In your editorial ‘Nuclear treaties’ (April 23), you have taken a fair view of the nuke treaties. It is true that Pakistan is portrayed as a ‘spoiler’ in FMCT negotiations without appreciation of Pakistan’s fears of nuke disparity. Let me add a few words.

Indo-US nuclear cooperation will help India double its fissile materials production. The separation plan, under the 123 Agreement, will serve to reduce India’s annual production of unsafeguarded plutonium by at least one-third. India’s current stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium from CIRUS and Dhruva reactors has been estimated to be about 500 kg. This stockpile is sufficient for roughly 100 weapons

.Tuesday, 27 Apr, 2010

With an assured supply of fuel for its power reactors programme, India could redirect its current uranium production to military use. Besides using liberated uranium, India has planned to increase its production from uranium mining.

It wants to step up uranium production from its Nalgonda mines from about 150 to 200 tonnes a year to 450 to 500 tonnes a year. It may divert at least 70 to 20 tonnes of mined uranium every year to produce 60 to 100 kg (per year) of weapons-grade plutonium by partially running one of its unsafeguarded power reactors at low burn-up.

Diversion of imported uranium or use of liberated uranium to make more weapons would be in line with India’s well-established nuclear policy. Homi Bhabha, the founder of the Indian nuclear programme, justified it.

His remarks should be an eye-opener for Pakistan. In his address to 12th Pugwash Conference, Udaipur (Jan 27 to Feb 1, 1964), he said:

“It is easy to see that, in certain circumstances, aid given by the (IAE) Agency, with its full safeguards system in operation, could help in accelerating a military programme. Let us assume that the country, receiving aid, received from the Agency heavy water or fissile material, the loan of the Agency’s heavy water or fissile material to that extent liberates the country’s own materials for use in military programmes (George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1999, pp 61-62).”

As advised by Bhabha, India misused the heavy water, imported from the US, in combination with the CIRUS reactor, without any compunction, to make nuclear bombs. It is now very likely to misuse the imported nuclear fuel, or uranium liberated by imported fuel.

India’s former head of the National Security Advisory Board is an ardent supporter of this dual policy. He suggests: “given India’s uranium-ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear-deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorise as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production” (K. Subrahmaniam, ‘India and the Nuclear Deal’, Times of India, Dec 12, 2005).

Pakistan has demanded that the US should extend the benefits of the 123 deal to it. China has supported Pakistan’s case. It appealed to the US that any exemptions for the international nuclear cooperation and trade, if and when agreed to the by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, should be open to Pakistan as well.

But the US has refused Pakistan’s request. It has not softened its stand despite Pakistan’s generous offer: “If bilaterally, the United States can facilitate a moratorium on fissile material production or on testing, we are very happy to be part of that”.

India’s increased nuclear capability (following 123 Agreement) has shaken Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence. As such, nuclear-war threshold stand lowered. The advanced countries should balance the pre-123-Agreement equilibrium by denying India nuclear favours. Or, alternatively, put Pakistan at par with India.