iiCampbell, Francis. “Has Globalization Changed the Nature of Diplomacy?” Proc. of Ethical Standards in Public Life, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge University, UK. N.p., 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/campbell-2015>.
iiiGelb, Leslie H. Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 2009. Print.
iv Ibid
v”“America Has No Permanent Friends or Enemies, Only Interests”.” Goodreads. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014. <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/633024-america
Posted by Vanab in BRITISH TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN, CORRUPT ROGUE NAWAZ SHARIF, Defenders of Pakistan, Global Intelligence Agencies, India Global Exporter of Terrorism, Ishaq Dar Financial Criminal, LIAR POLITICIANS, LIES IN PRINT MEDIA OF US, Media Hijack in Pakistan By Foreign Powers, MEDIA MIR JAFFERS, Morally corrupt Thieves of PML(N), Morosi Siyasat & Political Crooks, Nawaz Dangerous, NAWAZ SHARIF, Nawaz Sharif Dangerous Man, NAWAZ SHARIF FAMILY TURPITUDE, NAWAZ SHARIF SAGA OF ABSOLUTE & CHRONIC CORRUPTION, Pakistan Army, Pakistan's Debt Bomb, RAW SPIES IN NAWAZ SHARIF EMPLOYMENT on March 4th, 2017
Note by Commodore Tariq Majeed PN (Retd):
“This intelligence model is an improvement on the practices of Mossad which has infiltrated several Jewish agents into the occupied territory of Palestine as Muslims. These agents practice Islam like any normal Muslim. They mingle into local Muslim population just to wait for the appropriate time to strike.
Posted by Fiona in Trump War on Muslims on February 8th, 2017
February 01, 2017
President Donald Trump is getting ready to plunge into the burning Mideast with all the zeal and arrogance of a medieval crusader. The new administration’s knowledge of the region is a thousand miles wide and two inches deep.
Reviving a truly terrible idea originated by know-nothing Congressional Republicans, Trump proposes US-run safe zones in Syria for refugees from that nation’s conflict. The president went out of his way to insist that such safe zones would spare the United States from having to shelter Syrian refugees.
He should better worry about Chicago where 762 citizens were murdered last year.
At the same time, Trump, declaiming from his new Mount Olympus of New York’s Trump Tower, vowed to impose a 30-day halt on immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen to ‘protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals.’
One wonders if any of Trump’s Praetorian Guard noticed that all these listed ‘terrorist’ nations have been attacked by the United States or seen their governments overthrown by Uncle Sam. I’m surprised Afghanistan and Pakistan were left off the list. Their time will likely come soon. Is it any wonder that all of these Muslim nations bear a serious grudge against the United States? The angriest group is ISIS, who are seeking revenge for the destruction of Iraq.
Former President Barack Obama shied away from direct military intervention in Syria, preferring stealthy warfare, drones and hit squads. He had the sense to know that US military intervention in the heart of the Mideast would be fraught with danger, not the least clashes between US and Russian forces. History shows it’s easy to invade into unstable areas but hard to get out.
But not so for bull in the Mideast china shop Trump as he charges into the Levant, advised by generals who made a mess in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Trump’s ardently pro-Israel cabinet must be rubbing their hands in glee as they see Syria in his cross hairs. The destruction of Syria’s regime and fragmenting that nation is an Israeli strategic priority.
One wishes Trump would stop for a moment and reflect. There are 11 million Syrian refugees in Syria and neighboring states. They are the result of a civil war engineered by Washington, Turkey, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, with France and Britain playing a supporting role. Western money, arms, and supplies have fuelled the six-year-old conflict whose aim was to overthrow Syria’s Assad government because he is an ally of Iran.
The US and France did exactly the same thing in Libya, overthrowing its leader, Muammar Khadaffi, and murdering him – thank you, Hillary Clinton. The US invaded and destroyed Iraq, tore apart Somalia and neighboring Sudan, and is now providing warplanes, bombs and mercenary advisors that Saudi Arabia – the patron of the jihadi forces in Syria – is using to crush little Yemen.
The largest number of Mideast refugees are now in Syria, thank you Uncle Sam, and its neighbors, Jordan and Lebanon. The second biggest group are the 5.2 million Palestinian refugees scattered across the Levant. Iraq is awash with internal refugees, thank you George W. Bush. Add now a couple of million refugees from strife-torn South Sudan, a new failed nation created by blundering US Mideast policy as a way of punishing disobedient Sudan, thank Bush and Obama.
