Our Announcements
Sorry, but you are looking for something that isn't here.
Posted by admin in Bakhtiar Hakeem's Musings, Pakistan-A Polaris of Earth on October 20th, 2014
VALUES vs. PREJUDICES : All what I love, eulogize, praise and practice are values. And all what I despise, or reject and decline to do are prejudices. How simple! Let us explore this simplicity; rather an over simplification, with an approach of a social scientist. It has not been easy to define ‘value’ even for
lexicons. xxx And other dictionaries xxxx. We can develop a small bank of keywords, of some phrases and terminologies to help venture further. Values, Core Values Social Values Culture, Civilization Justice & Injustice Love Hatred Moorings Moral, Immoral Origin People, Family Clan Kinship Conservative Liberal
Ethics T here is an inferior self and a superior self. There is a mundane self and a spiritual self. Born out of clay and mud I do have all the biological measures of life and animal instincts. The beauty lays I do not stop or end here. He blew into me , later tested me in knowledge (names and definitions) and raised the level to be His viceroy. Now, here lies the catch, what I am, a polished and modified form of apes, or son/daughter of a prophet. It is too huge a gap to befilled-up, too complex a predicament. He does try to help me through His injunction , whether I learn it and follow or ignore, or go against these by setting my own isms, theories, customs and traditions; is a the test, or call it life. I refer to a Punjabi master-piece by Faiz A. Faiz, ‘Raba Sachya’ Justice Charity, love and being liberal all are values. These will all turn into prejudices, when I start raising boundaries around them. Weaker, lower and more porous the boundaries, less prejudicial it would be. When administration of Justice is based on widely accepted or in the light of Universal laws – it will be a ‘value’. And when Mr. True, man orders to make the two cities of Japan – it may be considered fruitful for his ladies, children and unarmed civilians but for those in those two cities of Japan? S o could be the value of charity. How do I decide to give subsidy? Where and to whom I take my items and cash – to orphans, single parent children, people with land-holdings of acres twelve and below, or to my ‘family’, clam or caste. First come first serve is a value, great if it is practiced without hatred towards sunni and shia. And without informing favorites in advance. How about casting a vote. What a significant exercise it is. It embodies a national cause. It catapults an insignificant common street urchin to a king maker. And what if I cast my vote for an inferior and non deserving candidate, knowing it to such. It turns into a prejudice. So is the rule of those in line; from thumb imprinter to Chief Election Commissioner. And just see Imran has even involved CJ of Pakistan. All are as much prejudiced as much they trampled the values of fairness, justice and honesty. Family is a great reference for love, care and sacrifice. All invaluable, valuables. The moment it means a son or a daughter preferred over other, one wife ditched against other, and an uncle is invited while other is ignored – it turn into prejudices. And you all are aware of word ‘step’ in the inventory of our relations. No amount of love, care and sacrifice can be justified at the cost of hatred, indifference and exploitation for some. Western would throughout the last century remained divided on ‘origin’ and ‘roots’. Jewish laws were different for Jew and non-Jew. (EN ref to) If a Jew was to be burn to a Jew, who was Adam (pbuh) and how could first Jew
Posted by admin in PAKISTAN THINK TANK ANALYST on November 16th, 2013
What does Pakistan really want in Afghanistan? That question has become all the more urgent since Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused Pakistan of being indirectly responsible for last week’s attack on our embassy in Kabul. Reports of a second possible attack, on Sunday, on the building alleged to house the local CIA station will, no doubt, fuel further speculation. Assessing Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan through the prism of honesty and realpolitik rather than wishful thinking may be the only way we’re going to get out of this messy war.
For a start, we need to understand that Pakistan intends to bring down the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, even if that means taking on its sometime U.S. ally. Pakistan hates Karzai out of a conviction that he has made common cause with Pakistan’s strategic nemesis, India, and a suspicion that the Afghan leader intends to harm Pakistan’s strategic interests in other ways. And, of course, the hatred is mutual. Rightly or wrongly, Karzai believes that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) assassinated his father, and would do the same to him given half a chance. (Read what Pakistan really envisions as an endgame for Afghanistan.)
A second misunderstanding we need to dispense with is that the ISI is somehow a rogue organization outside of Pakistan’s chain of command and is pursuing a pro-Taliban agenda all its own. The Pakistani army can remove the ISI director, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha – or any other officer of the organization – at a moment’s notice. So, if the ISI did indeed sponsor an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, such a step should be assumed to have been taken with the consent of the power that be in Pakistan, i.e. the military establishment. The idea that to make our Pakistan problem go away, the ISI needs to be “cleaned up” is naive. The Pakistani actions that make life difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan are driven by a clear-sighted strategic agenda.
As for the Pakistani proxy accused of carrying out the embassy attack, the Haqqani network, we need to understand why Pakistan won’t give it up or act against it as the U.S. demands. With up to 15,000 fighters and effective control of large parts of eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North Waziristan, the Haqqanis are an indispensible party to a peace settlement in Afghanistan – and a vehicle for securing Pakistan’s interests in that country after the U.S. withdraws. To sever relations with the Haqqanis now would mean Pakistan giving up a large degree of influence in Afghanistan after the war is over.
The U.S. has for years demanded that Pakistan mount a sweeping military offensive in North Waziristan to destroy the Haqqanis, but even if they were so inclined, the fact is that the Pakistani military has only ever been able to control the main roads in North Waziristan. The Pakistani army is incapable of occupying and holding this territory, no matter how much money we offer or how dire the threats we make. (See whether Pakistan really wants a stable Afghanistan.)
At the core of the problem stands a simple proposition: Pakistan doesn’t trust us with Afghanistan – and from Islamabad’s perspective, not without cause. We took a strategic decision to invade a country central to their national-security doctrine without seriously consulting them, preferring to think in terms of an Afghanistan of our dreams. Nor did we take into account their strategic interests and the proxies through which they have pursued them. The Soviet Union made the same mistake when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
Having failed to prevail a decade later, we now have two choices, neither of them particularly attractive to Washington. We can attempt to destroy the Haqqani base in North Waziristan by invading Pakistan. But to do that effectively would require more troops than we currently have in Afghanistan. Doing so would obviously destroy whatever relations we still have with Pakistan, with profoundly dangerous consequences in Afghanistan and far beyond.
Alternatively, we could hash out a settlement with Pakistan, which would inevitably mean accepting the Haqqanis and easing out Karzai in any political settlement to the conflict. Such a deal would also potentially bring in Afghanistan’s other neighbor with real strategic interests in the country – Iran. Iran can be unpredictable, but it’s by no means certain it would accept true Pakistani-American collusion in Afghanistan. In the mid-’90s, Iran was all but at war with the Taliban, and if Iran isn’t consulted on a settlement, it could play the spoiler.
Accepting Pakistan’s postconflict agenda and backing off on the Haqqanis at Karzai’s expense is too bitter a pill for Washington to swallow in an election year, so we’ll muddle through for another year. But when the U.S. finally leaves, don’t be surprised to see the Haqqanis in Kabul.
Robert Baer, a former Middle East CIA field officer, is TIME.com‘s intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower.