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Posted by Dr. Manzer Durrani in Politics on September 6th, 2009
Al-Biruni
The ideology of Pakistan stems from the instinct of the Muslim community of South Asia to maintain their individuality by resisting all attempts by the Hindu society to absorb it. Muslims of South Asia believe that Islam and Hinduism are not only two religions, but also two social orders that have given birth to two distinct cultures with no similarities. A deep study of the history of this land proves that the differences between Hindus and Muslims were not confined to the struggle for political supremacy, but were also manifested in the clash of two social orders. Despite living together for more than a thousand years, they continued to develop different cultures and traditions. Their eating habits, music, architecture and script, are all poles apart. Even the language they speak and the dresses they wear are entirely different.
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan
The ideology of Pakistan took shape through an evolutionary process. Historical experience provided the base; with Sir Syed Ahmad Khan began the period of Muslim self-awakening; Allama Iqbal provided the philosophical explanation; Quaid-i-Azam translated it into a political reality; and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, by passing Objectives Resolution in March 1949, gave it legal sanction. It was due to the realization of Muslims of South Asia that they are different from the Hindus that they demanded separate electorates. When they realized that their future in a ‘Democratic India’ dominated by Hindu majority was not safe; they put forward their demand for a separate state.
The Muslims of South Asia believe that they are a nation in the modern sense of the word. The basis of their nationhood is neither territorial, racial, linguistic nor ethnic; rather they are a nation because they belong to the same faith, Islam. On this basis they consider it their fundamental right to be entitled to self-determination. They demanded that areas where they were in majority should be constituted into a sovereign state, wherein they would be enabled to order their lives in individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (S. A. W.). They further want their state to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries.
The flag of Pakistan
As early as in the beginning of the 11th century, Al-Biruni observed that Hindus differed from the Muslims in all matters and habits. He further elaborated his argument by writing that the Hindus considered Muslims “Mlachha”, or impure. And they forbid having any connection with them, be it intermarriage or any other bond of relationship. They even avoid sitting, eating and drinking with them, because they feel “polluted”. The speech made by Quaid-i-Azam at Minto Park, Lahore on March 22, 1940 was very similar to Al-Biruni’s thesis in theme and tone. In this speech, he stated that Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, with different social customs and literature. They neither intermarry, nor eat together, and indeed belong to two different civilizations whose very foundations are based on conflicting ideas and concepts. Their outlook on life and of life is different. He emphasized that in spite of the passage of about 1,000 years the relations between the Hindus and Muslims could not attain the level of cordiality. The only difference between the writing of Al-Biruni and the speech of Quaid-i-Azam was that Al-Biruni made calculated predictions, while Quaid-i-Azam had history behind him to support his argument.
Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah
The Ideology of Pakistan has its roots deep in history. The history of South Asia is largely a history of rivalry and conflict between the Hindus and Muslims of the region. Both communities have been living together in the same area since the early 8th century, since the advent of Islam in India. Yet, the two have failed to develop harmonious relations. In the beginning, one could find the Muslims and Hindus struggling for supremacy in the battlefield. Starting with the war between Muhammad bin Qasim and Raja Dahir in 712, armed conflicts between Hindus and Muslims run in thousands. Clashes between Mahmud of Ghazni and Jaypal, Muhammad Ghuri and Prithvi Raj, Babur and Rana Sanga and Aurangzeb and Shivaji are cases in point.
When the Hindus of South Asia failed to establish Hindu Padshahi through force, they opted for back door conspiracies. Bhakti Movement with the desire to merge Islam and Hinduism was one of the biggest attacks on the ideology of the Muslims of the region. Akbar’s diversion from the main stream Islamic ideology was one of the Hindus’ greatest success stories. However, due to the immediate counterattack by Mujaddid Alf Sani and his pupils, this era proved to be a short one. Muslims once again proved their separate identity during the regimes of Jehangir, Shah Jehan and particularly Aurangzeb. The attempts to bring the two communities close could not succeed because the differences between the two are fundamental and have no meeting point. At the root of the problem lies the difference between the two religions. So long as the two people want to lead their lives according to their respective faith, they cannot be one.
Allama Iqbal
With the advent of the British rule in India in 1858, Hindu-Muslim relations entered a new phase. The British brought with them a new political philosophy commonly known as ‘territorial nationalism’. Before the coming of the British, there was no concept of a ‘nation’ in South Asia and the region had never been a single political unit. The British attempt to weld the two communities in to a ‘nation’ failed. The British concept of a nation did not fit the religious-social system of South Asia. Similarly, the British political system did not suite the political culture of South Asia. The British political system, commonly known as ‘democracy’, gave majority the right to rule. But unlike Britain, the basis of majority and minority in South Asia was not political but religious and ethnic. The attempt to enforce the British political model in South Asia, instead of solving the political problems, only served to make the situation more complex. The Hindus supported the idea while it was strongly opposed by the Muslims. The Muslims knew that implementation of the new order would mean the end of their separate identity and endless rule of the Hindu majority in the name of nationalism and democracy. The Muslims refused to go the British way. They claimed that they were a separate nation and the basis of their nation was the common religion Islam. They refused to accept a political system that would reduce them to a permanent minority. They first demanded separate electorates and later a separate state. Religious and cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims increased due to political rivalry under the British rule.
On March 24, 1940, the Muslims finally abandoned the idea of federalism and defined a separate homeland as their target. Quaid-i-Azam considered the creation of Pakistan a means to an end and not the end in itself. He wanted Pakistan to be an Islamic and democratic state. According to his wishes and in accordance with the inspirations of the people of Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed the Objectives Resolution. The adoption of Objectives Resolution removed all doubts, if there were any, about the ideology of Pakistan. The Muslims of Pakistan decided once and for all to make Pakistan a state wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in their individual and collective spheres, in accordance to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Posted by Dr. Manzer Durrani in Politics on September 5th, 2009
The decision to launch the infamous 1992 operation clean-up in Sindh was largely taken by the military establishment immediately after the retirement of General Mirza Aslam Beg as the Army chief and the elevation of the then chief of general staff General Asif Nawaz Janjua to his place in August 1991.
A careful scanning of the Pakistani newspaper files between 1989 and 1992 show that a proposal to send in the Army to ‘clean up’ Sindh was first floated in 1989 when Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the president of the country, Benazir Bhutto the prime minister, General Aslam Beg the Army chief and Lt-Gen Asif Nawaz the corps commander Karachi. However, difference of opinion arose after Ghulam Ishaq and General Aslam Beg opposed the suggestion.
It was during his tenure as the corps commander Karachi that Asif Nawaz shot to prominence. Sindh at that time wilted under the most violent period in its history. Ethnic battles between Sindhis and Mohajirs were a routine affair and Asif Nawaz was often asked by the civil administration to deploy his troops to impose curfew and break the civil strife.
On one such occasion, Lt-Gen Asif Nawaz had to personally come forward as a guarantor between two ethnic extremist groups to ensure a safe swapping of the hostages from both sides, who otherwise would have been killed. Therefore, he had floated a proposal to the PPP government in 1989 for carrying out two separate operations in urban and rural areas of Sindh against extremist elements in the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Al-Zulfiqar Organisation as well as against criminals and dacoits who had been enjoying the protection of influential political personalities and landlords. However, Beg reportedly voiced his opposition to the proposal and simply dragged his feet by demanding Herculean powers from the federal government for the Army under Section 245 of the Constitution.
Friday, September 04, 2009
By Amir Mir
LAHORE: The decision to launch the infamous 1992 operation clean-up in Sindh was largely taken by the military establishment immediately after the retirement of General Mirza Aslam Beg as the Army chief and the elevation of the then chief of general staff General Asif Nawaz Janjua to his place in August 1991.