At the same time, Washington must avoid any and all risk of military clashes in Syria with Russia. We can’t keep huffing and puffing that Moscow has no business in Syria when it’s as close to southern Russia as northern Mexico is to Texas. The US has troops and bases across the globe, most lately in Africa. Who are we to tell Russia to get out of Syria?
Just when it seemed that the Syrian conflict was beginning to simmer down, Trump’s intervention will be certain to heat up the conflict and undermine potential peace agreements. In case there are still Muslims who believed the US is their friend, as was the case fifty years ago, they will now understand that America is their enemy thanks to Trump’s ham-handed, ‘no Muslims’ policies.
Muslims account for 23% of the world’s population and will surpass Christians in about four decades. Besides riling up the Chinese, is it really wise to antagonize and insult members of Islam, the world’s fast-growing religion? And single out Muslims as most likely to face torture? Bad idea.
Eric S. Margolis is an award-winning, internationally syndicated columnist. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune the Los Angeles Times, Times of London, the Gulf Times, the Khaleej Times, Nation – Pakistan, Hurriyet, – Turkey, Sun-Times Malaysia and other news sites in Asia. EricMargolis.com
Posted by admin in Foreign Policy on January 7th, 2016
Abb Masood Raza Ke Saath – 5th January 2016 by aneesmalik941
Who is Behind Pathonkot Airbase Attack? By Sajjad Shaukat On January 2, this year, India a terrorist attack when a heavily-armed group of militants, wearing army uniforms stormed the Indian Air Force Base in Pathankot, located near the Pakistan border. The crossfire between the Indian security forces and the terrorists have continued on the fourth day during search and combing operation inside the Pathankot airbase. On January 5, an Indian Air Force official told the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) that the operation was stepped up. But, firing could be heard from inside during night of January 4 and morning of January 5. An Indian military official said a fifth terrorist was killed on the third day of the siege and at least one attacker remained in the complex, as troops worked to secure the sprawling compound. Indian sources revealed on January 5 that during the gunbattle, so far five terrorist and seven personal of the security forces including one Lt Col Niranjan of the National Security Guard (NSG) have been killed, while the operation at the base continues. But, the same day, Indian defence minister said that the operation finally came to end. The Pakistan Foreign Office said in a statement: “Pakistan condemns the terrorist incident in Pathankot…we extend heartfelt condolences to the government and people of India and the bereaved families. Building on the goodwill created during the recent high-level contacts between the two countries, Pakistan remains committed to partner with India as well as other countries in the region to completely eradicate the menace of terrorism afflicting our region.” On the other side, without any evidence and investigation, since the first day of the terror attack at the Pathankot airbase, Indian media, its leading newspapers and the TV channels started a deliberate blame game against Pakistan by accusing the latter and its primary intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) regarding the episode. In one way or the other, Indian officials also followed the blame game against Pakistan. However, we need an appropriate analysis to know as to who (Pakistan or India) is behind the terror attack at Pathankot airbase. In this regard, like the past practice, the Indian media, citing security officials reported that the terrorists were speaking Punjabi with each other and they hailed from Pakistan-based Jaish-i-Muhammad group—the terrorists were supported and financed by the ISI. The Indian media further claimed that the attackers had arrived from Pakistani Punjab’s Bahawalpur district, another revelation made by Indian officials, even when the operation against terrorists continued in Indian Air Force base of Pathankot. While, Indian Superintend of Police, Gurdaspur, Salwinder who was abducted one day before along with his friend and cook, told that the terrorists were speaking in Urdu. Indian Intelligence agencies had already alerted security agencies about the possible terror group’s planning of the attack. They also claimed that they traced the phone calls of the militants. On January 1, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval had alerted the Indian Air Force, NSG and Punjab Police about a possibility of terror attacks. Following the alert, Western Air Command chief Air Marshal SB Deo had reached Pathankot air base on the same day of night himself to take stock of security preparations. Some local residents also confirmed that at the night of January 1, there were movements of the security forces in the area. While, the militants entered the Pathankot airbase at 3 A.M on January 2. One day before, the terrorists had also hijacked the Indian SP’s car which was used by them to reach the base. The fact is that none had crossed the highly secured border from the Pakistan side, the hijacking of the Indian SP’s car and the alleged use of his phone was a drama and so was the charge that the attackers were linked to an organization Jaish-e-Muhammad which had been banned by Pakistan several years ago. Quite contrarily, Indian