B.K. Bangash/Associated Press

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	2851	681	2430	5962
Total*	14999	4771	25118	44888

 

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	177	117	234	528
February	208	59	193	460
March	207	72	454	733
April	239	36	124	399
May	247	76	193	516
June	303	64	289	656
July	303	60	207	570
August	258	70	304	632
September	278	22	164	464
October	252	40	166	458
November	288	31	69	388
December	91	34	33	158
Total	2851	681	2430	5962

2011

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	204	38	255	497
February	107	68	160	335
March	432	48	148	628
April	263	57	254	574
May	161	140	220	521
June	209	80	354	643
July	423	51	337	811
August	430	77	183	690
September	186	39	130	355
October	119	32	172	323
November	91	92	333	516
December	113	43	254	410
Total	2738	765	2800	6303

2010

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	182	33	387	602
February	92	68	340	500
March	168	36	502	706
April	182	50	558	790
May	156	38	833	1027
June	72	44	598	714
July	220	36	618	874
August	113	30	177	320
September	216	27	305	548
October	72	31	296	399
November	141	34	274	449
December	182	42	282	506
Total	1796	469	5170	7435

2009

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	250	69	245	564
February	216	31	430	677
March	168	67	171	406
April	132	89	297	518
May	279	155	1590	2024
June	200	157	1397	1754
July	156	58	768	982
August	155	34	531	720
September	111	77	662	850
October	255	118	1001	1374
November	175	93	792	1060
December	227	43	505	775
Total	2324	991	8389	11704

2008

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	88	111	455	654
February	182	33	30	245
March	137	26	41	204
April	80	25	16	121
May	61	30	37	128
June	149	31	38	218
July	82	71	250	403
August	339	124	784	1247
September	272	67	876	1215
October	262	60	735	1057
November	225	50	482	757
December	278	26	162	466
Total	2155	654	3906	6715

 

2007

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
January	26	16	29	71
February	35	4	8	47
March	28	21	261	310
April	176	18	83	277
May	57	10	14	81
June	31	12	40	83
July	144	143	191	478
August	56	63	117	236
September	101	67	144	312
October	282	101	154	537
November	293	94	341	728
December	293	48	97	438
Total	1522	597	1479	3598

2006

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
January	114	29	22	165
February	88	16	2	106
March	91	19	221	331
April	96	44	53	193
May	43	39	5	87
June	26	29	47	102
July	12	52	49	113
August	22	43	44	109
September	22	0	2	24
October	42	7	83	132
November	42	45	9	96
December	10	2	1	13
Total	608	325	538	1471

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
January	30	7	2	39
February	11	0	6	17
March	77	15	3	95
April	6	2	2	10
May	63	5	2	70
June	8	1	0	9
July	29	2	43	74
August	14	10	1	25
September	32	17	40	89
October	27	15	16	58
November	13	0	12	25
December	120	7	10	137
Total	430	81	137	648

 

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
January	0	4	0	4
February	2	0	1	3
March	47	45	25	117
April	6	5	1	12
May	45	0	0	45
June	60	37	24	121
July	28	6	19	53
August	42	17	4	63
September	70	36	70	176
October	114	11	28	153
November	5	19	72	96
December	16	4	0	20
Total	435	184	244	863

2003

 

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
January	7	0	0	7
February	18	3	1	22
March	0	0	1	1
April	1	0	0	1
May	6	0	1	7
June	5	13	0	18
July	61	2	0	63
August	4	0	0	4
September	10	0	0	10
October	8	5	18	31
November	0	0	2	2
December	20	1	2	23
Total	140	24	25	189

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.

Note: A large number of target killings, which many believe are carried out by the terrorists, backed by warring political parties, in Sindh were inadvertently left. Now that fatalities in such incidents have been included for the years 2011 and 2012, the data has been changed accordingly.

