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Posted by Azahir in Pakistan's Beauty, Pakistan-A Nation of Hope on June 21st, 2013
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Posted by Azahir in Pakistan's Hope, Pakistan's Strategic & Security Focus, Pakistan-A Polaris of Earth on June 21st, 2013
Pakistaniaat : A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011)
Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’
Reviewed by David Waterman
Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State.’ Maleeha Lodhi, ed. London: Hurst and
Company, 2011. 391 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1-84904-135-5.
Maleeha Lodhi, as the editor of Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State,’ has managed
to assemble some of Pakistan’s most influential academics, writers, economists
and policymakers in one volume, designed to give an insider’s perspective on
Pakistan’s “crisis” from diverse angles, and more importantly, to suggest
solutions regarding Pakistan’s obvious potential for a better future. The book is
not a collection of conference proceedings, but rather the product of a virtual
conference in cyberspace, discussing themes of “governance, security, economic
and human development and foreign policy […] what binds all the distinguished
contributors is their belief that Pakistan’s challenges are surmountable and the
impetus for change and renewal can only come from within, through bold reforms
that are identified in the chapters that follow” (3).
The first few chapters concentrate on Pakistan’s history and the sense of a
Pakistani identity, now that the country has existed in very concrete terms for
sixty-five years or so. Ayesha Jalal suggests that Pakistan’s path toward a
national identity for its heterogeneous people has been interrupted, as its history
has been co-opted for “political and ideological reasons” (11). Pakistan’s position
vis-à-vis India, militant Islam and 9/11 are all important factors in the equation as
well. Akbar Ahmed recalls Jinnah’s role not only in the founding of the nation,
but his continuing legacy in terms of an equilibrium between Islam and the State;
Jinnah’s thoughts are in large part gleaned from his speeches and letters, as he left
no monograph before his death (23). Mohsin Hamid, author of Moth Smoke and
The Reluctant Fundamentalist (filming for the movie has apparently begun),
assumes his mantle of engaged journalist in an essay entitled “Why Pakistan will
Survive.” His argument is best summed up as follows: “we are not as poor as we
like to think” (41), highlighting Pakistan’s strength in diversity, and in economic
terms, Hamid suggests that something as simple as a coherent, fair tax code could
allow the nation to concentrate on schools and healthcare, while cutting the
strings of American aid and its corresponding intervention in Pakistan’s affairs.
Maleeha Lodhi’s own chapter is a detailed overview of contemporary history,
calling attention to political asymmetry, clientelist politics and borrowed growth
David Waterman
as well as security concerns and regional pressures on national unity; ultimately
she calls for a “new politics that connects governance to public purpose” (78).
The essays then move into more political themes, and the first among them
discusses the army as a central element of Pakistani political, and indeed
corporate, life. Shuja Nawaz argues that while the army has historically been a
significant power broker, the generation of commanders from the Zia and
Musharraf eras is about to retire, thus promising the possibility of change,
including the realization that “counterinsurgency operations are 90 per cent
political and economic and only 10 per cent military” (93). Saeed Shafqat also
discusses the political role of the military, saying that while elections are of
course essential to democracy, more attention needs to be paid to the rule of law
and the incorporation of cultural pluralism (95), never forgetting the role of
various elites within the process; he suggests that the emergence of coalition
politics is a hopeful sign. Islam’s role in politics is the focus of Ziad Haider’s
essay, tracing its evolution from Jinnah’s comments through the Munir report,
Islamization under Zia and Talibanization to the “This is Not Us” movement
(129) and the hope that moderate Islam represents the future of Pakistan. A
chapter entitled “Battling Militancy,” by Zahid Hussain, continues the discussion,
tracing the development of jihadist politics given the situation in Afghanistan.
The focus then shifts to economic policy, beginning with Ishrat Husain’s
insistence that economic policies cannot remain sound without solid institutions
behind them; he cites the long-term nature of economic progress, while successive
governments seem interested only in short-term horizons (149-150). Meekal
Ahmed follows the Pakistani economy from the early sixties and periods of
relative health, through Ayub Khan’s era, also a time of economic stability, which
changes under Bhutto and his nationalization programs, and since then has gone
from crisis to crisis, both the government and poor IMF oversight bearing a share
of the blame. Competitiveness is the key concept for Muddassar Mazhar Malik,
who reminds us that Pakistan is “open for business” despite many challenges to
overcome, citing economic potential, natural resources and strategic location as
strong points (201). Ziad Alahdad then shifts the focus to energy, a sector in
crisis which then has an enormous impact on Pakistan’s economy, all of this in a
country with abundant natural energy resources; a more coherent exploitation of
Integrated Energy Planning would be part of an overall solution (240).