and foreign media have disclosed that Pakistan-based Kashmir’s militant body United Jihad Council on January 4 claimed responsibility for the Pathankot airbase attack. Besides, why the SP, his friend and cook were spared by the terrorists, proving them an opportunity to alert the senior authorities about the plot. How could the terrorists still penetrate the air base when some 200 commandoes had been airlifted to the base on January 1 and the base security was fully alert? Latest reports disclose that the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which has been entrusted with the attack probe, is questioning the SP Salwinder Singh, his friend Rajesh Verma, and cook Madan Gopal, deliberately connecting him with Jaish-e-Mohammad and ISI. In the evening of January 2, Indian home minister announced that the operation was over and four terrorists were killed. But, the operation again started on January 3, as he indicated that some militants are still hiding in the base. As regards the number of the terrorists, New Delhi started from four and by adding one each day, reached the figure of 11. Meanwhile, during queries of media persons, Indian home minister could not give appropriate replies to all these contradictory developments. Contradictory statements of the Indian military and civil officials have also been recorded, during the operation. According to latest information, India has guessed that the operation would continue for a few days. As a matter of fact, Indian intelligence agencies, especially RAW have themselves arranged terror attacks at the Pathankot airbase to fulfil a number of anti-Pakistan designs. In this respect, in the recent past, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to Pakistan to meet his counterpart Nawaz Sharif. The two countries decided to start a dialogue process to resolve outstanding issues, with the foreign secretaries of both countries, scheduled to meet in Islamabad on January 15, 2016. Earlier, New Delhi had itself suspended the talks with Pakistan. But, under the cover of Pathankot terror attack, Indian government said that it is “mulling options” regarding holding of Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan in Islamabad. It is mentionable that on November 26, 2008, several persons were killed in the simultaneous terror attacks in Mumbai. Without any investigation, Indian high officials and media had started blaming Pakistan. Under the cover of the Mumbai catastrophe, India began a deliberate propaganda campaign against Pakistan and tried to isolate the latter in the comity of nations by showing that Islamabad was sponsoring terrorism in India. Indian top officials and media anchors had remarked that Indian Mujahideen and the banned Lashkar-e-Tayba based in Pakistan and ISI were behind the Mumbai terror attacks. Similarly, on December 13, 2001, Indian parliament was attacked by five terrorists. Without any proof, Indian top officials and TV channels started a blame game against Pakistan by involving the banned Lashkar-e-Tayba and ISI in relation to the Parliament assault. Availing the pretext of the parliament attack and Mumbai catastrophe, New Delhi had, twice, suspended the process of dialogue with Islamabad in wake of its highly provocative actions like mobilization of troops. Pakistan had also taken defensive steps to meet any Indian prospective aggression or surgical strikes. But, India failed in implementing its aggressive plans, because Pakistan also possesses atomic weapons. Particularly, on May 27, 2014, Indian Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shariff in the oath-taking ceremony proved faultless, because Modi raised baseless issues like terrorism or cross-border terrorism as pre-condition to advance the Pak-Indian dialogue. It is of particular attention that on July 19, 2013, the Indian former home ministry and ex-investigating officer Satish Verma disclosed that terror attacks in Mumbai in November 26, 2008 and assault on Indian Parliament in January 12, 2001 were carried out by the Indian government to strengthen anti-terrorism laws. It has clearly proved that Indian secret agencies; particularly RAW had arranged terror assaults of parliament and Mumbai. While, during the talks between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan, at Ufa, Islamabad has conveyed to New Delhi a comprehensive agenda to discuss all outstanding issues, including Kashmir as well as terrorism. But, New Delhi’s insistence to restrict the agenda for the dialogue to terrorism or cross-border terrorism only, demonstrated India’s confused policy towards Pakistan. Indian foreign secretary level talks were held in Islamabad on March 3, 2015. In this context, Indian External Affairs Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry discussed contentious issues including Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and other bilateral issues. While, in 2014, India postponed the Secretary level talks with Pakistan; under the pretext that during his Indian visit Sartaj Aziz met Kashmiri leaders. In fact, a lack of seriousness on India’s part to settle all disputes, especially Kashmir issue has compelled New Delhi to follow a self-contradictory and confused strategy towards Islamabad. Hence, India has been arranging various terrorism-related events to shift the blame game to Pakistan, as it does not want to settle issues with Islamabad, particularly Kashmir dispute. As regards the case of cross-border terrorism, India has shown ambivalent