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Posted by admin in Kargil Coward Nawaz Sharif-Backstabber US President Clinton, Northern Light Infantry-Kargill War Heroes, Pakistan Army on July 12th, 2017
First Published on January 29th, 2014
Nawaz Sharif and India have one trait in common, both lie to protect their failures. India lied about their Kargil defeat.
Nawaz Sharif and his PMLN members lie about Pakistan Army’s Kargil War Victory.
Every Jiyala of PMLN will tell you Kargil War was a Failure.
Indian Army Chief of Kargil War wants to Forget It!
Nawaz Sharif’s reason behind this chicanery is that he did not want to give credit to Pakistan Army under the leadership of Gen.(Retd) Pervez Musharraf for thrashing the Indian Army at the heights of Kargil, which resulted in killing 3,000 Indian Army soldiers and officers. Gen.(Retd) Musharraf may have a thousand flaws, but, Kargil War was his finest hour. Gen(Retd) Aziz and Gen(Retd) Musharraf played a stroke of genius in Kargil War Strategy. Pakistan’s Political Pundits demonise him and due to personal bias portray him as responsible for a Kargil “fiasco.”
If Kargil War was a “fiasco” for Pak Army, then, the question arises, why did India Court Martial several GOCs and Corp Commander of Indian Army, XV Corp ?:
Indian Heavy Losses in Kargil War Are Remembered
in Huge Monument Build to Honour Over 3,000 War Dead
“But the General has not shared the lapses and neglect of responsibilities of the Army leadership, particularly of the sector commanders, and to an extent, his own. Some of these are by now, well known, including the mindset of the 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal, who insisted that there were only a handful of infiltrators 60 to 80 and that none of them was a Pakistani soldier. He committed troops without allowing them adequate weapons and strength, and if facts given by Lt Gen Y M Bammi in a book are taken into account, he punished an officer, Brig Devinder Singh, who wanted better preparations insisting that there were a large number of Pakistani soldiers inside the Indian territory.
The officer had eight battalions under his charge, and by all accounts, he fought very well, leading the troops from the front. Gen Malik himself has been seen and heard praising this officer at various fora. Yet, Brig Devinder Singh’s career was cut short to save those who were wrong.
To recall, the biggest players of the Kargil War were:
The Government at the highest echelon of the Political Leadership;
The Army Chief, GOC-in-C Northern Command, 15 Corps Cdr, and the 3 Div Cdr. The intelligence agencies, primarily the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The Indian Air Force (IAF) and its exercise of Air Power.
The dedicated and committed soldiers and the middle and junior level officers.
(Reference: http://defence.pk/threads/the-kargil-conflict.50085/”)
Nawaz Sharif was paranoid that after such a great victory. He was afraid that Gen (Retd) Musharraf would achieve same status as FM Ayub Khan and thereby kick out the absolutely corrupt and incompetent illegitimate Nawaz Sharif PMLN “Dandhelee”) Govt. Nawaz Sharif propaganda against Kargil is unrelenting. He did not want Pakistan public to believe that Pakistan Army was capable of achieving this victory. Nawaz Sharif is very astute about his business interests.
Nawaz Sharif’s objectives were to promote his business interest in India, a larger market for his Ittefaq Industries products. He wanted to save India and Indian Army from humiliation from this ignominious defeat. He used a two-pronged approach, 1) Stop the War and Prevent Pakistan Army to Make Gains in Kargil sector, which may make Indian Army’s Movements under Pakistan Army Observation Posts. Thus allowing Pakistan Artillery to cause serious damage to India convoys providing supplies to units in Kashmir. 2) To make Pakistan Army look weak, humiliated bungling, and a “rogue” organisation. This would give Nawaz and his party to keep Pak Army on the defensive and not interfere in national affairs, no matter how much corruption Nawaz and his friends do.
Nawaz Sharif is a CIA’s major asset in Pakistan’s political scene. He is weak, easily intimidated, cowardly, incompetent, and in times of crisis gets a “mind freeze.” He cannot handle crisis well and that can be seen in his vacillation and foot dragging against TTP. He is co-dependent on CIA and gets his direction through their position papers and relies heavily on their analyst. Even today, Sartaj Aziz, the Octogenarian is in Washington to get direction from Secretary John Kerry.