Strategic issues then occupy several chapters, beginning interestingly with
education as part of the formula, as advanced by Shanza Khan and Moeed Yusuf,
who suggest that politically-neutral education is the foundation not only of
Pakistaniaat : A Journal of Pakistan Studies Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011)
economic development but also the means to resist violent extremism by building
expectations and supplying hope, especially for the young. Pakistan of course
possesses nuclear weapons, and Feroz Hassan Khan asks the question, wondering
if its nuclear capability has allowed Pakistan to focus itself on other priorities, in
other words averting wars rather than fighting them, to paraphrase Bernard
Brodie, cited in Khan’s essay (268). Munir Akram’s essay, “Reversing Strategic
‘Shrinkage,’ highlights Pakistan’s current challenges: the Pakistani Taliban’s
attacks in KP and large cities; Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan; Balochi
alienation; economic stagnation; energy crises; growing poverty, all of which
have contributed to “a dangerous mood of national pessimism,” according to
Akram (284). Afghanistan occupies Ahmed Rashid’s attention, as it has for over
thirty years now; he critiques strategic claims that have become worn with time,
such as the need for strategic depth for Pakistan (although the notion of ‘strategic
depth’ changes when a country becomes a nuclear power), or India’s desire
(among other countries) to gain influence in Kabul (314-315). The final essay,
“The India Factor,” culminates the volume by tracing the tumultuous relations
between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, the bumpy road to peace, the effect of
the 2008 Mumbai attacks, all within the context of peoples who have not
forgotten the trauma of Partition and the secession of East Pakistan. In spite of
the obstacles, Syed Rifaat Hussain lists many of the promising agreements that
have been reached or are in progress, an encouraging sign and a reminder that
good relations are beneficial to both nations.
Human development, Maleeha Lodhi remarks in a concluding note, must
be Pakistan’s priority, and is within reach, as all of the contributors to the volume
insist. Lodhi summarizes thus: “Electoral and political reforms that foster greater
and more active participation by Pakistan’s growing educated middle class will
open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional,
patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people
and meet their needs” (350). Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ is a fine piece
of work, written by specialists for an audience of intelligent non-specialists, and
achieves its objective admirably. Maleeha Lodhi has succeeded remarkably in her
edition of this gathering of clear-sighted experts, who never lose sight of
Pakistan’s potential beyond its current challenges.
Posted by kulsoom Waheed in Afghanistan-Land of Backstabbers on June 21st, 2013
A NATO helicopter flies next to the building taken over by insurgents during an attack near the U.S. embassy in Kabul on Sept. 13, 2011
What does Pakistan really want in Afghanistan? That question has become all the more urgent since Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused Pakistan of being indirectly responsible for last week’s attack on our embassy in Kabul. Reports of a second possible attack, on Sunday, on the building alleged to house the local CIA station will, no doubt, fuel further speculation. Assessing Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan through the prism of honesty and realpolitik rather than wishful thinking may be the only way we’re going to get out of this messy war.
For a start, we need to understand that Pakistan intends to bring down the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, even if that means taking on its sometime U.S. ally. Pakistan hates Karzai out of a conviction that he has made common cause with Pakistan’s strategic nemesis, India, and a suspicion that the Afghan leader intends to harm Pakistan’s strategic interests in other ways. And, of course, the hatred is mutual. Rightly or wrongly, Karzai believes that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) assassinated his father, and would do the same to him given half a chance.
A second misunderstanding we need to dispense with is that the ISI is somehow a rogue organization outside of Pakistan’s chain of command and is pursuing a pro-Taliban agenda all its own. The Pakistani army can remove the ISI director, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha — or any other officer of the organization — at a moment’s notice. So, if the ISI did indeed sponsor an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, such a step should be assumed to have been taken with the consent of the power that be in Pakistan, i.e. the military establishment. The idea that to make our Pakistan problem go away, the ISI needs to be “cleaned up” is naive. The Pakistani actions that make life difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan are driven by a clear-sighted strategic agenda.
As for the Pakistani proxy accused of carrying out the embassy attack, the Haqqani network, we need to understand why Pakistan won’t give it up or act against it as the U.S. demands. With up to 15,000 fighters and effective control of large parts of eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North Waziristan, the Haqqanis are an indispensible party to a peace settlement in Afghanistan — and a vehicle for securing Pakistan’s interests in that country after the U.S. withdraws. To sever relations with the Haqqanis now would mean Pakistan giving up a large degree of influence in Afghanistan after the war is over.
The U.S. has for years demanded that Pakistan mount a sweeping military offensive in North Waziristan to destroy the Haqqanis, but even if they were so inclined, the fact is that the Pakistani military has only ever been able to control the main roads in North Waziristan. The Pakistani army is incapable of occupying and holding this territory, no matter how much money we offer or how dire the threats we make.
At the core of the problem stands a simple proposition: Pakistan doesn’t trust us with Afghanistan — and from Islamabad’s perspective, not without cause. We took a strategic decision to invade a country central to their national-security doctrine without seriously consulting them, preferring to think in terms of an Afghanistan of our dreams. Nor did we take into account their strategic interests and the proxies through which they have pursued them. The Soviet Union made the same mistake when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
Having failed to prevail a decade later, we now have two choices, neither of them particularly attractive to Washington. We can attempt to destroy the Haqqani base in North Waziristan by invading Pakistan. But to do that effectively would require more troops than we currently have in Afghanistan. Doing so would obviously destroy whatever relations we still have with Pakistan, with profoundly dangerous consequences in Afghanistan and far beyond.