General Janjua had been the corps commander Karachi for three years from April 1988 to March 1991 before being elevated as chief of general staff in April 1991 for a brief period, only to be made the 10th chief of army staff three months later on August 16, 1991. And the operation clean-up was launched shortly afterwards.Tw
Posted by Dr. Manzer Durrani in Politics on September 3rd, 2009
New York Times has damaged Pakistan at crucial junctures. During the Bengladesh crisis, it portrayed Mukti Bahini as Bengali patriots. It parroted the propaganda coming out of India’s propaganda organs. Its Delhi correspondent, Sydney Schanberg wrotes false and prejudicial articles against the Pakistan Army, and he was in the forefront of promoting the canard that Pakistan Army had butchered several million East Pakistanis.
On August 30, 2009, the New York Times ran a story about an allegation coming from the US Congressional sources that Pakistan has reverse-engineered and optimized an American legacy Harpoon missile bought by Pakistan in the 1980s. The timing of this article is rather curious; the story was leaked by anonymous sources on the same day that Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani left for a three-day visit to Libya on an invitation from the Libyan government.
Pakistan’s US Ambassador in Washington, DC, Hussain Haqqani, quickly dismissed this story, saying: “The accusations are incorrect and based on wrong intelligence. We will make sure that the US understands the correct picture and we will fight back periodic efforts to falsely blame Pakistan, which remains a critical US ally in fighting terrorism. Instead of false accusations, US media should help Pakistan secure the help it needs to fight our common enemy, viz terrorism.”
The most questionable aspect of this story is the source itself; without naming names, the New York Times makes assertions that can neither be proved nor disproved. Over the years this daily has accumulated a bulging clippings file full of splashy, yet often maddeningly unverifiable expos
Posted by Dr. Manzer Durrani in Politics on September 3rd, 2009
The Jinnahpur raucous induced considerable tremors in body politics of Pakistan in July 1992 and pulled the Army into gushing lava of acrimony and accusations. My innocuous remarks given in reply to a question of a journalist on Jinnahpur on 17 July 1992 in Karachi was twisted and drummed up callously. The Press guns remained trained on me and my name dragged into the slime. Absence of clarification ostensibly was being regarded, quite contrary to the truth, that whatever the tabloids had printed was correct.
The controversy was kept alive by Altaf Hussain and other MQM leaders throughout these 17 years. While the Army was absolved by the MQM, I was made the target of MQM. Story was twisted that I had fabricated Jinnahpur map and especially invited journalists from Punjab to Karachi and handed them the map along with some documents during my Press briefing on 17 July 1992.
Jinnahpur controversy has once again raised its ugly head with full steam from 23 August 2009 onwards. Brig
Posted by Dr. Manzer Durrani in Politics on September 3rd, 2009
The issue whether General Musharraf should be tried under Article 6 for abrogation of the Constitution is being heatedly debated across the country.
The apex court found his action of Nov, 2007 as illegal and unconstitutional, hence there should be no question or debate whether Musharraf is guilty of abrogating the Constitution.
Well before the court verdict, while still at the helm, Musharraf had himself confessed to breaching the constitution in an interview with BBC.
In wake of the prevalent political situation, when the nose was tightening around the neck of General Musharraf, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) on Monday tried to create a storm in the tea cup of political environment by calling Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry to constitute a ‘truth and reconciliation commission’ to probe into the allegation of Jinnahpur conspiracy.
The call came following the claim of Lt-Gen (retd) Naseer Akhtar, a former corps commander of Karachi, and Brig Imtiaz Ahmed, a former director-general of the Intelligence Bureau, that the MQM had nothing to do with the ‘Jinnahpur conspiracy’. Altaf Hussain said the former Karachi corps commander and the former director-general of the intelligence bureau had made it clear that the allegation of the recovery of maps of Jinnahpur from the offices of the MQM in June 1992 was baseless and that the documents were