During Kargil War, Nawaz Sharif was morbidly afraid of Indian intrusion across the international boundary in Lahore. His fears most likely included the capture of Lahore and his own arrest by the Indian Army. All of the above factors resulted in his mad dash to President Clinton to stop, “Pakistan Army,” which he could not do, from further escalation and consolidation in Kargil.
Nawaz Sharif does not car an iota about Pakistan or its people. His interests lie in survival and accumulation of wealth and power. Nawaz Sharif is a Pakistani “Banya,” who has a Banya Mentality. His upbringing by a corrupt father, who accumulated enormous wealth and went from a small brick Kiln foundry to acquisition of Pak Army’s major asset. The Ittefaq Foundry.
Nawaz Sharif is the causative agent for withdrawal of Pakistan Army from Kargil, which resulted in the only causalities due to their exposure to forward observers of Indian Artillery. Thus Nawaz snatched, a defeat from victory. He is responsible for all the Shahadats of the extremely brave NLI and Sindh Regiment soldiers when they were asked to pull back. Nawaz Sharif has PAK ARMY BLOOD on his hand. He has also demonised Pak Army through a whispering campaign by PMLN Jiayalas, that Kargil War was a defeat for Pak Army. He knows the truth. One day, that truth will catch-up to Nawaz, when he and his whole family may have to pay for it with their own blood. India is having a hard time swallowing Kargil defeat, in spite of heavy losses and post-defeat embarrassment, Indian Army continues to console itself, by reading false and concocted reports by Indian Media.
As usual, Pak Media was asleep at the wheel and due to its hatred of Pakistan Army for its meddling in politics, Pak media could not digest Pakistan Army’s finest hour and went along with lies and snake oil which India and Nawaz Sharif were selling.
{COMMENT}
If Kargil victory is so great, why is India , the Victor trying to forget it.
Victors Do Not Forget Victory, Only losers Do
New Delhi: Thirteen years ago, the Indian Army found itself drawn into a messy low-intensity conflict with Pakistan in the icy heights of Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir that cost it 527 soldiers. Today, Gen VP Malik, the then Army chief, laments that the major victory scored has all been forgotten. Kargil was India’s first television war and could have promoted a “strategic culture” in the country, but the gains were lost because of political compulsions, Malik says.
“We must celebrate the Kargil victory. Unfortunately, the Kargil war has become a political football,” 74-year-old Malik, who lives in the Chandigarh suburb of Panchkula, told a news agency in an interview.
“Politics got into the Kargil victory and the celebrations became a political football. That’s what we saw with political rivals celebrating and criticising the war for reasons that suited them,” Malik said.
“The armed forces had tremendous support from the people and the media,” he said, adding: “But politics got into all this and that’s why there were good celebrations initially and there are hardly any celebrations. Slowly people are beginning to forget because it is not providing much political mileage.”
From 2000 to 2003, July 26, the day the war ended, was commemorated in a variety of ways. This, however, stopped when the United Progressive Alliance government came to power.
Calling for grander celebrations, Malik said, “We have to tell the people about these battles and if we want to build a strategic culture, we need to celebrate these victories and inform people how these battles were won.”
The Kargil war in May-July 1999 saw India throwing back Pakistani regulars who had occupied key heights in the sector that had been vacated by the Indian troops during the harsh winter.
At the same time, Malik readily agreed that the victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan that saw the creation of the independent nation of Bangladesh was “much bigger” and “greater” than Kargil.
“The 1971 war was certainly a much bigger, greater victory for India, as we had fought on both (eastern and western) fronts. But that was 1971. In 1999, we were reacting to a situation, as in 1965, and were playing on the back foot.
“In 1971, we had taken the initiative in view of the refugees pouring in from the East and there was time for us to prepare for the war,” Malik said.
But the situation in 1999 was different, he said, noting that the whole world was watching India with suspicion following its 1998 nuclear tests.
“We did exceeding well with the Army, Navy and the Air Force jointly working out a strategy in a limited war scenario,” he added.
IANS
Posted by admin in NAWAZ SHARIF US & SAUDI AGENT on October 29th, 2013
Even as Nawaz Sharif struck a deal with US President Bill Clinton in July, 1999, to end the Kargil conflict with India, the then premier believed that the powerful Pakistani army would “get” him for brokering a truce.
Sharif never doubted there would be a military takeover and while the agreement was being documented, he anxiously whispered to Clinton, “They will get me Mr President.”
