the attack as company commander and was wounded.  The officer has given a very detailed account of the Battle. The unit sacrificed their lives due to failure in Command and staff Planning at all levels. This is evident from the unit’s move from Chaman/ Baluchistan on 29 September 1971 to the desert in Sind. Thereafter on 4 December 1971 to Fort Abbas, then to Sialkot Sector under 1 Corps on 14 December,  on the evening of 16 December to Pindi Purbian  for counter attack on the morning of 17 Dec 1971 in Jarpal area in 1 Corps. The unit kept Shuttling between three different brigade areas from 14 December to 17 December, with no clear orders. The Commanding Officer was denied any Reconnaissanc of the objective, in Day light Hours.  Poor Staff Planning at the GHQ and Command failure at Corps/Division and Brigade level. It also raises a important question; Was this Attack really needed after Surrender at DACCA on 16 December and ceasefire between INDIA AND PAKISTAN in the Afternoon of 17 Dec 1971? Perhaps all our Generals should read and keep by their bed side “Psychology of Military Incompetence, by Norman Dixon”