approach which can be judged from some other developments. In this connection, on July 27, 2015, three gunmen dressed in army uniforms killed at least seven people, including three civilians and four policemen in the Indian district of Gurdaspur, Punjab. Without any investigation, Indian high officials and media started accusing Pakistan, its banned militant outfits and intelligence agencies for the Gurdaspur incident. Indian Police remarked that the attackers were from Indian-held Kashmir, and some said that they were Sikh separatists, while Indian Punjab police chief claimed that the three gunmen were Muslim, but as yet unidentified. Contradicting speculations, India’s Home Minister Rajnath Singh told parliament that the gunmen came from Pakistan. Khalistan Movement Chief Manmohan Singh stated that the Gurdaspur incident is “a conspiracy of Indian secret agency RAW to defame Pakistan.” Besides, on December 31, 2014, prior to the US President Obama’s second visit to New Delhi, Indian intelligence agencies orchestrated a boat drama to defame Pakistan, allegedly reporting that a Pakistani fishing boat as a Pakistan-based outfit group Lashkar-e-Taiba was intercepted by Indian Coast Guards, off the coast of Porebandar, Gujarat. And Indian Coast Guard crew set the boat on fire and it exploded. The Indian government had claimed that it had foiled another 26/11-type attack of Mumbai. But, its reality exposed Indian terrorism, when some Indian high officials admitted that there was no such boat which came from Pakistan. Likewise, India intends to obtain various hidden purposes by blaming Islamabad for terrorism. First of all, it wants to divert the attention of the international community from the involvement of RAW which has well-established its network in Afghanistan, and is fully assisting cross-border incursions and terror-activities in various regions of Pakistan through Baloch separatist elements, Jundullah and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) including their affiliated outfits. On a number of occasions, these insurgent groups claimed responsibility for their acts of sabotage. It is worth-mentioning that Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif accompanied by the DG of ISI went to Kabul on December 17, 2014. During his meeting with his Afghan counterpart, President Ashraf Ghani and the ISAF commander, he presented the evidence of linkage between the massacre of children at Peshawar school and TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan. He also asked about action against the TTP and handing over of its chief Mullah Fazlullah to Pakistan. It is regrettable that New Delhi is destabilizing the regional countries in general and Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular. In order to obtain its secret designs, aimed at augmenting Indian hegemony in the region, India is foiling the peace process between Afghanistan and Pakistan by managing terrorist attacks like the recent ones in Afghanistan which revived old blame game against Islamabad. And, waging a prolonged war in Afghanistan, the US and other NATO countries have realized that after the withdrawal of foreign troops, Afghanistan would be thrown in an era of uncertainly and civil war. They recognize the fact and terrorism or stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan is interrelated. Hence, US-led developed nations which also spent billions of dollars for the development of Afghanistan have repeatedly agreed that without Islamabad’s help, stability cannot be achieved there. In this regard, a meeting was hosted by Pakistan between the Afghan officials and representatives of Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan in Murree (On July 8, this year) and dialogue were conducted for an Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process, while the representatives of China and America also participated in the meeting. In this backdrop of growing engagements of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and US, Indian desperation in Afghanistan is increasing. Moreover, New Delhi is trying to sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Recent terror-attacks in Pakistan and Balochistan might be noted as instance. Indian RAW has also created a heavily funded China-Pakistan and Afghanistan specific desk to target growing Pak-China-Afghanistan relations. Furthermore, on the direction of the Indian leader of the fundamentalist party BJP and Prime Minister Modi, Indian forces have accelerated unprovoked shelling across the Line of Control and Working Boundary, while creating war-like situation between Pakistan and India. Notably, Islamabad has raised the question of Indian cross-border terrorism and RAW involvement in Pakistan at the UNO forum, with strong evidence which was also shown to the US. It is notable that renowned thinkers, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Morgenthau opine that sometimes, rulers act upon immoral activities like deceit, fraud and falsehood to fulfill their countries’ selfish aims. But such a sinister politics was replaced by new trends such as fair-dealings, reconciliation and economic development. Regrettably, India is still following past politics in modern era. Without any doubt, we can conclude that India is behind the Pathonkot terror attack in order to obtain various goals against Pakistan. Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations Email: [email protected]
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