Clinton quipped, “Yours is a rogue army. Keep them under civilian oversight”.
Nawaz then retorted, “It is not the army. It is (a) few dirty eggs.”.
These revelations were made by Malik Zahoor Ahmad, a former information minister at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, in an article posted on the website of The News daily.
Three months after the agreement, the military led by Gen Pervez Musharraf struck and ousted the civilian government led by Sharif.
Thus Nawaz Sharif conceded the area captured by Pakistani soldiers, after destroying hundreds of Indian bunkers and killing 1000 Indian soldiers.
On the eve of July 4, 1999, the US Independence Day, Sharif quietly flew into Washington to meet Clinton to discuss an agreement to end the Kargil conflict.
The Coward of Kargil-Nawaz Sharif
“Coming at the height of the Kargil crisis, the visit was critical. The Prime Minister’s arrival in Washington was shrouded in mystery. The first reports of the visit came to the Pakistan Embassy not from our Foreign Office but the (US) State Department,” Ahmad wrote.
“Everyone was caught unawares. Hurried meetings were called, confidential internal memos dug up, and briefs developed to be able to lay down all the necessary ground work for the emergency high-octane meeting,” he added.
Posted by admin in Nawaz Sharif Massive Corruption, NAWAZ SHARIF US & SAUDI AGENT, Nawaz Sharif US Agent, Nawaz Sharif Womanizer, Pak Army Kargil Victory, PAKISTAN BILLION RUPEES LOAN DEFAULTER on April 19th, 2013
Nawaz Sharif is mainly responsible for spreading the rumour, that FCNA was losing at Kargil. He keeps harping the same tune, even, though some Indian generals have reluctantly accepted it as a defeat of Indian Army. But, this coward leaves no opportunity to bad mouth Kargil victory. Nawaz Sharif is an enemy of Pakistan. He puts his own interests above national interests. He felt threatened by Pakistan Army’s spectacular victory in Kargil War.
Cowardly, Kashmiri turncoat Nawaz Sharif was shocked by success of Pakistan;s Mujahedin of FCNA, who caused 3000 Indian Army Casualties, including the loss of two planes, death of one IAF Pilot and capture of Indian Pilot Lt.Nachikita by Pak Army. Being a US CIA Agent Nwaz was afraid that Musharraf and the Army would get all the glory, he ran to his patron President Clinton.
He defended his action to launch the operation in Kargil in the wake of fresh allegations that he masterminded the intrusions.
Referring to Lt Gen (retired) Shahid Aziz’s allegations that he had kept other military commanders in the dark about the operation, Musharraf said, “Telling everyone about it was not necessary at all”.
He claimed Aziz had an “imbalanced personality” and had resorted to character assassination by making these accusations.
“We lost the Kargil war, which was a big success militarily, because of (then premier) Nawaz Sharif…If he had not visited the US, we would have conquered 300 square miles of India,” Musharraf said in an interview with Express News channel.
Though Pakistan had initially claimed mujahideen were responsible for occupying strategic heights along the Line of Control in early 1999, Musharraf later revealed in his autobiography ‘In The Line Of Fire’ that regular Army troops had participated in the operation.
But Musharraf claimed the action in Kargil was a “localised” operation and not a major operation.
“Kargil was just one of many sectors under a Major General stationed in Gilgit, (who was) in charge of the area. Exchange of fire was routine there,” he claimed. Musharraf said he would not go so far as to accuse former premier Nawaz Sharif of betrayal but his decision to withdraw from Kargil was a mistake.
“Nawaz lost a political front which we had won militarily,” he claimed.
The former general, who has been living in self-exile outside Pakistan since 2009, said the “prime consideration” for actions like the Kargil operation is security and secrecy.
“So the Army leadership decides who is to be informed and when. As the operation progressed and the proper time arrived, a briefing of the corps commanders was held,” he said.
Musharraf said he was “really astonished” that Aziz was writing about the events 10 years later.
Blaming the nation at this juncture, as Aziz had done, seems to be “part of a conspiracy”, he claimed.
“It was a tactical action that had a strategic importance in which no more than a few hundred persons were involved, but which engaged thousands on the Indian side and was of tremendous importance,” he claimed.
Musharraf justified Pakistani casualties in the conflict, claiming the country lost only 270 men against India’s 1,600 soldiers.