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal

Note: The following Article below Leaves Out Almost Five Years of Incompetence and Corruption of Asif Zardari’s Civilian Dictatorship and the Autocracy of Pakistan People’s Party Machine. Dubai is the hub of illegal spending and night clubbing by Asif Zardari, Nawaz Shariff and PPPand PML(N) stalwart

 

U.S. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers

By 

 

Center for American Progress

 

SOURCE: AP/Emilio Morenatti

A Pakistani family eats dinner next to their hut on the outskirts of Islamabad. Only half of the country’s population can secure an adequate nutritional intake.

 

The history of U.S. assistance to Pakistan follows a predictable script: aid is tied to security imperatives that come and go, while the country’s political and economic well-being is effectively ignored. As an early ally in the cold war, Pakistan received nearly $2 billion from 1953 to 1961, a quarter of which was military assistance. The United States then suspended assistance during the Indo-Pakistan wars and following Pakistan’s construction of a uranium enrichment facility in 1979. Pakistan remerged as an ally in the 1980s during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan and was again the recipient of aid. But following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the late 1980s, assistance to Pakistan took another nosedive.

Following 9/11, Pakistan became a U.S. ally once more, and unsurprisingly, almost all of the aid provided since has gone to military operations. By failing to commit to the long-term health of the Pakistani state, successive generations of U.S. policymakers have convinced many in Pakistan, both in and out of government, that we are a demanding power with little interest in their own security, rather than a genuine partner. Increasing political and economic instability and the failure of a military-centric approach to check growing violence demonstrate that the Pakistani people need more than military assistance to improve stability in their country.

Assistance is largely targeted at fighting terrorism

 

$7.89 billion: The amount of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan since 9/11, the majority of which has been from “coalition support funds” intended as reimbursement for Pakistani assistance in the war on terror.

$3.1 billion: The amount allocated to economic and development assistance, including food aid, during the same period.

Is this military aid helping make Pakistan safer?

189: The number of deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan in 2003.

648: The number of deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan in 2005.

3,599: The number of deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan in 2007.

63 percent: The percentage of Pakistanis surveyed in June 2008 who felt less secure than they did just one year ago.

86 percent: The percentage of Pakistanis surveyed who believed their country was headed in the wrong direction.

72 percent: The percentage of Pakistanis surveyed who believed their personal economic situation had worsened in the past year.

Pakistanis need aid in other areas

 

77 million: The number of Pakistanis—half the country’s population—that are unable to secure an adequate nutritional intake.

50 percent: The percentage of the Pakistani population that is literate. Only one-third of Pakistani women can read and write.

2 percent: The percentage of total U.S. aid packages since 2001 directed toward education. This amounts to an average of less than $2 per Pakistani child per year.

A different approach is needed for FATA

 

$5.8 billion: Amount of U.S. aid to Pakistan spent in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas from 2002 through 2007.

96 percent: The percentage of those funds that were directed toward military operations.

1 percent: The percentage of those founds directed toward development.

Increased assistance is particularly needed in the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a region along the northwest border with Afghanistan that has been a key front in the war on terrorism. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, has noted that for nearly three decades now the only opportunities in this region have been “a service economy serving the industry of jihad”; low literacy rates (17 percent overall and 3 percent for women) and inadequate medical care (1 doctor for every 6,762 people) reflect the area’s long history of political marginalization. In this space, militant groups are able to organize and establish parallel state structures, endangering Pakistan and its neighbors.

Instead of focusing so heavily on military aid to Pakistan, the United States should dedicate more of its funding to enhancing security and earning the support of the Pakistani people through increased economic and development assistance. By working with a new civilian government to address Pakistan’s basic needs—improving literacy rates, boosting energy and agricultural production, providing more access to health care, and more—the United States can strengthen Pakistani society and institutions against militant subversion. In doing so we also clearly demonstrate a respect for Pakistan’s own needs, moving the partnership beyond short-term cyclical engagement that neglects the underlying causes of the country’s instability.

 

Reference