Alternatively, we could hash out a settlement with Pakistan, which would inevitably mean accepting the Haqqanis and easing out Karzai in any political settlement to the conflict. Such a deal would also potentially bring in Afghanistan’s other neighbor with real strategic interests in the country — Iran. Iran can be unpredictable, but it’s by no means certain it would accept true Pakistani-American collusion in Afghanistan. In the mid-’90s, Iran was all but at war with the Taliban, and if Iran isn’t consulted on a settlement, it could play the spoiler.
Accepting Pakistan’s postconflict agenda and backing off on the Haqqanis at Karzai’s expense is too bitter a pill for Washington to swallow in an election year, so we’ll muddle through for another year. But when the U.S. finally leaves, don’t be surprised to see the Haqqanis in Kabul.
Baer, a former Middle East CIA field officer, is TIME.com‘s intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower.
Read more: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2094844,00.html#ixzz2Wq7RrjUv
Posted by Luis-King in Afghanistan-Land of Backstabbers on June 21st, 2013
US-Taliban peace talks: Pakistan’s political fortunes set to revive, India concerned
Indrani Bagchi, TNN, Jun 20, 2013
NEW DELHI: A prospective Afghan political deal crafted by Kerry and Kayani threatens to sink Karzai. As the Taliban set up an office in Doha to start peace talks with the US dressed up in their old flag and named the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, in one fell swoop, the gesture has marginalized Hamid Karzai, presaged a future Taliban role in the Afghan government and revived Pakistan’s political fortunes with the US.
The new situation has profoundly negative implications for India’s security, particularly if the Haqqani network is added to the talks as Pakistan desires. India has promised to take up the issue with US secretary of state John Kerryduring the strategic dialogue to be held here next week. In Baghdad, foreign minister Salman Khurshid said, “We have from time to time reminded all stakeholders about the red lines that was drawn by the world community and certainly by the participants should not be touched, should not be erased and should not be violated.” The “red lines” included a renunciation of Taliban’s links with al Qaida and an acceptance of the Afghan constitution. However, its been a couple of years that the US has abandoned all preconditions for talks with the Taliban.
India is one of the largest donors to Afghanistan’s stabilization, but India has a minimal role in the political chess-game currently under way, which will minimize India’s security concerns in the larger transition. Officials in Kabul said, despite repeated assurances to Karzai by the US, the Taliban went ahead to set themselves up almost as a government in exile. Their initial statement said, as an afterthought, that they could even talk to “Afghans”, but not the government. With the Taliban also opening talks with Iran as well as with the former Northern Alliance, the US, helped by Pakistan, could be preparing the way to bring the Taliban back into government in Kabul, a decade after they were removed from power by the US invasion.
For the present, the Taliban in Doha, with the blessings of the US and Qatar, is more than an Afghan insurgent group. Just by the very fact that they are not in Afghanistan, its very easy for them to scale up their international profile to position themselves as a challenger or alternative Afghan government. Its clear the Taliban are sitting at the table because Pakistan has played a key role in getting them there. While Mullah Omar is believed to have agreed to the talks, the fact is that all the Taliban leaders in Doha have a strong Pakistan connection, with their families all living in Pakistan.
According to Pakistani media reports, the deal came about largely because of a personal relationship between Kerry and Kayani. Quoting unnamed Pakistan military officials, a report in Pakistan’s Express Tribune said, “The hardliners among the Taliban ranks did not want to give any space to US forces. They had realised that by stalemating international forces they had actually won militarily. It was Pakistan’s turn to use its influence even though everyone in Washington had deep doubts about the Taliban showing flexibility. Our pitch to the Taliban was that by becoming part of the dialogue process they could gain international sanction, end conflict peacefully and achieve their goals of foreign forces exiting their country much more swiftly than through perpetual conflict.”
Karzai angrily suspended security talks with the US, as Washington scrambled to save the Doha talks by getting the Taliban to take down the offending banner. No peace talks started between the US and Taliban on Thursday, and a visit by the Afghan High Peace Council to Qatar on Friday too was cancelled. In Kabul, Karzai called in envoys from Russia and China and India to brief them on his position, even as Kerry tried to pacify him about the talks.
While the US takes some time to pacify Karzai, sources said the first deals the US would be looking for includes the release of a US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, in Taliban custody. On Thursday, Taliban spokesmen said he could be released in return for five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. The US has not yet agreed to that though there may be some offer of keeping the prisoners in Bagram rather than Cuba.
Second, the US will seek safe passage from the Taliban for their equipment and weapons as they prepare to leave Afghanistan. The Taliban may have entered peace talks but only on Wednesdaythey carried out an attack for which they even claimed responsibility. It’s clear the forthcoming negotiations will be arduous, where the Taliban have the advantage of waiting for their demands to be met, while the US is heading for the exits.
Posted by AghaSaad in Afghanistan-Land of Backstabbers on June 21st, 2013
Pakistan influence on Taliban commanders helped Afghan breakthrough
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