India eventually decided, after examining the pros and cons of widening the conflict across the Line of Control (LoC) or even across the international border, on a strategy of containment within the narrower objective of regaining the Kargil heights. This narrower framework meant higher casualties on the Indian side because of the difficulty of traversing slopes against dug-in defenders where the terrain offers no cover.
New Delhi calculated that it does have the political will and military morale, despite the heavy casualties, and can sustain the cost in human and material terms. A near-consensus domestically and the willingness of the Indian military command to accept constraints allowed India to continue with an operation in which it suffered disproportionately heavy casualties.
With regard to Pakistan, the intriguing question is whether the Kargil heights seizure was part of the normal stepping up of guerrilla activity during summer, or whether it had more ambitious objectives. If it were the former, little can be added, except to mention in passing a failure of Indian intelligence. The guerrillas’ presence was only discovered by accident when two Indian army patrols happened to spot them. The true extent of the guerrilla presence did not sink in until the Indian army had carried out an aerial survey of the area, which revealed that between 400 to 700 guerrillas had seized the heights. This could have put them in a position in any future war to threaten the sole overland logistics link with the Indian forces deployed in Siachen, i.e. the Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.
But the Kargil seizure could have other strategic objectives with military, political and diplomatic dimensions. Militarily, if the seizure could be maintained for a reasonable period of time and at least until winter sets in, it could open up possibilities of forcing either an Indian withdrawal from Siachen, or a trade-off between the Kargil heights and the Siachen Glacier.
Politically, it could reflect the impatience in Islamabad with lack of progress in bilateral discussions on Kashmir under the Lahore Declaration process after the fall of the BJP government in end-April. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India heads a caretaker government until elections are held in September-October, the hope may have been to force New Delhi back to the negotiating table in a serious mode. Diplomatically, since the bilateral process had not yielded results, an internationalisa-tion of the Kashmir issue may have been sought to bring it back onto the frontburner.
If we assume for the sake of argument that all or some of these objectives formed part of the Pakistani thrust into Kargil, or at least were taken on board once things hotted up on the Line of Control, we can examine the results achieved or likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future and then draw up a balance sheet of gains and losses.
Missing Kashmir for Kargil
Militarily, the inherent difficulty of holding on to the Kargil heights in the face of overwhelming firepower and numbers has become a key question as the battle drags on. India has weighed the costs of heavy casualties against the bigger costs of potentially adverse international intervention if the conflict is widened. It has relied on the political consensus to hold on to Kashmir no matter what the cost, which informs its domestic political spectrum (the weak and scattered chinks of rationality represented by liberal opinion notwithstanding). India’s slow but definite gains against the guerrillas have produced collateral pressures for a withdrawal of the guerrillas from what is turning into a suicidal mission.
The political timing of the Kargil seizure, if the idea was indeed to force New Delhi back to serious negotiations, could not have been worse. A caretaker government heading into an election was hardly likely to be in a position to negotiate, let alone offer any flexibility or concession on such a major issue. There has been speculation in the Indian press after the visit to Pakistan by the US emissary General Anthony Zinni regarding proposals purportedly from Islamabad for India to allow safe passage to the guerrillas, quoting the precedent of the Hazrat Bal shrine siege. Whether these reports hold any water or not is not known.
However, Western diplomatic pressure on Islamabad is mounting, especially after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington DC and London, and these could take various forms, economic, political, diplomatic. The dependence of the Pakistani economy on the goodwill of the West, and particularly the US, to keep foreign fund flows going makes Pakistan that much more vulnerable to ‘persuasion’.
It goes without saying that such ‘persuasion’ seeks to maintain the status quo on Kashmir, while advocating peaceful negotiations. Pakistan’s experience indicates that retaining the status quo has always proved favourable to India. Any disturbance of New Delhi’s hold on Kashmir, even if partial or temporary, serves to refocus the attention of the global community on a long-neglected, festering wound. But in trying to disturb the status quo in its favour, the manner in which Pakistan pursues this tactical goal is crucial. This cannot happen by ignoring the ground reality.
The Pakistani army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, put his finger on the problem by descrseems to have hardened in the West that the status quo must be restored before diplomatic “business as usual” can be resumed.
Even as Nawaz Sharif struck a deal with US President Bill Clinton in July, 1999, to end the Kargil conflict with India, the then premier believed that the powerful Pakistani army would “get” him for brokering a truce.
Sharif never doubted there would be a military takeover and while the agreement was being documented, he anxiously whispered to Clinton, “They will get me Mr President.”
Clinton quipped, “Yours is a rogue army. Keep them under civilian oversight”.
Nawaz then retorted, “It is not the army. It is (a) few dirty eggs.”.
These revelations were made by Malik Zahoor Ahmad, a former information minister at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, in an article posted on the website of The News daily.
Three months after the agreement, the military led by Gen Pervez Musharraf struck and ousted the civilian government led by Sharif.
Thus Nawaz Sharif conceded the area captured by Pakistani soldiers, after destroying hundreds of Indian bunkers and killing 1000 Indian soldiers.
On the eve of July 4, 1999, the US Independence Day, Sharif quietly flew into Washington to meet Clinton to discuss an agreement to end the Kargil conflict.
The Coward of Kargil-Nawaz Sharif
“Coming at the height of the Kargil crisis, the visit was critical. The Prime Minister’s arrival in Washington was shrouded in mystery. The first reports of the visit came to the Pakistan Embassy not from our Foreign Office but the (US) State Department,” Ahmad wrote.
“Everyone was caught unawares. Hurried meetings were called, confidential internal memos dug up, and briefs developed to be able to lay down all the necessary ground work for the emergency high-octane meeting,” he added.
Nawaz Sharif is mainly responsible for spreading the rumour, that FCNA was losing at Kargil. He keeps harping the same tune, even, though some Indian generals have reluctantly accepted it as a defeat of Indian Army. But, this coward leaves no opportunity to bad mouth Kargil victory. Nawaz Sharif is an enemy of Pakistan. He puts his own interests above national interests. He felt threatened by Pakistan Army’s spectacular victory in Kargil War.
Cowardly, Kashmiri turncoat Nawaz Sharif was shocked by success of Pakistan;s Mujahedin of FCNA, who caused 3000 Indian Army Casualties, including the loss of two planes, death of one IAF Pilot and capture of Indian Pilot Lt.Nachikita by Pak Army. Being a US CIA Agent Nwaz was afraid that Musharraf and the Army would get all the glory, he ran to his patron President Clinton.
He defended his action to launch the operation in Kargil in the wake of fresh allegations that he masterminded the intrusions.
Referring to Lt Gen (retired) Shahid Aziz’s allegations that he had kept other military commanders in the dark about the operation, Musharraf said, “Telling everyone about it was not necessary at all”.
He claimed Aziz had an “imbalanced personality” and had resorted to character assassination by making these accusations.
“We lost the Kargil war, which was a big success militarily, because of (then premier) Nawaz Sharif…If he had not visited the US, we would have conquered 300 square miles of India,” Musharraf said in an interview with Express News channel.
Though Pakistan had initially claimed mujahideen were responsible for occupying strategic heights along the Line of Control in early 1999, Musharraf later revealed in his autobiography ‘In The Line Of Fire’ that regular Army troops had participated in the operation.
But Musharraf claimed the action in Kargil was a “localised” operation and not a major operation.
“Kargil was just one of many sectors under a Major General stationed in Gilgit, (who was) in charge of the area. Exchange of fire was routine there,” he claimed. Musharraf said he would not go so far as to accuse former premier Nawaz Sharif of betrayal but his decision to withdraw from Kargil was a mistake.
“Nawaz lost a political front which we had won militarily,” he claimed.
The former general, who has been living in self-exile outside Pakistan since 2009, said the “prime consideration” for actions like the Kargil operation is security and secrecy.
“So the Army leadership decides who is to be informed and when. As the operation progressed and the proper time arrived, a briefing of the corps commanders was held,” he said.
Musharraf said he was “really astonished” that Aziz was writing about the events 10 years later.
Blaming the nation at this juncture, as Aziz had done, seems to be “part of a conspiracy”, he claimed.
“It was a tactical action that had a strategic importance in which no more than a few hundred persons were involved, but which engaged thousands on the Indian side and was of tremendous importance,” he claimed.
Musharraf justified Pakistani casualties in the conflict, claiming the country lost only 270 men against India’s 1,600 soldiers.
India eventually decided, after examining the pros and cons of widening the conflict across the Line of Control (LoC) or even across the international border, on a strategy of containment within the narrower objective of regaining the Kargil heights. This narrower framework meant higher casualties on the Indian side because of the difficulty of traversing slopes against dug-in defenders where the terrain offers no cover.
New Delhi calculated that it does have the political will and military morale, despite the heavy casualties, and can sustain the cost in human and material terms. A near-consensus domestically and the willingness of the Indian military command to accept constraints allowed India to continue with an operation in which it suffered disproportionately heavy casualties.
With regard to Pakistan, the intriguing question is whether the Kargil heights seizure was part of the normal stepping up of guerrilla activity during summer, or whether it had more ambitious objectives. If it were the former, little can be added, except to mention in passing a failure of Indian intelligence. The guerrillas’ presence was only discovered by accident when two Indian army patrols happened to spot them. The true extent of the guerrilla presence did not sink in until the Indian army had carried out an aerial survey of the area, which revealed that between 400 to 700 guerrillas had seized the heights. This could have put them in a position in any future war to threaten the sole overland logistics link with the Indian forces deployed in Siachen, i.e. the Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.
But the Kargil seizure could have other strategic objectives with military, political and diplomatic dimensions. Militarily, if the seizure could be maintained for a reasonable period of time and at least until winter sets in, it could open up possibilities of forcing either an Indian withdrawal from Siachen, or a trade-off between the Kargil heights and the Siachen Glacier.
Politically, it could reflect the impatience in Islamabad with lack of progress in bilateral discussions on Kashmir under the Lahore Declaration process after the fall of the BJP government in end-April. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India heads a caretaker government until elections are held in September-October, the hope may have been to force New Delhi back to the negotiating table in a serious mode. Diplomatically, since the bilateral process had not yielded results, an internationalisa-tion of the Kashmir issue may have been sought to bring it back onto the frontburner.
If we assume for the sake of argument that all or some of these objectives formed part of the Pakistani thrust into Kargil, or at least were taken on board once things hotted up on the Line of Control, we can examine the results achieved or likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future and then draw up a balance sheet of gains and losses.
Missing Kashmir for Kargil
Militarily, the inherent difficulty of holding on to the Kargil heights in the face of overwhelming firepower and numbers has become a key question as the battle drags on. India has weighed the costs of heavy casualties against the bigger costs of potentially adverse international intervention if the conflict is widened. It has relied on the political consensus to hold on to Kashmir no matter what the cost, which informs its domestic political spectrum (the weak and scattered chinks of rationality represented by liberal opinion notwithstanding). India’s slow but definite gains against the guerrillas have produced collateral pressures for a withdrawal of the guerrillas from what is turning into a suicidal mission.
The political timing of the Kargil seizure, if the idea was indeed to force New Delhi back to serious negotiations, could not have been worse. A caretaker government heading into an election was hardly likely to be in a position to negotiate, let alone offer any flexibility or concession on such a major issue. There has been speculation in the Indian press after the visit to Pakistan by the US emissary General Anthony Zinni regarding proposals purportedly from Islamabad for India to allow safe passage to the guerrillas, quoting the precedent of the Hazrat Bal shrine siege. Whether these reports hold any water or not is not known.
However, Western diplomatic pressure on Islamabad is mounting, especially after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington DC and London, and these could take various forms, economic, political, diplomatic. The dependence of the Pakistani economy on the goodwill of the West, and particularly the US, to keep foreign fund flows going makes Pakistan that much more vulnerable to ‘persuasion’.
It goes without saying that such ‘persuasion’ seeks to maintain the status quo on Kashmir, while advocating peaceful negotiations. Pakistan’s experience indicates that retaining the status quo has always proved favourable to India. Any disturbance of New Delhi’s hold on Kashmir, even if partial or temporary, serves to refocus the attention of the global community on a long-neglected, festering wound. But in trying to disturb the status quo in its favour, the manner in which Pakistan pursues this tactical goal is crucial. This cannot happen by ignoring the ground reality.
The Pakistani army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, put his finger on the problem by describing Kargil as “a tactical, military issue”, while Kashmir as such was “a strategic, political” one. In other words, to see only the Kargil part of the picture represented by the Kashmir problem, is to miss the forest for the trees. However, in the present instance, Islamabad appears to have failed to persuade the global powers-that-be of the justness of this linkage. On the contrary, opinion seems to have hardened in the West that the status quo must be restored before diplomatic “business as usual” can be resumed.
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